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## VII. LITURGICA

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## Did St. Gregory the Great compose a Sacramentary?

H. ASHWORTH O. S. B., Quarr Abbey, Isle of Wight

For some 200 years now, scholars have been engaged in examining the external evidence for the belief that St. Gregory the Great composed the Service Book known as the Gregorian Sacramentary<sup>1</sup>. At the end of the 9th. century, John the Deacon stated categorically that this was so;<sup>2</sup> evidence for the existence of the belief at Rome can be found from the mid-eighth century<sup>3</sup>; and doubts were first expressed by George Baron d'Eckhart<sup>4</sup>, in 1729; until then it was confidently assumed that the Service Book sent by Pope Hadrian I to Charlemagne was a copy of a work composed and authorised by Pope Gregory the Great.

No scholar seems to have studied the text of the Sacramentary for proof of its Gregorian authorship, until Dom Capelle published an article in 1937, showing from internal evidence that elements in the *Hadrianum* are certainly the work of St. Gregory<sup>5</sup>. After the appearance of Dom Capelle's article, it seemed that the investigation should be continued, that some attempt should be made to determine, from a close examination of the internal evidence contained in the Sacramentary, whether, and if so, in what sense, it can be reasonably claimed that it is the work of St. Gregory the Great. This task I have undertaken, using Lietzmann's edition of the *Hadrianum*<sup>6</sup>, which is based on

<sup>1</sup> cf. Dom Morin, *Les Témoins de la Tradition Grégorienne*, in *Rev. Bénéd.* t. 7, 1890, pp. 289 sq.

<sup>2</sup> *De Vita Sancti Gregorii*, Lib. II, cap. XVII.

<sup>3</sup> Egbert of York: *De Institutione Catholica* Dialogus, XVI. (PL 89, col. 441).

<sup>4</sup> cf. Dom Morin, *art. cit.*

<sup>5</sup> *La Main de Saint Grégoire dans le Sacramentaire Grégorien*, in *Rev. Bénéd.* t. 49, 1937, p. 13 sq.

<sup>6</sup> *Das Sacramentarium Gregorianum nach dem Aachener Urexemplar*, Liturgiegeschichtliche Quellen, Münster in Westf. 1921.



the earliest known Ms. Cambrai N° 164. The results are, perhaps, valuable, even if much remains to be done before the conclusions arrived at can be more than tentative. Here, I can only indicate the sort of internal evidence to be found, on which I have based certain conclusions. The very nature of the argument, involving as it does the confrontation of parallel passages, sometimes of considerable complexity, makes it impossible to convey its force in a paper such as this. The details of proof for much that I shall put forward here, must therefore be left for future publication.

A good illustration of the type of internal evidence to be found, was given by Dom Capelle, when he pointed to the Epiphany collect as an example of Gregory's special use of the antithetical termes *fides-species*, and to the Christmas Preface as a remarkable example of the Saint's theology of the Incarnation<sup>1</sup>. Now these are not isolated instances. Examples can be multiplied of literary parallels between Gregory's authentic works and the Sacramentary. If due allowance is made for the limits imposed by the form proper to a prayer formulary, it becomes difficult to deny the cumulative effect of these parallels. On both sides not only is there similarity of vocabulary, of thought (both theological and moral), of characteristic expression, but the authentic parallel passages are often the key to the true meaning of a prayer. It could of course be suggested that the similarities are purely verbal, and that the phrases used are common form in liturgical language. To this I would answer that the verbal similarities are too numerous for this explanation to be adequate, and above all that the similarities are far from being purely verbal or limited to commonplace *formulae*. Thus far the evidence available would seem to confirm what has been accepted as historical fact from the mid-eighth century: that St. Gregory the Great composed a Service Book or Sacramentary. But there is evidence pointing in a contrary direction, which cannot be ignored; there are indications that someone familiar with St. Gregory's style and

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<sup>1</sup> cf. art. cit. *supra*.

writings has composed prayers which, at first sight, from a purely literary point of view, could be taken as his. Let me give an example. The collect for the Dedication Mass of the Pantheon<sup>1</sup> runs thus:

*Concede quaesumus omnipotens deus, ad eorum  
nos gaudia aeterna pertingere, de quorum nos  
uirtute tribuis annua sollemnitate gaudere:  
per.*

The presence in this prayer of the words *ad gaudia aeterna pertingere* would normally be an indication of Gregory's hand, according to the rules of internal evidence. Such a phrase is used time and again by St. Gregory<sup>2</sup>. But here it is found in a collect for a feast introduced into the Calendar after his death. The collect is found nowhere else in the Sacramentary, nor is it taken from any other Service Book. This would seem to indicate that the author used Gregory's works; he did not adapt a previous formulary.

Let me give another example, the collect for Gregory's own feast:<sup>3</sup>

*Deus qui animae famuli tui Gregorii  
aeternae beatitudinis praemia con-  
tulisti: concede propitius ut qui  
peccatorum nostrorum pondere premi-  
mur, eius apud te precibus subleue-  
mur: per.*

<sup>1</sup> Lietzmann, 107/1.

<sup>2</sup> Moral. IX, 43: *Qui nimirum sollemnitatis dies usque ad altaris cornu tendi praecipitur: quia tamdiu necesse est ut quisque se afficiat, quousque ad superni sacrificii altitudinem, id est ad aeterna gaudia pertingat.*

In Ezech. II, I, 16: *Propheta uero ad portam respicit, quia qui uerba Dei audit, semper oculos cordis ponere ad exitum debet, et sine cessatione meditari quando a praesenti uita exeat, atque ad aeterna gaudia pertingat.*

In Ezech. II, III, 23: *ista . . . ex bona uita ad gaudia aeterna pertingat.* cf. ibid. II, VII, 13: *eos ad gaudia interna pertingere . . .*

Reg. Epist. IX, 213: (Edit. Ewald-Hartmann, MGH): *. . . ad aeterna Deo auctore gaudia possitis et regna pertingere.*

Reg. Epist. XII, 5: *. . . ut haec agens per temporalia, quae despiciendo pateris, ad caelestia regna pertingas.*

<sup>3</sup> Lietzmann, 30/1.

Here again the words: *Concede propitius ut qui peccatorum nostrorum pondere premimur, eius apud te precibus subleuemur* are in Gregory's best style, are found in his writings<sup>1</sup>, and could only have been used here by someone very familiar with Gregory. Can we make a guess at the author of these two prayers? It is well known that the Pantheon was dedicated by Pope Boniface IV about the year 613, and that the Mass for the occasion is that of May 13th. in the Hadrianum. Now Boniface IV was one of Gregory's favourite deacons<sup>2</sup>, and would therefore be in a position to have assimilated deeply his thought and teaching, his outlook on life, his very manner of expression. In point of fact Boniface's correspondence gives us proof of this<sup>3</sup>. The terms which he uses to conclude the second of his letters which have come down to us, are to be found almost word for word in various passages of Gregory's own correspondence. It is reasonable therefore to suggest that the collect for the Dedication Mass of the Pantheon may be the work of Boniface IV.

With regard to the collect for Gregory's own feast, I can do no more than put forward a tentative suggestion. It is evident enough to me that this collect could only have been written by someone so intimately connected with Gregory as to be able to reproduce his style and vocabulary. Anyone could have inserted the words: *peccatorum nostrorum pondere premimur*,

<sup>1</sup> In Evang. II, XXXVI, 2: *De quo uidelicet ordine quamuis adhuc indigni existimus, quamuis peccatorum nostrorum pondere grauamur: . . .*

Moral. II, 7: *Cumque se non uolasse sed perambulasse insinuat; quanto peccati pondere in imis prematur demonstrat.*

Moral. XI, 28: *Et quia cum is qui peccatorum suorum pondere premebatur, ad rectitudinis statum ducitur, . . .*

Reg. Epist. V, 37: *Quid autem dicturi sumus, qui populum Dei cui indigne praesumus peccatorum nostrorum oneribus premimus...?*

<sup>2</sup> There are several persons named Boniface in Gregory's correspondence, but from a note of Ewald (MGH. t. I, p. 287) it would appear that the *Bonifatius* of Dialogues III, cap. 20, is the same person as the Bonifatius diaconus of Epist. I, 50; IV, 2, IX, 72, who afterwards became Pope Boniface IV.

<sup>3</sup> See Appendix.

for they appear in another prayer of the *Hadrianum*<sup>1</sup>, but no one who was not intimate with Gregory could have taken Gregory's own sentiments, as he expressed them in a letter to the Patriarch of Alexandria<sup>2</sup>: *Omnipotens deus . . . vobisque aspiret ut pro me enixius oretis, ut quem propria peccata depri-munt, uestrae apud omnipotentem Dominum preces leuant*, and have transposed them into the terms of the collect for the Saint's own feast in perfect imitation of his style. Boniface IV may very well have done this, for his Epitaph<sup>3</sup> says of him:

*Gregorii semper monita atque exempla magistri  
uita opere ac dignis moribus iste sequens.*

Could these lines be the key to the problem of the *Gregorianum*? It is clear enough from the evidence that only a fifth of the total prayer formularies in the *Hadrianum* can be the work of St. Gregory himself. It has also been pointed out that the whole Service Book has been put together in some haste, especially the *Sanctorale*<sup>4</sup>. Prayers composed by St. Gregory under the pressure of certain definite circumstances<sup>5</sup> are to be found spread throughout the whole work without any apparent reason. How can all this be explained? The answer may perhaps be found in the words of the *Liber Pontificalis*<sup>6</sup> concerning Boniface IV:

*Huius temporibus famis, pestilentiae et inundationes  
aquarum grauissime fuerunt.*

Does it seem too far-fetched to suggest that Boniface IV, finding himself in circumstances similar to those in which St. Gregory had been, should have turned to a small collection of prayer

<sup>1</sup> Lietzmann, 89/7.

<sup>2</sup> Reg. Epist. X, 21, in fine.

<sup>3</sup> De Rossi, Inscript. Christ. t. II, p. 126.

<sup>4</sup> Abbé Emmanuel Bourque, *Etude sur les Sacramentaires Romains*, t. II, p. 444.

<sup>5</sup> Dom H. Ashworth O. S. B., *The Influence of the Lombard Invasions on the Gregorian Sacramentary*, in "Bulletin of the John Rylands Library" Vol. 36, No. 2, March 1954, pp. 305 sq.

<sup>6</sup> Edit. Duchesne, 1886, t. I, p. 316.

formularies left by Gregory, in order to draw up a *Libellus Precum* which would be of service to him in all circumstances? I would even suggest that it is due to Boniface IV initiative that the first outlines of the *Gregorianum* took shape. Other Popes no doubt added to the collection, until by the mid-eighth century there had come into existence a well developed Service Book for the use of the *Domnus Apostolicus*, which was traditionally held to be the work of St. Gregory the Great. The *terminus ad quem* of such a compilation I would place in the last quarter of the VII century, for the compiler of the *Missale Francorum*, written in Gaul about 715—720, would seem to have known a well organised *Gregorianum*.

### Appendix

I have printed below the only two Letters extant of Boniface IV. It is unfortunate that more of his correspondence has not survived, for valuable as these documents are in allowing us to see that Boniface drew upon Gregory's *Registrum Epistolarum*, it is difficult to determine to what extent he was in the habit of doing this. In this connection it comes as a surprise to discover that the opening lines of the following Letter are taken *verbatim* from Gregory's *Registrum*: VIII, 13. Even more striking is the discovery that many parts of Boniface's Letters have parallels in Gregory's correspondence, these I have italicized. If much of the First Letter of Boniface IV is to be found in the *Liber Diurnus*, the fact that these passages are an evident adaptation of Gregory's own interpretation of Matth. X, 8, must not be overlooked. Equally important for a true appraisal of the evidence is the manner in which Boniface has used the passages to be found in the *Liber Diurnus*. It is noteworthy that these passages reproduce, not always *verbatim*, Gregory's ideas and thought concerning the ideal *Pastor animarum* that a Bishop should be, and it is these which Boniface has introduced into his Epistle confirming the election of Florianus to the See of Arles. This may perhaps indicate how much Boniface had assimilated Gregory's thought and teaching. If I may

venture an opinion, the character of these borrowings would seem to indicate the truth of the lines of his Epitaph:

*Gregorii semper monita atque exempla magistri  
uita opere ac dignis moribus iste sequens.*

and would add some plausability to the hypothesis concerning the part he may have played in the genesis of the Gregorian Sacramentary.

*Reuerentissimo fratri Floriano Coepiscopo  
Bonifatius seruus seruorum Dei  
(MGH. Epist. t. III, p. 453 sq.)*

*Multum, frater carissime, sinceritatis tuae bono congaudeo, quod grauitatem, qua praeditum te dudum audieram, praecellentissimorum regum atque electionis tuae epistolae nec non dilectissimi filii nostri, Candidi presbyteri, testimonium confirmauit, qui tanto latius, quanta in uos sollicitudo ecclesiastici ordinis, quantaque cura sit rectitudinis, indicabant<sup>1</sup>; unde, etsi corporaliter te nescio, caritate tamen et opere scio, quia, nisi in uos Omnipotentis gratia flagraret, usque ad me uitae uestrae opinio minime peruenisset. Qua de re ab eodem omnipotente Deo quantis ualeo precibus exoro, ut<sup>2</sup> sua te manu protegat et caelestis in te gratiae dona multiplicet<sup>2</sup>, quatenus in aeternum perficiat bona, quae in te temporaliter ostendit.*

Officium etenim sacerdotis assumere, si interiori uigilantia perpendamus, plus est oneris quam honoris: quippe cui propria curare non sufficit, nisi et salubriter gesserit aliena. *Nam*

<sup>1</sup> Reg. Epist. VIII, 13:

*Multum, frater carissime, sinceritatis tuae bono congaudio, quod grauitatem, qua praeditum te dudum audieram, praesentium portitoris Pauli fratris et coepiscopi nostri testificatio confirmauit. Qui tanto latius, quanta in uobis sollicitudo ecclesiastici ordinis quantaque cura sit rectitudinis indicauit, quanto hoc et praesens comperit et in sua amplius defensione cognouit.*

<sup>2</sup> Reg. Epist. VII, 4: . . . et, quamuis indignus, omnipotentem Dominum quibus ualeo precibus exoro, ut in uobis suam gratiam augeat, . . . Sed oro ut omnipotens Deus . . . caritatem ex gratiae suae dono multiplicet, . . . Sancta autem Trinitas sua uos manu protegat, . . .

*si pastores ouium solem geluque pro gregis sui custodia die ac nocte ferre contenti sunt, ut ne qua ex eis aut errando pereat aut ferinis laniata morsibus rapiatur, oculis semper uigilantibus circumspectant*<sup>1</sup>: quanto sudore quantaque sollicitudine debemus esse peruigiles nos, qui pastores animarum dicimur? Attendamus et susceptum officium exhibere erga custodiam dominicarum ouium non cessemus, ne inde post desidiam nostram ante summum pastorem negligentiae reatus excruciet, unde modo honoris reuerentia sublimiores inter ceteros iudicamur. Sic itaque nos oportet esse sollicitos, ut callido antiquoque humani generis inimico aditum praecludamus et totis contra eius uoracitatem obsistamus, ne nostra, ut diximus, forte desidia rabida, quod absit, quemquam fauce deglutiat et eius ad nostram non immerito applicetur poenam perditio, qui commissos sollicita custodire cautela negleximus. Exhibeamus ergo, quod dicimur, et quibus diuini dispensatione consilii praeesse nos contigit, prodesse quantum possumus festinemus, ut, dum creditor rationes nobiscum positurus aduenerit lucrum fecisse repperiat et sua nos, sicut promisit, remuneratione laetificet<sup>2</sup>. *Scriptum*

<sup>1</sup> cf. Reg. Epist. II, 46:

Quod quam graue sit, frater oportet nos tota mentis intentione perpendere. Ecce lupus Dominicum gregem non iam in nocte latenter, sed in aperta luce dilaniat, et nos eum grassari in ouium nece cernimus, et nulla ei sollicitudine, nullis uerborum iaculis obuiamus. Quos ergo fructus Domino multiplicati gregis ostendemus, si et ipsum quem pascendum suscepimus otiosa mente cernimus a bestia deuorari? *Studeamus igitur cor nostrum terrenorum pastorum imitatione succendere, qui hiemales noctes imbris geluque constricti ducunt saepe peruigiles, ne vel una ouis et non forte utilis pereat. Quam etsi insidiator ore uoraci momorderit, quomodo satagunt, quibus cordis anhelant aestibus, in quibus uocibus ut eruant captum pecus angustia stimulante prosiliunt, ne a gregis domino quicquid per incuriam perdiderint exigatur? Uigilemus ergo ne quid pereat, et si captum forte quid fuerit, uocibus diuinorum eloquiorum ad gregem Dominicum reducamus, ut ille qui pastor pastorum est, uigilasse nos circa ouile suum suo dignetur misericors iudicio comprobare.*

<sup>2</sup> Reg. Epist. I, 24: *Scriptum namque est: „Mundamini qui fertis uasa Domini.“ Domini etenim uasa ferunt, qui proximorum animas ad interna sacraria perducendas in conversationis suae exemplo suscipiunt. Apud semetipsum ergo quantum debeat mundari conspiciat, qui ad aeternitatis templum uasa uiuentia in sinu propriae conuersationis portat. Hinc diuina uoce praecipitur, ut in Aaron pectore rationale iudicii uittis*

*namque est: „Mundamini, qui fertis uasa Domini“: Domini etenim uasa ferunt, qui proximorum animas ad aeterna sacraria perducendas in conuersationis suae exemplo suscipiunt. Apud semetipsum ergo quantum debeat mundari conspiciat, qui ad aeternitatis templum uasa uiuentia in sinu propriae conuersationis portat. Hinc diuina uoce praecipitur, ut in Aaron pectore rationale iudicii uittis ligantibus imprimatur, quatenus sacerdotale cor nequaquam cogitationes fluxae possideant, sed ratio sola constringat; nec indiscretum quid uel inutile cogitet, qui ad exemplum aliis constitutus ex grauitate uitae semper debet ostendere, quantam in pectore rationem portet.*

Haec itaque, frater carissime, tota uirtute considera et locum, quem adeptus es, non ad requiem, sed ad laborem te suscepisse cognosce<sup>1</sup>. Adhortationis ope fidelium corda corrobora, infidelium uero conuerte. Quod ut facilius assequi merearis, praedicationem tuam uita commendet; ipsa eis instructio, ipsa magistra sit; ad desiderium aeternae uitae te docente, suspirent, tuo uiuentes exemplo perueniant; quia ideo, diuina gratia suffragante, ad hoc honoris culmen uocatus es, ut fraternitatis tuae doctrina, quae soli tibi utilis prius inter ceteros latebat, iam nunc in altum ducta multis proficiat et diuinæ sapientiae radios spargat. Sed hac de re omnipotenti Deo gratias agimus, cuius pia dispensatio illos ad sollicitudinem curae pastoralis prouehit, qui episcopatum non honorem sed onus existimant, ut, quantum in altiori loco proficerint, tantum humiliter uiuant et hic semetipsos in labore exerceant, quatenus ad honorem solidum alibi pertingant.

Pallium praeterea iuxta antiquam consuetudinem fraternitati tuae transmisimus, quo ita uti memineris sicut prodecessores

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*ligantibus imprimatur, quatenus sacerdotale cor nequaquam cogitationes fluxae possideant, sed ratio sola constringat. Nec indiscretum quid uel inutile cogitet, qui ad exemplum aliis constitutus ex grauitate uitae semper debet ostendere, quantam in pectore rationem portet.*

<sup>1</sup> Reg. Epist V, 16:

Animarum lucrum Deo nostro tota mentis intentione facere festinate: nomen nos pastoris non ad quietem, sed ad laborem suscepisse cognoscite.



nostri tuis prodecessoribus concesserunt<sup>1</sup>, priuilegiorum tuorum scilicet integritate seruata. Cuius quoniam indumenti honos modesta actuum uiuacitate seruandus est, hortamur, ut ei morum tuorum ornamenta conueniant, quatenus auctore Deo recte utrobique possis esse conspicuus. Cor ergo tuum neque prospera, quae temporaliter blandiuntur, extollant neque aduersa deficiant; sed, quicquid illud fuerit, uirtute patientiae deuincatur. Nullum apud te locum odia, nullum fauor indiscretus inueniat. Benignum re boni sentiant; districtus mali cognoscant. Insonem apud te culpabilem suggestio mala non faciat; nocentem gratia non excuset. Remissum te delinquentibus non ostendas; non quod ultus non fueris, perpetrari permittas. Sit in te et boni patris dulcedo et contra prave agentes iudicis seuera districtio, quatenus Deo miserante talis possis existere, qualem sacra esse lectio protestatur. Oportet enim episcopum irreprehensibilem esse. Sed his omnibus uti salubriter poteris, si magistram caritatem habueris; quam qui secutus fuerit, a recto aliquando tramite non recedet. Ecce frater carissime inter multa ista sacerdotum ista sunt pallii, quae si studiose seruaueris, quod foris accepisse ostenderis, intus habebis.

Praecipue autem obseruare nos conuenit<sup>2</sup>, *ut illud semper ad memoriam redeat, quod ueritas praecipit dicens: „Gratis accepistis, gratis date“, quod isdem dominus et redemptor noster*

<sup>1</sup> Reg. Epist. V, 62: Pallium uero, sicut per epistolam uestram, quam per Andream fratrem et coepiscopum nostrum suscepimus, postulastis, direximus, quo uos ita uti necesse est, sicut praedecessores uestri usi concedentibus nostris praedecessoribus adprobantur.

<sup>2</sup> In Euang. I, XVII, 13:

Vobis enim sacerdotibus lugens loquor, quia nonnullos uestrum cum praemiis facere ordinationes agnouimus, spiritalem gratiam uendere et de alienis iniquitatibus cum peccati damno temporalia lucra cumulare. Cur ergo ad memoriam uestram non redit quod uox Dominica praecipiens dicit: „Gratis accepistis, gratis date.“ Cur non ante mentis oculos reuocatis, quod templum Redemptor noster ingressus, cathedras uendentium columbas euerit, et nummulariorum effudit aes? Qui namque sunt in templo Dei hodie qui columbas uendunt, nisi qui in Ecclesia pretium de impositione manus accipiunt? Per quam uidelicet impositionem Spiritus sanctus caelitus datur. Columba ergo uenditur, quia manus impositio, per quam Spiritus sanctus accipitur, ad pretium praebetur. Sed Redemptor noster cathedras uendentium columbas euerit; quia talium negotiatorum sacer-

*ingressus templum cathedras uendentium columbas euertit et nummulariorum effudit aes. Qui namque sunt, in templo Dei hodie qui columbas uendunt, nisi qui in ecclesia impositionem manus ad pretium tribuunt, per quam uidelicet impositionem spiritus sanctus desuper datur? Columba igitur uenditur, quia manus impositio per quam sanctus spiritus accipitur, ad pretium praebetur. Sed redemptor noster cathedras uendentium columbas euertit, quia talium negotiatorum sacerdotium destruit. Et quidem hi nonnumquam ante humanos oculos uideri sanctos se simulant atque in occultis suis apparere peruersi in conspectu interni arbitris non erubescunt. Sed ueniet, ueniet dies ille, nec longe est, in quo pastorum pastor appareat et uniuscuiusque facta in publicum deducet atque ostensa omnibus damnat. Unde et per semetipsum quasi flagellum de funiculis fecit et de domo Dei prauos negotiatores expulit, quia subditorum quidem culpas plerumque modo per eos qui praesunt percutit, pastorum uero uitam postmodum per semetipsum ferit. Admonendi itaque sunt qui hoc agunt, ne per appetitum praemiorum deorsum tendant, cum alios per officii sui ministerium sursum mittant: per ea namque sancta mysteria quae agunt multos a peccatis suis diluunt eosque ad appetendam caelestem patriam erudiunt, et ipsi per uitam reprobam ad inferni supplicia festinant. Cui ergo, cui tales sacerdotes similes dixerim nisi aqua baptismatis, quae peccata baptizatorum diluens, illos ad regnum caeleste mittit et ipsa in cloacam descendit?*

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*dotium destruit. Et plerumque se Pastores sanctos hominibus exhibent, atque in occultis suis uideri turpes ante interni arbitri oculos non erubescunt. Ueniet, ueniet projecto ille dies, nec longe est, in quo Pastorum Pastor appareat, et uniuscuiusque facta in publicum deducat: et qui modo subditorum culpas per praepositos ulciscitur, tunc praepositorum mala per semetipsum saeuens demnas. Unde et ingressus in templum, per semetipsum quasi flagellum de funiculis fecit, et de domo Dei prauos negotiatores ejiciens, cathedras uendentium columbas euertit: quia subditorum quidem culpas per Pastores percutit, sed Pastorum uitia per semetipsum ferit.*

ibid. 18:

*Ingressiunt electi, sacerdotum manibus expiati, caelestem patriam: et sacerdotes ipsi per uitam reprobam ad inferni supplicia festinant. Cui ergo rei, cui similes dixerim sacerdotes malos, nisi aqua baptismatis, quae peccata baptizatorum diluens, illos ad regnum caeleste mittit, et ipsa postea in cloacas descendit?*

Uos itaque studium doctrinae uestrae ostendite et a pastoribus uestrae dioceseos haec de quibus praefatus sum, damnosa lucra remouete. Sermone uestro cotidie hi qui uobis caelesti gratia commissi sunt erudiantur, ut discant terrena despicere, caelestia amare, ut in dilectione inuisibilium ferueant et ex bono uestro semine ante omnipotentis Dei oculos segetes suorum operum reddant, *quatenus de ipsis ac de uobis<sup>1</sup> impleatur quod scriptum est: „Ubi plurimae segetes, ibi manifesta est fortitudo boum.“*

Sancta Dei Trinitas fraternitatem uestram *gratiae suae protectione circumdet<sup>2</sup>* atque ita in timoris sui uia nos dirigat, ut post uitae huius amaritudines ad aeternam simul peruenire dulcedinem mereamur.

Praeterea patrimoniolum ecclesiae nostrae in illis partibus constitutum, quemadmodum olim habuistis in omnibus commendatum, quaesumus, ut in eo se fraternitas uestra amplius debeat commodare.

Deus te incolumen custodiat reuerentissime frater.

*Bonifatius IV papa Theodorico II regi.*

(MGH. Epist. t. III, p. 456)

*Scripta excellentiae uestrae cum ea, qua decuit<sup>3</sup>, dulcedine et ueneratione suscepimus; in quibus nobis de fratris et coepiscopi nostri Floriani ordinatione significastis atque, ut ei secundum antiquam consuetudinem<sup>4</sup> pallium deberemus transmittere, scrip-  
sistis. Unde omnipotenti Deo gratias agimus, quia ita cor uestrum<sup>5</sup>*

<sup>1</sup> Reg. Epist. VIII, 29:

Gratias itaque omnipotenti Domino soluimus, *quia impletum uidemus in uobis esse quod scriptum est: Ubi plurimae segetes, ibi manifesta fortitudo boum.*

<sup>2</sup> Reg. Epist. XI, 4:

Omnipotens Deus caelestis uos *gratiae protectione circumdet*, . . .

<sup>3</sup> Reg. Epist. IX, 75: Scripta fraternitatis uestrae *suscipimus, in quibus indicastis* . . .

Reg. Epist. IX, 176: . . . nos tamen sedis apostolicae auctoritatem *eo quo decuit moderamine temperantes* . . .

<sup>4</sup> Reg. Epist. XIII, 41: Nam quod permanere in palatio *iuxta antiquam consuetudinem* apostolicae sedis diaconem uestra serenitas non inuenit, . . .

<sup>5</sup> cf. the next note.

sua protectione disponit, ut inter ceteras regni uestri sollicitudines etiam de ecclesiarum suarum uos faciat ordinatione tractare. Sed quid maius, quid uberius, quid etiam poterit laudabilius repperiri quam *recta fides*<sup>1</sup> in regibus, quae non solum hic eos *tranquille uiuere*, sed etiam in aeterno regno faciet participes inueniri<sup>2</sup>. Ergo cum notum sit omnibus uestram excellentiam integram professionem uehementer amplectere ac toto corde diligere, opportunum est uoce clamare prophetica: Iocundetur caelum desuper et fundant montes iocunditatem et colles laetitia laetabuntur; nam meritorum uestrorum actus uocem uos pastoris egregii audire fecit et assequi, idcirco in sua uos tranquillitate custodit. Igitur quia, excellentissime fili, Deus noster uos elegit de regibus, uocem eius libenter audientes, creatorem et auctorem luminis estis sine dubio assecuti, quatenus per religionem orthodoxae fidei tenebras futuri supplicii euadatis. *Ut autem sicut fide, ita et actione uincatis*<sup>3</sup>, necessarium esse ualde prospeximus, ecclesiasticas uobis utilitates, quas et diligitis, commendare, ut, quod pauperes *beati Petri apostolorum principis*<sup>4</sup> uestro sunt largitatis munere consecuti, uobis suffragantibus ualeat augmentari. *Paterno itaque affectu uestram excellentiam salutes*, creatoris nostri *miserecordiam exoramus, ut sua uos a malis omnibus protectione custodiat atque post multa annorum curricula in aeterna faciat uita regnare*<sup>5</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Reg. Epist. IX, 67: *Unde omnipotenti Deo gratias agimus, qui ita cor uestrum sua pietate regit, ut, sicut fidem rectam tribuit, ita quoque placita sibi uos semper operari concedat.*

<sup>2</sup> cf. Reg. Epist. II, 27: . . . et ad fructum boni operis totis cordis nisibus inhiare, ut et in praesenti saeculo *tranquille uiuere*, et in futuro caeleste regnum ualeat possidere.

<sup>3</sup> Reg. Epist. VI, 6: *Ut ergo sicut fide ita et actione uincantur*, benignam se excellentia uestra suis subiectis semper exhibeat . . .

<sup>4</sup> A most frequent expression in Gregory's correspondence.

<sup>5</sup> Reg. Epist. V, 60: *Salutantes itaque excellentiam uestram paterno caritatis affectu* petimus ut cuncta quae . . . fieri seruarique mandauimus fauoris uestri praesidio compleantur.

Reg. Epist. VI, 5: idcirco *paterno salutantes affectu* . . . et hic excellentiam uestram in subole gaudere concedat *et post multorum curricula a malis omnibus* absolutam ante conspectum aeterni faciat iudicis inueniri.

Reg. Epist. VIII, 2: Omnipotens Deus *sua uos a malis omnibus protectione custodiat*, et quoniam uita uestra bonis omnibus ualde est

necessaria, post longa adhuc tempora uos ad caelestis patriae gaudia perducatur.

Reg. Epist. VIII, 4: Omnipotens Deus *sua uos protectione custodiat* atque a perfidis gentibus regnum uestrum sui extensione brachii defendat uosque *post longa annorum curricula* ad gaudia aeterna perducatur.

ibid.: . . . pro quo gratias referentes diuinæ potentiae misericordiam deprecamur, *ut et hic uos sua protectione custodiat*, et, sicut inter homines, ita quoque *post multorum annorum tempora in aeterna faciat uita regnare*.

Reg. Epist. VI, 16: . . . *et hic deuictis hostibus pacatae uos reipublicae imperare et cum sanctis suis in aeterna faciat uita regnare*.

## Où en est la question des «Psalter Collects»?

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Depuis cinq ans que le volume des Psalter Collects a été publié par la Henry Bradshaw Society, on est obligé de constater que rien d'essentiel n'a été découvert dans le champ, alors tout neuf, des Collectes Psalmiques. Les séries anciennes de Collectes Psalmiques sont toujours celles que Dom Wilmart avait distinguées et classées: la série Africaine, ainsi nommée parce qu'elle utilise l'ancien psautier Africain, et commençant par *Visita nos*; la série Hispanique, utilisant le, ou plutôt les psautiers particuliers à l'Espagne, et commençant par *Domine apud quem*; et la série Romaine, utilisant surtout le *Psalterium Romanum*, et commençant par *Effice*.

Tous les efforts faits pour découvrir d'autres séries anciennes sont restés sans résultat: on a bien trouvé quelques autres séries, comme celle qui fut imprimée plusieurs fois à Anvers par les successeurs de Plantain dans le cours du XVII<sup>e</sup> siècle et dont on sait maintenant qu'elle existait dès 1610 (on a donné des spécimens de cette série à la page 60 des Psalter Collects), ou même comme cette série qu'on trouve dans un psautier de Brescia du XI<sup>e</sup> siècle, mais ces séries sont notoirement postérieures, plus ou moins calquées sur la série Romaine — celle qui eut la plus grande vogue au Moyen Age —, et sont loin d'avoir la même saveur antique que les trois anciennes séries: si bien qu'on peut pratiquement les négliger.

Une réelle découverte a cependant été faite concernant la série Hispanique: nous la devons à Dom Jean Leclercq qui, à la fin d'un *Codex Regularum* de l'abbaye autrichienne de Lambach, manuscrit XXXI, a trouvé les collectes de la série Hispanique écrites par une main du IX<sup>e</sup> siècle, donc deux siècles

avant le plus ancien manuscrit de cette série utilisé dans l'édition des *Psalter Collects*: de plus, le texte de ces prières se révèle aussi proche que possible de celui des manuscrits de la tradition que nous avons appelée franco-catalane (*Psalter Collects*, p. 31), et vient confirmer d'une manière éclatante la préférence que nous avons accordée à ce texte franco-catalan (*Psalter Collects*, p. 33—35).

Entre temps, le texte de la série Africaine a été étudié dans un article paru dans *Sacris Erudiri* VI, 1 (1954) pp. 73—95: *Etudes sur les Collectes du Psautier, La série Africaine et l'évêque Verecundus de Junca*: on y montre que cette série doit être légèrement antérieure aux écrivains africains Fulgence de Ruspe et Verecundus de Junca qui reproduisent les expressions typiques de cette série: celle-ci doit donc avoir été écrite en Afrique du Nord, probablement dans la seconde moitié du V<sup>e</sup> siècle, au cours de la longue persécution vandale dont elle se fait maintes fois l'écho.

On voudrait maintenant étudier les deux autres séries: Des doutes s'étant élevés de plusieurs côtés sur le caractère hispanique de la seconde série, une étude à venir essayera de montrer que le matériel des collectes de la série Hispanique est réellement espagnol dans son ensemble, quand bien même l'ordonnateur de cette série serait un prélat mérovingien ou même carolingien.

Une autre étude aura pour objet la série Romaine, dont l'auteur est resté inconnu jusqu'ici: dès maintenant, on croit pouvoir annoncer que cette série a des chances d'avoir été composée par l'auteur du *Breviarium in Psalmos*, faussement attribué à saint Jérôme, et qui ne serait autre qu'un certain Jean, diacre romain, devenu pape sous le nom de Jean I<sup>er</sup> dans le premier quart du VI<sup>e</sup> siècle (522—526). Le piquant de l'affaire est que, devant les différences de style et autres, existant entre les collectes psalmiques de la série Romaine et les oraisons de la liturgie romaine authentique, certaines personnes avaient déclaré que l'auteur des collectes psalmiques de la série Romaine ne pouvait être un romain... Ces personnes avaient raison

seulement en ce sens que les collectes psalmiques de la série Romaine, quoique les plus universellement répandues dans tout le Moyen Age, ne paraissent pas avoir fait partie de la liturgie officielle de Rome. Le fait qu'il s'est trouvé un Pape (le florentin Clément VII, 1523—1534) pour ordonner de publier un psautier avec les collectes psalmiques de la série Romaine, n'est pas suffisant, à lui seul, pour parler d'une édition liturgique officielle, car ledit Psautier est publié en vue des besoins particuliers de la Collégiale Saint-Laurent à Florence: *Psalterium David... cum suis orationibus in finem cuiuslibet psalmi, juxta formam Clementis Septimi Pontificis Maximi, ad exorandum Deum pro Serenissimis Mediceis tum vivis tum defunctis, in insigni Ecclesia Sancti Laurentii ab ipsis a fundamentis erecta. Florentiae apud Juntas, 1673* (titre de l'édition conservée au British Museum).

Ce qui est attendu avec impatience par un certain nombre d'étudiants, c'est une nouvelle édition des Psalter Collects. Précisément, une nouvelle édition des Collectes du Psautier nous a été demandée par la Collection „Sources Chrétiennes“ et nous avons répondu par l'acceptation de cette offre. Une difficulté cependant s'est montrée: „Sources Chrétiennes“ demande une traduction française en face du texte latin: Or, chacun sait que la traduction d'un ancien texte latin est chose délicate. Dans le cas présent la difficulté est accrue par deux motifs principaux: a) par le fait qu'on se trouve en face d'un morcellement de 150 petits textes, dans chaque série, textes très courts, sans lien l'un avec l'autre, rendant impossible une certaine unité d'ensemble fort désirable et, par contre, engendrant vite une inévitable monotonie; b) par le caractère sententieux et même cryptique d'un certain nombre de ces textes, surtout dans la première et la deuxième séries: il est très délicat de vouloir traduire en clair des expressions que, seuls, les contemporains immédiats pouvaient comprendre: on risque de forcer la pensée, de la trahir par quelque côté. Nous déclarons sans ambages que, selon nous, les textes latins seuls seraient préférables, mais nous ferons loyalement l'effort de donner la



traduction qu'on nous demande: la mise au point de cette dernière demandera pourtant un certain délai.

Et c'est ainsi que, dans un avenir que nous souhaitons prochain, nous pourrons livrer au public, *Deo favente*, une nouvelle édition des Collectes du Psautier.

Nicolas Cabasilas:  
*An Exposition of the Divine Liturgy*

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In his *Exposition of the Divine Liturgy* N. Cabasilas takes the view that at the altar the sacrifice is an earthly shadow of the action of the eternal High Priest in the heavenly places. Nicolas is familiar with the view of S. Chrysostom (*De Sacer.* VI, 4; III. 4, 5), and like him, he insists that Christ is the Consecrator and High Priest of every offering, and on that account he maintains in chapter XLVI that no sin of the priest at the altar can mar the efficacy of the sacrificial offering. He maintains, like S. Cyril (*Catech.* XXIII. 8, 9), that the Intercession after the Consecration is an earthly share, however small, in the intercession of our High Priest who appears on our behalf before the Father in heaven and who pleads our cause. Chapter XXVIII of the *Exposition* contains these words: "For he did not make his offering and sacrifice once and then cease his priestly office, but for ever he performs this office by which he is our Advocate before God for ever" (Heb. VII. 17; Ps. CIX. 4). The sacrifice at the altar is not a repetition of Calvary, nor does it effect a change in the Person of Christ, but it is a sharing in and representation of that offering at Golgotha, because this sacrifice once offered has eternal significance, and is an abiding reality for us (Chap. 27, 32). And if we are to receive the fruits of this sacrifice we must be no mere spectators at the Eucharist, but we must share in the Eucharistic sacrifice both actually and morally. (*Vita.* Bk. IV. Sect. B; cf. *Exposit.* Ch. XLII; cf. *S. Chrysos. In Eph. Hom.* III. 4.)

Cabasilas does not try to define too closely the relation between the Eucharistic sacrifice and the sacrifice once offered. He relies on the authority of the Words of Institution and Administration for saying that since these sacred Gifts are the

Body of Christ and the Blood of the New Covenant then the offering at the altar becomes a sacrifice (Chap. XXXII). To consecrate is to offer the sacrifice. His words are "The sacrifice (at the altar) proclaims his Death . . . whenever the precious Gifts are changed into the Body of the Lord" (Ch. XVI); (cf. Masure, "*The Sacrifice of the Mystical Body*" p. 153).

On the subject of the Epiclesis Cabasilas has an interesting and clear viewpoint. He does not relegate the Words of Institution to a position of insignificance in the Rite. Nor does he regard Christ as the passive Victim, as Gregory Dix implies in his strictures on Cabasilas. One must take all the passages, not just a short extract from a single chapter, as Dix has done, in order to understand the full and comprehensive view of the Invocation which Cabasilas has in mind. And in that comprehensive view there are four factors, which are not irreconcilable, but which fit into a balanced Trinitarian theology. There is nothing in it, in fact, that a Western could reject. The four factors are: Christ is the Consecrator, the great High Priest, in relation to whose heavenly priesthood every celebration of the Divine Liturgy must be referred. Secondly, the Words of Institution are of sacred and special significance for the consecration. Thirdly, the consecration is 'completed' when the words of Epiclesis have been pronounced. Fourthly, the author's view has the great merit of regarding the Eucharistic Invocation in the context of the recitation of the saving acts of God in the Anamnesis; and he thinks of the Eucharistic Invocation because of the many activities of the Divine Spirit who dwells in the Church and who is operative in all her ministerial acts.

Under the last two headings, he stresses the parallel between the Eucharistic actions and the Incarnate Life of our Lord. What, for example, precedes the Consecration symbolises the early life of the Saviour in Galilee. The Reading of the Gospel corresponds to the open Ministry of the Lord in Galilee. The Great Entrance is the Triumphal Entry into Jerusalem. What follows the Consecration symbolises the Descent of the Holy Spirit at Pentecost "for the conversion of unbelievers and for the sanctification of the faithful". For this Divine Economy of

Salvation the priest offers the Eucharistic Thanksgiving in the Anamnesis. So to invoke the Holy Spirit's aid and operation is to enter into that Divine Scheme of salvation for church and individual (Chaps. XXXVII and XXVI). The Descent of the H. Spirit and the sanctification of the communicant by the Holy Spirit are the counterpart to his action at Pentecost (PG 150, 452 AB). Calvary was brought to fulfilment in Pentecost. The sacrificial offering at the altar is 'completed' when it 'receives' its fulfilment by the Descent of the Holy Spirit (Chap. XVI.).

We may return to the first two headings: First, Christ is the Consecrator. In chapter XXX Nicolas says: "There is, as S. Paul says, 'One Mediator between God and men, even Jesus Christ' (I Tim II. 5), so that all mediation and all consecration are effected for us by one alone, even the Saviour Himself"; again in chap. XLIX: — The Lord) "May be spoken of as the offerer and the offering and the recipient of the offering". Cabasilas stresses this priesthood of our Lord in many passages. In chapter 30 he says: Christ is "Himself both priest and altar and sacrifice", and in chapter XXXI: "Why is it that in order to consecrate the Gifts, the priest does not invoke the Son (of God) who is both priest and sanctifier, as has been said, but he invokes the Father. . . ." (to whom the whole Anaphora is addressed, PG 150, 477 D). Or as the Liturgy of S. Basil expresses it: "Thou, o Christ, art he that offers the sacrifice, and thou art the offering".

S. John of Damascus was the first to deny that the Words of Institution are the instrument of consecration. Nicolas Cabasilas does not follow S. John in that respect. Nor does he follow S. John in the use which he makes of S. Chrysostom's original illustration of the word of Creation. Nicolas writes as follows in chapter XXIX: "Let us begin with the words of the holy John Chrysostom (*de Proditione Judae*, *Hom. I*, 6) . . . Let us see whether this word of the Saviour (The Word of Institution) is operative like that creative word when God said 'Be fruitful and multiply'. What then? After that word of Creation have we no need of anything else for this purpose — of increasing the race. Is it not necessary for humanity both to marry, and unite in wedlock, and make

other careful plans without which it would not be possible for the race to survive and progress. Therefore just as we regard marriage a necessity for the procreation of children, and after union again pray for this result, so that we do not account our action a slight on the creative word of God, because we know that that is the basic cause of generation but comes to have this effect by marriage, by feeding and other such functions; in the same way we believe (in the case of the Liturgy) that the word of the Lord ('This is my Body') completes the Sacrament, but it does so through a priest and by his intercession and prayer. (The basic word of the Lord at the Institution) is not always functioning absolutely or indiscriminately. But several conditions are required, without which it will not perform its function. . . ."

Cabasilas devotes a good deal of space further on to the same effect. We might sum up his position thus: The Words of Institution were spoken once for all by our Lord in the Upper Room and they are always the basic instrument of consecration, but they need to be 'Applied' or 'Adapted' through the Invocation; but this is not the same as saying that the celebrant's iteration of the Words of Institution is all that is required for consecration. The Words of Institution are the words of predisposing consecration of eucharistic elements in general, and the words of the Invocation are the particular consecration of the elements on the altar. The Anglican Church adopts the same principle in the Sacrament of H. Baptism; in it the Minister of the Sacrament says that God "By the Baptism of his well-beloved Son Jesus Christ in the river Jordan did sanctify water (in general; cf. P. B. 1549) to the mystical washing away of sin". But this general predisposing of the element is applied later in the Rite with these words: "Sanctify *this* water to the mystical washing away of sin" (1662). Nicolas Cabasilas cites the same principle in the use of the Roman Catholic Church where the Latin Mass contains a prayer that the Elements may be brought up to the heavenly altar and so she completes the act of Consecration by an Invocation. The Eastern Church at the Council of Florence in 1439 did little more than repeat the views of N.

Cabasilas on the subject of the Epiclesis (Héfélé, *Conciles*, vol. XI. p. 455).

Thirdly, Nicolas Cabasilas fixes the action of Consecration as being 'completed' after the words of Invocation have been prayed, and he therefore attaches special importance to the office and work of the Holy Spirit in the Eucharist (PG 150, 425; 477). Is it possible to reconcile this with what he has said elsewhere of Christ as the Consecrator (ibid. 428; 469)? Dix thinks not (*Shape of Lit.* p. 282), and (on page 293) Dix confesses that he cannot understand the meaning of Cabasilas in what he calls this 'Very embarrassed passage'. The passage in question is as follows (Chap. XXVII; ibid., 437): — "When the priest has made mention of that awful Supper, and how (the Lord) delivered it to his holy disciples before his passion, and that he received the cup and took bread and hallowed the Eucharist, and that he spoke the Words by which he manifested the Mystery, and when he in turn has uttered the same Words, he bows down and prays and implores God, applying those divine Words of His only begotten Son, our Saviour, to the Gifts offered on the altar, that they receiving his all-holy and almighty Spirit may be changed, the bread into his precious and holy Body itself, and the wine into his stainless and holy Blood itself. And when this has been said, the whole of the priestly Rite has been accomplished and completed, and the Gifts have been consecrated, and the sacrifice has been perfected, and the great sacrifice and victim, which was slain for the sake of the whole world, is seen to lie on the holy Table; for the Bread is no longer a figure of the Lord's Body, nor an offering which bears an image of the real Gift, nor an offering which gives us a pictorial memorial of the sufferings which save us, as a picture might do, but it is the real Gift itself, the Body itself of the all-holy Master, which really experienced all the insults, violence and stripes, which was crucified, which was slain, which witnessed before Pontius Pilate the good confession, which was flogged, which was tormented and spitted upon, which tasted the gall. In like manner also the Wine is the Blood itself which leapt out from the slain Body, this Body, this Blood, which was conceived by

the Holy Ghost, which was born of the holy Virgin, which was buried, which rose on the third day, which ascended into heaven, which sitteth on the right hand of the Father.”

Nicolas Cabasilas reiterates the usual Eastern analogy of the Incarnation for the Eucharistic Invocation (*S. Jn. Damasc. de Fide*, IV, 13; PG 94, 1140). In chapter XXVII he says: The Holy Spirit ‘formed’ the body and blood of the Infant in the womb of the Blessed Virgin, and so also in the Eucharist the Gifts are overshadowed by the same Holy Spirit so as to be ‘made’ the Body and Blood of Christ. But he does not stress this analogy of the Incarnation (PG 150, 452 A).

This same chapter, XXVII, is, I believe, the clue to much of his thought. It has been the subject of favourable comment by theologians of different schools of thought, and in recent times by French liturgical scholars such as De La Taille, H. Bouëssé, and Salaville (See the last named, *Exposit.* p. 145). And if Cabasilas’s statements about the Liturgy, and the Epiclesis in particular, have been criticised because of a different emphasis in other passages in his writings, it is true, I think, that chapter XXVII gives coherence to his teaching, and there is nothing here which a Western should reject.

His point here is that our consciousness of the Holy Trinity must be maintained through the whole of the Liturgy, and he refuses to distinguish between the working of Father, Son and Holy Spirit in the Liturgy: to the Father we give thanks because we receive all blessings of grace and nature from him, and because the Son gave his life a ransom on the Cross, and because he instituted the Eucharist, and because the Holy Spirit came to vitalize (‘energise’ — S. John Damasc.) the Church at Pentecost, he for whom every Eucharist is an opportunity to bless the souls of worshippers in and with the Gifts on which his grace is invoked. But once we begin to separate the working in the Eucharist of the Son and the Holy Spirit as if they were unrelated, Cabasilas refuses to follow this Western tendency to divide between their saving acts, to separate Pentecost from Calvary, to say this is the work of the Son, or in this the Son is ‘passive’ (Dix) and the Holy Spirit is active — that

kind of Western tendency is alien to the mind of Cabasilas (PG 150, 333 A). Our Eucharist is offered he says not to the Father alone but also to the Son and H. Spirit (ibid. 477). He sees the liturgical action as a Trinitarian ought to see it, as one who believes that the Son was conceived in the womb of the Virgin by the operation of the Holy Ghost, and that the Father sent the Son to be the Saviour of the world.

Dix finds fault (P. 301 and 302) with Cabasilas; yet this author is not 'illogical' as it is maintained, because he speaks of the working of the Son and of the Spirit in the consecration. But his thought ranges between the basic generating words of Institution and the Words of Invocation. To segregate them is alien to his eastern mind, and to his spiritual experience. To Cabasilas, and perhaps even more for the great writer of the next (XV) century, Symeon of Thessalonica, the celebration of the Liturgy is an occasion of Triune action by Father, Son and Holy Spirit. As Cabasilas later expresses it (chap. XLVII): "God... appropriates these Gifts (of bread and wine) that he may make them the Body and Blood of the only begotten Son (by the agency of the Holy Spirit)." And he expresses it similarly in chapter XXXVII: "Now and always the Mediator is one and the same, and always it is the same Holy Spirit (who communicates to us his Gifts, PG 150, 333 A). This is almost identical with the words of S. Cyril: "Every grace and every perfect gift comes upon us from the Father, through the Son, by the Holy Ghost" (In Luc. XXII. 19).

Nicolas takes the view that the joint operation of the Trinity in the Sacrament is a part of the general action of the Trinity in promoting the salvation of mankind; and if he speaks of the Holy Ghost as taking part in the consecration he refers to him as the immediate agent (as Waterland says, p. 530, Works, Vol. IV, Oxford, 1843) of the Father, and not as the ultimate source of sanctification.

This is no more than S. Augustine in the West said: "In this Trinity there is none greater or less than another; no separation in working, no dissimilarity of substance." S. Ambrose refers in even more explicit terms to the Eucharist thus: The Holy



Spirit is referred to as "He who with the Father and the Son is by the priests named in Baptism and invoked in the oblations". And in the third century in the East a similar view is reflected in the writings of Origen when he speaks of "The bread . . . over which has been invoked the Name of God, and of Christ, and of the Holy Spirit".

But ultimately the authority for Cabasilas's teaching must be found in the Lord's own words: that "by the Spirit of God" (Mtt. XII. 28 and Lk. IV. 18) He Himself proclaimed the Gospel and wrought miracles and established the Kingdom of God, and that his Ministry on earth would be continued after his Ascension in and by his Holy Spirit (Jn. XVI. 14, 15).

## La Connexion entre le rite de la Consignation et l'Épiclèse dans Saint Ephrem

J. P. DE JONG, Heemstede

Avant d'aborder mon exposé proprement dit, il me paraît utile de préciser quelques termes dont nous nous servirons régulièrement.

Sous *consignation* nous ne comprenons pas ici le rite de tracer un signe de croix avec une espèce au dessus de l'autre, mais toujours plus spécialement une action de signer en vue d'une union des deux espèces, soit du pain d'hostie avec le saint Sang, soit la commixtion du Sang avec une parcelle du pain d'hostie. Ce rite remonte à l'antiquité chrétienne et il est conservé dans toutes les liturgies. Il est curieux de constater que sa signification s'est perdue au cours des âges.

L'*épiclèse* est une prière qu'on rencontre dans l'anaphore de toutes les liturgies orientales et dans laquelle on demande la descente du Saint-Esprit sur les oblats, afin que ceux-ci puissent produire le salut des communicants. Toutefois souvent les paraphrases ont élargi cette épiclèse de telle sorte qu'elle présente le caractère de „*forma consecrationis*“ (épiclèse consécrationnaire). On s'étonne qu'une pareille formule puisse être prononcée après les paroles de l'Institution. Depuis le début du XIV<sup>e</sup> siècle seulement ce problème est une controverse entre Rome et l'Orient chrétien. Pendant des siècles on a cherché une solution, mais le résultat devait rester insatisfaisant aussi longtemps qu'on n'étudiait pas l'épiclèse sur le plan de la figuration sacramentelle, mais toujours en rapport avec le concept métaphysique de la transsubstantiation. Cette faute capitale exclue a priori toute solution, car „*sacramentum est in genere signi*“.

Dans une publication qui vient de paraître cette année<sup>1</sup> nous avons tâché d'approfondir le sens et la signification d'„épiclèse“ et de „commixtion“, en nous basant sur les documents nestoriens.

<sup>1</sup> Archiv für Liturgiewissenschaft, Band 4, 2, 245sq.

Le résultat le plus important de cette recherche était, qu'il nous permettait de déterminer la relation qui existe entre les deux. On a pu ainsi prouver que l'épiclèse aussi bien que la commixtion se rapportent à la même réalité. Elles se trouvent toutes deux sur le même plan, c.-à-d. sur le plan des figures. Il faut considérer l'une et l'autre sous l'aspect sacramental, c.-à-d. comme préparation des oblates à la communion. Les paroles de l'épiclèse et la symbolisation après coup, exprimée par le rite de la consignation, appartiennent donc à une nouvelle phase qui indique la transition du sacrifice à la communion. Ainsi deux parties furent nettement distinguées dans l'anaphore, deux „moments“ où est évoquée une opération divine, représentée sous un signe sacramental.

Dans la première phase de l'anaphore, le pain et le vin sont figures du corps brisé et du sang répandu de notre Seigneur. Après quoi, dans la seconde phase, le corps et le sang deviennent figures d'une nourriture divine. Alors la figure sacramentelle est remplacée par une autre. C'est justement cette transition d'une figure à l'autre que j'ai exprimée par le mot „transfiguration“. Depuis les premiers temps de la liturgie de la Syrie cette transfiguration, évoquée dans l'épiclèse, est signifiée par le rite de la consignation. La relation qui existe entre l'épiclèse et la consignation est par conséquent comme celle qui existe entre la parole prononcée et la parole figurée. L'épiclèse donc se manifeste visiblement dans l'union des éléments eucharistiques c.-à-d. par le rite de la consignation.

L'explication susdite, basée sur les écrits de Théodore de Mopsueste et de Narsès de Nisibe, doit-elle être qualifiée de typiquement nestorienne? Narsès nous ramène à la 1<sup>e</sup> décade du IV<sup>e</sup> siècle dans la ville de Nisibe où était né saint Ephrem et où il allait passer d'ailleurs la plus grande partie de sa vie. Y a-t-il aussi entre ces deux hommes une communauté de pensée et celle-ci s'étend-elle à l'objet de la présente étude? Je suis enclin à répondre ici affirmativement. D'abord il est important à signaler que M. E. Bishop a déjà attiré l'attention sur des textes parallèles<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> E. Bishop, *Observations on the Liturgy of Narsai. Texts and Studies VIII*, 1, 1909, 147 sq.

1) *Saint Ephrem s'exprime ainsi: Who, it is said, has held the Spirit in his hands? Come and see, O Solomon, what the Lord of thy father has done; for fire and Spirit, not according to its nature, He has mingled and poured into the hands of His disciples.*

*In the bread and the cup is fire and Spirit.*

(*Adv. scrut. sermo X.*)

2) *Narsès le répète en disant: A corporeal being (the priest) takes hold with his hands of the Spirit in the bread, and he lifts up his gaze towards the height, and then he breaks it.*

*This is a marvel. — that a hand of flesh (i. e. the priest's) holds the Spirit.*

(*Hom. XXI (C).*)

Il semble que ces textes impliquent que ce n'est pas le Christ, qui est présent sous les espèces eucharistiques, mais le Saint-Esprit, qui est indiqué ici par les mots «Feu et Esprit». Il est curieux que ce genre de textes se trouve justement dans les ouvrages authentiques de saint Ephrem, tandis que les passages qui attribuent, à ce qu'il semble, au Saint-Esprit la consécration du pain et du vin, soient empruntés à des écrits dont l'authenticité est très douteuse. Bishop a cherché un expédient. Il croit avoir trouvé dans Narsès la trace d'une terminologie syrienne-orientale en usage à l'époque de saint Ephrem, selon laquelle „l'Esprit“ désignait non pas le Saint-Esprit, mais le Christ lui-même. Cette supposition est-elle fondée sur les écrits de saint Ephrem? J'en doute. Les textes comparés, il est juste de regarder l'expression «Feu et Esprit» comme un pléonasme, par lequel est indiquée la même réalité sacramentelle que par les deux mots, pris à part. Je suis d'accord avec E. Bishop pour dire que dans des textes authentiques d'Ephrem le mot «Esprit» est employé dans un sens reposant évidemment sur une tradition fort ancienne, qui remonte au second siècle. Nous sommes encore avant le Concile de Constantinople (381). Enfin, il faut constater, que par „Esprit“ on n'entend pas, ni la Personne du Saint-Esprit, ni non plus la Personne du Christ. A mon avis «Esprit» est encore employé ici dans le sens plus large de «Nature spiri-

tuelle parfaite de Dieu», la Nature divine, commune au Père, au Fils et au Saint-Esprit. Cet Esprit prit forme parmi nous dans le Verbe incarné, mais aussi sous les signes visibles extérieurement de pain et de vin. Il ne faut pas oublier que le mystère de l'Eucharistie, sous l'aspect sacramental, était considéré anciennement dans la relation la plus intime avec le mystère de l'Incarnation.

Après ce travail préparatoire on peut envisager la question de l'épiclese elle-même. Quel est le sens et quelle la signification de l'épiclese dans saint Ephrem? Il y a des textes qui indiquent que saint Ephrem n'ignorait pas le rite de la consignation. Ce rite doit-il être expliqué ici également comme une symbolisation de l'effet sacramental, évoqué dans l'épiclese? Je voudrais citer d'abord un texte qui est sans doute très important pour l'explication de l'épiclese. Le feu descendant du ciel y est employé comme point de comparaison pour l'offrande d'Elie et l'oblation eucharistique. De cette strophe donc, vue dans le contexte, et comparée avec un texte parallèle dans Chrysostome<sup>1</sup>, je vous donnerai la paraphrase suivante:

*Sur les offrandes d'Elie le feu descendit — ces offrandes furent consumées par le feu. Le Feu de la miséricorde descendit sur notre offrande — cette offrande devint par le Feu (la Divinité) pour nous (source de) vie*<sup>2</sup>.

Nous trouvons des variations sur le même thème dans Alcuin et dans les livres mozarabes<sup>3</sup>, et last but not least dans notre Missale Romanum<sup>4</sup>. Voici le texte original, publié par A. Wilmart:

*Peto clementiam tuam ut descendat super panem et calicem plenitudo tuae divinitatis. Descendat etiam... sicut quondam in patrum hostiis descendebat...*<sup>5</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> De sacerdotio III, 4. Johannis Chrysostomi opera omnia I, 1 (Maurini) Paris, 1839, 468.

<sup>2</sup> E. Beck, Des heiligen Ephraem des Syrers Hymnen de Fide 10, 13. CSCO 155, Syr. 74, 1955, 35.

<sup>3</sup> DACL V, 1 p. 167/8.

<sup>4</sup> Missale Romanum. Praeparatio ad Missam. Oratio S. Ambrosii, Feria VI.

<sup>5</sup> A. Wilmart, L'Oratio Sancti Ambrosii. Revue Bénédictine 39 Maredsous, 1927, 335/6.

Ici encore je voudrais attirer l'attention sur le fait qu'en premier lieu on demande à Dieu que la plénitude de sa Divinité descende sur les oblats. Après le Concile de Constantinople cette opération divine est généralement attribuée au Saint-Esprit. L'effet de cette influence sur le sacrifice se manifeste comme une „transfiguration des oblats“ au sens, que nous avons déjà élucidé. S'il est vrai que, par l'épiclese, les éléments eucharistiques deviennent le symbole d'une réalité sacramentelle nouvelle, on peut se demander, si cette réalité est exprimée aussi extérieurement dans la figuration sacramentelle. La réponse à cette question est affirmative: Cela se fait par le rite de la consignation auquel saint Ephrem fait allusion quand il dit que les femmes reçoivent dans la main voilée une goutte de la vie du calice de la vie<sup>1</sup>. En fait elles reçurent ainsi le Pain eucharistique, mais ce Pain était signé d'abord du Sang. Encore dans un sermon de Noël<sup>2</sup> saint Ephrem montre le Pain eucharistique rougi par le sang des raisins. De nouveau nous trouvons dans ces paroles une allusion au rite de la consignation, dont le sens et la signification peuvent d'ailleurs être tirés du contexte. Bien que les fidèles n'aient pas vu le Christ en chair, l'Humanité du Christ leur est montrée non moins réellement que dans la crèche, bien que ce soit d'une façon sacramentelle. Cela se fait lorsque le Pain (Corps du Christ) est signé du vin de raisin (Sang précieux). De même que la figure extérieure du Christ d'après son Humanité est empreinte ici dans le Pain, ainsi son image invisible (la Divinité) est empreinte dans les cœurs des fidèles, à la sainte Communion. Suivons le déroulement de la pensée de saint Ephrem. Le Corps du Seigneur, signé du Sang, est donc pour lui la figure de l'Humanité du Christ. Ainsi la figure visible de Dieu-Homme est clairement représentée d'une façon sacramentelle. Ce signe évoque pourtant immédiatement une autre image du Christ, qui se cache sous le voile de son Humanité. Par cette image, invisible pour des yeux d'hommes, l'Être divin est indiqué, par lequel Il est un avec le Père. Et c'est justement d'après cette image de sa

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *ibid.* de Fide 10, 15.

<sup>2</sup> *Hymni de Nativitate* 11. *Editio Romana* II, 429.

Divinité que le nouvel homme est recréé à l'image et à la ressemblance de Dieu. Ainsi le rite de la consignation, étant la dernière préparation à la Communion, appartient à une nouvelle phase dans la figuration sacramentelle de l'Eucharistie. Les éléments eucharistiques nous étant représentés jusqu'ici comme séparés, après la consignation le Corps du Seigneur nous est montré uni inséparablement au Sang. L'intention du rite est donc évidemment de poser le signe qui indique sa Divinité par l'intermédiaire de l'Humanité du Christ.

Voici pour finir le résumé de notre étude :

Schéma de la Phase II  
(L'Eucharistie sous l'aspect sacramentel)

Epiclèse	Consignation	Communion	Effet sacramentel
<i>Le Feu de la Divinité descend sur l'oblation qui devient source de vie. Le Feu descend et réside dans le Pain.</i>	<i>Symbolisation de l'Epiclèse: le Pain signé du Sang, le carbo ignis, icône de l'Humanité du Christ, est figure de la Nature divine du Verbe.</i>	<i>Ainsi le Seigneur nous donne «Feu et Esprit» en nourriture et breuvage, la source de la vie nouvelle.</i>	<i>Pénétrés «de Feu et d'Esprit» nous devenons nous-mêmes ignés et spirituels, c.-à-d. participants de la nature et de la vie divines.</i>

## A Typology of Baptism in Hippolytus

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In his Commentary on Daniel, written about 204, Hippolytus gives us a typological interpretation of the story of Susanna. In that well-known and often quoted passage Susanna prefigures the Church, and Joachim, her husband, Christ. The garden represents the calling of the saints who are planted like fruitful trees in the Church. And Babylon is the world, where two peoples, typified by the elders, plot against the Church, namely the Jews and the Gentiles. The time of the attack is the Passover when the laver is prepared and the Church, washing herself as Susanna, is presented as a pure bride to God. The two maids are types of faith (*πίστις*) and love (*ἀγάπη*) which are accompanying the baptism and prepare oil and unguents, the latter symbolically representing the commandments of the Holy Word, the former the Holy Spirit, with which the baptized are anointed. And the Father concludes:

“All these things were figuratively represented in the blessed Susanna, for our sakes, that we who now believe on God might not regard the things that are done now in the Church as strange, but believe them all to have been set forth in figure by the patriarchs of old, as the Apostle also says”<sup>1</sup>, whereupon 1 Cor. X. 11 is quoted.

In the short extract now given, I have intentionally omitted some words in the sentence on the Passover baptism. The Greek text is: *ποῖαν “εὐθετον <ἡμέραν” > ἀλλ’ ἢ τὴν τοῦ πάσχα; ἐν ἣ τὸ λουτρὸν ἐν παραδείσῳ τοῖς κανυσομένοις ἐτοιμάζεται καὶ <ἡ ἐκκλησία ὡς> Σωσάννα ἀπολουομένη καθαρά νύμφη θεῷ παρίσταται*<sup>2</sup>;

<sup>1</sup> The Ante-Nicene Fathers I—X, Buffalo 1884—1886, new ed. 1951, V, p. 192.

<sup>2</sup> In Dan. I, 16 = GCS, Hippolytus Werke I (ed. Bonwetsch 1897), p. 26, ll. 18 ss.



What is here the meaning of τοῖς καυσόμενοις? Both the variations of the manuscripts on this point and the history of editions and translations, ancient and modern, bear evidence of the difficulties caused by this expression.

The 13th century MS P<sup>1</sup> (Par. gr. 159) has got the corruption καυσουμένοις. That form may however be taken as a support of the ingenious conjecture, advanced in 1858 by Lagarde: καινουμένοις. That reading gives a quite clear meaning: the "Passover at which the laver is prepared to those who are going to be renewed", that is the catechumens. Otto Bardenhewer, the grand old man of patrology, adopts this proposal in his dissertation of 1877, where he critically examines the texts at that time available<sup>1</sup>.

In his edition of some fragments of the commentary on Daniel printed in 1672 and later on reprinted by Migne, Combefis has given another conjecture: καιομένοις — "to those who burn". In his Latin translation he renders as follows: *per quem lavacrum in pomario aestuantibus paratur et Susanna lavans, munda Deo Sponsa sistitur*<sup>2</sup>. The German translations of the Old Slavonic version, published by Bonwetsch more than 200 years later, may be considered as a certain support of that reading: „Und welche gute Zeit suchten sie außer die des Pascha, in welcher bereitet wird das Bad den Versengten und die Kirche wie Susanna sich gewaschen habend wie eine reine Braut vor Gott steht“<sup>3</sup>.

Seemingly influenced by this new evidence Bardenhewer has changed his opinion, and in his Patrology, where he gives an abstract of the Commentary on Daniel, he renders the participle in question: „den unter der Hitze Leidenden“<sup>4</sup>.

What heat, one may ask himself. The translator of the Old Slavonic text, Bonwetsch had already expressed himself more

<sup>1</sup> Des heiligen Hippolytus von Rom Kommentar zum Buche Daniel, Freiburg i. Br. Diss. Würzburg 1877, p. 73.

<sup>2</sup> Migne, PG X, col. 692 D.

<sup>3</sup> ed. Bonwetsch, p. 27, ll. 7 ss.

<sup>4</sup> Geschichte der altkirchlichen Literatur I—V, Freiburg i. Br. 1902 bis 1932, II, pp. 548 s.

clearly when, commenting on the episode of Susanna, he took up the wording of the Old Slavonic translation but defined it in adding „den von der Sonnenglut Versengten“<sup>1</sup>. This seems to be a strange interpretation, as it is more in accordance with the original situation in the story of Susanna—there it was really a hot day—than with the throughout spiritual exegesis of that story. As a matter of fact Bonwetsch has not contented himself with the paraphrasing now referred to but has also mentioned the martyrdom, comparing Dan. XII. 12 (ἐκπυρούμενοι).

Another spiritual burning is alluded to by the French author of the article on baptism published in 1909 in Dict. de la théol. cathol. He paraphrases our passage in this way: «Le jour où elle se baigne...préfigure la fête pascalle où, dans le jardin de l'Église, le bain est préparé aux catéchumènes brûlants de désirs» (col. 198) Mr. Bareille apparently presumes the present participle *καυνομένοις* but he has as far as I can see left the question open, whether it should be understood in a good or bad sense. Are the catechumens burning with human lusts and passions which are now going to be extinguished, or are they really longing for the baptism?

Hitherto I have only referred to possible renderings of a corrected or conjectured text. But following the principle of *lectio difficilior* we might now put the question: is there any possibility of keeping the form *καυσομένοις* and getting a plausible meaning out of it? Firstly there is a philological difficulty. Although the middle participle in Classical Greek is used in a passive sense to express duration, that use generally dropped later on. The passive future form ought to be *καυθησομένοις*, but one might perhaps regard *καυσομένοις* as an atticism. Otherwise the participle must have an active-middle sense.

Supposing that we have a passive participle several translations are still possible. There is not time now to discuss all of them in detail. The metaphorical use in future form: “those who are to burn”, namely of passions, is excluded as well as “those

<sup>1</sup> Studien zu den Kommentaren Hippolyts zum Buche Daniel und Hohen Liede (TU. 16, NF I: 2, Leipzig 1897), p. 59.

who are to be kindled" as a synonym of illuminated. "Burnt" might perhaps be taken as an allusion to martyrdom (*cf. supra*!). It is, however, understood in a proper sense by the last editor and translator, M. Lefèvre: «C'est en ce jour qu'est préparé dans le Jardin le Bain (qui doit rafraîchir) ceux que le (feu) devrait consumer»<sup>1</sup>. Apparently this very free paraphrase is based on an interpretation of *καυσόμενοις* as a passive future, indicating the function of the eternal fire, which is threatening the whole of mankind.

I should like to propose another translation<sup>2</sup>, as there are in fact many instances of the baptism being described as a burning. We must remember that the story of the three young men in the furnace was in early times interpreted as a typology of baptism and thus incorporated into the lessons during the Paschal vigil, when the baptism took place.

In Theodore of Mopsuestia's important commentary on baptism, translated into Syriac shortly after his death, this Sacrament is called "the second birth", which prepares "that real and awe-inspiring second birth of the resurrection". God is compared to a potter, who in the resurrection restores his damaged and dissolved work of clay, man. But: "We perform the symbols and signs (of these things) in water, and are renewed and reconstituted according to the working of the Spirit on it . . . As an earthen vessel, which is being remade and refashioned in water, will remain in its soft nature and be clay as long as it has not come in contact with fire, but when it has been thrown on fire and baked on it, it will undoubtedly be remade and refashioned—so also we, who are in a mortal nature, rightly receive our renewal through baptism and are refashioned through this same baptism and receive the grace of the Holy Spirit, which hardens us more than any fire can do"<sup>3</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Sources chrétiennes 14, 1947, p. 101.

<sup>2</sup> P. Lundberg, *La typologie baptismale dans l'ancienne église* (Acta seminarii neotestamentici upsaliensis X), Diss. Uppsala 1942, p. 45, wisely abstains from translating.

<sup>3</sup> Woodbrooke Studies VI, Cambridge 1933 (ed. Mingana), pp. 56 ss.

This symbolical language has been preserved especially in the Syrian church. In his liturgical homilies on baptism Narsai<sup>1</sup> uses it again and again. I will give some examples:

"the sweet spring of Baptism... By the heat of iniquity our mind was withered, and its fruit had dropped off; and He sprinkled His gift as dew and watered our soul... Cunningly He mixed the colours for the renewal of our race, with oil and water and the invincible power of the Spirit. A new art the Chief Artist put forth... the womb of the water should conceive (p. 46)... As in a furnace he [the priest] re-casts bodies in Baptism; and as in a fire he consumes the weeds of mortality. The drug of the Spirit he casts into the water as into a furnace; and he purifies the image of men from uncleanness. By the heat of the Spirit he purges the rust of body and soul; and instead of clay we acquire the hue of heavenly beings. The vat of water he prepares, he sets, in the likeness of a furnace (pp. 48 s). A beauteous bride-chamber He [the Lord] has fitted on earth for a type of that which is above (p. 54)... Men are re-casting men as in a furnace, and purging from them the hateful alloy of hateful wickedness. A beauteous colour they acquire on a sudden from the midst of the water, and more than the sun burns the light of their minds" (p. 55).

In another homily the same ideas recur with new variations: "As in a furnace He [the Creator, Fashioner of all] re-casts our image in Baptism; and instead of our clay He has made us spiritual gold. Spiritually, without colour, was He pleased to depict us (p. 33)... Out of our clay He has made treasure-keepers of His hidden things... priests... Ah, corporeal beings, painters of the Spirit, without hands! [on the tablets of the waters (p. 34)... Lo, he brings them, as it were, into a furnace by means of their words (p. 36)... The furnace of the waters His purpose prepared mystically; and instead of fire He has heated it with the Spirit of the power of His will. His own handiwork He made a craftsman over His creation, that it should re-cast itself in the furnace of the waters and the heat of the Spirit (p. 41)...

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<sup>1</sup> *Texts and Studies VIII*: 1, Cambridge 1909 (transl. R. H. Connolly).

With liquid oil and weak water he re-casts the body, and instead of clay he changes (and) makes (it) pure gold (p. 42)...oil ... It is the great brand of the King of kings with which they are stamped, that they may serve (as soldiers) in the spiritual contest (p. 43)...and with His name he is branded that he may serve (as a soldier) according to His will" (p. 44).

In the last sentence yet another possibility of translating *καυσομένων* presents itself; the baptism has also been considered as a spiritual cauterizing. In view of this rich symbolism of fire in connexion with the Baptism, which symbolism is not restricted to Syrian churches and later centuries, I think that the discussed detail in the story of Susanna in Hippolytus might have got a sufficient explanation<sup>1</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. also the author's *Le baptême de feu* (Acta seminarii neotestamentici upsaliensis IX), Diss. Uppsala 1940, p. 107; *The Body and Eternal Life* (Horæ Soederblomianæ I: 2 = *Mélanges* Johs. Pedersen), Stockholm 1946, pp. 87 ss.; *Ignis divinus* (Publications of the New Society of Letters at Lund 34), Lund 1949, pp. 78 ss., 96 ss.

## The Consecration of Water in the Early Rite of Baptism

J. D. C. FISHER, Brighton

The consecration of the font on Holy Saturday or on the Vigil of Pentecost is a well known feature of the early rite of holy baptism. But the question to which the liturgiologist would dearly love to know the answer is, Just how old is this custom?—a question which is easier to ask than to answer.

That some form of consecration was indispensable for the water before it could be used in the administration of baptism is a belief for which Tertullian supplies the earliest positive evidence<sup>1</sup>.

Hippolytus follows a little later with his statement that the water is prayed over<sup>2</sup>. Origen is the first Eastern writer to mention consecration<sup>3</sup>. From their time onwards it can safely be assumed that the water for baptism was always consecrated before use, and that the consecration was generally regarded as indispensable.

Since this custom was not a recent innovation at the time when Tertullian wrote, it must have originated before the end of the second century—but as to how much before, there is not sufficient evidence to say. The opinion of St. Basil that the consecration of the water is one of several baptismal practices derived from the apostles themselves, even if not mentioned in holy scripture, can hardly be allowed to settle the question<sup>4</sup>. For while baptism was commonly administered out of doors, the water is not likely to have been consecrated; it is difficult, for instance, to imagine that Philip the deacon consecrated the water in which he baptised the eunuch<sup>5</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> de Bapt. 4.

<sup>2</sup> Apostol. Trad. 21.

<sup>3</sup> in Joan. 3. 5. GCS 4. 512. Cf. in Joan. 6. 17.

<sup>4</sup> de Spir. sanct. 66.

<sup>5</sup> Acts 8. 36.

Moreover in stipulating that living water should, if possible, be used for baptism, the *Didache*<sup>1</sup> shows that at any rate in one quarter the church's mind was influenced by the enactment in the Mosaic Law that certain lustrations should be performed in living water<sup>2</sup>. Now this regulation is derived ultimately from the primitive belief that streams and springs were inhabited by a deity who was the author of any beneficial properties they were thought to possess. Evidence of this belief may be seen in the Old Testament<sup>3</sup>, and would appear to survive even in the notion popularly held about the pool of Bethesda<sup>4</sup>. In so far as ideas of this kind underlie the *Didache*'s requirement of living water, then any formal consecration of the water would be superfluous. Indeed it is highly probable that so long as flowing water was used, no consecration was thought necessary<sup>5</sup>. But it was the use of still water in some receptacle such as a font within a building, rather than in the open air, which seems to have created a sense that this apparently lifeless substance was in need of some infusion of the Spirit, and therefore to have given rise to the conviction that it was unfit for its sacred purpose, unless it was first subjected to a formal act of consecration, consisting in a solemn invocation of the infusion of the Holy Ghost.

There is not time here to say much about the consecration from the liturgical point of view. Here, as elsewhere, the procedure became more elaborate as time went by. St. Ambrose<sup>6</sup> and St. Augustine<sup>7</sup> mention that the water was signed with the sign of the cross. Later than the time of St. Ambrose the Milanese rite contained a pouring of chrism into the water during

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<sup>1</sup> Par. 7.

<sup>2</sup> Lev. 14. 5, 50, 52; 15. 13; Num. 19. 17. Cf. F. Gavin, *Jewish Antecedents of the Christian Sacraments*, London, 1928, pp. 37, 42.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Gen. 14. 7, Josh. 19. 8. Oesterley and Robinson, *Hebrew Religion*, New York, 1930, pp. 32 ff.

<sup>4</sup> John 5. 4 (A. V.).

<sup>5</sup> Cf. T. Thompson, *Offices of Baptism and Confirmation*, Cambridge, 1914, pp. 162f.

<sup>6</sup> *de Myst.* 3. 14.

<sup>7</sup> in Joan. Evang. Tract. 118. 5. Cf. c. Jul. Pelag. 6. 62, Serm. 213. 8.

the prayer of consecration<sup>1</sup>, a practice found also in two of the *Ordines Romani*<sup>2</sup>, in Hildephonsus of Toledo<sup>3</sup>, Dionysius Areopagiticus<sup>4</sup> and other sources.

It is necessary to pass from ritual to doctrine. Here again Tertullian is our earliest authority. Because, he says, the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters at the creation, the element of water is worthy to be used for baptism. Therefore it makes no difference whether a person is baptised in the sea or in a pond, in a river or in a fountain, in a lake or in a trough, because all water receives the power of sanctifying when God is invoked. For then the Holy Spirit supervenes from heaven and is upon the waters, sanctifying them from Himself, and the waters thus sanctified imbibe the power of making holy<sup>5</sup>. Tertullian does not merely think of the Holy Spirit as lighting upon the water: the effect of the consecration, he believes, is that the water is as it were medicated<sup>6</sup>. In some sense, then, perhaps quasi-material<sup>7</sup>, Tertullian believed the water to be imbued at consecration with the Holy Spirit. St. Cyprian wrote briefly, "Water cannot cleanse sins and sanctify a man unless it also has the Holy Spirit"<sup>8</sup>. In short, consecration is held to effect a real presence of the Holy Spirit in the water.

Now however much the ceremonial of consecration may have varied from church to church and from age to age, the doctrine remains constant during the age of the Fathers. Tertullian's tract on baptism became widely known; and his words about the consecration were quoted amongst others by Didymus of Alexandria<sup>9</sup>, Isidore of Seville<sup>10</sup>, and some Gallican writers

<sup>1</sup> M. Magistretti, *Mon. Vet. Liturg. Ambros.*, Milan 1904, 3. 472.

<sup>2</sup> *Ordo Primus* and *Ordo Septimus* (Mabillon's numbering) PL 78. 956. 999.

<sup>3</sup> *de Cognit. Bapt.* 109.

<sup>4</sup> *de Eccles. Hierarch.* 2.

<sup>5</sup> *de Bapt.* 3, 4.

<sup>6</sup> *ib.* 4.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. P. Pourrat, *Theology of the Sacraments* St. Louis 1930, pp. 109f.

<sup>8</sup> *Ep.* 14. 5.

<sup>9</sup> *de Trin.* 2. 14.

<sup>10</sup> *Etym.* 6. 49.



of the ninth century<sup>1</sup>. Origen says that the water after consecration is no longer mere water, having been sanctified by a mystical invocation<sup>2</sup>. Numerous extant consecration prayers contain a petition that the water may be filled with the Holy Spirit<sup>3</sup>. St. Basil writes that, if there is any grace in the water, it is due not to the nature of the water itself but to the presence of the Holy Spirit<sup>4</sup>. This is repeated by St. Ambrose<sup>5</sup>. The pouring of chrism into the font, which in course of time became a widespread custom, symbolised the entry of the Holy Spirit into the water; and lest it should be supposed that, as the chrism would float upon the top of the water, therefore the symbolism is only of the Spirit of God moving upon the face of the water<sup>6</sup>, be it noted that in the *Ordo Romanus Primus* the pontiff is ordered to pour chrism upon the water crosswise and mix it with the water with his hand<sup>7</sup>.

The fact that stands out most prominently is the close parallelism between the consecration of the water in baptism and that of bread and wine in the eucharist. Liturgically this appears in the tendency to model the baptismal consecration prayer upon the eucharistic prayer, the *Sursum Corda* and *Vere Dignum* appearing, for instance, in certain Western rites<sup>8</sup>. Doctrinally the parallelism is shown, for instance, in the way in which St. Cyril of Jerusalem discusses the effect of consecration upon water and chrism, and bread and wine: as the bread of the eucharist after the invocation of the Holy Ghost is mere bread no longer, but the body of Christ, so the holy ointment is no

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<sup>1</sup> Theodulf of Orleans, *de Ordine Bapt.* 13, Jesse of Amiens, *Ep. de Bapt.*, Rabanus Maurus, *de Cler. Inst.* 1. 25.

<sup>2</sup> in Joan. 3. 5 (*supra*).

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Sacramentary of Serapion 19, Gelasian Sacramentary (ed. Wilson p. 86), etc.

<sup>4</sup> *de Spir. Sanct.* 35.

<sup>5</sup> *de Spir. Sanct.* 1. 6.

<sup>6</sup> Gen. 1. 2.

<sup>7</sup> Loc. cit.

<sup>8</sup> E. g. in the *Missale Gothicum* and *Vetus Missale Gallicanum*, Neale and Forbes, *Ancient Liturgies of the Gallican Church*, Burntisland 1855, pp. 98, 190.

more simple ointment after the invocation, but the gift of Christ, and is made effectual to convey the Holy Ghost by the presence of His own Godhead<sup>1</sup>; water after it has received the invocation of the Holy Ghost and of Christ and of the Father is not to be regarded as mere water but as water containing grace<sup>2</sup>.

Secondly, the nouns, *invocatio* and *epiclesis*, with their cognate verbs are as prominent in relation to the consecration of the water as in that other connection where they have been more widely discussed. The purpose of the epiclesis in baptism is to effect a real presence of the Third Person of the Trinity in the water, as it is the purpose of the epiclesis in the eucharist to effect a real presence of the Second Person of the Trinity in the bread and the wine.

When due regard is paid to the doctrine of consecration, it becomes evident, if it were ever in doubt, that all the blessings conferred at the actual moment of baptism are conferred by the agency of the Holy Spirit. However different writers may have expressed themselves in regard to the gift of the Holy Spirit in confirmation, the early church without doubt believed that the Holy Ghost was present and active at the font. Even if the Gelasian Sacramentary says most explicitly that the candidates receive the Holy Spirit when the bishop confirms them<sup>3</sup>, it still insists that their baptism is a regeneration by means of water and the Holy Spirit<sup>4</sup>. Whether or not the Fathers

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<sup>1</sup> Cat. Myst. 3. 3.

<sup>2</sup> Cat. 3. 3.

<sup>3</sup> *Deinde ab episcopo datur eis Spiritus septiformis. Ad consignandum imponit eis manum in his verbis . . .* ed. H. A. Wilson, p. 86.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. the prayer at the presbyteral unction immediately after the baptism: *Deus omnipotens, Pater Domini nostri Jesu Christi, qui te regeneravit ex aqua et Spiritu sancto, quique dedisti tibi remissionem omnium peccatorum* (i. e. at the baptism which has just taken place) *ipse te linit chrismate salutis . . .* Wilson p. 86. Cf. also the opening of the confirmation prayer: *Deus omnipotens . . . qui regenerasti famulos tuos ex aqua et Spiritu sancto, quique dedisti eis remissionem omnium peccatorum* (i. e. at baptism) *tu, Domine, immitte in eos Spiritum sanctum tuum . . .* Wilson p. 87.

for the most part taught that the baptised receive the Holy Ghost at the moment of confirmation rather than that of baptism, in no case did they regard the washing in water as a mere washing in water. For this reason the expression, 'water-baptism', now heard in some theological discussions, is, when applied to the teaching of the Fathers, highly misleading.

## Gleichzeitige Hymnen in der Liturgie der Griechischen Kirche

P. MAAS, Oxford

Gleichzeitige Gedichte, d. h. solche, die aus metrisch identischen Versen bestehen (oder: die *κατὰ στίχον* gebaut sind), finden sich in den mittelalterlichen liturgischen Büchern der orthodoxen Kirche nur an einer Stelle: im Horologion zum Abendgottesdienst (*ἀπόδειπνον*) der Fastenzeit. Auch dort ist von solchen Gedichten nur ein einziges allgemein aufgenommen, der Hymnus *Ἡ ἀσώματος φύσις τῶν Χερουβιμ*; fünf weitere stehen, an diesen Hymnus anschließend, in dem Erlanger Horologion (cod. Erlang. 96) von 1025 und, minder vollständig, in einigen andern Horologiis. Von diesen sechs Hymnen sind drei (Nr. 1, 4 und 5) auch auf Papyrusblättern des 6. Jahrh. erhalten, und es ist ziemlich sicher, daß die ganze Sammlung in das Ende des 5. Jahrhunderts gehört<sup>1</sup>.

Warum ist diese rhythmisch sehr eindrucksvolle Dichtungsweise verdrängt worden zugunsten von *στιχηρά, κανόνες* und ähnlichen Gattungen, deren Rhythmen uns so gar nicht ins Ohr fallen wollen?

Ich stelle zur Erwägung, ob die Ursache nicht in der Musik zu suchen ist. Dank der Forschung der letzten drei Jahrzehnte, besonders den wahrhaft monumentalen Monumenta Musicae Byzantinae, sehen wir deutlicher als zuvor die strenge melo-

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<sup>1</sup> Literatur: Byz. Zeitschr. 17, 307 ff., 18, 309 ff.; 32, 423 f. (G. S. Mercati); Frühbyzantinische Kirchenpoesie (Lietzmanns Kleine Texte Nr. 52/53) S. 1—8; Nr. 1 und 6 der Erlanger Sammlung auch in C. Trypanis, *Medieval and Modern Greek Poetry* (1951) pp. 4 f. Eng verwandt mit diesen sechs Stücken sind zwei längere Gebete, die außerhalb der offiziellen liturgischen Bücher überliefert sind: das Gebet des Romanos (Frühbyz. Kirch. S. 9) und der Hymnus *Ὡς ἐνώπιον* (G. S. Mercati, Byz. Zeitschr. 18, 323 ff.), dessen Anfang schon um 890 in der Vita Euthymii (cap. 4, 19 de Boor) zitiert wird (Byz. Zeitschr. 21, 436).

dische Regelung des Vortrags der Liturgie<sup>1</sup>. Die Melodie aber schließt sich — wie eng, ist noch ungeklärt — an das rhythmische Schema der Strophen an<sup>2</sup>. Vielleicht sind die nur 8 bis 13 Silben langen Verse der gleichzeitigen Hymnen als für diese Art von Musik zu kurz empfunden worden.

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<sup>1</sup> Ich verweise besonders auf Vol. VI der Transcripta dieser Monumenta (The Hymns of the Hirmologium, Part I), mit der Einführung und den Anmerkungen von Carsten Hoeg. Kanon I 10 (pp. 71ff., 251f.) könnte einen gleichzeitigen Text vortäuschen (prosodielose Zwölfsilber), aber es handelt sich offenbar um eine Nachahmung der jambischen Kanones des Johannes Damaskenos. Der Text ist stark verderbt; p. 72 Mitte steht *αὐθις τε* statt *ἀκτιστε*.

<sup>2</sup> Da die Hirmologien von jeder Ode nur die erste Strophe ausschreiben, wäre es erwünscht, wenn wenigstens für einige Kanones eine vollständige kritische Ausgabe des Textes vorgelegt würde.

## Imposition of Hands in the Letters of Innocent I

J. MACDONALD, Oxford

It is generally agreed among scholars that the Roman Church of this period did not rebaptize converts from heresy when these had already been baptized in the threefold name. But did the Roman Church also refuse to reconfirm? Here scholars cannot agree. It is certain that hands were laid upon heretics when they were reconciled to the Church. But some have interpreted this as the reiteration of confirmation, others have identified it with penance. For example, according to de Puniet in his article on Confirmation in the *Dictionnaire d'archéologie chrétienne et de liturgie*, it has not been proved that the Roman Church ever repeated the confirmation of heretics who had already been confirmed. Cabrol endorsed de Puniet's opinion in his article on heretics in the same dictionary. Other authors who asserted that the imposition of hands in this case was penitential and not confirmation were Coppens (*L'imposition des mains*, pp. 389—390), Tom Thompson (*The Offices of Baptism and Confirmation*, p. 229) and O. D. Watkins (*A History of Penance*, p. 492).

I believe that the letters of Innocent I clearly show that at least this Pope regarded the imposition of hands in the reconciliation of heretics as their confirmation. It cannot then rightly be asserted with de Puniet that the Roman Church has never repeated a confirmation which had already been conferred upon heretics.

This Pope, Bishop of Rome from 401—417, uses the expression *manus impositio*, imposition of the hand, in eight different contexts in his surviving letters. It is interesting to examine in each whether he is referring to penance, or to confirmation or to ordination.

In three of the eight contexts he is clearly writing of ordination. In his 17th letter addressed to Rufus, Bishop of Thessalonica, and others he writes that those ordained by heretics have their heads wounded by that imposition of the hand. (*Ep.* 17. 7. PL 20, 530.) In his 24th letter, he authorises Bishop Alexander of Antioch to consecrate with his own hand bishops to the sees in the neighbourhood of that city. (*Ep.* 24. 1. PL 20, 548.) Again he complained in a letter to Aurelius Bishop of Carthage that hands were being too readily laid in ordaining to the Episcopate those who had not passed through the lower grades of the ministry. This letter is not to be found among Innocent's collected epistles in Migne's 20th Latin volume. It is in volume 84 (Col. 657) for Innocent's 18th century editor Dom Coustant judged it to be spurious. The letter was later vindicated by the Ballerini and is now generally accepted as one of the Pope's genuine epistles.

We cannot now consider these three references to the imposition of hands in ordination. Nor can we delay over a very interesting reference to the imposition of hands in the exorcism of demoniacs. This is to be found in the well-known letter to Bishop Decent of Gubbio. (PL 20, 557.) But we must pass to the other four contexts. Innocent writes in each of these of the imposition of hands in the reconciliation of heretics.

In the first two of these, a distinction is made between those who were already baptized as heretics and those who had been rebaptized by heretics after leaving the church. The latter he regards as apostates, guilty of one of the three classical capital sins. So they have to do penance (*poenitentia*). Penance is not mentioned in the case of those who have not left the church but have been baptized as heretics. They are merely to be received by the laying on of hands. One of the two passages occurs in a letter to Bishop Victricius of Rouen and I quote it in full: "Those converted from the Novatianists or Donatists (*Montenses*) are to be received only by the imposition of the hand. Although baptized by heretics, they were baptized in the name of Christ. An exception must be made in the case of those who left us for them and were rebaptized. If these return

to their senses . . . they are to be received after long penance." (*Ep.* 2. 11. PL 20, 475.) The other passage from the letter to Rufus of Thessalonica and other clerics draws exactly the same distinction. Those who have gone over to heresy from Catholicism cannot be received in the Roman Church except through penance. Those who had been baptized into heretical Christianity were received only by the imposition of the hand. (*Ep.* 17. 8. PL 20, 531.) In both contexts the imposition of hands upon converted heretics seems to be distinguished from penance.

A further passage in the letter to Rufus quotes the 8th Canon of Nicaea about the Novatianists: "It pleased that great and holy Council that when they came to the Catholic Church they should receive the laying on of hands." It has long been a matter of dispute whether this canon referred to ordination or penance. Innocent seems to regard it as confirmation rather than ordination for he goes on to relate how Peter and John completed with the imposition of hands the baptism of those who had been duly baptized by Philip the Evangelist. (*Ep.* 17. 10. PL 20, 532—533.)

But it is in our final context that we find most clearly the theory that the imposition of hands upon converted heretics is a completion of baptism by confirmation. Innocent writes as follows to the Bishop of Antioch: "As for the Arians and suchlike nuisances, we indeed receive their converted laity under the symbol of penance (*sub imagine poenitentiae*) and sanctification of the Holy Ghost. But this does not indicate that their clergy are to be received with their priesthood or ministry. We only allow their baptism to be valid on the ground of its being performed in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost but we do not reckon that they have the Holy Ghost as a result of their baptism and those mysteries. When their founders left the Catholic faith, they lost the perfection (*perfectionem*) of the Spirit which they had received. Nor can they give His fulness, which has its chief operation in ordinations, when they have lost that fulness by the faithlessness of their impiety . . . How can we possibly consider their profane priests worthy of the honours of Christ,



when their laymen are received as incomplete (*imperfectos*) to gain the grace of the Holy Spirit with the symbol of penitence." (*Ep.* 24. PL 20, 549—551.)

There are six points here to which I will briefly draw your attention. First, the use of the term *perficio*. This is a technical term, one of those used regularly for confirmation before *confirmatio* was employed. It is used for example by Ambrose in the *De Sacramentis* (Bk. 3. Cap. 2. 8.) and in the 77th Canon of the Council of Elvira. So when Innocent states that the Arians have lost the perfection of the Spirit which they have received, he means that they have lost their confirmation. Thus he later refers to them as *imperfectos*, unconfirmed.

Secondly, they were not unconfirmed because of any ritual defect in their initiation ceremonies. The founders of Arianism had lost their confirmation gift by becoming heretics. So they were unable to convey the fulness of the Spirit in confirmation or ordination. It was for this reason that confirmation was repeated in the Roman Church.

Thirdly, Innocent was not primarily arguing for the repetition of confirmation but for the fact that heretics did not receive the fulness of the Spirit in ordination. His argument was that just as the Arian laity had to be reconfirmed, so their clergy would require reordination. Innocent is so certain of the propriety of the reconfirmation of laymen that he can use it as an argument for the necessity of the reordination of clerics.

Fourthly, in the words *sub imagine poenitentiae* Innocent notes that the imposition of hands in the perfecting of converted heretics has a parallel in penitential usage. But the distinction which he drew in his earlier epistles between the imposition of hands and penance shows that he did not confuse the imposition of hands in this reconciliation with that in penance. He was less likely to make this confusion because the imposition of hands upon heretics took place at the time of reconciliation. The imposition of hands upon ordinary penitents in Rome seems on the other hand to have taken place some time prior to their final reconciliation on Maundy Thursday. (O. D. Watkins. op. cit. p. 492.)

Fifthly, there is no evidence that consignation of the forehead or unction was used in connection with the restoration of heretics. The imposition of hands alone is mentioned. If Innocent regarded this rite as being the confirmation of the converted heretic, it follows that the imposition of hands and not consignation was for him the essential matter of confirmation. *Imperfecti* are received not by consignation by the imposition of the hand. This is most important in view of the emphatic assertion of the British scholar Mr G. W. H. Lampe and others that for Innocent consignation was the medium whereby bishops conferred the Spirit. (*The Seal of the Spirit*. p. 218.) On the other hand, an Irish writer suggested in 1915 that Innocent regarded the gift of the Holy Ghost as the effect of some such ceremony as the imposition of hands. (M. O'Dwyer, *Confirmation*, p. 83.)

Sixthly and lastly, if it is true that Innocent I envisaged the reconfirmation of heretics, other patristic authors may be interpreted in a similar sense. For example, Leo in his letter to Bishop Nicetas of Aquileia writes of those baptized once only but by heretics: "They are to be confirmed (*confirmandi*) by the imposition of hands with only the invocation of the Holy Ghost, because they have received merely the form of baptism without the grace of sanctification." (*Ep.* 159. 7.) But to attempt to work this out in detail would require a further paper.

## Mysteriengegenwart. Das Anliegen Dom Casels und die neueste Forschung

B. NEUNHEUSER O. S. B., Maria Laach

Auf einer Konferenz für Patristische Studien können wir das Werk Odo Casels nur betrachten, insofern es eine Deutung patristischer Gegebenheiten bietet. Casel hat in seinem Streben nach einem tieferen Verständnis der heiligen Handlungen des kirchlichen Kultus vor allem auf die Lehre der Väter und der alten Liturgien zurückgreifen wollen. Er will heilige Überlieferung wiedergeben, wenn er als „Hauptanliegen der Mysterienlehre“ die Absicht nennt, „die kirchlichen Mysterien, vor allem die Eucharistie, aber auch die anderen Sakramente je nach ihrer Stellung und ihrem Maße, als das *sacramentum redemptionis*, d. h. als die Gegenwart des Heilswerkes in der *Ekklesia*, wieder klar hinzustellen, die Sakramente nicht zu bloßen ‚Gnadenmitteln‘ herabzusetzen“<sup>1</sup>. Diese Gegenwart ist — nach Casel — eine Gegenwart der historischen, einmaligen Heilstat (und nicht etwa nur des ewigen, überzeitlichen Heilswillens oder eines himmlischen Ereignisses), allerdings in sakramentaler, nicht-historischer Weise (nicht etwa also eine „Wiederholung“); ferner, diese sakramentale Gegenwartsweise erschöpft sich nicht in der Gleichgestaltung mit Christus innerhalb des sakramentalen Effekts, sondern ist bereits vor ihm gegeben. Damit der Gläubige in der sakramentalen Feier mit Tod und Auferstehung Christi verbunden und ihnen gleichgestaltet wird, müssen diese selbst — sakramental zwar, aber doch wirklich — gegenwärtig sein. Casel sieht in dem Gesagten, dem Kern der „Mysterientheologie“, die Lehre der Väter wiedergegeben.

Dieses inhaltliche Anliegen tritt uns bei Casel stets entgegen in einer methodisch-formalen Weise, die den eigentümlichen

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<sup>1</sup> Jahrbuch für Liturgiewissenschaft 15, 1941, 253.

Namen seiner Ansicht begründet, nämlich der Mysterien-theologie. Er hat seine Ansichten ausgesprochen (und eigentlich bis zum Schluß unentwegt daran festgehalten) auf Grund der obwaltenden Analogie zwischen christlichen und heidnischen Mysterien; für die Begründung dieser Analogie sah Casel eine wichtige Stütze in der Semasiologie des Wortes *μυστήριον-μυστήρια* und seiner lateinischen Äquivalente *sacamentum-sacramenta*.

Die Kontroverse, die sich mit diesen Anliegen Casels auseinandergesetzt hat, darf als bekannt vorausgesetzt werden; es geht in ihr sowohl um den Inhalt (ist das wirklich die Ansicht der Väter?) als um die formal-methodische Seite (ist die Analogie richtig gesehen?). Einen neutralen Bericht über den Stand der Kontroverse bis 1947 gibt die Darstellung von Th. Filthaut<sup>1</sup>. Ich selbst habe Ergänzungen dazu bis etwa zur Gegenwart gegeben im Archiv für Liturgiewissenschaft<sup>2</sup>.

Die neueste Forschung hat nun zu einigen entscheidenden patristischen und biblischen Grundfragen Stellung genommen. Darüber soll hier kurz berichtet werden. Es handelt sich um die Arbeiten von G. Fittkau über den Mysterienbegriff bei Chrysostomus<sup>3</sup>, von J. Betz über die Eucharistie bei den frühen griechischen Vätern<sup>4</sup> und endlich um das Gespräch zur Deutung von Röm. 6, wie es vor allem getragen wurde von R. Schnackenburg<sup>5</sup> und V. Warnach<sup>6</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Die Kontroverse über die Mysterienlehre (1947); franz. Übersetzung: *La théologie des mystères. Exposé de la controverse*. Trad. franç. par J.-C. Didier et A. Liefoghe, prof. à l'Univers. cath. de Lille (1954).

<sup>2</sup> ALw 3/1, 1953, 104—122: Mysteriengegenwart. Ein Theologumenon inmitten des Gesprächs; ferner: Ende des Gesprächs um die Mysteriengegenwart? in: ALw 4/2, 1955, 316—324.

<sup>3</sup> Der Begriff des Mysteriums bei Johannes Chrysostomus. Eine Auseinandersetzung mit dem Begriff des Kultmysteriums in der Lehre Odo Casels (*Theophaneia* 9, 1953).

<sup>4</sup> Die Eucharistie in der Zeit der griechischen Väter. Bd. I/1. Die Aktualpräsenz der Person u. des Heilswerkes Jesu im Abendmahl nach der vorephesinischen griechischen Patristik (1955).

<sup>5</sup> Das Heilsgeschehen bei der Taufe nach dem Apostel Paulus. Eine Studie zur paulinischen Theologie (Münchener Theol. Studien. Histor. Abt. 1. Bd., 1950). Ferner: Todes- und Lebensgemeinschaft mit Christus. Neue Studien zu Röm. 6, 1—11, in: Münchener Theol. Zeitschr. 6, 1955, 32—55.

<sup>6</sup> Taufe und Christusgeschehen nach Röm. 6, in: ALw 3/2, 1954, 284—366.

Fittkau und Betz zeigen in der Eindringlichkeit ihrer umfassenden Studien gut, daß die Forschung heute mehr und mehr zu der übereinstimmenden Auffassung gekommen ist, der von Casel in einer — in sich außerordentlich beachtlichen — ersten Überschau zusammengestellte Väterbeweis bedürfe einer genauen Nachprüfung im einzelnen. Man anerkennt die Kraft und Größe der intuitiven Schau Casels, verlangt aber — und mit Recht — die Nachprüfung der These im Rahmen von Einzeluntersuchungen, in denen die Lehre der betreffenden Väter eigens betrachtet wird. Nachdem Poschmann die „Mysteriengegenwart im Lichte des hl. Thomas“ geprüft hatte<sup>1</sup>, drängte sich eine Untersuchung auf über Johannes Chrysostomus, einen der an entscheidender Stelle von Thomas zitierten Zeugen<sup>2</sup>.

An Chrysostomus will Fittkau kritisch prüfen, „ob der kühne Längsschnitt durch die christliche Tradition mit Hilfe des Caselschen ‚Kulteidos Mysterium‘ die volle Mitte des altkirchlichen Mysterien- und Kultverständnisses getroffen hat“<sup>3</sup>. Sein Ergebnis ist negativ: „Der nach dem Zeugnis des Chrysostomus den sakramentalen Heilsgütern eigene Mysteriencharakter hat . . . inhaltlich nichts mit dem antiken Kulteidos Mysterium, wie O. Casel es auffaßt, gemein“<sup>4</sup>. Chrysostomus kenne als sakramentale Mysteriengegenwart nur Folgendes: „Die auf dem Grund des objektiven Vollzugs der sakramentalen Heilszuwendung ruhende und sie zuinnerst formende Bindung und Rückbeziehung der sakramentalen Heilswirklichkeit zur Person und Heilstat Christi“<sup>5</sup>.

Das sorgfältig gearbeitete Buch vermittelt viele Erkenntnisse von bleibendem Wert. Es sieht mit Recht im Worte Mysterion einen der Schlüsselbegriffe in der Theologie des großen Antiocheners; der Kern der in ihm angedeuteten Wirklichkeit ist „personaler Lebensaustausch zwischen dem Erlöser und den

<sup>1</sup> ThQu 116, 1935, 53—116.

<sup>2</sup> In der Summa Theol. III p., art. 1, irrtümlich unter den Namen des Ambrosius; es handelt sich um Hom. 17, 3 zu Hebr. 10 (PG 63, 131).

<sup>3</sup> A. a. O. 47.

<sup>4</sup> Ebd. 209.

<sup>5</sup> Ebd. 210.

Erlösten“<sup>1</sup>. Dennoch haben wir große Bedenken, die Erkenntnisse Fittkaus als endgültig gesicherte anzuerkennen.

Zunächst:

Sein bewußter Verzicht auf den etymologisch-philologischen, geschichtlichen Rahmen der Wortentwicklung hat Fittkau — leider — das Gemeinsame übersehen lassen, das diesen Begriff mit der Aussagekategorie der heidnischen wie patristischen Antike verbindet. Ungelöst bleibt die Frage, wie der überraschend häufige Gebrauch des Wortes in kultischer Bedeutung zu erklären ist; ungedeutet bleibt auch die an einigen Stellen geradezu mysterientechnische Sprache des hl. Chrysostomus<sup>2</sup>. Daß, ohne diese Zusammenhänge zu sehen, ein volles Begreifen des antiken Gebrauches der Mysterienkategorie nicht möglich ist, hat sogar Adolf Kolping in seiner sonst wohlwollenden Anerkennung des Fittkauschen Buches ausdrücklich zugegeben<sup>3</sup>. Vor allem aber ist Fittkaus Beweisführung sachlich nicht überzeugend. Bezüglich der Taufe bleibt ungeklärt, was letztlich der Inhalt des in der Deutung der Tauftheologie von Röm. 6 so entscheidend wichtigen Wortes *ὑποταγή* ist<sup>4</sup>. Chrysostomus spricht viel zu wenig aus eigentlich theologisch-wissenschaftlichem Interesse, als daß seine Ausführungen letzte Klarheit bringen könnten. Bezüglich der Eucharistia: Wir möchten stärker als Fittkau betonen, daß die begriffliche Sprache des hl. Chrysostomus keine unmittelbaren Schlüsse erlaubt bezüglich des Mysteriencharakters der Eucharistie im Caselschen Sinne<sup>5</sup>; das besagt dann natürlich auch, daß man keine negativen Schlüsse ziehen kann! Sachlich vermag aber auch hier Fittkau nicht zu überzeugen. Er bemüht sich, an einzelnen Beispielen zu zeigen, daß Casels Interpretation wichtiger Stellen nicht zu Recht besteht. Wir greifen die Behandlung der Stelle des Kommentars zu Hebr. 9, 24—10, 10, vor allem zu 10, 10 heraus<sup>6</sup>. Das richtige Verständnis der Aus-

<sup>1</sup> Ebd. 219.

<sup>2</sup> Vgl. ebd. 88, 99f., auch 124f.

<sup>3</sup> ThR 51, 1955, 27.

<sup>4</sup> Vgl. a. a. O. 158—166; besonders zu 166: was ist denn dies „Ab- u. Ebenbild“?

<sup>5</sup> Vgl. ebd. 211, 185; auch 85 und 207.

<sup>6</sup> Hom. 17, 3 (PG 63, 131).

fürhungen hängt zu einem großen Teil ab von der richtigen Deutung bzw. Übersetzung des Begriffes *θυσία*. An sich kann er beides bedeuten: „Opfergabe“ oder „Opferhandlung“. Der Zusammenhang scheint uns hier gebieterisch die Bedeutung „Opferhandlung“ zu erfordern. Der Text lautet: „Dies (das sakramentale Tun) geschieht zum Gedächtnis des damals Geschehenen (τοῦ γενομένου) . . . Nicht ein anderes Opfer begehen wir . . . sondern immer das gleiche, oder vielmehr wir vollziehen ein Gedächtnis des Opfers (ἀνάμνησιν ἐργαζόμεθα θυσίας)“<sup>1</sup>. Das zweite „Gedächtnis des Opfers“ entspricht offenbar ganz dem ersten „Gedächtnis des damals Geschehenen“; also muß „Opfer“ auch an der zweiten Stelle gedeutet werden im Sinne eines „Geschehens“, einer „Handlung“. Die Fittkausche Übersetzung von *θυσία* als „Opfergabe“ ist unhaltbar<sup>2</sup>; damit wird seiner ganzen Beweisführung das Fundament entzogen! Der Inhalt des sakramentalen Gedächtnisses ist nicht die Wiederdarbringung der gleichen Opfergabe, sondern die Gedächtnistat, die sich auf die gleiche Opferhandlung bezieht. Wobei freilich das „Wie“ zu erläutern wäre. Die Caselsche Erklärung scheint immer noch dem Text selbst am besten gerecht zu werden: es handelt sich in diesem „Vollzug eines Gedächtnisses des Opfers“ um das mysterienhafte Wiederhinstellen der einen und gleichen Opferhandlung<sup>3</sup>. Freilich, Chrysostomus selbst sagt das nicht ausdrücklich; Fittkau muß sogar feststellen: er dringt nicht vor „zu einer vollkommenen Erkenntnis . . . der Wirkkraft der sakramentalen Versinnbildung des äußeren Zeichens“<sup>4</sup>. Wir sind also zu dem Schlusse berechtigt: Fittkau hat keinesfalls eine Entscheidung zu geben vermocht!

J. Betz macht in seinem Buche „Die Eucharistie in der Zeit der griechischen Väter“ (d. h. in der vorepaphesinischen griechischen Patristik) eine Feststellung, die uns in unserer Zurückhaltung gegenüber Fittkau, der seine These hier und da mit

<sup>1</sup> PG 63, 131; Casel behandelt die Stelle im JLw 6, 1926, 151f., Fittkau a. a. O. 171—178.

<sup>2</sup> Betz lehnt ebenfalls die Deutung Fittkaus ab; a. a. O. (s. S. 55, Anm. 4) 192 Anm. 185.

<sup>3</sup> Vgl. JLw 6, 1926, 152f.

<sup>4</sup> A. a. O. 211.

starkem Pathos vorträgt, bestärkt: „Die formelle und ausdrückliche Fragestellung (nach dem Wie der Gegenwart) sucht man bei den vorephesinischen Theologen vergeblich“<sup>1</sup>. Dennoch vertritt Betz in seiner eingehenden Untersuchung mit Nachdruck den Standpunkt, die vorephesinische griechische Patristik sehe in der Eucharistie gegeben „die kommensorative Aktualpräsenz der einstigen Erlösungstat Christi“, und gerade Chrysostomus gilt ihm als der Theologe dieser Anamnesis<sup>2</sup>. Betz bringt seine Untersuchung aus der gleichen methodischen Grundeinstellung wie Fittkau: er möchte kritisch im einzelnen prüfen, ob die Caselsche These zu Recht besteht. Besser als Fittkau wird er dabei Casel gerecht, wenn er ausdrücklich die säkulare Tat des Grundanliegens Casels anerkennt<sup>3</sup>. Er wählt aber die Neuprägung „kommensorative Aktualpräsenz“ anstatt „Mysteriengegenwart“, weil dieser Begriff „von Casel selbst . . . mit übertriebenen Analogievorstellungen aus der heidnischen Mysterienwelt belastet wurde“<sup>4</sup>. Sachlich gibt Betz nach genauer Darlegung der Väterlehre von der Eucharistie als der „kommensorativen Aktualpräsenz der einstigen Erlösungstat Christi“ einen guten Überblick über die heute als mögliche Deutung in Frage kommenden Ansichten<sup>5</sup>. Betz meint dann, daß Casels Deutung des zu Recht von ihm bei den Vätern festgestellten Sachverhaltes die Gegenwart der Heilstat zu stark betone; diese Gegenwart sei nach Casel nicht nur mehr real, sondern geradezu absolut zu nennen. Sie entwerte das Symbol; unter der äußerlichen Hülle des Symbols sei die Heilstat Christi in ihrem absoluten Selbst zugegen, während Betz die Väter verstehen zu müssen glaubt in dem Sinne, daß die Heilstat Christi im Symbol gegenwärtig werde, wie etwa die platonische Idee im sinnenfälligen Einzelding zugegen sei<sup>6</sup>. Wenn auch Betz sich mit dieser Deutung von Casel etwas distanziert, so

<sup>1</sup> A. a. O. (s. S. 55, Anm. 4) 198.

<sup>2</sup> Ebd. 192.

<sup>3</sup> Ebd. 247.

<sup>4</sup> Ebd. 243, Anm. 380.

<sup>5</sup> Ebd. 198—202.

<sup>6</sup> Ebd. 202.



steht er doch im Grunde in der gleichen Richtung wie dieser. Wir können und müssen in der These von Betz, wenigstens was diese Grundlinie angeht, eine Rechtfertigung des Caselschen Standpunktes und seines inhaltlichen Kernes bezüglich der vor-ephesinischen griechischen Patristik sehen. Die nähere Begründung des „Wie“ dieser Gegenwart, auf deren Namen es dann schließlich nicht ankäme, ist der weiteren Forschung als Aufgabe gestellt.

Neben die Frage, ob die Interpretation Casels die Meinung der Väter in legitimer Weise wiedergibt, tritt nun weiterhin die Frage: ist der Versuch Casels, seine Ansicht auf die Hl. Schrift, insbesondere bezüglich der Taufe auf Röm. 6 zu stützen, gelungen?<sup>1</sup> Neue Impulse wurden dieser Frage gegeben durch die S. 55, Anm. 5 erwähnte größere Arbeit von R. Schnackenburg. Er versucht, die strittigen Fragen, vor allem bez. Röm. 6, zu beantworten, indem er das in eingehender Einzelanalyse der verschiedenen Stellen erarbeitete Material im großen Rahmen der paulinischen Heilstheologie sieht. Bei aller Anerkennung des Wertes der durch Casel gegebenen Anregungen ist sein Ergebnis aber ziemlich negativ. Immerhin hält auch er folgende „typisch paulinische Grundidee zum Verständnis“ seiner „eigentümlichen Redeweise vom „Mitbegrabenwerden““ usw. für notwendig: „Was Christus widerfuhr, geschieht auch dem Christen“<sup>2</sup>. Heilsgeschichtliches (Adam-Christus-Parallele) und Pneumatisch-Überzeitliches (ἐν Χριστῷ) sollen so in harmonischer Weise verbunden sein<sup>3</sup>. Schnackenburg glaubt derart den Mittelweg zu gehen „zwischen zwei versengenden Feuern (hie Casel — hie Hahn)“<sup>4</sup>. Während bei Hahn zu befürchten sei, „daß man einer existentiell gedachten Verflochtenheit in das historische Sterben Christi auf Kosten des sakra-

<sup>1</sup> Vgl. Filthaut (s. S. 55, Anm. 1) 81—85; franz. Übersetz.: 81—86.

<sup>2</sup> A. a. O. (s. S. 55, Anm. 5) 152.

<sup>3</sup> Ebd. 158.

<sup>4</sup> Ebd. 208. — Bei Hahn handelt es sich um die Arbeit von W. Tr. Hahn, Das Mitsterben und Mitaufstehen mit Christus bei Paulus. Ein Beitrag zum Problem der Gleichzeitigkeit des Christen mit Christus (1937); s. dazu O. Casel im ALW 1, 1950, 315—323.

mentalens Geschehens das Wort redet“<sup>1</sup>, sieht Schnackenburg bei Casel eine Überbewertung des Symbols bei Paulus<sup>2</sup>. Auf die im übrigen gehaltvolle und anregende Studie Schnackenburgs hat nun V. Warnach geantwortet mit seiner Arbeit über „Taufe und Christusgeschehen nach Röm. 6“ (s. S. 55 Anm. 6). Schnackenburg seinerseits hat dazu Stellung genommen in seinem Aufsatz „Todes- und Lebensgemeinschaft mit Christus. Neue Studien zu Röm. 6, 1—11“ (s. S. 55 Anm. 5). Hier bietet er eine aus seinen bisherigen Erkenntnissen weiterentwickelte Deutung des paulinischen Denkens. Die ruhige Art, in der Schn. die bisherige Position überprüft, sie aufgibt, verbessert oder verteidigt, läßt vieles erhoffen für die sachliche Fortführung dieses Gespräches.

Im Mittelpunkt der Auseinandersetzung steht mit Betonung Röm. 6, 5 und sein Zentralwort: *ὁμολογια*. Während Schnackenburg die Deutung Casels als Überbewertung für Paulus ablehnt („so beachtlich die Caselsche ‚Symbol‘-Theorie vielleicht für die spätere Zeit ist“)<sup>3</sup>, verteidigt Warnach in glücklicher Weise die „konkrete Bedeutung von *ὁμολογια*“ für „den Phänomenbereich des Kultes“ im Sinne von kultischem Gleichbild<sup>4</sup>. Die Taufe ist „Gleichbild seines Todes“, „weil in ihr der Tod Christi selbst unter kultischer Gestalt (Ritus) erscheint und wirksam gegenwärtig wird“<sup>5</sup>. In seiner Antwort zeigt sich Schn. zwar bereit, seine bisherige Deutung von *ὁμολογια* aufzugeben, möchte aber nun den Gesamtausdruck *ὁμολογια τοῦ θανάτου* im Sinne von Todesgestalt zusammennehmen und erklären als „Gestalt des Todes“, Todesgestalt, ohne dabei an ein Abbild oder dgl. zu denken, im Sinne von *μορφή, εἶδος, σχῆμα*<sup>6</sup>. Er möchte, in Anlehnung vor allem an E. Stommel<sup>7</sup>, die Aussage

<sup>1</sup> A. a. O. 208.

<sup>2</sup> Ebd. 126.

<sup>3</sup> Ebd. 122—126; das letzte Zitat auf S. 126.

<sup>4</sup> A. a. O. (s. S. 55, Anm. 6) 306f.

<sup>5</sup> Ebd. 311.

<sup>6</sup> In der S. 55, Anm. 5 an 2. Stelle genannten Arbeit: S. 36f.

<sup>7</sup> „Begraben mit Christus“ (Röm. 6, 4) und der Taufritus, in: Römische Quartalschrift 49, 1954, 1—20; Stommel hat freilich in der gleichen Zeitschrift (50, 1955, 1—21) in seinem Aufsatz „Das ‚Abbild seines

des Apostels ablösen von der Beziehung auf den Ritus, sie vielmehr nur bezogen sein lassen auf die theologischen Grundgedanken des Apostels. Schackenburg greift dabei zurück auf die hebräisch-semitische Anschauung von der „korporativen Persönlichkeit“, gemäß der eine Angleichung an die Christus-Tat gegeben ist auf Grund unserer Teilnahme an den Taten des Stammvaters, dem wir inkorporiert sind<sup>1</sup>. So beachtlich diese Gedanken sind, so sehr man mit Stommel die große Freiheit der paulinischen Bildersprache herausstellen muß, so scheint uns doch dieses fast völlige Absehen vom Ritus in der Erklärung von Röm. 6 wenig überzeugend. Schn. bemerkt abschließend, die Mysterienkategorie sei für Paulus nicht zuständig, wenn damit auch nichts entschieden sei für die Ausdeutung der Taufwirklichkeit im 4. Jahrhundert oder für die Eucharistie<sup>2</sup>. Damit mag richtig gesagt sein, daß die Dinge bei Paulus in der Tat noch nicht in der entfalteten Deutlichkeit einer späteren Zeit gesagt sind; aber ob Schn. nicht doch übersieht, daß die Caselsche Konzeption, wie sie Warnach verteidigt, bei Paulus in der Tat grundgelegt ist? Sollten die späteren Deuter des 4. Jahrhunderts, zumal unter den Griechen, nicht doch auf Grund eben des bei Paulus gegebenen Ansatzes ihre Ansichten entfaltet haben, für die auch Schn. die Caselsche Deutung zum wenigsten als beachtlich zugibt? All diese Fragen sind nun neu aufgeworfen und zu beantworten!

Wir möchten unsererseits abschließend auf das hinweisen, was Betz mit Recht sagt<sup>3</sup>: mehr und mehr wird man sich dessen

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Todes' (Röm. 6, 5) und der Taufritus“ das so radikal weitergeführt, daß wir ihm nicht mehr zu folgen vermögen; er will auch hier „vom Taufritus . . . vollständig absehen. Das ‚Abbild seines Todes‘ ist nicht die Taufe, viel weniger der äußere Taufritus. Das ‚Abbild‘ wird vielmehr durch die Taufe im Täufling geschaffen . . .“ (21). Auch seine kategorische Ablehnung der Übersetzung von Röm. 6, 4 durch „in den Tod“ und seine Forderung der Übersetzung durch „auf den Tod“ (ähnlich wie bei den Wendungen in der Apg. 2, 38; 8, 16 u. ä. im Sinne von „auf das Konto des“) scheinen uns die hier gegebene Aufgabe doch allzusehr zu vereinfachen! (4f. u. 21).

<sup>1</sup> A. a. O. 44—47; 51.

<sup>2</sup> A. a. O. 51f. und 50 (Anm. 63), 52f.

<sup>3</sup> A. a. O. (s. S. 55, Anm. 4) 202.

bewußt, daß die durch Casel aufgeworfene „Fragestellung durchaus modern (ist) und erst durch die Laacher Mysterientheologie zum brennenden Problem wurde. Die Väter haben sie ausdrücklich nicht gestellt. Offene und direkte Antworten dürfen wir daher in diesem Punkte von ihnen nicht ohne weiteres erwarten“. Aber die Frage nach dem „Wie“ der Gegenwart der Heilstat Christi in den Sakramenten, das sagt auch Betz, wächst aus der Lehre der Alten organisch hervor. Sie ist uns heute ausdrücklich gestellt!

Die richtige Beantwortung dieser Frage wird einen entscheidend wichtigen Beitrag geben können im ökumenischen Gespräch der Gegenwart. E. Iserloh hat in seinem Buche „Die Eucharistie in der Darstellung des Johannes Eck“<sup>1</sup> treffend gesagt, „daß die Mysterienlehre, wie sie in unseren Tagen vorgetragen wird, die Richtung angibt, in der die lange ausstehende, befriedigende Antwort auf die von den Reformatoren aufgeworfenen Fragen zu suchen ist“<sup>2</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> ... Ein Beitrag zur vortridentinischen Kontroverstheologie über das Meßopfer (Reformationsgesch. Studien u. Texte 73—74, 1950).

<sup>2</sup> A. a. O. 345. — In Oxford mußten wir uns aus Zeitmangel auf den Vortrag des 1. Teiles (bis S. 60 oben) beschränken, so daß Schnackenburg-Warnach und das Folgende nicht mehr behandelt werden konnten. In einer kurzen Diskussion meinte ein franz. Theologe (aus Metz bzw. Straßburg), der Vergleich mit den hellenistischen Mysterien sei zwar für Casel persönlich der Weg geworden zu seinen bedeutsamen Erkenntnissen; er zweifle aber, ob dieser methodische Weg über diese persönliche Bedeutung hinaus sachlich für die anderen gangbar sei. Frl. Chr. Mohrmann (Nijmegen) äußerte Bedenken bez. der von Casel gegebenen semasiologischen Deutung von *μυστήριον* und *sacramentum*, wenigstens für die früheste Zeit.

# The Institution Narrative of the Roman Canon Missae: Its Beginnings and Early Background

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Symbols for the MSS to which reference is made in this paper

- Bo*        *The Bobbio Missal*
- St*        *The Stowe Missal* (Dublin, Royal Irish Academy, cod. D. 11. 3); see G. F. Warner, *The Stowe Missal*, I Facsimile, II Printed Text, Henry Bradshaw Society XXXI (1906) and XXXII (1915).
- Fr*        *Missale Francorum* (Rome, Bibliotheca Vaticana, cod. Reg. lat. 257); see Mabillon, *De Liturgia Gallicana*, Paris 1729, pp. 301—328.
- PD 47*   *Padua, Biblioteca Capitolare, cod. D. 47*, a Gregorian Sacramentary of the mid 9th century; see K. Mohlberg/A. Baumstark, *Die älteste erreichbare Gestalt des Liber Sacramentorum der römischen Kirche*, Liturgiegeschichtliche Quellen 11/12, Münster, 1927.
- Gell*       *The Sacramentary of Gellone* (Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, cod. lat. 12048), a Gelasian book of the late 8th century.
- VR 316*   *Rome, Bibliotheca Vaticana, cod. Reg. lat. 316*, of the mid 8th century; see H. A. Wilson, *The Gelasian Sacramentary*, Oxford 1894.
- Cbr 164*   *Cambrai, Bibliothèque Municipale, cod. 164 (159)*, written in 812; see H. Lietzmann, *Das Sacramentarium Gregorianum nach dem Aachener Urexemplar*, Liturgiegeschichtliche Quellen 3, Münster, 1921.

Every paragraph, indeed every clause, of the *Roman Canon Missae* is fraught with interest. Yet inevitably some paragraphs have received less attention than others; and among these is the Institution Narrative. Nearly thirty years ago, it is true, Präfekt F. Hamm submitted the Roman Institution Narrative

to investigation as part of a general study of liturgical Institution Narratives<sup>1</sup>; but his treatment left something to be desired, in that he overlooked certain remarkable features of the Roman text. Since his time, the Roman Narrative has received only brief and occasional consideration. The discussion devoted to it by Professor A. Jungmann, in the course of his comprehensive commentary on the Roman Mass, valuable as it is, is necessarily restricted in its scope.<sup>2</sup> Dom B. Botte and Dr C. Mohrmann share the broad conclusion of Präfekt Hamm and Professor Jungmann; their opinion is concisely expressed in a footnote:

«Dans toutes les liturgies, le récit de l'institution eucharistique repose sur une tradition indépendante des évangiles. En même temps qu'on enrichissait ce récit de divers circonstances, on a cherché à en rendre symétriques les deux parties et à les rapprocher des textes évangéliques.»<sup>3</sup>

That this judgement is applicable to the Institution Narratives of *St James*, *St Mark*, *St Basil* and the other oriental liturgies is beyond dispute. The texts of these Narratives are elaborate and artificial, and display the hand of the literary refiner. The Narrative of *St James* may be quoted as an example of the more opulent type of 'enrichissement':

μέλλων δὲ τὸν ἐκούσιον καὶ ζωοποιὸν διὰ σταυροῦ θάνατον δ ἀναμάρτητος ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν ἁμαρτωλῶν καταδέχεσθαι, ἐν τῇ νυκτὶ ἣ παρεδίδοτο, μᾶλλον δὲ ἑαυτὸν παρεδίδου ὑπὲρ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου ζωῆς καὶ σωτηρίας, λαβὼν ἄρτον ἐπὶ τῶν ἁγίων καὶ ἀχράντων καὶ ἀμύμων καὶ ἀθανάτων αὐτοῦ χειρῶν ἀναβλέψας εἰς τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ ἀναδείξας σοι τῷ θεῷ καὶ πατρὶ εὐχαριστήσας εὐλογήσας ἁγιάσας κλάσας μετέδωκε τοῖς ἁγίοις καὶ μακαρίοις αὐτοῦ μαθηταῖς καὶ ἀποστόλοις εἰπὼν·

Λάβετε φάγετε, τοῦτό μου ἐστὶ τὸ σῶμα τὸ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν κλώμενον καὶ διαδιδόμενον εἰς ἄφεσιν ἁμαρτιῶν.

ὡσαύτως μετὰ τὸ δειπνήσαι λαβὼν ποτήριον καὶ κεράσας ἐξ οἴνου

<sup>1</sup> Die liturgischen Einsetzungsberichte im Sinne vergleichender Liturgieforschung untersucht. Liturgiegeschichtliche Quellen und Forschungen 23, Münster 1928.

<sup>2</sup> Missarum Sollemnia, Wien 1948. II Band, pp. 236—263.

<sup>3</sup> L'Ordinaire de la Messe. Etudes Liturgiques, 2, Louvain and Paris 1953, p. 81, n. 1.

καὶ ὕδατος ἀτενίσας εἰς τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ ἀναδείξας σοι τῷ θεῷ καὶ πατρὶ εὐχαριστήσας εὐλογήσας ἀγιάσας πλήσας πνεύματος ἁγίου μετέδωκε τοῖς ἁγίοις καὶ μακαρίοις αὐτοῦ μαθηταῖς καὶ ἀποστόλοις εἰπὼν·

Πιετε ἐξ αὐτοῦ πάντες,

τοῦτό μοῦ ἐστι τὸ αἷμα τὸ τῆς καινῆς διαθήκης τὸ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν καὶ πολλῶν ἐκχυνόμενον καὶ διαδιδόμενον εἰς ἄφεσιν ἁμαρτιῶν. τοῦτο ποιεῖτε εἰς τὴν ἐμὴν ἀνάμνησιν, ὅσάκις γὰρ ἂν ἐσθίητε τὸν ἄρτον τοῦτον καὶ τὸ ποτήριον τοῦτο πίνετε, τὸν θάνατον τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καταγγέλλετε καὶ τὴν ἀνάστασιν αὐτοῦ ὁμολογεῖτε ἄχρις οὗ ἂν ἔλθῃ.<sup>1</sup>

The same judgement applies also to the Narrative of *De Sacramentis*, albeit with some reservation, as will be evident from an inspection of the text:

*Qui pridie quam pateretur in sanctis manibus suis accepit panem, respexit ad caelum, ad te, sancte pater omnipotens aeternae deus, gratias agens benedixit, fregit, fractumque apostolis et discipulis suis tradidit dicens:*

*Accipite et edite ex hoc omnes, hoc est enim corpus meum quod pro multis confringetur.*

*Similiter etiam calicem postquam cenatum est, pridie quam pateretur, accepit, respexit ad caelum, ad te, sancte pater omnipotens aeternae deus, gratias agens benedixit, apostolis et discipulis suis tradidit dicens:*

*Accipite et bibite ex hoc omnes, hic est enim sanguis meus [ ]<sup>2</sup> Quotiescunque hoc feceritis, totiens commemorationem mei facietis donec iterum adueniam.<sup>3</sup>*

Here, while the tendency to seek after symmetry is unmistakable, it has not been carried to the lengths observable in the Narrative of *St James*, or (it may be added) in those of *St Basil* and *St Mark*. By comparison with these the Narrative of *De Sacra-*

<sup>1</sup> B.-Ch. Mercier, *La Liturgie de Saint Jacques*. Edition critique du texte grec. *Patrologia Orientalis* 262, 1946, pp. 200, 202.

<sup>2</sup> It is probable that certain phrases have been omitted at this point, as being not strictly relevant to the theme of consecration.

<sup>3</sup> *De Sacramentis* IV, 21, 22, 27.

*mentis* is restrained and austere; and the scriptural elements in it have been allowed to retain something of their native simplicity. Nevertheless, the Narrative of *De Sacramentis* is a carefully formalized composition. The Narrative of the Roman Canon, on the other hand, is patently different alike from that in *De Sacramentis* and from its oriental counterparts. Even a cursory inspection of it reveals two striking circumstances. For one, the Roman Narrative presents the Gospel tradition in a bolder relief than we have it in the oriental forms or in *De Sacramentis*. For the other, while the Roman Narrative exhibits a number of additions to the Gospel tradition, these additions are not merely literary devices introduced in accordance with rhetorical rules. The majority of the additions is of scriptural derivation. Their effect is to enhance the vividness of the Narrative, and to educe, with a minimum of 'enrichissement', the full significance of the Institution. Is it possible, then, that we should regard the Roman Institution Narrative as an exception to the general judgement of Dom B. Botte and Dr C. Mohrmann quoted above? Can that Narrative fairly be said to rest "sur une tradition indépendante des évangiles"? If the answer to the first question be affirmative and to the second be negative, how is this phenomenon to be explained? The matter is deserving of a short investigation.

It will be agreed that, for the earliest attainable form of the text of the Roman Narrative, we must turn to the Hiberno-Gallican family of manuscript Sacramentaries; and of these we may reasonably select the so-called *Bobbio (Bo) Missal* as being the oldest member of this family<sup>1</sup>, and as providing, in consequence, a convenient basis for inquiry. The Institution Narrative, as it is contained in the Canon of the 'Missa Romensis Cotidiana' of *Bo* runs as follows<sup>2</sup>:

<sup>1</sup> Paris, B. Nat., cod. lat. 13246. Dom Leo Eizenhöfer O.S.B., describes it as *saec. VII vel potius VIII; probabilius Gallia meridionalis versus orientem quam Italia septentrionalis vel Hispania*, Canon Missae Romanae I, Collectanea Anselmiana. Series Minor: Subsidia Studiorum I, Rome 1954, p. 5.

<sup>2</sup> The Bobbio Missal, Text. Ed. E. A. Lowe, Henry Bradshaw Society LVIII (1920), p. 11f. For the purposes of this paper, the spelling of the MS has been corrected and modern punctuation introduced.



*Qui pridie quam pateretur, accepit panem in sanctas ac venerabiles manus suas, eleuatis oculis suis in [ad] caelos (caelum) ad te deum patrem suum omnipotentem, (tibi) gratias agens (egit) benedixit, fregit, dedit discipulis suis dicens:*

5 *Accipite et manducate ex hoc omnes.*

*Hoc est enim corpus meum.*

*Simili modo, posteaquam caenatum est, accepit et hunc praeclarum calicem in sanctas ac venerabiles manus suas, item tibi gratias agens benedixit, dedit discipulis suis dicens:*

10 *Accipite et bibite ex eo [hoc] omnes.*

*Hic est enim calix <sancti> sanguinis mei noui et aeterni testamenti, mysterium fidei, qui pro uobis et pro multis effunditur (effundetur) in*

15 *remissione [remissionem] peccatorum. Haec quotienscumque feceritis, in mei memoriam facietis.*

Before proceeding to consider the character of this Narrative, it will be convenient to dispose of several textual matters. Beside the *Bo* text, only one other MS, *PD 47*, reads *in caelos* in line 2. Either the scribe of *Bo* himself, or a contemporary corrector, has scored out the final *s*, thus leaving *caelo*, a reading which has no parallel. The correction, however, may have been left incomplete, or it may have been an error.<sup>1</sup> The two other Sacramentaries of the Hiberno-Gallican family, on the other hand, *St* and *Fr*, agree in reading *ad caelum*. The remaining MSS read *in caelum*. If *ad* be not the original reading, it may be regarded as an early variant of *in*. Between *caelos* and *caelum*, the weight of the evidence is in favour of *caelum*. Two matters arise out of line 3f. *Bo* is alone among the Sacramentaries in omitting *tibi* before the phrase, *gratias agens*. We may therefore reasonably assume that *tibi* was omitted through scribal inadvertence; and we may properly restore it to the text. In regard to the participle, *agens*, it should be noticed that *St* and *Fr* read the perfect,

<sup>1</sup> An example of a similar, and mistaken, correction occurs four lines above; the *e* of *pridie* is scored out: see The Bobbio Missal, Facsimile, Henry Bradshaw Society LIII (1917), fol. 13<sup>v</sup>.

*egit*. Accordingly, although all other MSS read *agens*, the possibility that *egit* was the original reading must be taken into account. The matter will receive further consideration at a later stage of this paper. In line 10, there is some uncertainty with regard to *eo*. *St* and *Fr* read *hoc*. *Hoc* occurs again in *Ordo Romanus* VII<sup>1</sup>; it was presumably held to be the true reading by the compiler of the "Gelasian of the VIII century". The scribe of *Bo* must have been familiar with *hoc* from *Matthew* 26<sup>28</sup>. For this reason, although *hoc* was probably the reading of the archetypal liturgical Narrative, the *eo* of *Bo* cannot be discarded as a scribal mistake; it may be taken as an early appearance of what was to become the *lectio recepta* of the Canon. The case in regard to the adjective, *sancti*, in line 11 can be summarily decided. *Sancti* occurs elsewhere only in the Narrative of *St*; it may be removed as being an "Irishism".<sup>3</sup> Two further matters arise out of the clause, *qui pro uobis et pro multis effunditur in remissione peccatorum* in lines 13—16. The first is of some importance, and concerns the word *effunditur*. Apart from *Bo*, the present tense is not found except in *Gell*. The remaining Sacramentaries agree in reading the future tense, *effundetur*. There can be no room for doubt that *effundetur* is the correct reading. For the second matter, there is rather less assurance. The *Bo* reading, *remissione*, occurs also in four Gelasian MSS, inclusive of *VR 316*, and in the important Gregorian MS, *Cbr 164*. *St* and *Fr*, on the other hand, read *remissionem*, and the weight of the evidence is in favour of the accusative. *Remissionem*, therefore, may be taken as the true reading, although *remissione* was obviously accepted in certain quarters, and perhaps at an early date. Finally, it must be noted that, in the last line and for the last word, the scribe of *Bo* wrote *faciates*. He, or another, subsequently attempted to convert the second *a* into *e* or *ae*. *St* reads *faciatis*. *VR 316* and *Gell* read *faciaetis*. *Facietis* is the reading of *Fr* and of the

<sup>1</sup> M. Andrieu, *Les Ordines Romani du haut moyen âge*. II Les Textes (Ordines I—XIII), Louvain 1948, p. 299, l. 13.

<sup>2</sup> On *sanctus sanguis* as a characteristic Irish expression, see No. 14 of the 'Liturgical Note' by Edmund Bishop in *The Book of Cerne*, ed. A. B. Kuypers, Cambridge 1902, pp. 247f. and 282, n. 1.

majority of the Sacramentaries: it may be accepted as the more probable of the two.<sup>1</sup>

We may now examine the Narrative. What does it disclose as to its composition and character? It is patently not the composition of some *scholasticus*; and it is as patently not a conflation or harmonization of the Narratives of the Synoptists. Nevertheless it is, predominantly, a gospel Narrative. Its groundwork is *Matthew 26<sup>26-28</sup>*. *Accipit panem . . . benedixit, fregit, dedit discipulis suis, dicens: Accipite et manducate ex hoc omnes. Hoc est enim corpus meum . . . gratias egit (agens), benedixit, dedit discipulis suis dicens: Accipite et bibite ex hoc [eo] omnes . . . Hic est enim calix sanguinis mei novi . . . testamenti . . . qui . . . pro multis effundetur in remissionem [remissione] peccatorum* is a series of passages appropriated directly from *Matthew*. But the text of *Matthew* here employed exhibits certain marked differences from the familiar text of the Vulgate. For the source of the differences we must go behind the Vulgate to the Old Latin versions of the Gospels. The matter can be most easily illustrated by presenting an Old Latin text of *Matthew 26<sup>26-28</sup>* in parallel with the Vulgate equivalent. The Old Latin text selected for this purpose is that of the European *Codex Veronensis* (b) of the V century:

b.	Vulgate.
(26) <i>Ipsis autem cenantibus accipit ihs panem et benedixit ac fregit dedit- que discipulis suis</i>	<i>Caenantibus autem eis, accipit Iesus panem et benedixit, ac fregit, deditque discipulis suis,</i>
et ait	et ait:
5 <i>Accipite et manducate ex hoc omnes</i>	<i>Accipite et comedite:</i>
<i>hoc est enim corpus meum.</i>	<i>hoc est corpus meum.</i>
(27) <i>Et accipiens calicem gratias egit et dedit illis dicens</i>	<i>Et accipiens calicem gratias egit et dedit illis, dicens:</i>

<sup>1</sup> The *lectiones variae* of the Institution Narrative of the Canon can be conveniently studied in L. Eizenhöfer, op. cit. pp. 32f.

10 <i>Accipite et bibite ex hoc</i>	<i>Bibite ex hoc omnes:</i>
(28) <i>hic est enim sanguis meus</i>	<i>hic est enim sanguis meus</i>
<i>noui et aeterni testamenti</i>	<i>noui testamenti,</i>
<i>qui pro multis effundetur</i>	<i>qui pro multis effunditur</i>
<i>in remissionem peccatorum.</i> <sup>1</sup>	<i>in remissionem peccatorum.</i>

When these two versions are compared, it will be seen that the spaced words and phrases of *b* which differ from the text of the Vulgate occur also in the Institution Narrative of the Canon. It should be stated that *b* is alone among the Old Latin versions of *Matthew* in introducing *ex hoc omnes* after *manducate* in line 5 and *et aeterni* before *testamenti* in line 12. It is not alone, however, in exhibiting the other peculiarities of the liturgical Narrative. The *enim* of line 6 occurs in *a*, *f*, *r*<sup>1</sup> and *h*<sup>2</sup>. *g*<sup>1</sup> and *h* agree with *b* in reading *Accipite et* before *bibite* in line 10; and *accipite* has the support of the Old Syriac also. *Effundetur* is the reading of all but three of the Old Latin MSS collated by A. Jülicher for the first volume of his *Itala*.<sup>3</sup> Other codices, it may be added, agree with the liturgical Narrative against *b*. *c*, *f*, *ff*<sup>2</sup>, *h* and *r*<sup>1</sup> read *dicens* for *et ait* in line 4 of *b*. *ff*<sup>1</sup> reads *discipulis suis* for *illis* in line 8 of *b*; and *c* reads *hic est calix sanguinis mei* for *hic est enim sanguis meus* in line 11 of *b*. *a*, again, presents an inversion of the liturgical clauses in reading *cum benedixisset [gratias] egit* and *benedi[xit et] gratias [egit]* in verses 26 and 27 respectively.<sup>4</sup> The variants within the liturgical Narrative itself, *eo* for *hoc* and *remissione* for *remissionem* (v. supra, p. 68, lines 10 and 15), also reflect Old Latin readings in the same verses.<sup>5</sup> It may be suggested that the Old Latin versions of *Matthew* which exhibit these "liturgicisms" have in

<sup>1</sup> The Four Gospels from the Codex Veronensis, ed. by E. S. Buchanan. Old Latin Biblical Texts: No. VI, Oxford, 1911, p. 52.

<sup>2</sup> *h* places *enim* immediately after *hoc*.

<sup>3</sup> *Itala*. Das Neue Testament in altlateinischer Überlieferung, I Matthäus-Evangelium, Berlin 1938, from which the statistics in this paragraph have been obtained.

<sup>4</sup> The inversion occurs also in a Mozarabic Institution Narrative, see M. Férotin, Le Liber Ordinum, Monumenta Ecclesiae Liturgica V, Paris 1904, col. 238, lines 6, 7.

<sup>5</sup> *d* and *ff*<sup>2</sup> read *eo*; *aur*, *c*, *f*, *ff*<sup>2</sup>, *g*<sup>1</sup>, *l* and *q* read *remissione*.

turn been influenced, at least to some degree, by the Narrative of the Canon. The suggestion is reasonable. If we may accept it, it would indicate that the ecclesiastical authorities responsible for these versions recognized *Matthew* as being the groundwork of the liturgical narrative. By contrast, the liturgicisms in the Old Latin texts both of *Mark* and *Luke* are remarkably few; for the most part they occur in connexion with the words, *Hoc est corpus meum* and with their counterpart concerning the cup, and are not derived from the liturgical tradition represented by the Roman Canon; and the presence of most of them can equally well be explained as the result of influence by *Matthew* and I *Corinthians* 11.<sup>1</sup>

A further document, and one of no little importance, remains to be noticed. St Cyprian, in his 63rd Epistle, condemning the use of any other than the mixed cup in the Mass, quotes *Matthew* 26<sup>27,28</sup> as the true and authentic account of the Lord's actions and words concerning the cup at the Institution. The passage runs thus:

*Calicem etenim sub die passionis accipiens benedixit, et dedit discipulis suis dicens: Bibite ex hoc omnes: hic est enim sanguis testamenti qui pro multis effundetur in remissionem peccatorum.*

From the words spaced, it will be observed that this excerpt from an early African Old Latin version of *Matthew* exhibits several of the peculiarities of the Roman Narrative concerning the cup, and also attests the readings, *Hoc* and *remissionem*. The quotation has more, however, than a merely textual interest.

<sup>1</sup> For an examination of the Old Latin text of *Luke*, see Appendix to the Article, "Luke XXII, 19b—20", by G. D. Kilpatrick in *Journal of Theological Studies*, Vol. XLVII, 1946, pp. 54ff. Dr Kilpatrick notes one Roman liturgicism occurring in verse 19a of *f* which, however, may be an example of the influence of *Matthew*. He notes another in verse 20 of *c* where the text, *hic est calix novi testamenti sanguinis mei*, belongs to a passage wanting (as he demonstrates) from the archetype of *c*, and is also related to Matt. 26<sup>28</sup> in *c*, *hic est calix sanguinis mei*, as noted above. The compiler of 19b—20 in *c* appears to have turned to *Matthew* in *c* for his form of the Dominical words over the second cup. See also Jülicher, *Itala*, III *Lucas-Evangelium*, Berlin 1954, in loc.

St Cyprian's use of the passage is something more than reference to an historical record. His purpose in Epistle 63 is to prove that, as the Eucharist is the fulfilment of the Institution, so the celebrant's procedure must be identical with that of the Lord, and must conform exactly with the Lord's prescription as given in *Matthew*. It will not escape notice that St Cyprian introduces the Matthaean quotation with the words, *sub die passionis*, which recall the initial phrase of the Institution Narrative of the Canon, *qui pridie quam pateretur*. These considerations suggest that for St Cyprian the Institution Narrative of *Matthew* was the liturgical Narrative.

If, however, *Matthew* provides the groundwork of the Narrative of the Canon, another New Testament document has made a distinctive contribution to it. I *Corinthians* 11<sup>25, 26</sup> furnishes the nexus between the two parts of the liturgical Narrative; it also supplies material for a recasting of the Dominical words concerning the cup, and it contains the matrix of the form assumed by the Dominical command at the end of the Narrative. The command, *τοῦτο ποιεῖτε εἰς τὴν ἐμὴν ἀνάμνησιν*, was an element of the Institution Narrative in the 2nd century.<sup>1</sup> When and where the Pauline nexus made its first appearance, on the other hand, cannot be said. It is absent from the Narratives of *Apostolic Tradition*, *Apostolic Constitutions* VIII and *St Basil*; it is present in those of *St James*, *St Mark* and *St John Chrysostom*. But we need not look to later Jerusalem, Alexandria or Constantinople for the origin of the Latin usage. It is worthy of attention that St Cyprian, when establishing the argument advanced in his Epistle 63, refers neither to *Mark* nor to *Luke*, but turns to I *Corinthians* 11. He quotes verses 23 to 26 in full.<sup>2</sup> What is prescribed by the Lord in *Matthew*, he asserts, is confirmed and handed down by St Paul. I *Corinthians* 11<sup>23-26</sup> is therefore an apostolic and authoritative witness to and commentary upon the Matthaean Narrative. While we may suppose

<sup>1</sup> Justin Martyr introduces the command before the words, *τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ σῶμά μου*: 1 Apol. 66<sup>a</sup>. Irenaeus alludes to it at the end of his reference to the Institution: Adv. Haer. IV, 17<sup>a</sup>.

<sup>2</sup> Ep. cit. 10.

it probable that St Cyprian was familiar with the addition of the Dominical command to the liturgical Narrative, it would go beyond the limits of the evidence to assume that any other element of I *Corinthians* 11<sup>23-26</sup> had been incorporated into that Narrative by St Cyprian's time. Nevertheless, St Cyprian's treatment of the Matthaean and Pauline texts, and his emphasis upon their authority as being both authentic records of the Institution and also trustworthy guides to the proper conduct of the Eucharist, would undoubtedly open the way to the kind of Matthaean-Pauline combination with which the Institution Narrative of the Canon presents us. At all events, one fact is certain. The text of the Pauline nexus in the Latin liturgical Narrative is again that of an African Old Latin version. The phrase of the canon, *Simili modo, posteaquam caenatum est, accepit et (hunc praeclarum) calicem*, is akin to the text quoted by St Cyprian, *Simili modo et calicem postquam caenatum est accepit*. The Vulgate rendering is, *Similiter et calicem postquam caenavit*.

The word, *hunc*, of the phrase bracketed above produces, in the minds of the attentive faithful, the effect of identifying the Eucharistic chalice, taken into the celebrant's hands or set down upon the altar, with the cup of the Last Supper and the Institution.<sup>1</sup> The identification is sustained in the form given to the Dominical words concerning the chalice, *Hic est calix sanguinis mei* etc., the form itself being a combination of Matthaean and Pauline phrases, yet so adjusted as not to weaken or obscure the Matthaean statement, *Hic est sanguis meus*. The Eucharistic chalice therefore is, in Cyprian's phrase, *Calix domini* or *Calix dominici sanguinis*. In the course of Epistle 63, St Cyprian uses the former designation some fifteen times in regard to the Eucharistic cup. The designation has the ring of a familiar and generally current expression; it is not impossible that the words, *Calix*

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<sup>1</sup> The adjective *praeclarum* is derived from Psalm 22<sup>5</sup>. Cyprian, in Ep. cit. 11, takes the words, *Calix tuus inebrians quam peroptimus*, to be a prophecy of the Eucharistic cup. For the text, see Dom R. Weber, *Le Psautier romain et les autres anciens Psautiers latins*. Edition critique. Collectanea Biblica Latina X, Rome 1953, in loc.

*domini*, or *Calix dominici sanguinis*, were recited at the administration of the cup at the communion in St Cyprian's time. If that were so, it would not be difficult to account for the combination of Pauline with Matthaean phraseology in the Dominical words pronounced over the cup in the liturgical Institution Narrative. Yet, even if the usage in regard to the formula of administration was otherwise, St Cyprian's exposition is evidence of the currency of ideas which, during a period when flexibility of detail was not held to be incompatible with rigidity of pattern in the Eucharistic Prayer or Canon, would have rendered such a combination easy of accomplishment.

Adjustment to the purpose of the liturgy can be discerned again in the form assumed by the Dominical command occurring at the conclusion of the Narrative of the Canon. The clause, *Haec quotienscumque feceritis, in mei memoriam facietis* is clearly a transformation or adaptation of *Hoc facite, quotienscumque biberitis, in meam commemorationem*, as Cyprian's African Old Latin version of the Pauline command runs. What was written by St Paul with reference only to the drinking is applied, in the transformation of the Canon, to the whole liturgical action. Here a common liturgical pattern is being followed. In the text of the Canon, however, the imperative, *facite*, is replaced by the future, *facietis*. The reason for the change will be considered among the concluding reflexions of this paper.

The use of the word, *memoria*, instead of *commemoratio* requires a brief notice. In the Old Latin texts, as in the Vulgate, *commemoratio* is the word employed to translate *ἀνάμνησις*. *Commemoratio* is also the word used by Cyprian in the liturgical contexts of Epistle 63. It is the equivalent of *ἀνάμνησις* in the Institution Narrative of *De Sacramentis*. It was the term used in the Anamnesis of the Canon known to Fulgentius of Ruspe.<sup>1</sup> *Memoria*, on the other hand, appears in liturgical contexts in the writings both of Tertullian and of St Augustine. Tertullian, for instance speaks of *uini saporem quod in sanguinis sui memo-*

<sup>1</sup> *cum tempore sacrificii commemorationem eius facimus*, Frag. 28 from Contra Fabianum Arianum VIII (PL 65, col. 791).



*riam consecrauit* (sc. *Dominus*).<sup>1</sup> St Augustine refers to the Eucharist as *peracti sacrificii* (sc. *Christi*) *memoria*<sup>2</sup> and *sacramentum memoriae*.<sup>3</sup> We may infer, therefore, that the word, *memoria*, was a recognized synonym of *commemoratio* considered as a rendering of ἀνάμνησις. Here its nuance of meaning is somewhat more concrete than that of *commemoratio*. The *memoria martyris Christi* was his tomb or commemorative chapel: in the same way, the *memoria Christi* was the liturgical action of sacrifice and communion instituted by Christ Himself, and not merely a recollection of Him in a *carmen* or *oratio*.

One or two matters of detail, omitted in the main course of the discussion, have yet to be considered.

At the beginning of the Narrative of the Canon, after the statement, *accepit panem* and before *benedixit*, there occurs the participial clause, *tibi gratias agens* (line 3). Are we to treat this clause as a symmetricism, introduced in order to establish a balance with the *tibi gratias agens* which precedes the *benedixit* of the second part of the Narrative (line 9)? There is no compelling reason for soing so. *Gratias egit* appears as the rendering of εὐχαριστήσας in St Cyprian's African Old Latin version of I *Corinthians* 11.<sup>4</sup> It is possible, however, that the clause antedates the liturgical combination of I *Corinthians* 11<sup>23-25</sup> with *Matthew* 26<sup>26-28</sup>. The appropriateness of introducing it at this point of the liturgical Narrative will be evident, when the initial phrase of the Canon is recalled. Presumably the Latin Eucharistic Prayers always began, as the Greek Prayers begin, with some expression of the propriety of rendering thanksgiving to God, *Vere dignum et iustum est tibi gratias agere*. The introduction of the clause, *tibi gratias agens*, at the beginning of the liturgical Institution Narrative is an expression of the accord of the Eucharistic *Actio* with the action of the Lord at its Institution. It is possible, as we have noted (p. 69 *supra*), that the original reading was *egit*. If that were so, the transformation of the perfect into

<sup>1</sup> De Anima, 17.

<sup>2</sup> Contra Faustum 20<sup>18</sup>.

<sup>3</sup> Id. 20<sup>21</sup>.

<sup>4</sup> Ep. cit. 10.

the participle, *agens*, could be explained as a symmetricism. The introduction of the clause in whatever form, however, belongs, in the opinion of the present writer, to a period well before that in which the attainment of merely literary balance was thought to be desirable.

The clause, *manducate ex hoc omnes*, in line 5 is sometimes also taken as an example of literary retouching, it being alleged that the words, *ex hoc omnes* have been added to *manducate* in order to produce a balance with the subsequent clause, *bibite ex hoc omnes* in line 10. The presence of the complete clause in *Matthew* 26<sup>26</sup> of *b*, however, is a difficulty in the way of treating its last three words as an addition of the Vulgate or post-Vulgate period. It may be added that a cognate form of the complete clause is quoted in Syriac by Aphrahat, 'akkul menneh kulkun (*manducate ex eo omnes*)<sup>1</sup>. In the account of the Institution, in which the Syriac phrase occurs, Aphrahat is quoting from the *Diatessaron*. Upon this ground, the addition of *ex hoc omnes* to *manducate* may be held to derive from an early insertion into the Greek text of *Matthew*.

Of the remaining additions to the Narrative, little need, or can, be said. The reference to the hands of the Lord (*accepit panem . . . calicem*) *in sanctas ac venerabiles manus suas*, in lines 1f. and 8, recall an analogous phrase of Cyril (or John) of Jerusalem, *Χριστός ἐδέξατο ἐπὶ τῶν ἀχράντων αὐτοῦ χειρῶν καὶ ποδῶν ἡλους*<sup>2</sup>. Out of such devout oratorical usage as this, the Roman phrase and the similar phrases in the Greek Narratives have emerged. They are literary embroideries of a later period. The same may be said of the phrase, *ad te deum patrem omnipotentem*, in line 3, which is also paralleled in the Greek Narratives. It is likely that these Latin phrases found their way into the Roman Narrative under Greek influence. The clause, *elevatis oculis in caelum*, in line 2 appears to present another parallel with Greek usage. *St. James* and *St. Mark* read ἀναβλέψας εἰς

<sup>1</sup> De Paschate 6 (Aphraatis Demonstrationes, ed. Dom I. Parisot, Patrologia Syriaca, P. I, t. 1, Paris 1894, col. 516).

<sup>2</sup> Cat. Myst. 2<sup>6</sup>: cf. 1 Clem. ad Cor. 33, αὐτός γάρ ὁ δημιουργός . . . ἀνθρῶπον ταῖς ἱεραῖς καὶ ἀμώμοις χερσὶν ἐπλάσεν.

τὸν οὐρανόν, following *Matthew* 14<sup>19</sup>, *Mark* 6<sup>41</sup> and *Luke* 9<sup>16</sup>. The Roman clause, however, is reminiscent of *John* 17<sup>1</sup> in the Old Latin text of *a*, which reads *adlevatis oculis suis in caelum*. Also, the Roman clause, unlike those in *St James* and *St Mark* and their Latin equivalent, *respexit in caelum*, in *De Sacramentis*, is not repeated in the second half of the Narrative. There is some likelihood, therefore, that the clause is an early, or at all events a pre-Vulgate, addition to the Roman Narrative, and is independent of the corresponding Greek clauses. Of the expansion of the expression, *noui testamenti*, by the words, *et aeterni* in line 12, it will be recalled that these words appear in *Matthew* 26<sup>28</sup> in the text of *b*, but in that of *b* alone (p. 71 supra). The word, *aeterni* is not a literary, but a doctrinal addition, borrowed from *Hebrews* 13<sup>22</sup>. Together with the words, *mysterium fidei*, borrowed from *I Timothy* 3<sup>9</sup>, it illuminates and heightens, in phraseology understood to be Pauline, the meaning of the *calix domini*, the Eucharistic cup.<sup>1</sup> There is no clue to the date at which these doctrinal additions were made. Finally, there is again no clue to the date of the introduction of the words, *pro uobis (et)* before *pro multis effundetur* in lines 13f. Presumably this phrase is borrowed from the longer text of *Luke* (22<sup>20</sup>). The conjunction of *καὶ πολλῶν* with *ἐπὲρ ὑμῶν* occurs in the corresponding passages of *St James* and *St Mark*, *St Basil* and *St John Chrysostom*. It is wanting alike from *Apostolic Tradition* which reads *pro uobis (ἐπὲρ ὑμῶν)* alone following *Luke* 22<sup>20</sup>, and from *Apostolic Constitutions* VIII, which reads *περὶ πολλῶν* alone, following *Matthew* 26<sup>28</sup>. The words, *pro uobis* may have been present in the Narrative known to *St Augustine*<sup>2</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> For *mysterium fidei*, cf. Ap. Const. VIII, τοῦτο τὸ μυστήριον τῆς καλῆς διαθήκης (Brightman, *Liturgies Eastern and Western*, p. 20, line 18). The clause is the first of the Dominical words concerning the bread.

<sup>2</sup> Aug. Serm. 216<sup>3</sup> (Ad competentes), *Non sitis uiles uobis, quos cunctorum Creator et uester tam caros aestimat, ut uobis quotidie Unigeniti sui pretiosissimum sanguinem fundat*. The reference is to Eucharist, and may imply the presence of a *pro uobis funditur* clause in the Institution Narrative. It may be that originally both *mysterium fidei* and *pro uobis* were additions peculiar to the Baptismal Mass.

We may now attempt to summarize the positions set forth in this paper, and to draw from them such inferences as may appear permissible.

Whatever the relation of the prayers of the Canon quoted in *De Sacramentis* to their Roman equivalents, the Institution Narrative of *De Sacramentis*, in its careful formalization, differs too markedly from the Roman Narrative contained in the oldest, the Hiberno-Gallican, family of Sacramentaries to be reckoned as even an earlier form of the Roman Narrative. The oldest available text of the Roman Institution Narrative is that in the *Canon Missae* of *Bo*, the oldest member of the Hiberno-Gallican family; and cannot safely be assigned to a date much before A. D. 700. With the assistance of the other two members of the Hiberno-Gallican family, *St* and *Fr*, and of certain other manuscript Sacramentaries, the text of the Narrative of *Bo* can be corrected at several points; but, at the best, the corrections can assist us only approximately to recover the text used a century earlier, in the time of St Gregory the Great. It is consequently the more impressive that the Narrative of *Bo* and of its cognates, *St* and *Fr*, bears about it the unmistakable marks of a great antiquity. It has descended from the pre-Vulgate age. Its beginnings are bound up with the history of the Old Latin versions of New Testament documents, African equally with European. Old Latin texts of *Matthew* 26<sup>26-28</sup> provide its groundwork, with which is combined material from an African Old Latin version of I *Corinthians* 11. The whole is worked up into a unity presenting a graphic and impressive Narrative of the Lord's Institution of the Eucharist *pridie quam pateretur*. Certain obvious additions, few in number, and some of them of a late date and probably of Greek inspiration, have not altered the essential character of the Narrative. In spite of the additions, the Narrative has lost nothing of the directness of the New Testament Narratives which form the substance of it; and its Scriptural directness stands out yet more conspicuously, when the Greek liturgical Narratives are brought into comparison. From these considerations it is not unreasonable to infer that the Institution Narrative of the Roman Canon

belongs to a liturgical tradition for which the careful preservation of the Scriptural form and character of the Narrative was held to be vital.

Of the basic principles of that tradition we have ample enough information in the 63rd Epistle of St Cyprian and in incidental references in the writings both of Cyprian and Tertullian. Controversy with the Jews had taught early Latin Christians to conceive of Christianity as the *Lex Nova*, foreshadowed by the Old Dispensation and foretold by the prophets<sup>1</sup>. With the *Lex Nova* there is included inevitably the *Sacrificium Novum* and the *Sacerdotium Novum*, to both of which also the *Lex Vetus* or *Prior* looks forward. But for the *Sacrificium Novum* to be right, valid, acceptable and effectual, it must be celebrated, as was the *Sacrificium Vetus*, in the correct manner prescribed by the Lord. The *Sacrificium Novum* is the Passion of Christ which He offered at the Last Supper and completed on the Cross, and which He ordained to be continued in the Eucharist instituted by Him at the Last Supper. The Supper, the Passion and the Mass are therefore inseparable elements of the *Sacrificium Novum*, and Christ Himself is the *Sacerdos* of the New or Christian Sacrifice. If, then, the Christian Sacrifice, the Passion, is to be rightly offered in the Church, it must be a careful *imitatio* of Christ's procedure at the Institution. This procedure is prescribed in *Matthew* 26<sup>26-28</sup>, which in turn is confirmed by St Paul in I *Corinthians* 11. Any deviation from the procedure here enjoined vitiates the rite, so that there can be no assurance that the Sacrifice of the Passion is offered. *Inuenimus*, writes St Cyprian, *calicem mixtum fuisse, quem dominus obtulit, et uinum fuisse, quod sanguinem suum dixit. unde apparet sanguinem Christi non offerri, si desit uinum calici, nec sacrificium dominicum legitima sanctificatione celebrari, nisi oblatio et sacrificium nostrum responderit passioni*<sup>2</sup>, that is to say, to the procedure at the Institution, the Matthaean Narrative of which immediately precedes this passage. Later in Epistle 63, Cyprian states the matter

<sup>1</sup> See Tertullian, *Aduersus Iudaeos* and Cyprian, *Testimonia aduersus Iudaeos* I.

<sup>2</sup> Ep. cit., 9.

positively, *et quia passionis eius mentionem in sacrificiis omnibus facimus, passio est enim domini sacrificium quod offerimus, nihil aliud quam quod ille fecit facere debemus*<sup>1</sup>. To such a liturgical tradition as this to which St Cyprian is witness, an authentic Scriptural, or rather Gospel, Institution Narrative is indispensable. For the function of the Narrative in the Canon is not merely to revive the memory of a significant historic event, or to provide a rationale for the celebration of the Eucharist, as the Greek Narratives do; its function is rather to make the significant historic event continuously present and operative. By means of the Narrative, therefore, the Church's *actio* in the Eucharist is identified with, and becomes, the *actio* of Christ at the Institution. The Pauline nexus, in introducing a slight but historical detail, enhances the vividness of a Narrative which is a dramatic recital, and the dramatic character of which is further emphasized by the simple manual acts of taking the bread and the cup into the hands, performed in the sight of the worshippers presumably from early times. The presence of the word, *hunc*, in the clause, *accepit et hunc praeclarum calicem*, in the text of the Roman Narrative may be taken, with the mixed cup and the manual acts, as an expression of the identification of the two *actiones* with each other. Moreover, the celebrant of the Eucharist is the deputy or agent of Christ; *sacerdos*, writes Cyprian, *vice Christi fungitur*<sup>2</sup>, so that, through the agency of the celebrant pronouncing the Dominical words, Christ continues to consecrate, to offer and to command, as He did at the Supper *sub die passionis eius*. In the African-Roman liturgical tradition, then, the recital of the Matthaean-Pauline Narrative ensures that the Eucharistic *actio* will be at one and the same time a true representation of the Institution and a true fulfilment of it, and accordingly a true offering of the *Sacrificium Novum*.

What of the clause with which the Narrative ends, *Haec quotienscumque feceritis, in mei memoriam facietis*? Why was the Pauline command, *hoc facite quotienscumque biberitis in meam*

<sup>1</sup> Id., 17.

<sup>2</sup> Id., 14.

*commemorationem*, thus transposed? St Cyprian's Epistle 63 again offers us the clue. It is clear from Cyprian's exposition of the matter that he understood the Dominical command to have been expressed in the two specific Gospel injunctions, *manducate ex hoc omnes* and *bibite ex hoc omnes*. The eating and drinking as the Lord has commanded them to be done, involve the performance of the whole Eucharistic *actio*, and are themselves integral to it. The Pauline declaration or command, on the other hand, refers only to the drinking. Yet, whereas the Pauline Narrative includes the injunction, *hoc facite in meam commemorationem*, in reference to the bread, the Latin liturgical Narrative, being purely Matthaean at this point, lacks it; so that, had the Narrative been concluded with the unrevised Pauline command concerning the cup, the pattern of the Matthaean groundwork would have been distorted, and the drinking would wrongly have appeared to possess an import greater than, or different from, the eating. The difficulty has been removed by recasting. In its recast form, the Pauline command has been made to include the eating: *haec quotienscumque feceritis*. It has also been transformed into an assurance, *a Domino*, that as often as "these things" are done, the *memoria* or *commemoratio* of Himself, which Christ appointed, will be duly accomplished. The Matthaean injunctions, *manducate*, *bibite*, are left in proper relief, and the secondary Narrative of I *Corinthians* 11 is made to subserve the requirements of the primary, that of *Matthew* 26.

The considerations set forth in this paper, so it seems to the author of it, go some way towards explaining the peculiar character of the Institution Narrative of the Roman Canon, and towards accounting for its pronounced differences from the Narratives of the Greek liturgies. They go some way, also, towards accounting for the transmission of the Roman Narrative, in fundamentally unchanged form, to the period of the Sacramentaries. If the argument be sound, the Roman, or rather African-Roman, is the one liturgical Institution Narrative which cannot be described as resting on a tradition "*indépendante des évangiles*."

## A Note on the Apostolic Claim in the Church Order Literature

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The purpose of this note is simply to compare the manner in which the claim to apostolicity is made in some representative members of the Church Order family.

The Didache can be quickly passed over, for the only claim to apostolicity in it is the title. Patristic references to the work are usually to some such title as 'The Teaching of the Apostles'. The Bryennios text has the heading *Διδαχὴ Κυρίου διὰ τῶν δώδεκα ἀποστόλων τοῖς ἔθνεσιν*. As what immediately follows is the moral and religious teaching of the Two Ways, *Διδαχὴ Κυρίου* is perhaps no bad summary.

The *Apostolic Tradition* of Hippolytus is clearly not pseudonymous: indeed, Hippolytus appears to have been the sort of man who might well be touchy about his copyright. Both by what it includes and what it does not have, it stands apart from both the later Church Orders and the Sacramentary of Serapion; and the selection of material seems most intelligible if we see *Apostolic Tradition* as primarily a polemical work.

The prologue and epilogue make it clear that Hippolytus intends to correct perversions of the true teaching recently perpetrated by leaders of the Church, and his material is selected with this in mind. The extempore prayer used in services might lead, wittingly or unwittingly, to the expression of false doctrine, and this would be especially true of modalism, which sounded so much like the language of devotion. Hippolytus lays down, therefore, a prayer-form expressive of true doctrine as he understood it. He does not insist on its being followed word for word: but it is essential that a man's prayer be orthodox<sup>1</sup>, and to

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<sup>1</sup> Ap. Trad. X. 5 The Sahidic has transliterated *ἀρθόδοξος* (References to Ap. Trad. are given according to the edition of G. Dix, *The Treatise on the Apostolic Tradition*, London 1937).



this the prayer-form is a guide. Many of the rules about ordination are expressed so strongly that it seems clear that some recent contrary practice is being opposed<sup>1</sup>, and similarly, though less obviously, the precise rules for catechumenate and sacramental admission to the church, seen, as Dom Capelle has shewn<sup>2</sup>, as a single unified development, and the rules which follow, are doubtless intended to correct lax or erroneous practice or theology. All this would arise from the policy of the bishops, which, as Hippolytus saw it, gave a free rein to heresy and encouraged low moral standards<sup>3</sup>.

When Hippolytus talks in this work about apostolic tradition, his concept is dynamic, not static. It is associated with the work of the Holy Spirit, delivered by the Father to the Son, and by the Son to the Apostles, and by the Father to the Church<sup>4</sup>, vouchsafed to those who believe aright<sup>5</sup>, guiding the judgment of faithful ministers<sup>6</sup>, and bringing the true church to its haven at last<sup>7</sup>. Throughout the insistence on tradition is related to this confidence in the leading of the Spirit.

Ancient customs believed to be associated with the apostles, were indeed tenaciously upheld: unfortunately, as the Roman church knew to its cost from the Quartodeciman controversy, this could lead to a conflict of rival traditions, each equally claiming to be apostolic<sup>8</sup>. In *Apostolic Tradition*, however, while Hippolytus is undoubtedly contending for the continuance of certain customs familiar to him, his main concern

<sup>1</sup> e. g. the silence of the presbyters at a bishop's consecration (II. 3—4), and the subordination of the deacon (IX. 2—8).

<sup>2</sup> L'Introduction du catéchuménat à Rome, RTAM v. 1933 pp. 129 to 154.

<sup>3</sup> Hippolytus, Philos. IX (GCS p. 245—251).

<sup>4</sup> Ap. Trad. III. 3.

<sup>5</sup> ib. I. 5.

<sup>6</sup> ib. XVI. 25. Dix regards these words as an interpolation, but on grounds which are hardly conclusive.

<sup>7</sup> Ib. XXXVIII. 4.

<sup>8</sup> The controversy illustrates the problems arising from the claim to apostolic authority for extra-Scriptural practices. To Victor, representative of the apostolic church of Peter and Paul, Polycrates opposes the equally 'apostolic' tradition of the Asian churches on the date of Easter, going back, as he claims, to St. John himself.

is less the exact form of the customs — as has often been pointed out, he allows a certain latitude in the prayer-forms<sup>1</sup>, and much of the phraseology is patently of his own making<sup>2</sup> — than the regulation of church life according to the received doctrinal pattern. He regards himself, as the proemium to the *Philosophumena* shows, as in the true succession, while the ideas which inspire his opponents are non-Christian and philosophic in origin<sup>3</sup>. The Tradition is the received pattern of church life: it has to be taught; it is therefore essential that it be apostolic in doctrine.

It is in this light that it seems best to take Hippolytus' claim to apostolicity. *Apostolic Tradition* is not a pseudepigraph, like the other church orders: Hippolytus issues no new commands, he only 'counsels' men to keep the apostolic tradition<sup>4</sup>. Nor is it necessary to assume that he used the word 'apostolic' simply to bolster up his own schismatic position<sup>5</sup>. For the clue to his meaning, we need probably look no further than the teaching of his master Irenaeus. The Scriptures are the apostolic witness and contain the apostolic doctrine<sup>6</sup>: the unanimity of the hierarchies of the apostolic churches is guarantee that the tradition of the apostles, the same as that to which Scripture witnesses, has been accurately handed down<sup>7</sup>. But Hippolytus has to deal with a question at which Irenaeus had only hinted: the calamity which takes place when a bishop, a guarantor of the tradition, proves to be heretical in doctrine or unworthy

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Ap. Trad. X. 3—5.

<sup>2</sup> The anaphora, in particular, where the anti-modalist point is so strongly hammered home, may well have its origin in Hippolytus's lecture-room as much as in liturgical tradition. Parallels in the anaphora with other works of Hippolytus are noted by R. H. Connolly, *The Eucharistic prayers of Hippolytus*, JTS XXXIX, 1938 pp. 350ff.

<sup>3</sup> Philos. I. 1. Cf. Ap. Trad. XXXVI. 12.

<sup>4</sup> Ap. Trad. XXXVIII. 2. Sahidic transliterates *συμβουλευειν*.

<sup>5</sup> The difference in tone and in the manner in which Hippolytus describes himself in Ap. Trad. and Philos. suggest that the former was written before, the latter after his final breach with Callistus. Cf. also Dix, op. cit. pp. XXVff.

<sup>6</sup> Adv. Haer. III. 9ff. (Harvey II p. 30ff.).

<sup>7</sup> Adv. Haer. III. 1—4 (Harvey II p. 1ff.).

in life<sup>1</sup>. Hence the stress on the testimony of the Holy Spirit who shows how the rulers of the church ought to keep the tradition<sup>2</sup>. A similar point is made in the prologue to the *Philosophumena*, with the difference that Hippolytus now explicitly claims the succession to the apostles, in both High Priesthood and the office of teaching<sup>3</sup>.

This is to suggest, therefore, that the primary meaning which Hippolytus attached to the term 'apostolic tradition' was less 'customs instituted in apostolic times' (i. e. a long time ago)<sup>4</sup>, though it includes this idea, than 'that which is in accordance with the witness and teaching of the apostles'. It is discipline and government based on right doctrine. This may partly explain why the man who contended so fiercely for the tradition *quae permansit usque nunc*<sup>5</sup> could at the same time be plausibly accused of being a dangerous innovator in Christology.

With the Syriac *Didascalia*, however, we are in a different world of ideas, though probably not far away in date. Dom Connolly has shewn that the *Didascalia* used the *Didache*<sup>6</sup>, but there is no evidence that its author knew the *Apostolic Tradition* of Hippolytus<sup>7</sup>. Like Hippolytus, he had polemical motives. In the sections of the work which are simply a treatise on pastoral theology, he moves forward in a leisurely enough fashion: but in what lies nearest his heart, the Judaising tendencies in his church which he sees as cutting the nerve of the Christian life, he waxes very wroth.

<sup>1</sup> Adv. Haer. III. 3. 1. (Harvey II p. 9). Cf. E. Molland, *Irenaeus of Lugdunum and the Apostolic Succession*, JEH I, 1950, p. 12ff.

<sup>2</sup> Ap. Trad. 1. 5.

<sup>3</sup> Philos. I. 1 (GCS p. 3).

<sup>4</sup> Cf. G. W. H. Lampe, *The Seal of the Spirit*, London 1951, p. 129: 'We must bear in mind the general tendency in the ancient world to ascribe a hoary antiquity to anything which was known to have existed as long as living people could remember.'

<sup>5</sup> Ap. Trad. 1. 3.

<sup>6</sup> The use of the *Didache* in the *Didascalia*, JTS XXIV, 1923, pp. 147 bis 157.

<sup>7</sup> Connolly, *Didascalia Apostolorum*, Oxford 1929, LXXXIII, could point to only one parallel which might indicate a dependence, and that is, to say the least, a dubious one.

It is very noticeable, however, in contrast to Hippolytus, that the literary form is such that the work purports to be the direct production of the apostles. In the 'pastoral theology' sections this is not obtruded: but when dealing with the Deuterosis teaching of the Judaisers it is most emphatic.

From time to time interest is sustained, for the first readers doubtless as much as for ourselves, by vivid references to evangelic (and sometimes extra-evangelic) events as occurring within the experience of the speakers, and particular apostles come forward when something related to their own field is in question<sup>1</sup>. The climax comes with an imaginative account of the events leading up to the Apostolic Council of Acts XV, which was called, we are told, because the whole Church was in danger of falling into heresy, the whole being patently turned against the supporters of the 'Deuterosis'. While the apostles are together in Jerusalem for the Council they write the *Didascalia*, after which they return to their provinces<sup>2</sup>.

It is all magnificently done: and Dom Connolly was doubtless right when he said that the apostolic claim, 'though put forward boldly enough at certain points in the book, does not go very deep, and lends no serious air of unreality to the work as a whole'<sup>3</sup>. But something very significant has occurred. The author, like Hippolytus, holds that the apostolic tradition is the sure preventive against heresies: but he sets out the essentials of the tradition as a work purporting to come from the apostles themselves. He is neither a sectary seeking to justify a claim to esoteric teaching, nor a novelist writing *amore* some particular apostle: his work claims to be a 'catholic *Didascalia*' in the name of them all.

The three documents already mentioned are heavily plundered by the Church Orders proper. The *Apostolic Church Order*<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Connolly, op. cit.: VI, p. 44 (Judas); XI, p. 111, XV, p. 138 (conversations with the Lord); XXI pp. 178—192 (Holy Week); X, p. 103 (I, Matthew), XXIII, p. 200ff. (I, Peter, James, etc.).

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. XXIII—XXV, pp. 200—258.

<sup>3</sup> op. cit. p. XXVI.

<sup>4</sup> This title is used here for the first part of the work first noted (in part of its Ethiopic form), by Ludolf (*Ad suam historiam aethiopicam*

(so-called) which opens the Egyptian Heptateuch and which, judging from the multitude of versions in which it is found, enjoyed no small popularity, declares itself to be the canons of the apostles for the direction of the Church. The stage is set in the preface<sup>1</sup>. The apostles meet together, and with one voice announce that they are about to issue orders which the Lord revealed to them by the Holy Spirit: orders which relate to the ministry and the task of making the church below a copy of that above. The teaching of The Two Ways is distributed between them, each apostle in turn proclaiming the propositions. These exhortations are closed by Peter declaring that the remainder of this kind of teaching is provided for by Scripture: the apostles will now deliver what was commanded them<sup>2</sup>: i. e., the more directly ecclesiastical teaching, which is also divided among them. The book closes with a renewed statement of apostolic authority, and a charge by Peter not to add to or diminish from the commands set forth in the book<sup>3</sup>.

The literary form of the Apostolic Church Order is not dissimilar to that of the Didascalia: but the apostolic claim goes much further. Here we have the concept of a collection of Church ordinances claiming the full and direct authority of the apostles, a sort of apostolic supplement to Scripture.

This same concept is a feature of the Testamentum Domini. In this curious work the apostolic pretence reaches its climax: for Testament claims to be no less than a verbatim report of the Lord's own words given between the Resurrection and the Ascension in response to a request of the apostles for a guide

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antehac editam Commentarius, Frankfurt-on-Main, 1691) given in its Coptic form by Lagarde, *Aegyptiaca*, Göttingen 1883, and in its Arabic and Ethiopic forms by G. Horner, *The Statutes of the Apostles*, London 1905. Ap. Trad. is, of course, embedded in the same collection. The Greek version was edited by Th. Schermann, *Die allgemeine Kirchenordnung*, Paderborn 1914, and a Syriac version was published in 1901 by J. P. Arendzen, *JTS* III. pp. 59—80.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Horner, op. cit. p. 9f., 233f., 295f.

<sup>2</sup> Ib. p. 133, 239, 301.

<sup>3</sup> Ib. p. 138, 244, 306.

for bishops. With one of its many audacities, it adapts one of the beatitudes of the Apocalypse to a blessing on those who heed its own teachings<sup>1</sup>.

The Lord is represented as saying that because of the growing number of carnal professors in the churches, only the perfect shall know the whole of His teaching (i. e. that before the Passion) 'These remaining words' (i. e. the regulations of Testament) are to be spoken in the churches. Pearls are not to be cast before swine: but (accepting the emendation of Cooper and Maclean)<sup>2</sup>, 'this tradition shall be spoken and given to those who are firm and fixed and who do not fall away who keep my commandment, the Holy Ghost also bestowing on them his grace that they may believe uprightly'<sup>3</sup>.

The debt to Hippolytus is quite noticeable in this sentence: not only is the pseudo-dominical work called a 'tradition', but a phrase about the Holy Spirit's operation in those that do not fall away is borrowed from the prologue of *Apostolic Tradition*. But we may also see what we have in the *Apostolic Church Order* in another form: the idea of an extra-evangelic body of teaching given to the apostles after the resurrection to be secretly handed down for the benefit of the leaders of the church.

Finally, we may recall that the most successful of all the Church Orders, the *Apostolic Constitutions*, also claims to be the joint work of all the apostles. In this case, Clement is named as the redactor. Other members of the Church Order family are in our present manuscript tradition attributed to Clement<sup>4</sup>: but *Apostolic Constitutions* is the first in which the attribution Clementine authorship is integral to the work, and the appear-

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<sup>1</sup> Testament I. 17 (J. Cooper and A. J. Maclean, *The Testament of our Lord*, Edinburgh 1902, p. 61).

<sup>2</sup> Op. cit. p. 148.

<sup>3</sup> Testament I. 18 (Cooper-Maclean p. 61f.).

<sup>4</sup> Notably the Arabic version of the *Apostolic Church Order* and Testament: even the independent Syriac version of the latter published by Arendzen (JTS II 1901 p. 401—416) is entitled 'The book of Clement on the End'.

ance of the attribution elsewhere may well be due to its influence<sup>1</sup>.

The remaining Church Orders are, for the most part, local rechauffés of *Apostolic Constitutions*. With the growth of the statute law of the Eastern synods, the Church Orders are replaced by collections of canons, some of which, like the *Apostolic Canons* and the 'Edessene' Canons, claim in the prefaces to be directly given by the apostles. Strangely enough, the *Canons of Hippolytus* are in this category: the apostolic claim is thus set out thus in the preface (following von Haneberg's Latin translation):

*'Hi sunt canones ecclesiae et praecepta quae scripsit Hippolytus princeps episcoporum Romanorum secunda mandata apostolorum ex parte Spiritus Sancti qui loquebatur per eum.'*<sup>2</sup>

Tardy acknowledgement is thus made to Hippolytus of the debt which the Church Orders owe him: but the canonist has quite misunderstood what Hippolytus means by apostolic tradition, and has transferred to him the function fulfilled by Clement in *Apostolic Constitutions*.

The difficult literary problems involved in the Church Orders are notorious, and the date and the type of Christianity which the particular members represent are sometimes in doubt. But without prejudice to these questions, one may notice two very different ways of viewing apostolic tradition. In the one case, apostolic tradition is a tradition of right doctrine and principles, which, the believer accepting, he may confidently expect the leading of the Holy Spirit, however bishops may betray their

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<sup>1</sup> Particularly is this likely in the case of Testament. According to the title it was written in eight books by Clement of Rome, but at present it is divided into only two books, referred to by the translator as the first and second books of Clement. The subscription, however, states that 'John and Peter and Matthew wrote this Testament, and sent it in copies from Jerusalem by Dositheus and Silas and Magnus and Aquila.' The conclusion would seem to be that this is original and the ascription to Clement and the mention of eight books a reflection of Apostolic Constitutions. This seems more likely than the direct influence of the Clementine romance.

<sup>2</sup> *Canones Sancti Hippolyti*, Münster 1870. Cf. H. Achelis, *Die Canones Hippolyti* (TU VI). Leipzig 1891, p. 12.

trust. In the other, the work as a whole is attributed verbatim to the apostles, a distinct body of apostolic teaching apart from Scripture, and delivered by them, at the command of the Lord, to the bishops. How far this was a conventional literary device, and how far to be taken seriously, is another question: but we cannot overlook the huge claims made by the authors for the origin and binding nature of their ordinances.

We may also note that some of the Gnostic teachers appealed to a very similar doctrine: a secret tradition, preserved in succession from the apostles, and given to those who were worthy. Thus Ptolemaeus tells Flora<sup>1</sup> of the *ἀποστολική παράδοσις* preserved in a *διαδοχή* from the apostles<sup>2</sup> and regulated by the *διδασκαλία* of the Saviour, and Basilides claimed the tradition of Peter and Matthias through Glaukias the *ἐμπνεύς* of Peter<sup>3</sup>.

The different doctrines of tradition held on the one hand by Irenaeus and Hippolytus and on the other by the Gnostics and the Church Orders proper, also bear comparison with two different explanations noted within Rabbinic Judaism by Rabbinites, concerning the origin of *halakhah*, itself arising from the need to apply the revealed law to concrete situations at a later time<sup>4</sup>. The vast body of laws so arising could be explained as a secret Torah received from Moses in a marked line of succession. The number of laws specifically so designated was not large — S. Schechter<sup>5</sup> reckoned them at about forty in the whole of Rabbinic literature and it may be, as G. F. Moore suggests, that in most cases this explanation was due to homiletic hyperbole rather than to serious juristic theory<sup>6</sup>. The other explanation is that law spiritually begets *halakhah*:

<sup>1</sup> Epiphanius, Haer. XXXIII. 7 (PG XLI c. 568).

<sup>2</sup> G. Quispel, *Lettre à Flora* (Sources Chrésiennes), Paris n. d., suggests that Ptolemaeus is claiming a link with Paul through Theudas and Valentinus.

<sup>3</sup> Clement, Strom. VII. 16 (GCS p. 75) for Glaukias; Hippolytus Philos. VII (GCS p. 195f.) for Matthias.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. G. F. Moore, *Judaism I*, Cambridge, Mass., 1927, pp. 251ff.; R. A. Stewart, *The Earlier Rabbinic Tradition*, London 1949, p. 12.

<sup>5</sup> *Studies in Judaism*, London 1896, p. 430.

<sup>6</sup> *op. cit.* p. 254.



the Mosaic law thus contained within itself all future legislation, because it was living and active. This latter is analogous, though not identical, with Hippolytus's doctrine of tradition. The other presents a similar rationale to that given by the Gnostic teachers and by the later Church Order literature, which provides the nearest approach made by the early church to a Christian Talmud<sup>1</sup>.

The Church Orders, by contrast with apocalyptic, another genre in which pseudonymity is conventional, are invariably written in the name of all the apostles. The teaching is catholic: there can be no pitting of the tradition of one apostle against that of another. A suitable intermediary, as in some Christian apocalypses, is sometimes named: and ironically enough, Hippolytus himself, his identity now forgotten, was in course of time raised to that dignity. As a result we find not only the headings of the *Epitome of the Apostolic Constitutions* and the *Canons of Hippolytus*, but writers like Palladius<sup>2</sup> and Cyril of Scythopolis<sup>3</sup> referring to him as a contemporary of the apostles.

Much as the Church Orders stand in debt to Hippolytus, they do not owe their doctrine of apostolicity to him. This was, as the *Didascalia* shews, enshrined in literary form independently of Hippolytus, and before the growth of the main body of the Church Order literature as we now know it: and when this had in certain circles become regular, it was read back into the work of Hippolytus himself.

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<sup>1</sup> It is perhaps not without interest that the most fertile soil for the Church Order literature was Syria, where there was, generally speaking, a closer contact between Jew and Christian than elsewhere, and where there was always a pull in a Judaising direction.

<sup>2</sup> Lausiac History CXLVIII. (PG XXXIII c. 1251).

<sup>3</sup> Quoted Lightfoot, *St. Clement of Rome*, vol. II, London 1890, p. 343, et. al.

## On the Baptismal Rite According to St. Hippolytus

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A Hebraist's intrusion into the alien field of patristic liturgy may seem to call for an apology. However, considering the special position of Hippolytus's *Apostolike Paradosis*, the reactions to it of a student of Rabbinics may not be utterly unprofitable to specialists in the field. In the first place, the Order of Hippolytus is held to be one of the earliest, and though our text is rather a patch-work reconstruction, it may well be the source of the other well-known Church Orders.<sup>1</sup> Secondly, great stress has been laid on the allegedly Jewish character of our Treatise. The late Gregory Dix was particularly emphatic in his claims in this respect:

*His [Hippolytus's] whole initiation rite is recognizably derived from the initiation of Jewish proselytes. His baptismal rite is derived directly from the baptismal rite for Jewish proselytes . . . . . the universal primitive rite of Christendom . . . . . is Jewish through and through*<sup>2</sup>.

Since Hippolytus does not seem to be inventing but rather acts "the conservative or reactionary zealot"<sup>3</sup> it may be worth our while to glance again briefly at his treatment of the baptismal rite.

One *caveat* should be entered right at the outset. Ritual customs were often shared by Judaism and the Hellenistic world.

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<sup>1</sup> For text and versions I have used Dom Gregory Dix, *The Treatise on the Apostolic Tradition of St. Hippolytus of Rome*, 1, 1937. Cf. also W. Till and J. Leipoldt, *Der koptische Text der Kirchenordnung Hippolyts*, 1954 (*Texte u. Unters.* 58). For the date and authenticity of the document cf. the literature quoted in the edd. and in Dom Odo Casel's posthumous review of H. Elfers, *Die Kirchenordnung Hippolyts von Rom*, 1938, which appeared in *ALW* II, 1952, pp. 115—30. Elfer's book was not accessible to me.

<sup>2</sup> Dix, *op. cit.* pp. XL—XLI.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.* p. XXXVII.

It is not always possible, therefore, to dogmatize about the immediate origin of some details. Many a "Greek" custom may have come to Christianity from Judaism which had adopted it previously. We shall soon find an example of this.

Hippolytus has little to say on pre-baptismal catechesis. Nevertheless the subject is relevant for an understanding of baptism proper. The preparatory teaching is usually taken to be something on the lines of the "Two Ways"-doctrine of the *Didache*, the Jewish origin of which is generally accepted. The formulation in the *Didache*, however, has a "Deuteronomic" flavour: the way of life and the way of death. The "parallel" version in the *Epistle of Barnabas* XVIII f. brings us closer to the sectarian and apocalyptic climate; it speaks of the Ways of Light and Darkness. It is the same dualistic equation of Light and Life, Darkness and Death that we know from the Hermetic writings and the Gospel of John. There are many similarities not only with the known apocryphal writings, but also with the so-called *Discipline Manual* of the Qumran sect.<sup>1</sup>

This teaching is mentioned here not because catechesis as such is necessarily Jewish<sup>2</sup>. As is well known, Christian baptism at first dispensed with catechesis. It was spontaneous, unprepared and, indeed, wholesale. Only in course of time did the Church feel compelled to exercise greater care and to operate selection. Periods of preparation were a regular feature both of the Essene and/or Qumran novitiate, and of the mysteries. More important is the fact that the doctrine of the Two Ways, presided over by their respective Princes or Angels of Light and Darkness,

<sup>1</sup> Cf. e. g. *Epistle of Barnabas* (EB) XIX. 2 with *Discipline Manual* (DM) I. 10, 3—5; EB XIX. 3 with DM IV. 3; EB XIX. 4 with *Damascus Covenant* (DC) VI. 20—VII. 3, DM IV. 2—3; EB XIX. 5 with DM VIII. 22 f.; EB XIX. 6 with DM IV. 3—4 etc. EB XX. 1 with DM IV. 12—3, 9—10; EB XX. 2 with DC VI. 16—7 etc.

<sup>2</sup> Altogether the rabbinic reader frequently has the impression when reading the comparative literature on the subject (e. g. A. Benoit, *Le Baptême Chrétien au deuxième Siècle*, 1953, or J. Leipoldt, „Die Altchristliche Taufe religionsgeschichtlich betrachtet“ in A. Alt-Festschrift, *Wiss. Zeitschr. der Karl-Marx-Universität*, III, Leipzig 1953—1954, pp. 45—56) that the Jewish features are really far less prominent or even real than is alleged.

gives us the spiritual climate and the universe of discourse within which we must see primitive baptism.<sup>1</sup> If the dominion of the world is shared between the Prince of Light and that of Darkness, then there is no vacuum or neutral sphere in which you can possibly exist. You belong either to the one or to the other; *tertium non datur*. In order to become one of the children of light, you must first leave the realm of darkness, be cleansed of the spirit of impurity and renounce Satan.

There are, of course, profound differences between the dualistic doctrine of Spirits as it appears in parts of the N. T. and in the theory and ritual of baptism in the early Church<sup>2</sup>, and that of the Qumran writings. The latter is definitely not demonic but of pneumatic. It is question of the spirit by which man lives, not of the spirit by which he is affected or which he harbours.<sup>3</sup> Nevertheless the difference is never so great in practice as it seems in theory, and it is easy to see how in its rapid spread through the Greco-Roman world, Christianity quite naturally veered towards the "demonic" type of dualism. But bearing in mind the ontological or pneumatic dualism current in Jewish sectarian circles, it seems probable that the notion of subjection to Satan and his evil spirits is not merely due to sinning or to eating of *τράπεζα τῶν δαιμόνων*. Similarly the problem whether Jews too were exorcized for baptism or not, must be re-examined in this light.<sup>4</sup> But however that may be, there is not the slightest trace of demonism in what the Rabbinic sources have to say on proselyte baptism.<sup>5</sup> Our Rabbinic sources may not take us back very far, but at least they are clear and precise as far as they go. They tell us quite unequivocally that proselyte baptism has nothing whatsoever to do with either demonism or "levitical purity".

<sup>1</sup> EB, it should be noted, has no Prince of Lights (as DM III. 20) but only knows light-bringing angels of God v. angels of Satan.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. in particular F. J. Dölger, *Der Exorzismus im altchristlichen Taufritual*, 1903.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. DM IV. 2 and EB's description of the heart as an *ὄψος δαιμονίων* "through doing things which were contrary to God" (XVI. 7).

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Dölger, *op. cit.* pp. 37—39.

<sup>5</sup> Nor, as a matter of fact, in the *Didache*.

Both non-sacramental, ritual purification-baths and the metaphorical, spiritual use of lustration is known in the O. T.<sup>1</sup>; cf. in particular the "pouring out" of the Spirit *Zc.* 12: 10 and *Joel* 3: 1. The *ruah* looms large in the Qumran writings, and the *Discipline Manual* actually engages in sharp polemics against lustrations without repentance and without the Spirit, i. e. without adhesion to the sect.<sup>2</sup> Most probably these expressions are not meant to do away with actual lustrations; the *halakhah* of the Damascus Covenanters (if we may, for the moment, juxtapose the evidence) concerning lustrations is almost identical with that of the Rabbis.<sup>3</sup> But at any rate the distinction water — spirit is clearly alive, as it also was for John the Baptist.<sup>4</sup> Moreover, for the very first Christians the coming of the Spirit was a special, eschatological event and therefore not essentially part of baptism. Of course baptism is also admission to the eschatological community, but this aspect was not stressed overmuch in the literature of the first two centuries. Inevitably, however, the two coalesce. The proper bath, i. e. the one administered by the right group, saves precisely because it mediates the right "Spirit". This is obviously the Qumran conception of the Spirit and the notion of baptism as it emerges from many passages in the N. T.<sup>5</sup>

We can now turn to the preliminary exorcisms which are performed throughout Holy Week and particularly on Saturday.<sup>6</sup> Washing and cleansing takes place on Maundy Thursday.<sup>7</sup> The catechumen is now *katharos* and rid of evil spirits. In other words, his former "possessor" has been ejected and the necessary vacuum has been created for the entry of the Holy Ghost. There is not the slightest hint in Hippolytus that baptism

<sup>1</sup> Ez. 36: 25; Is. 1: 16 etc.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. DM III. 9; IV. 21: וְזוֹ עָלֵינוּ רֹחַ אֱמֶת כְּמִי נִדָּה.

<sup>3</sup> DC. X. 10f.; cf. C. Rabin, *The Zadokite Documents*, 1954, p. 51.

<sup>4</sup> Mt. 3: 11; Lk. 3: 16; John 1: 33.

<sup>5</sup> Tit. 3: 5; John 3: 5; 1 Cor. 12: 13; Mt. 28: 19; cf. also Acts 1: 6f. and Rom. 8: 1, Gal. 3: 27.

<sup>6</sup> Dix, XX. 3—4, 8.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid. 5.

itself has exorcistic effects.<sup>1</sup> Exorcism merely prepares for baptism; baptism itself confers the Spirit.

"If any woman be menstruous she shall be put aside and be baptized another day".<sup>2</sup> I do not know whether there are Greek parallels to this regulation; nothing like it occurs anywhere in Rabbinic literature in connection with the admission of female proselytes. On the contrary, what indirect references there are seem to imply the contrary. A number of passages, some of which are Tannaitic, suggest that even menstruous women were admitted to proselyte baptism<sup>3</sup>. One may venture the guess that the menstruous woman is *e definitione* still in the grip of the demonic powers<sup>4</sup> and consequently baptism should be deferred to a more auspicious moment.

The preference for living water, shared by Hippolytus<sup>5</sup> with most old sources, does certainly not go back to Rabbinic practice. If not connected with demonological considerations (?), it must be due to the metaphorical power of the phrase מים חיים, the "living waters" or "waters of life". Although living waters were generally of considered to be superior to all others<sup>6</sup>, they were not obligatory in most cases. With the scarcity of streams in Palestine this is not surprising and immersion in cisterns and stagnant pools (בורות שיחין ומערות), is, in fact, taken for granted as the normal practice.<sup>7</sup> The Damascus Document<sup>8</sup> similarly speaks of stagnant pools. The basin discovered at the Qumran site is generally taken to be the sect's "bath", although a number of archeologists contest this and regard it as a watercistern.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Dölger, *op. cit.* pp. 13—4 who quotes Cyprian and others to the effect that baptism is more powerful and efficacious than the other, minor exorcisms.

<sup>2</sup> Dix, *loc. cit.* 6.

<sup>3</sup> b. Keth. 37a; Bekhor. 46b, 43a.

<sup>4</sup> For Greek ideas on the subject cf. Th. Wächter, *Reinheitsvorschriften im Griechischen Kult* (Religionsgesch. Versuche u. Vorarbeiten IX) 1911, p. 37.

<sup>5</sup> Dix, *loc. cit.* XXI. 2.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. M. Mikvaoth I.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. M. Nazir IX. 2; cf. also b. Sabbath 14a.

<sup>8</sup> X. 12 (Rabin, *op. cit.* p. 51).

<sup>9</sup> A. Parrot and others in *RHPhR* 35, 1955, pp. 64, 66.

It should be added that in the Tannaitic period Rabbinic law did not consider the Jordan to be a living water; if its waters were used for ceremonies requiring מים חיים, then these were held to be invalid — *pace* the Mandaeans and Nestorians.<sup>1</sup>

Nudity, even in mixed baths, was the normal custom in the Greco-Roman world. The Jews insisted on nudity because of the stringent חציצה rules: the water must touch the whole body. The slightest "interception" invalidated the lustration. In these circumstances one cannot help feeling puzzled by the information of Josephus<sup>2</sup> that Essene novices, on admission to the baths, were given a loin-cloth. Perhaps this was used on entering and emerging from the bath. Certainly Epiphanius's story<sup>3</sup> of the Ebionites jumping into the water fully dressed sounds very odd indeed, though it should be added that to this day the Mandaeans wear a special ritual dress, the *rasta*, for their baptismal immersions.

Nudity seems to be sufficiently attested for early baptism<sup>4</sup>, and Hippolytus ordains<sup>5</sup> "and they shall put off their clothes". If this is an instance of Jewish tradition, then its Jewish background, which is one of legal punctiliousness or even finickiness, is conspicuously absent. This is borne out by the readiness with which concessions were made. The reason for nudity in baptism is obviously quite different<sup>6</sup>: the body that had just been exorcized and disinfected from demonic contagion was now to be fully exposed to the renewing influence of the water. As a matter of fact the water too is blessed and consecrated, if not exorcised. "And at the hour when the cock crows, they shall first pray over the water".<sup>7</sup> I do not propose to press the cock whose crowing heralds the light of dawn and the end of the nightly

<sup>1</sup> See M. Parah VIII. 10.

<sup>2</sup> B. J. II. VIII. 5 and 7.

<sup>3</sup> Panarium XXX. 2.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Chrysostomus, Epistle to Innocent (P. G. 52, col. 533); Cyril of Jerusalem, Cat. XX, Myst. II. 2 (P. G. 33, col. 1077).

<sup>5</sup> XXXI. 3.

<sup>6</sup> Already G. Anrich, *Das Antike Mysterienwesen in seinem Einfluß auf das Christentum*. 1894, p. 200f. pointed out the pagan, "lustral" character of nudity, loosening of the hair, taking off shoes etc.

<sup>7</sup> XXI. 1.

rule of demons. Rabbinic law too directs that proselyte baptism should take place in day-time, but again, significantly, for a legalistic reason. But perhaps the closest indication of the Jewish ancestry of the rite is furnished by the further direction that after baptizing first the children and then the men, last come the women "who shall all have loosed their hair and laid aside the gold ornaments which they were wearing. Let no one go down into the water having an alien object (*eidos allotrion*) with them".<sup>1</sup>

This immediately suggests the wide-spread notion of knots as a favourite seat of demons.<sup>2</sup> But it also suggests the Rabbinic rules for the monthly lustration of women after the menses. Loosening the hair (and even washing and combing it) is enjoined by the Talmud and all later rituals as necessary before immersion. This is called *חסיפה*. The Talmud<sup>3</sup> gives as one of the reasons of this ordinance (ascribed to Ezra and therefore, perhaps, a tradition of some standing) the fear that "a knot may have formed itself in the hair", thereby impeding the access of water. Moreover the rules for the immersion of women after the menses and that of proselytes are expressly identified.<sup>4</sup> The connection of Hippolytus's rule with *חסיפה* was first put forward by Frank Gavin in 1929.<sup>5</sup> Van Unnik<sup>6</sup>, without even mentioning Gavin, has laboured the same point, but by labouring it too much has somewhat overstated and spoilt his case. Rejecting the explanation of the loose hair as an anti-demonic measure, van Unnik launches into a discussion of loose hair as a mark of impurity. Lepers, mourners etc., in fact all those who are temporarily removed from the normal sphere of life to a more marginal sphere, i. e. to the "order of impurity", wear their hair loose. Therefore, it is alleged, a) menstruous women did the same and b) proselytes were required to undo their hair so as to demonstrate their membership in the "order of impurity".

<sup>1</sup> XXI. 5.

<sup>2</sup> References in van Unnik, "Les cheveux défaits des femmes baptisées", *Vigiliae Christianae* I, 1947, pp. 77—100.

<sup>3</sup> b. B. K. 82a; cf. also b. Nid. 66—67.

<sup>4</sup> b. Yeb. 47a.

<sup>5</sup> HUCA VI, 1929, pp. 57—58.

<sup>6</sup> Loc. cit.



Now of all this there is not the faintest trace in rabbinic literature. Considering the vast range and volume of Talmudic writings some weight should be attached, for once, to the *argumentum ex silentio*. But there is further, albeit indirect evidence. The technical term for the *dishevelled* (not loose) hair of lepers, Nazirites, the adulterous woman etc. is פָּרֵעַ, and this word occurs dozens of times throughout the Talmud in connection with the rules concerning the aforementioned. It *never* occurs in connection with the menstruous woman, where the only term used is *hafifah*, which means washing or possibly also combing the hair. The woman going down to her monthly immersion wears her hair loose but not dishevelled. It seems wiser, therefore, to forget about Pedersen for the moment and to take *hafifah* simply as what it is. Since the rules of immersion for *niddah* were applied to proselyte baptism, the proselyte too was required to loose, not dishevel her hair.

On the other hand van Unnik appears to be right when he insists that this traditional "bathing behaviour" was interpreted by the early Church in terms of demonism and exorcism. All we have said so far seems to bear this out and Hippolytus actually furnishes further evidence to this effect.

Speaking of the Hours of Prayer, Hippolytus says: "He who has used marriage (*gamos*) is not defiled; for those who are washed have no need to wash again for they are pure. By (as it were) catching thy breath in thine hand and signing thyself with the moisture of thy breath, thy body is purified even unto thy feet. For the gift of the Spirit and the sprinkling of the font drawn from the heart of the believer as from a fountain purifies him who has believed".<sup>1</sup>

Both washing of hands and purificatory lustrations were known in the Hellenistic world. Certain pollutions, sexual intercourse etc. debarred from temples and sanctuaries. The Rabbinic rules on the subject seem to be due to contemporary influences. The washing of hands before prayer is often referred to. The Rabbis also prohibit Prayer and the Study of Torah after marital

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<sup>1</sup> XXXVI. 10—11; cf. Dix, pp. 65—6 for the various readings.

intercourse unless a ritual bath is taken<sup>1</sup>, although no such prohibition exists even for the severest degrees of levitical defilement mentioned in the Bible (such as contact with a dead body, flux, leprosy etc.).<sup>2</sup> In fact, a person in such a state of severe defilement is debarred from praying after a seminal emission and is required to immerse himself for this "minor pollution" although the "major pollution" persists. Moreover the Rabbis never try to connect this rule with the biblical laws on seminal effusion in *Leviticus* but are content to describe it as a new and original ordinance.<sup>3</sup> Although it stands to reason that an ascetic movement would resort to baptisms and purification rites at many occasions and for more than one purpose, yet it may be useful to draw a distinction between the aforementioned purification-baths before prayer and the baths known to us from Josephus's description of the Essenes and from the Qumran Scrolls. The latter are concerned primarily with the rules of levitical purity in matters of food and drink. Already Z. Frankel had guessed as much in connection with the Essene baths before their communal meal. The Qumran writings are quite explicit on the subject since the sect's טהרה obviously means their "food" or "meal". Like the lay-*haberim* of the Mishnah, the members of the sect consumed their food in a state of levitical purity איכלין חולין בטהרה. Clearly the habits of the חברים go back to the "early *asidaioi*", חסידים הראשונים.

If this is correct, than our understanding of the sectarian lustrations gains considerably and we should be able to differentiate them more clearly from baptism. It appears that the background of the sectarian baths is definitely ritualistic. In order to grasp this phenomenon one must divest one's mind of the prejudice that serious spiritual life or pneumatological aspirations and ritualism do not go together. A good example is furnished by the neo-pythagorean tradition where a genuinely spiritual concern for the ascent of the soul is closely wedded to purification ceremonies. It is precisely the complete and utter

<sup>1</sup> M. Ber. III. 4—6; cf. also the Gemara *ad loc.*

<sup>2</sup> Cg. Tossefta Ber. II. 12 (ed. Zuckerman p. 4).

<sup>3</sup> b. Ber. 21a.

absence of any ritualistic element which distinguishes Jesus and his teaching from contemporary sectarian Judaism.

The lustration prescribed by the Rabbis after a seminal emission may similarly have originated with the חסידים הראשונים, though it belongs to a different category. It is not concerned with food but with prayer and the study of Torah; the bath is therefore taken in the morning and not before meals. It seems highly probable that daily immersions began as a routine measure against possible nocturnal pollutions (טובלי שחרית, hemerobaptists). The habit was strong enough to persist with the Ebionites of Epiphanius<sup>1</sup> and the Elehasaites. Similarly the Pseudo-Clementines commend daily baths as illustrated by the authoritative example of Peter.

In the matter of repeated baths we touch the very nerve of the sacramental conception of baptism which largely depends on its uniqueness.<sup>2</sup> Of course the proselyte to Judaism continued (or possibly began) to practise purificatory immersions after his initiation bath. But then his initiation bath was not designed to "purify" him nor, for that matter, to procure forgiveness of sins or the gift of the Spirit. It caused him to be reborn as a member of a group or nation that practised, among other laws, certain rules of purity. There is a slight resemblance here to the idea of sectarian baptism, for although admission to the sect transforms the convert into one of the children of light, it actually imposes upon him the whole load of "hasidic" (and extreme pharisaic) purity laws. The bath does not admit him to the community but to the *life* of the community — which consists, among other things, of frequent lustrations. The nearest analogy is not Christian baptism but first communion, i. e. not initiation into the community but admission to partaking of its full life. But Christian baptism is the act of admission to the Community of the Spirit; it purifies, renews, regenerates; it replaces the evil spirit(s) by the Holy Ghost. This is essentially a unique and once-for-all achievement. The

<sup>1</sup> Panarium XXX. 2.

<sup>2</sup> This is not the place to discuss the relation of baptism to the sacrament of penance. Cf. A. Benoit, *op. cit.*

gift of the Spirit is communicated through baptism and through nothing else. The unctions which Hippolytus describes<sup>1</sup> are the prior oil of exorcism<sup>2</sup> and the subsequent oil of thanksgiving. Already the Pseudo-Clementines clearly distinguish between *lousai* and *baptizein*. The significant fact is that the tradition represented by Hippolytus does not appear to operate with St. Paul's categories of the abolition of the old law and the inauguration of the antinomian era of freedom. The opposition to further purification rites and baths grows out of the immanent logic of the Holy Ghost-theology of baptism.

This is connected with another strange disregard of Paul. A. Benoit<sup>3</sup> has remarked that Paul's baptismal mysticism of dying and rising with Christ is conspicuously absent from the important documents of the second century. Expressions like "new creation" (Barnabas), "bath of regeneration" (Justin) etc. do occur, but they cannot hide the absence of the specific Pauline themes. These documents clearly present another, non-Pauline tradition of Gentile Christianity. On pain of overstating the difference I would say that whereas for Paul the unity of baptism is its unity in Christ, for the tradition represented by Hippolytus it is the *unitas spiritus sancti*.

This accounts for Hippolytus's strange compromise. Baptism has purified once and for all; yet Hippolytus does not repudiate further purification gestures. The equation breath-spirit-*pneuma* needs no apology; cf. John 20:22 "When he had said this, he breathed on them and he said to them Receive ye the Holy Ghost". The same symbol still finds its beautiful manifestation in the ceremony of the *benedictio fontis*. Possibly the moisture of the breath — breath and spittle — represents both water and spirit.<sup>4</sup> There are variants in the text here and the reference

<sup>1</sup> XX. 6—8, 10. 19.

<sup>2</sup> Oil was widely used for exorcisms, also among Jews. Curiously enough there is one case on record when it was used by a Rabbi to exorcise a young scholar who was "bewitched" by Christianity; cf. *Kohleleth Rabba*, I 8. 4.

<sup>3</sup> *Op. cit.*

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Anrich, *op. cit.* p. 221, and Dölger, *op. cit.* p. 130f. on *Speichelsalbung* and the kathartic efficacy of saliva.

to "the sprinkling of the font" presents difficulties of its own. But it is fairly clear that Hippolytus does not envisage even a symbolic repetition of baptism. The Holy Ghost indwells the Christian. Atavistic suggestions of impurity are countered by the re-affirmation or re-actualization of the baptism received.

We may conclude, therefore, that the baptismal order of Hippolytus evinces the same characteristic features as other second century documents. They represent an alternative tradition to that stemming from Paul. The decisive factor in baptism is the Holy Ghost. This, in its turn, links up both with the dualistic conceptions current in certain Jewish circles and with the prominence accorded to demonic activities in popular belief. There is no *prima facie* relationship with Pharisaic or Rabbinic doctrines or practices except in so far as certain ritual details and technicalities (such as nudity, loose hair during immersion etc.) which were shared by all Jewish groups and sects were carried over and were continued to be practised for some time. But though some practices were taken over, their interpretation was immediately altered to suit the new context of demonism. This idea is totally absent from Rabbinic speculations on the meaning of lustration. The Rabbis were aware of the demonic or exorcistic significance which these baths had for the pagan mind and they would refer to it as a makeshift to satisfy Gentile questioners. But to them personally the notion was devoid of any reality and hardly worth a minute's consideration. This is very nicely brought out by a story told<sup>1</sup> of Rabbi Yohanan b. Zakkai (first century C. E.):

*An idolater<sup>2</sup> asked R. Yohanan b. Zakkai: 'These rites that you perform look like a kind of witchcraft. You bring a heifer, burn it, pound it and take its ashes. If one of you is defiled by a dead body you sprinkle upon him two or three drops and you say to him: "Thou art pure!".' Rabbi Yohanan asked him: 'Has the demon of madness ever possessed you?' 'No', he replied. 'Have*

<sup>1</sup> Bamidbar Rabba XIX. 8 (Hukkath); Pesikta XIV (Parah), ed. Friedmann, p. 65a. The midrash purports to explain the opening words of Nu. 19: 2 which introduce the law on the red heifer.

<sup>2</sup> Pesikta reads "A Gentile".

*you ever seen a man possessed by this demon of madness?* 'Yes', said he. *'And what do you do in such a case?'* *'We bring roots',* he replied, *'and make them smoke under him, then we sprinkle water upon the demon and it flees'.* Said R. Yohanan to him: *'May your ears hear what your mouth speaks! Precisely so is this spirit of impurity; as it is written (Zac. 13: 2) "And also I will cause the prophets and the unclean spirits to pass out of the land". Water of purification is sprinkled upon the unclean and the spirit flees.'*

*When the idolater had gone R. Yohanan's disciples said to their master: 'Master! This man you have put off with a mere makeshift, but what explanation will you give to us?'* Said he to them: *'By your life! It is not the dead that defiles nor the water that purifies. The Holy one blessed be He merely says: "I have laid down a statute, I have issued a decree. You are not allowed to transgress my decree", as it is written (Nu. 19: 2) "This is the statute of the Torah".'*<sup>1</sup>

Here we find a flat refusal of magic and exorcism. The interpretation is in the true spirit of the Rabbinic religion of joyous obedience to the divine command. The alternative conception of purification as a mystery or sacrament, was probably beyond the possibilities of Rabbinic religion. What the Rabbis would not and could not do, early Christianity did do: it conceived of baptism as a divine mystery, but in a context of demonism and exorcism, though, as has been pointed out, not necessarily as itself an exorcistic rite. To the extent that the "magical" background of the rite grew weaker, the original restrictions of tradition were relaxed. The understanding of the mystery only gained in the process.

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<sup>1</sup> One may, perhaps, question whether R. Yohanan was really speaking his whole mind. There is no reason to doubt the Talmudic traditions connecting him with the *merkabah*-mystics and Jewish gnostics of the period. He may thus well have had further ideas on the meaning of the commandments. But the unqualified rejection of demonistic and exorcistic explanations is certain.



## VIII. IURIDICA

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## Origen and the Punishment of Adultery in Jewish Law

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The Mishnah in the tractate *Sanhedrin* lists the death penalties in the order stoning, burning, beheading and strangling, representing the last-mentioned as the most common, to be applied in the absence of an express indication to the contrary in the Law. The sequence is hardly a systematic one either from severe to lenient, in which case it would be difficult to account for the order beheading and strangling, or from special to general, in which case beheading would have to come first since it is applied only in the case of the murderer. The correct explanation lies in the fact that only the first three, stoning, burning and beheading, go back to the Old Testament. Within these traditional penalties the arrangement proceeds from the ceremonious to the simple, beheading being the simplest. But the fourth death penalty, strangling, is appended. In other words, the sequence reflects the historical growth—not because of any historical interest on the part of the Rabbis, but because the enumeration stoning, burning, beheading, and some discussion of these three, were established by the time that strangling was adopted<sup>1</sup>.

Why was this additional penalty recognized? It does not occur in the Old Testament, yet in the Mishnah it is the ordinary, common mode of carrying out the death penalty. No doubt it was introduced in pursuance of that reform which was directed against death penalties that mutilated the skeleton, a reform connected with the belief in bodily resurrection. However, as stoning and burning were rendered innocuous by that reform,

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<sup>1</sup> The writer has given other illustrations of the same phenomenon in *The Civil Law of the Mishnah: the Arrangement of the Three Gates*, *Tulane Law Review* 18 (1944) 351ff.

being henceforth executed in a way which left the skeleton intact, there must be further reasons for the striking prominence acquired by strangling.

One of them may be that it is perhaps less primitive than the other death penalties. But a stronger reason emerges from a consideration of a remark by Origen. He tells us<sup>1</sup> that the Jews exercise capital jurisdiction neither with full permission nor quite secretly from the Emperor. This certainly depicts the true situation. In strictness they had no such jurisdiction, but the Romans, practical politicians, winked at it so long as it was kept within due limits. It is clear that in such a situation strangling was a suitable penalty. It was not a *Volksfesthinrichtung*, not an execution by way of public festival like stoning and burning—and let us note that the latter two to some extent retained this character even in their reformed mode. Consequently it was less offensive to the Romans. It was also less offensive than beheading, since beheading was associated with military government, of which point the Rabbis, to judge by some of their statements<sup>2</sup>, were fully conscious. It is significant that Herod, who had his two sons from Mariamne strangled, wished to avoid any fuss, any publicity, in view of the popularity of his victims. He was exercising, or exceeding, *iudicium domesticum*, his private power as head of the family. So this case of strangling, one of the earliest recorded, cannot be regarded as an official execution. But it is revealing: strangling can be done on the quiet.

Support for this view is furnished by a paragraph from the Tosephta<sup>3</sup>, if its meaning is—there is room for doubt—that where the appropriate death penalty is impracticable, any other may be substituted, the main thing being to destroy the criminal somehow. This paragraph may well have resulted from the incompatibility with Roman rule of the more conspicuous modes of execution. Even in the few cases where they

<sup>1</sup> Ep. ad Africanum 14; see Schürer, *Geschichte des Jüdischen Volkes im Zeitalter Jesu Christi*, vol. 1, 3rd and 4th ed., pp. 658f.

<sup>2</sup> E. g. Mishnah Sanhedrin 7. 3.

<sup>3</sup> Sanhedrin 12. 6. I owe this reference to Mr. Reuven Yaron of Brasenose College.

were not altogether abandoned in favour of strangling; the Rabbis admitted that circumstances might make it necessary to withdraw to the latter.

When was strangling recognized as an official death penalty? The reform referred to above was in the main undertaken about the time of the New Testament. But we may *a priori* suspect that the changes in the mode of stoning and burning preceded the introduction of an entirely fresh penalty, strangling. Most probably, that is, the reform at first moved within the traditional penalties and only then proceeded to the more radical argument that stoning, burning and beheading were confined to the cases where Biblical law specified these penalties, and that wherever the Bible spoke of the death penalty in general it must mean something more ordinary, namely, strangling.

Now in John we find a Pharisee saying concerning an adulteress: "Now Moses in the Law commanded us that such should be stoned"<sup>1</sup>. As the Mishnah imposes strangling on adultery, it is often held either that John commits an error or that the woman was only betrothed, in which case Talmudic law did admit stoning. (This in effect amounted to an abolition of stoning in this connection since in Talmudic times betrothal was normally a very temporary affair and there would hardly be time for the lady to go astray. The Rabbis made sure of the abolition by further special rules.) But the text has also found defenders<sup>2</sup>, and they are right. The Old Testament, if we interpret it naturally, imposes stoning on adultery<sup>3</sup>. The Book of Susannah takes the same view<sup>4</sup>. Neither Philo nor Josephus mention strangling. Stoning seems to be assumed by Eliezer ben Hyrcanus, about 100 A. D.<sup>5</sup> True, his position is not absolutely

<sup>1</sup> John 8. 5.

<sup>2</sup> E. g. Büchler, *Die Todesstrafen der Bibel und der jüdisch-nach-biblichen Zeit*, *Monatsschrift für Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judentums* 50 (1906) 670, and Bauer, *Das Johannesevangelium*, *Handbuch zum Neuen Testament* 6, 2nd ed., 1925, p. 113.

<sup>3</sup> Deut. 22. 22ff.; Lev. 20. 10; Ezek. 16. 38ff. The Ezekiel passage shews also that a murderer was beheaded.

<sup>4</sup> Susannah 45.

<sup>5</sup> Babylonian Sanhedrin 51a; see Büchler, *op. cit.*, p. 681 n. 2. Büchler, however, is hardly justified in holding, p. 670 n. 3, that Ben Azzai, later

clear. He contends that a priest's daughter is to be burned for misconduct while she is under her father, but to be stoned for misconduct affecting her father-in-law. He may in the second half be contemplating only the period of betrothal, not that of marriage as well. But surely, a combination of positive evidence from the Old Testament, the Book of Susannah, John and—though he is less unambiguous—Eliezer with the silence of Philo and Josephus, to which we must add the *a priori* considerations in favour of the lateness of strangling, should prevail against the dictum of the Mishnah.

It is safe to conclude that adultery was punishable by stoning, not strangling, in the time of Jesus, and probably still in that of John. On the other hand, for Akiba and Ishmael, about 120 A. D., and far more progressive than the earlier Eliezer, the punishment is strangling<sup>1</sup>. The change, therefore, at least as far as this crime is concerned, occurred in the first decades of the second century.

Yet even now the idea of stoning persisted. Again a passage from Origen is relevant, where he observes that the Jews can neither punish a murderer nor stone an adulteress, for these matters fall within the competence of the Romans<sup>2</sup>. Here—unless we suppose that he is merely under the influence of the story from John—stoning is still represented as the proper penalty for adultery, years after the redaction of the Mishnah.

In the case of murder, beheading was never replaced. (There was at some date an alteration in the mode of beheading, but not one to save the skeleton.) The penalty, however, became largely theoretical. There was reluctance to put a murderer to death and a number of provisions were laid down to prevent

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than Eliezer, in *Derekh Eretz* 11, also assumes stoning in the case of adultery. Ben Azzai, who quotes Deut. 22. 13f., almost certainly has in mind a woman accused by her husband of misconduct during betrothal and of not having been found a virgin by him.

<sup>1</sup> Babylonian Sanhedrin 51b; see Büchler, *op. cit.*, p. 681, whose conclusions I cannot all accept. It is curious that, while thinking that Ben Azzai adhered to stoning, he should favour such an early date as he does for the introduction of strangling.

<sup>2</sup> Commentary on Romans, in Rufinus' version, 1. 6 c. 7; see Momm-  
sen, *Römisches Strafrecht*, p. 120 n. 1.

a court from ever pronouncing the death sentence. In a particularly bad case, I suppose, the Romans were called in. In the case of adultery, stoning was replaced. Here also, in the end, the death penalty was virtually given up, but not so soon. When the crime was first brought under strangling, this was not merely academic. The Roman tribunals may have proved too lenient. Very likely the development towards strangling started by the husband resorting to self-help, for which purpose this method would be most convenient. By 200 A. D. strangling in the case of adultery had received the fullest possible sanction, that of the Mishnah. From Origen we may infer that many none the less regarded it as a *pis aller* in comparison with stoning, which—for how long we do not know—remained in their minds the correct punishment in principle.

It is not the only instance of even the Mishnah failing to oust some deep-rooted notion. The Mishnah may be considered to represent the orthodox line of the time; but Jewish life was far from uniformly orthodox. We know of a fair number of cases—and careful inquiry will bring to light more and more—of early concepts and even practices surviving their rejection by the official leadership of the community<sup>1</sup>.

The pericope in John is widely considered to be spurious. The question is here immaterial. Whether genuine or not, it has this feature in common with the Fourth Gospel in general that it preserves authentic Jewish material of the New Testament period<sup>2</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> For an example from the field of succession see the writer's *Inheritance in Two Lukan Pericopes*, *Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung, Roman. Abt.*, 72 (1955) 330ff.

<sup>2</sup> I wish to thank Dr. Ernst Bammel of Brasenose College for valuable criticism.

## Some Aspects of Constantine's Legislation

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### I

In the short time at our disposal we can do no more than attempt to draw attention to a small selection of Constantine's laws which, it is hoped, will appear to be of a special interest. We may begin with *Vatican fragment* 34, that law which refers to the earliest enactment known to have come from Constantine's chancery, well before his victory at Saxa Rubra:

"The Augusti and Caesares to Flavia Aprilla. Since you claim to have bought an infant slave at a certain price, and to have paid that price and received the documents, it has been decreed by us already long ago that he who wishes to regain the child should give another slave in his stead or pay his value. Therefore we believe that at present you are his rightful owner, even if you bought him for a fixed price of his parents. In no event, however, may a barbarian child be proved free. Signed: July 21st, A. D. 313."

Three facts about this decree should be specially noticed: First the atrocious Latin in which it is conceived, and which caused it not to be included in the official redaction of the *Codex Theodosianus*, since it was superseded by *Cod. Theod.* V. 10. 1 (A. D. 329), dealing with the same subject. Secondly its place of origin. Since the bureau issuing the constitution had access to the "*iam olim*"-constitution, which can only have come from the chancery at Trêves, this decree too must have come from there. Thirdly the subject matter. The decree shows a fundamental change in the common law of slavery, as illustrated by Diocletian's constitution of A. D. 294, *Cod. Just.* IV. 43. 1.

Thus the earliest decree of Constantine's, issued when he was still only one of the four rulers of the Empire, against the

rule that only the senior Augustus should issue laws, broke the common law of slavery in favour of the slave trade. The reason for this is also obvious: Already Julius Caesar had filled his coffers with the money received for that one million of slaves sold by him in the course of his campaigns in Gaul, and with this treasure had conquered the world. Now Constantine was going to do the same. There you have the famous "pacification of the German frontier tribes" between A. D. 307 and 312. Notice, how *nullus ex gentilibus*, no barbarian, may be claimed as free, whether he be man, woman, child or even infant baby.

There is, therefore, an enormous contrast between the political importance of our decree and its appalling Latin. Evidently the chancellery at Trèves could do no better. This fact was also frankly admitted by an early panegyrist of Constantine, Nazarius. The tradition of Roman administration was only maintained at Rome. Diocletian, the ruler of the East, had issued all his laws in Latin, thousands of them, inspite of the inconvenience involved for the recipients. That had been as much a matter of principle as of necessity. The insufficiency of Eastern administration had been proved when two eastern armies, that of Severus as well as that of Galerius, when invading Italy, had been simply bought by Maxentius. The army administration of the East had proved unequal to the task of maintaining them abroad. The most important part of the army service, the Quartermaster's Dept., had broken down, and the soldiers were left starving. The presence of Maximianus, their old Emperor (but was he in the case of Galerius' army?) had only served to cover the shame of the soldiers' defection.

Constantine's Q. M. G. S. was hardly any better. That was the reason for the smallness of the forces he employed for the conquest of Italy in A. D. 312, and for his almost incredible "Blitzkrieg" tactics. However, he succeeded where the others had failed, and at once subordinated the imperial chancellery at Rome to that of Trèves. Dissolve it he could not, but there was to be no disloyalty. In consequence there must have been a large exchange of personnel between Rome and Trèves. That is shown by the elegant style of the constitutions issued at



Trèves, even if they were of a purely local, Gallic interest, as e. g. *Cod. Just.* XI. 62. 1 (A. D. 315), which had no political importance whatsoever.

## II

This distinction of hands has to be the first preliminary if we ever want to arrive at a proper assessment of the witness which the legislation under Constantine's name may afford for the understanding of his own, enigmatic character. For it should go without saying that he had more important things to do than writing all his laws with his own hand. The second and equally necessary consideration in judging Constantine's laws, is their state of preservation. To illustrate this point we would refer to his famous edict containing the punishment of crucifixion for slaves. It is found on the one hand in *Cod. Theod.* IX. 5. 1, and on the other on three inscriptions, and reconstituted by Mommsen and Gradenwitz in Bruns, *Fontes*<sup>7</sup>, 265f.

The tradition on stone is more than twice as long as that in the law code; and you will find the same discrepancy if you compare the Constantinian decrees which are preserved in Eusebius' *Life of Constantine* with their respective equivalents in the *Codex Theodosianus*. What is the reason for that? It is to be found in the fact that all the enactments in the law code had undergone a twofold process of vetting before they were embodied in that voluminous work. The top layer, so to speak, of alterations was provided by the commission of lawyers appointed by Theodosius II. to compile his Codex. In two laws which are to be found in the *Codex Theodosianus* these men were given permission not only to condense all prior enactments which were to be included, but even to alter their wording with regard to style as well as to substance. Thus we have to take into account the possibility of alterations by the Theodosian commission in the first half of the fifth century.

It is well known, however, that these men used their powers rather timidly. The real damage was done at the first vetting by the Constantinian chancellery itself. For technical reasons, lack of space and of writing material, no law was preserved in its

entirety at the imperial offices. Constantine and his successors revelled in lengthy pronouncements of faith and policy, designed by an office the members of which were trained rhetors, not lawyers. From these pronouncements short records were taken by the legal staff, and more or less carefully preserved. This duty fell to a highly trained and efficient group of officers. Its members frequently improved the pronouncements' style; but, as we will see, they also interfered with what may have appeared to them as bad thought, and at times even suppressed it completely. Some instances will be given, therefore, of both the refashioning and the issuing of decrees in an anti-Constantinian, i. e. pagan sense.

### III

a) It has to be remembered that until A. D. 324 Constantine shared the Emperorship with his brother in law, Licinius. Mutual relations between the two Emperors were, however, far from happy. Already in A. D. 314 a clash occurred, and ten years later the final war broke out, and its decision went in favour of Constantine. Now Constantine was in the field of law a revolutionary. Three hundred years later Isidorus of Seville still recorded: "The ancient laws fell into disrepute; the new law began with Constantine" (*Etymol.* V. 1. 6—7). This "new law" was a Christian battle cry. In view of this it is indeed surprising that we should find in one of Constantine's laws, coupled with a pointed reference to the *ius antiquum*, the punishment of slaves by crucifixion to be upheld, so shortly after the battle of Saxa Rubra (Oct. 27th, A. D. 312) as in the decree just examined under another aspect. For with Mommsen and Gradenwitz and despite O. Seeck's protest, its date is Jan. 1st, A. D. 314. We cannot escape the alternative that either this law was not one of Constantine's or else that his vision of the Cross was a trumped up falsehood. We feel that Constantine, who so frequently in his pronouncements protested his veneration of the Cross of Christ, just could not have upheld the *lex vetus* whereby slaves were executed by crucifixion.

However, the evidence of the three inscriptions, which are all of eastern origin, makes it quite clear that this was not

one of Constantine's laws, but came from his colleague and rival, Licinius. For the personal friend and successor of Galerius, Licinius, was wedded to the *lex vetus*. Under the terms of the Milan agreement, however, Constantine was bound to promulgate the laws of the ruler of the East. In this case such a law contained one of the pin pricks administered to Constantine by his colleague in preparation of the war of A. D. 314. Why then, we would ask, was this law preserved? Was it an accident, or were there adherents of the *lex vetus* in Constantine's own chancellery? We will postpone the answer till we have examined two more Constantinian laws.

b) In *Cod. Theod.* VII. 20. 2 (A. D. 320) a most singular decree of Constantine's will be found, the highly stylised minutes of a rather heated discussion between the Emperor and his veterans. These veterans took exception to their being demobilised, unless their demands for special privileges were granted. The personal intervention of the Emperor was indeed required to quell the mutiny. Now in these minutes two very curious features are to be found. First, there is the acclamation, *dii te nobis servent, Constantine*, which is quite plainly pagan; but secondly, there is the addition *vestra salus nostra salus, vere dicimus iurati dicimus*, which is just as obviously Christian. For U. Wilcken has proved that Christian soldiers, who refused to swear by the Emperor's *genius*, had no objection to an oath of allegiance by his *salus*.

We would suggest, therefore, that the acclamation *dii te nobis servent*, was in fact rather mutinous. Even the Roman Senate, which at the time was still largely composed of pagans, acclaimed the Emperors at the introduction of the *Codex Theodosianus*, *deus vos nobis dedit; deus vos nobis servet*. Constantine, who had changed the military oath of his troops from *genius* to *salus*, must have greatly frowned at their acclamation, *dii te nobis servent*. And yet this acclamation is still preserved in the *Codex Theodosianus*. We ask once more: Was there an element in Constantine's chancellery that was pleased to preserve this pagan acclamation in a decree by the first Christian Emperor? Once more we postpone the answer.

c) Our third instance is a decree addressed to Verinus, the *vicarius Africae*, *Cod. Theod.* IX. 15. 1 (A. D. 318/9), introducing the *poena cullei* for *parricidium* in the African province. This punishment had not been used there previously, since it was an institution belonging to the sacred law of the ancient city of Rome. Now there are two things to be noticed with regard to the technical side of this particular constitution. The first is that the decree was not meant to be published, neither was it in fact published. If, as in this case, the note *p. p.*, i. e. *propositum*, is missing from a constitution, that in itself may not constitute sufficient proof to indicate that we are faced with a merely internal administration order. If, however, the dates of departure and accession are as carefully noted down as in the subscription of our decree, such a conclusion is inescapable. The second thing to be noticed are these very dates. Even on a journey to Carthage during the winter months, the time taken from Nov. 16th, A. D. 318 to March 14th, A. D. 319, seems to indicate a fair distance. The sending of the constitution from Rome cannot have taken four months. We would suggest that it came from beyond the Alps, from Trêves.

The next point to consider is the person of the addressee, Verinus. We know of him that he was shortly afterwards promoted to the position of *praefectus urbi* at Rome. He became one of the most popular city prefects of the Constantinian era. That makes it highly probable that he was a heathen like the vast majority of Roman senators and a very considerable majority of the inhabitants of the ancient capital of the world.

This suspicion is confirmed when we look at the content of the decree, which abounds with paganism. First the *poena cullei* itself. We have already stated that it was an institution of the ancient sacred law of Rome. Moreover, a contemporary legal source, *Pauli Sent.* V. 24. 1, states that it was no longer practised at that time. Nevertheless, the little handbooks for students, which in the end went to form the basis of Justinian's *Institutes* (IV. 18. 6), described it in the very same way as the decree of Constantine. That goes to show that it was one of the professors' and antiquarians' pet subjects. Secondly the reference to the

*elementa*. One look at Firmicus Maternus' violent attack upon the worship of the elements makes clear the paganism of this reference. Thirdly the expression *fata properavit* for "to murder". *Fatum* as an idea and as a term was repulsive to many Christians. It is found — once more with the meaning of death — in only one other Constantinian decree (*Cod. Theod.* I. 2. 4, A. D. 319), presumably by the same hand, and after that only seventy years later in the *Theodosian Code*, at a time when conditions were vastly different.

To sum up, all this paganism was found in a decree originating from Trêves, as it seems, where Constantine had transferred officers from Rome, presumably because they were less likely to cause any harm in his ancient possessions than in the newly conquered Italy. It was directed to an high official who himself was probably a heathen. It was an internal regulation, not to be published. For the third time we put our question, was there a pagan fifth column in Constantine's chancellery, and now we feel we have sufficient evidence to reply in the affirmative.

#### IV

The assumption that there was such a group working at Trêves and probably also at Rome in the imperial chancelleries is strengthened by the evidence which we possess in Constantine's legislation about pagan resistance in Italy in the years from A. D. 313 to 324. Characteristic is in particular a law of May 25th, A. D. 323, issued at the time when the tension between East and West was at its highest. This law (*Cod. Theod.* XVI. 2. 5) punished the mob for compelling Christian clergy to take part in pagan lustrations with no more than a whipping, and the *honestiores*, who also had taken part in the sport, with a fine. There is also the legislation about the *haruspicia* at Rome. The first constitution dealing with the *haruspices* at Rome was rather draconic (*Cod. Theod.* IX. 16. 1, Feb. 1st, A. D. 319), the second took notice of the unrest caused by the first among the people of Rome (*Cod. Theod.* IX. 16. 2, May 15th, A. D. 319), and the third even ordered the *haruspices* to perform the customary rites at the imperial palace, after it had been hit

by lightening (*Cod. Theod.* XVI. 10. 1, Dec. 17th, A. D. 320). There was yet another decree (*Cod. Theod.* IX. 16. 3, A. D. 321), by which the performance of magic rites on farms and estates, and of magic cures, if they be harmless, was permitted by the imperial government. And all this legislation was enacted during the years of tension between Constantine and Licinius, either in A. D. 314, or between the winter of A. D. 318/9 and that of 323/4. There seems to be good reason to assume that the Emperor's vigilance was of necessity less strict with regard to pagan prepossessions amongst his officers during that period, if they were loyal otherwise.

The assumption of such a group working under Constantine's very eyes amongst his councillors also explains the amazing gaps which appear in the *Codex Theodosianus* with regard to his legislation in favour of the Church. The full text of his great law about episcopal courts is preserved only by accident, outside the *Codex Theodosianus*, in that elusive collection of Sirmondus; but e. g. the record of Constantine's fundamental law on the observation of Sunday as a holiday was not found by the commission of Theodosius II., although they searched for it and produced some secondary material. Furthermore, a whole number of decrees in favour of the Church, mentioned in ecclesiastical writers, as Eusebius' *Vita Constantini*, Theodoret, Sozomenos and others, is missing from the *Codex Theodosianus*. One or two may have perished by accident; one or two may have been rejected by the compilers. Their almost total absence can, however, be explained in two ways only: Either the Church Fathers have been guilty of "many inventions", or Constantine's chancellery has been guilty of suppressing this evidence. Personally we incline to taking the second view, which has been set out more fully in the *Zeitschr. d. Sav. St., Rom. Abt.* 72, 1955, 127 f.

## The False Decretals, Faustus of Riez and the Pseudo-Eusebius

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The *Pseudo-Isidorian Decretals* contain four passages about the sacrament of Confirmation, which were attributed to Popes Clement, Eusebius, Urban and Miltiades, and had considerable influence upon the theological formularizations of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. The passages, except that attributed to Clement, were cited by the canonist Burchard of Worms in the eleventh century, by Ivo of Chartres, Gratian and Peter the Lombard in the twelfth, by St. Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth, and, as late as the sixteenth century, by the *Catechism* of the Council of Trent<sup>1</sup>. In our day there has been a revived interest in the sacrament of Confirmation, which may justify a closer examination of the sources and purpose of the Pseudo-Isidore<sup>2</sup>.

The first passage purports to be from St. Clement, but is an interpolation into a few sentences of the Clementine *Recognitiones*:

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<sup>1</sup> Burchard attributes the small extract which he gives to Pope Anserus, Decretum, lib. 4, 51 and 56, PL 140, 738—39; Ivo, Decretum, 1, 260, PL 161, 121; Panormia, 1, 113, PL 161, 1069; Gratian, Decretum, 3, d. 5, 1—3, ed. Friedberg, 1, 1413, has a long extract attributed to Miltiades, and smaller ones to Urban and Eusebius; Peter the Lombard, Liber Sententiarum, D. 7, one small extract attributed to Urban, another to Miltiades; St. Thomas, Summa, 3, q. 72, a. 1, bis; a. 8, ad 3 and ad 4; a. 12, ad 1, quoting only Miltiades; Catechism of the Council of Trent, p. 2, cap. 3, q. 13, citing Urban and Eusebius; p. 2, cap. 3, qq. 3, 5 and 20, citing Miltiades.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. A. J. Mason, The Relation of Confirmation to Baptism, London 1891, pp. 415—422; F. J. Dölger, Das Sakrament der Firmung, Wien 1906, pp. 118—119; H. Weisweiler, Das Sakrament der Firmung in den systematischen Werken der ersten Frühscholastik, Scholastik 8 (1933) p. 488; G. Dix, The Theology of Confirmation, London 1946, pp. 22—25; L. S. Thornton, Confirmation, London 1954, pp. 154—155.

Pseudo-Isidore,  
Hinschius, pp. 63—64

Omnibus ergo festinandum est sine mora renasci deo et demum consignari ab episcopo, id est septiformem gratiam spiritus sancti percipere, quia incertum est uniuscuiusque exitus vitae. Cum autem regeneratus fuerit et postmodum septiformis spiritus gratia ab episcopo ut memoratum est, confirmatus, quia aliter perfectus esse christianus nequaquam poterit, nec sedem inter perfectos habere si non necessitate, sed incuria aut voluntate remanserit, ut a beato Petro apostolo accepimus ut ceteri sancti apostoli praecipiente domino docuerunt, et demum ex operibus bonis ostendat in se similitudinem eius qui eum genuit patris.

*Recognitiones*, 6, 9—10,  
PG 1, 1353.

Omnibus ergo festinandum est sine mora renasci deo, quia incertus est uniuscuiusque exitus vitae. Cum autem regeneratus fueris per aquam, ex operibus bonis ostende in te similitudinem eius, qui te genuit patris.

It seems fairly clear that the Pseudo-Isidore wished to associate Baptism with Confirmation, and cunningly interspersed observations about the latter between sentences which he found in the *Recognitiones*. The expressions which he uses, *consignari ab episcopo*, *septiformis gratia spiritus sancti*, and even *perfectus Christianus* were normal enough at the period; his remark, however, that those who neglect to receive the imposition of the bishop will not take their place among the perfect appears to apply to their state after death, and so touches upon a question which was very little discussed until the twelfth century<sup>1</sup>. As early as the year 250, or thereabouts, the unknown author of the *De Rebaptismate* had asserted that the baptized but unconfirmed can be saved, and about the year 300 the Council of Elvira had said: *Si quis diaconus regens plebem sine episcopo vel presbytero aliquos baptizaverit, episcopus eos per benedictionem perficere debet; quod si ante de seculo recesserint, sub fide qua quis crediderit poterit esse iustus*<sup>2</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Weisweiler, art. cit., number 3, 'Die Notwendigkeit des Sakramentes der Firmung', pp. 514—523.

<sup>2</sup> The *De Rebaptismate*, Hartel's ed., CSEL III, 3, appendix, pp. 74—75; Elvira, Mansi, 2, 12 and Hefele-Leclercq, 1, 261.



Moreover, John, the Roman Deacon, writing about the year 500, had begun to answer the question put to him by his correspondent Senarius: 'whether it is any disadvantage to a man, or not, if after being baptized, he should pass out of this life without the unction of the chrism and the bishop's benediction'; but unhappily the manuscript breaks off before recording his answer<sup>1</sup>. The Pseudo-Isidore, although obviously wishing to urge the importance of consignation by the bishop, gives no adequate account of its effects in the after-life, and, indeed, in the passage which he attributes to Pope Miltiades, inculpable omission of the consignation is said to be made up for by death itself.

The second passage is attributed to Eusebius, who was Pope for a short time in 309 or 310:

*Epistola Eusebii Tertia*  
Hinschius, p. 242.

Similiter et hereticos omnes quicumque dei gratia convertuntur et in sanctae trinitatis nomine credentes baptizati sunt, Romanae ecclesiae regulam tenentes, per manus inpositionem reconciliari praecipimus. Manus inpositionis sacramentum magna veneratione tenendum est, quae ab aliis perfici non potest nisi a summis sacerdotibus. Nec tempore apostolorum ab aliis quam ab ipsis apostolis legitur aut scitur peractum esse, neque ab aliis, sicut dictum est, quam ab illis qui eorum locum tenent unquam perfici potest aut fieri debet. Nam si aliter praesumptum fuerit, irritum habeatur et vacuum, nec inter ecclesiastica unquam reputabitur sacramenta.

*Epistola Innocentii ad Decentium*  
PL 20, 555.

De consignandis vero infantibus manifestum est, non ab alio quam ab episcopo fieri licere. Nam presbyteri, licet secundi sint sacerdotes, pontificatus tamen apicem non habent. Hoc autem pontificium solis deberi episcopis, ut vel consignent vel paracletum spiritum tradant, non solum consuetudo ecclesiastica demonstrat, verum et illa lectio actuum apostolorum quae asserit Petrum et Ioannem esse directos, qui iam baptizatis traderent spiritum sanctum. Nam presbyteris, sive extra episcopum, sive praesente episcopo cum baptizant, chrismate baptizatos ungere licet sed quod ab episcopo fuerit consecratum; non tamen frontem ex eodem oleo signare, quod solis debetur episcopis, cum tradunt spiritum paracletum.

<sup>1</sup> PL 57, 406—407. Mason refers to this John the Deacon, and his judgement that John wrote about the year 500 has since been confirmed by other authorities, cf. D. B. Capelle, *Les Tractatus de baptismo attribué à S. Maxime de Turin*, *Revue Bénédictine* 45 (1933) pp. 108—118.

Elsewhere the Pseudo-Isidore cites the famous letter of Innocent to Decentius, Bishop of Gubbio; but in the passage which he attributes to Eusebius he himself seems solely responsible for the statement that consignation by anyone save a bishop is null and void. Probably the Pseudo-Isidore was referring to the Chorepiscopi, against whom the False Decretals wage incessant war. The Councils of Paris of 829, and of Meaux of 845, had declared that Chorepiscopi were not permitted to administer Confirmation; and between 842 and 847 Raban of Mainz had defended the validity of such acts of the Chorepiscopi. But the Pseudo-Isidore gave circulation to fabricated letters of Popes Damasus, Leo the Great, and John III, in which all such acts of the Chorepiscopi were declared absolutely invalid and to be repeated, and the declaration in the letter attributed to Pope Eusebius fully accords with the general purpose of the Pseudo-Isidore, which was to magnify the position of the diocesan bishop and defend him from the encroachments of the Chorepiscopi. In 864 Pope Nicholas I wrote to the Archbishop of Bourges forbidding any repetition of ordinations or consecrations, on the ground that the Chorepiscopi were true bishops; nevertheless the influence of the False Decretals caused considerable doubts, and in 888 the Council of Metz repeated the assertion that ordinations and consecrations by the Chorepiscopi were invalid<sup>1</sup>.

The passages attributed to Popes Urban and Miltiades are taken, with the exception of the introductory section about the comparative importance of Baptism and Confirmation, from the Pseudo-Eusebian homily edited by Schott and published by de la Bigne in his *Magna Bibliotheca Patrum*, volume 5, Cologne, 1618. Casimir Oudin as early as 1722 had suggested that the real author of these homilies was Faustus of Riez, an Englishman who became Abbot of Lerins, and later, Bishop

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<sup>1</sup> Council of Paris, Mansi 14, 556; of Meaux, *ibid.* 829; Raban, PL 110, 1195—1199; letter of Damasus, Hinschius, *op. cit.* p. 511; Leo, *ibid.*, 628; John III, *ibid.*, 716; Nicholas I, Epist. 66, PL 119, 884; Council of Metz, Mansi 18, 80. Cf. L. Saltet, *Les Réordinations*, Paris 1907, pp. 109—124.

of Riez about the year 462, the exact date of his death being unknown. Oudin's suggestion was supported by Coustant about the same date, by John Stilling in 1760, and in our own time by Dom Germain Morin and by Alexander Souter<sup>1</sup>. With the exception of the introductory remarks about the comparative value of Baptism and Confirmation, the whole of the following passage was copied *verbatim* by the Pseudo-Isidore from the Pseudo-Eusebius; I give it here from Shott's edition, adding for comparison sentences taken from admittedly authentic works of Faustus of Riez, which tend to confirm Oudin, Coustant, Stilling, Morin and Souter in their attribution of the Pseudo-Eusebian Homilies to Faustus of Riez. The passage included in brackets marked 1, thus: 1 [ ], is attributed by the Pseudo-Isidore to Miltiades, that in brackets 2, thus: 2 [ ], to Urban; it will be noticed that one sentence is attributed to both, which suggests that the work of falsification was somewhat hastily done.

Pseudo-Isidore,  
Hinschius, pp. 245—246.

1 [De his vero super quibus  
rogastis vos informari, id est  
utrum maius esset sacramentum  
manus inpositio episcoporum aut  
baptismus, scitote utrumque mag-  
num esse sacramentum. Et sicut

Hinschius' attribution of this  
to the Pseudo-Eusebius is mistaken;  
its origin is unknown to me.

<sup>1</sup> Oudin, *Commentarius de Scriptoribus Ecclesiae Antiquis*, vol. 1, Lipsiae, pp. 390—426; Coustant, in the Appendix to the Maurist edition of the sermons of St. Augustine, PL 39, 2062; Stilling, *Acta Sanctorum Septembris*, Antverpiae 1760, pp. 708—712; Morin, *Critique des sermons attribués à Fauste de Riez dans la récente édition de l'Académie de Vienne*, *Revue Bénédictine* 9 (1892) pp. 49—61; *Mes principes et ma méthode pour la future édition de S. Césaire*, *ibid.* 10 (1893) pp. 61—77, especially 65—68; *La collection gallicane dite d'Eusèbe d'Emèse et les problèmes qui s'y rattachent*, *Zeitschr. für neutest. Wissenschaft* 34 (1935) 92—115; incidental references in *Sancti Caesarii Arelatensis Sermones*, in the *Series Latina* of the *Corpus Christianorum*, Turnholti 1953, v. g. pp. 254, 283, 352, 622, 682, 687, 770, 795, 817, 826, 860, 877, XXXII-XL; and in *Sancti Augustini Sermones post Maurinos reperti*, vol. 1 of *Miscellanea Agostiniana*, Roma 1930, v. g. pp. 726 bis; Souter, *Observations on the Pseudo-Eusebian Collection of Gallican Sermons*, *Journal of Theological Studies* 41 (1940) pp. 47—57.

unum a maioribus fit, id est a summis pontificibus, quod a minoribus perfici non potest, ita et maiori veneratione venerandum et tenendum est, sed ita coniuncta sunt haec duo sacramenta, ut ab invicem nisi morte praeveniente nullatenus possint segregari, et unum sine altero rite perfici non potest. Nam unum praeveniente morte salvare sine altero potest, aliud autem non potest.

Unde scriptum est: In diebus illis dicit dominus: Effundam de spiritu meo super omnem carnem. Advertamus summas divitias bonitatis. Quod in confirmandis neofitis manus inpositio tribuit singulis, hoc tunc spiritus sancti descensio in credentium populos donavit universis. Sed quia diximus quod manus inpositio et confirmatio ei qui iam renatus est in Christo aliquid conferre possit, forte cogitet aliquis: Quid mihi prodest post misterium baptismatis ministerium confirmationis? Aut quantum video, non totum de fonte suscepimus, si post fontem adiectione novi generis indigemus. Non ita, dilectissimi, adtendat caritas vestra. Sicut exigit militaris ordo ut, cum imperator quemcumque in militum receperit numerum, non solum signet receptum, sed etiam armis competentibus instruat pugnaturum: ita in baptizato benedictio illa munitio est. Dedisti militem, da ei adiumentum militie. Numquid prodest, si quisquam parentum magnam parvulo conferat salutem, nisi providere studeat et tutorem? Itaque paraclitus regeneratis in Christo custos et consolator et tutor est. Ideo dicit sermo divinus: Nisi dominus custodierit civitatem, in vanum vigilant qui custodiunt eam. Ergo spiritus sanc-

Council of Elvira, about the year 300; Mansi 2, 11:

Canon 77: Si quis diaconus regens plebem sine episcopo vel presbytero aliquos baptizaverit, episcopus eos per benedictionem perficere debebit; quod si ante de saeculo decesserint, sub fide qua quis credidit, poterit esse iustus.

Faustus of Riez, *De Spiritu Sancto*  
CSEL 2, 142—3:

Hos cum interrogaret Paulus: si spiritum sanctum acceperitis credentes, qui utique post baptismum salvatoris per inpositionem manuum rite baptizatis fuerat confitendus, at illi responderunt: neque si spiritus sanctus est, audivimus. his auditis baptizati sunt in nomine domini Iesu. et cum inposuisset illis manus Paulus, venit super eos spiritus sanctus et loquebantur linguis et prophetaabant. adverte, quia cum baptizantur in nomine Iesu, postea accipiunt spiritum sanctum et propheticam ex paracleti invocatione virtutem. Vere deus est, qui post dei donum plenitudini inponit augmentum.

tus, qui super aquas baptismi salutifero descendit inlapsu, in fonte plenitudinem tribuit ad innocentia, in confirmatione augmentum praestat ad gratiam. Quia in hoc mundo tota aetate victuris inter invisibiles hostes et pericula gradiendum est, in baptismo regeneramur ad vitam, post baptismum confirmamur ad pugnam. In baptismo abluimur, post baptismum roboramur, ac si continuo transitis sufficiant regenerationis beneficia, victuris autem necessaria sunt confirmationis auxilia. Regeneratio per se salvat mox in pace beati saeculi recipiendos, confirmatio autem armat et instruit ad agones mundi huius et prelia reservandos. Qui autem post baptismum cum adquisita innocentia immaculatus pervenit ad mortem, confirmatur morte, quia non potest peccasse post mortem.

Hic si forte illud etiam requirere velimus, post passionem et resurrectionem Christi, quid apostolis profuerit adventus spiritus sancti, ipse dominus eis hoc evidenter exponit. Quae dico, inquit, vobis, non potestis ea portare modo, cum autem venerit ille spiritus veritatis, ipse vos docebit omnem veritatem. [Vides, quia cum spiritus sanctus infunditur, cor fidele ad prudentiam et constantiam dilatatur. Attributed also to Urban] Itaque ante descensionem spiritus sancti usque ad negationem apostoli deterrentur, post visitationem vero eius usque ad martyrium contemptu salutis armantur, secundum haec per Christum redimimur, per spiritum vero sanctum dono sapientiae spiritalis inluminamur, hedificamur, erudimur, instruimur, consummamur, ut illa sancti spiri-

*Ibid.* 1, 10, p. 118:

Et gentiles et catechumeni de patris et filii dispensatione participant, de sanctificatione spiritus sancti non facile, nisi iam baptis-

tus voce audire possimus: Intellectum dabo tibi et instruem te in via hac quam ingredieris.

2 [De spiritu sancto accipimus, ut spirituales efficiamur, quia animalis homo non percipit ea quae sunt spiritus dei. De spiritu sancto accipimus, ut sapiamus inter bonum malumque discernere, iusta diligere, iniusta respuere, ut malitiae ac superbiae repugnemus, ut luxuriae ac diversis inlecebris et fedis indignisque cupiditatibus resistamus. De spiritu sancto accipimus: vitae amore et gloriae ardore succensi divinitus erigere a terrenis mentem ad superna et divina valeamus. Attributed also to Urban]

Pseudo-Isidore

Hinschius, p. 146

2 [Ad hoc enim sensum rationabilem naturae munere et secundum nativitatis reparationem suscepimus, ut secundum apostolum magis quae sursum sunt sapiamus, non quae super terram, quia sapientia huius mundi stultitia est apud deum. Quid autem suadet, carissimi, sapientia huius saeculi, nisi nocitura quaerere et amare peritura, negligere salutaria, pro nihilo reputare perpetua? Cupiditatem commendat, de qua dicitur: Radix omnium malorum est cupiditas. Quae in primis hoc malum habet, quod dum ingerit transitoria abscondit aeterna; et dum a foris posita conspicit, intra se latentia non introspicit, et dum aliena quaerit, sectatori suo semetipsum reddit alienum. Ecce quid suadet saeculi sapientia, vivere in deliciis, unde dicitur: Anima quae in delitiis est vivens, mortua est.]

mum consecuti, purificati et spirituales effecti, apostolici etiam et apostoli ac toto spiritu ad martyrium praeparati.

*Ibid.* 1, 11, p. 121:

Apostolico illic nihilominus iteratur oracula: et nunc, inquit, domine, respice in minas eorum, et: repleti sunt omnes spiritu sancto et loquebantur verbum dei cum fiducia. adverte etiam hoc loco in trinitate spiritum sanctum contineri. in oratione pater rogatur, in dei verbo filius agnoscitur, in apostolorum constantia spiritus ignis operatur. repleti sunt omnes spiritu sancto.

Faustus of Riez

*De Gratia*, 1, 9, CSEL 21, p. 29

Sensum rationis et arbitrium voluntatis in unamquamque animam inspiravit.

*De Spiritu Sancto*, 2, 8,  
*ibid.*, p. 152:

Ipse naturae deus est, qui auctor est gratiae.

These fortuitous correspondences, occurring in so short a section of the Pseudo-Eusebian writings, tend to confirm the judgement of Oudin, Coustant, Stilling, Morin and Souter that the author of both really was Faustus of Riez. Particularly interesting is the sentence *spiritus sanctus...in fonte plenitudinem tribuit ad innocentiam, in confirmatione augmentum praestat ad gratiam*, which is met in Faustus' undoubted work *De Spiritu Sancto* by the *vere deus est qui post dei donum plenitudini inponit augmentum*. In the sermon on the Trinity of the Pseudo-Eusebius, we read: *Ecce saluti tuae tota trinitas Deus militat, redemptionem tuam pater ordinat, filius administrat, spiritus sanctus est qua virtute confirmat. Cum ergo ab ipso specialiter in baptismo vivificari mortuos, absolvi reos, confirmari noveris absolutos: Deus utique est, qui ad effectum divina opera perducit: Deus, inquam, est, qui collatum bonum plenitudinum ponit augmentum*. The word *plenitudo* is a favourite both with the Pseudo-Eusebius and with Faustus; for instance, compare the words in the sermon on the Trinity with almost similar words in the *De Spiritu Sancto* of Faustus:

Pseudo-Eusebius  
*Magna Bibliotheca Patrum*  
 p. 576 B

Innumerae multitudines per universam terram uno lavacro diluuntur, et ut dicit Apostolus, uno spiritu potantur. Et ideo dicit Deus: In diebus illis effundam super omnem carnem de spiritu meo; et non dicit, effundam spiritum meum. Tantum de eo, quantum mundus possit capere, dispandat. Vides quod a patre quidem substantiae unitate progreditur, non tamen a patre separatur. Emitteritur, non amittitur, et effunditur, et tenetur atque in effusionis verbo magnitudo plenitudinis declarat. Maximum divinitatis insigne est, posse simul omnes

Faustus  
*De Spiritu Sancto*, 1, 13,  
 CSEL 21, p. 127

In illa specialiter sacratissima regenerationis nocte ab oriente in occidentem, a solis ortu usque in occasum, ab aquilone et mari ubique idem spiritus unus et plenus operatur, per omnia praesens esse invocatione creditur, benedictione sentitur, innumerae multitudines uno baptismo diluuntur et, ut dixit apostolus, uno spiritu potantur, in unum adoptionis gremium renascuntur. et ideo dicit deus: in diebus illis effundam de spiritu meo super omnem carnem. adverte quod dixit: effundam de spiritu meo, et non dixit: effundam spiritum meum, id est:

infundere, et integrum nihilo-  
minus permanere.

tantum de eo, quantum possit  
mundus accipere, dispensabo. vides,  
quod a patre egreditur nec tamen  
a patre separatur, emittitur et  
non amittitur, effunditur et retine-  
tur, et in eo quod effundi legitur,  
magnitudo plenitudinis declaratur.

The word *plenitudo* occurs in the two short works of Faustus, the *De Gratia* and the *De Spiritu Sancto*, at least eight times, and variations of *plenus* and *impleo* at least twenty-six times; in the first thirty Homilies of the Pseudo-Eusebius, the word *plenitudo* occurs ten times, and *plenus* or *impleo* at least twenty times. Similarly, the word *reparatio*, which occurs in the passage cited about Confirmation, is used ten times in Faustus' two treatises on Grace and on the Holy Ghost, and fourteen times in the first thirty Homilies. The word *maiestas* is a favourite also, coming twenty times in the *De Spiritu Sancto*, and at least fourteen times in the first thirty Homilies. Other favourite words are variations of *blandus*, such as *blandimenta*, *blandire*, and *inlapsus*, *fatalis*, *munificentia*, *inlecebrae*, *magnificentia*, which are repeated in all the works.

Souter, working from the Brussels manuscript 1316, of the Homilies, gives a list of words which he thinks unusual; and of these no less than eighteen occur in the *De Gratia* and the *De Spiritu Sancto* as well as in the Homilies<sup>1</sup>. In all these works the biblical text used is the pure Vulgate, but the following variations from it occur in Faustus and in the Pseudo-Eusebius: Matt. 16, 24: *si quis vult post me venire, abneget se ipsum sibi*; Matt. 25, 42: *dedisti mihi bibere* (the Vulgate has *potum*); Luke 5, 21: *quis potest donare peccata* (the Vulgate has *dimittere*); John 3, 5: *non potest intrare in regnum Dei* (the Vulgate has *introire*).

<sup>1</sup> Observations on the Pseudo-Eusebian Collection of Gallican Sermons, *Journal of Theological Studies* 41 (1940) pp. 55—57: *absento*, *adnumero*, *amministrator*, *adtintatio*, *aeternitas*, *bestialis*, *confusibilis*, *defaeco*, *definite*, *detractio*, *discussio*, *formator*, *imprimo*, *inlapsus* (a word I happened to notice independently), *impenetrabilis*, *malagma*, *maleblandus*, *temporivus*.



There is no doubt that most of the Eusebian Homilies show similarity of mental outlook with the authentic works of Faustus. Both attack Pelagius and his denial of the need of redemption and of original sin<sup>1</sup>, and both contain phrases which give foundation for the charge of Semi-Pelagianism: in Homily 4 for the Epiphany (MBP 551 A) the '*gratia divina, quae ubi nostrae infirmitati invenerit votum, statim supponit auxilium*' corresponds to '*non tribuitur munus salutis, nisi prius interrogetur desiderium voluntatis... quia praecessit voluntas gratiam ideo praevenit et gratia regenerationem*' of the *De Gratia* (CSEL p. 84, lines 5—10). The discussion in the Homily on the Ninevites shows exactly the same outlook as that on the same subject in the *De Gratia*: because the Ninevites hearkened to preaching, and did penance, therefore they received God's mercy (MBP 569 G; CSEL p. 91, 24. 25). The Homily on the good thief holds that he merited forgiveness because he confessed Christ in exceedingly difficult circumstances and so there is no ground whatever for general hope of death-bed repentance, an outlook which accords with Faustus' absolute rejection of the possibility of conversion shortly before death (MBP 568 D; CSEL p. 184ff.). The Homilies, like the *De Gratia*, manifest anxiety lest the freedom of the will be imperilled (MBP 574 C, and generally), and lest any think that our fate is not in our own hands (*ibid.* 550 c); they distinguish, as does the *De Gratia*, between God's invitation and God's 'drawing' (566 G, cf. CSEL p. 52, 9), and make the *credulitatis affectus* to be within man's natural capacities (568 AB), regard the first grace as preaching (568 H), and the gift of grace as God's acceptance of our good desires (569 F), things so much in accord with the *De Gratia* as to make reference needless. The Homilies contain no perception of the mystery of God's providence, or of his distribution of grace, and no exhortation to trust for perseverance in good to God's help. Whatever charges of Semi-Pelagianism have been made against Faustus of Riez, such as those by Suarez, Noris, Coustant and others, lie equally against the Homilies; and whatever defence

<sup>1</sup> Hom. 5 on Easter, *Magna Bibliotheca Patrum*, 560 H; *De Gratia*, 1 and 2, CSEL 21, pp. 6—14, etc.

can be made against the charges, such as that by Stilling, Diedro, Ruard Tapper and others, must apply equally to the Homilies as to Faustus himself<sup>1</sup>.

Even a casual reader of the Homilies and of Faustus' admitted works will be aware of other similarities: God's uniqueness proved by his omnipresence, the same formulas about the Trinity and the Incarnation, the same arguments to prove the divinity of the Holy Ghost—his not being 'local' in presence, his knowledge of God's intimacies, his distribution of gifts as he wills, his being neither begotten nor unbegotten, etc.—the same outlook upon the necessity of the redemption, the same interpretation of Romans 5, 3—5, the same insistence upon the union of body and soul, and others. There is unquestionably a very strong presumptive case that the same mind was at work in many of the Homilies and in Faustus' works.

This, however, seems to me only a strong presumption and by no means a satisfactory demonstration; and a convincing demonstration would involve delicate and exhaustive 'internal criticism'. In the first place we need a good edition of the Pseudo-Eusebian Homilies, even though it were only from the twelfth century Paris manuscript 1269; and a thorough philological, grammatical and, above all, theological index to the Homilies. Then we need a satisfactory index to the authentic works of Faustus, since Engelbrecht's indices are purely historical, grammatical and philological, and include sermons which Morin rightly thinks are not by Faustus at all. This would lay the foundation for serious criticism, which demands such thoroughness and such delicacy of judgement. Morin, for instance, assigned

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<sup>1</sup> Stilling in the *Acta Sanctorum* for September has a long defence of Faustus, and gives ample references. Engelbrecht says that Stilling convinced him, Pref. to the Vienna edition of Faustus, p. XVI; but Engelbrecht's attribution to Faustus of a sermon full of the most fulsome praise of Augustine makes one wonder if he had ever compared Faustus' *De Gratia* with Augustine's later writings on grace. Morin and W. Bergmann think that this sermon, n. 27, CSEL p. 330—334, is derived from St. Caesarius of Arles, cf. Morin, *Revue Bénédictine* 9 (1892) p. 59, and his Caesarius of Arles in the *Corpus Christianorum*, p. 961.

all the seventy-five Homilies of the Pseudo-Eusebius to Faustus, apparently unaware that Stilting, like himself led by considerations of style and thought, and upon an exhaustive study of the Semi-Pelagian issue, had judged that several were not by Faustus at all: the sermon on St. Blandina, numbers 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 of the Easter sermons, the one on the Litanies, on SS. Peter and Paul, numbers 1 and 2 on the martyrs and the last on Penance; and, of Shott's additions from the ninth century Brussels manuscript 1651—1652, a fair number<sup>1</sup>.

This preliminary work done, there arises the question of the homilies attributed to either the Pseudo-Eusebius or to Faustus by various manuscripts and by various authorities, and then, also, the citations from 'Eusebius' which occur in the writings of Paschasius, Ratran, Ivo of Chartres, Alger of Liège and Gratian, which might possibly be derived from manuscripts other than those used in the larger collections,—though, of course, they might not<sup>2</sup>. Through these we may have access to manuscripts which may give unexpected light.

One may, however, ask whether it would be possible, and, even if possible, worth while, to take the trouble involved in attempting to identify the author or authors of these works? Against the very possibility W. Bergmann long ago objected that we possess no homily proved to be the authentic Faustus which might be used as a standard of comparison; and one might urge that the preachers of the period embodied odd passages from other homilists into their sermons and inter-

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Acta Sanctorum*, iam cit., pp. 710—713. Hazarding a guess, I feel that Stilting may well be right in rejecting some, v. g. on St. Blandina, on the Litanies and on SS. Peter and Paul, but wrong in rejecting others, v. g. 5, 6, 7, and 8 on Easter. But such guesses are worthless, save perhaps as a hint to a future editor.

<sup>2</sup> Attributions to Faustus of various Homilies: Stilting, *Acta Sanctorum*, pp. 713 and 714; Morin, appendix to his *Caesarius of Arles*, pp. 956, 965, 973, 981—982, 983, 987, 990; Coustant, in the Maurist edition of Augustine's spurious sermons, PL 39, Homilies Nr. 161, 162, 168, 176, 182, 196, 197, 198, 203, 242; the Migne edition of Jerome, PL 30, 215 and 272; there is some overlapping between Morin and Coustant. Some sermons occurring in the Pseudo-Eusebian collection were attributed to Jerome, Augustine, Isidore of Seville and Caesarius of Arles; the identification of these manuscripts may prove very helpful.

laced their own reflections into these extracts, thus making a net-work exceedingly difficult to disentangle. Against this, however, is the distinctive style of Faustus and the authentic works of his which we possess, together with various historical references, especially in the Pseudo-Eusebian sermon on St. Maximus of Lerins. To identify authors merely from style is indeed an exceedingly delicate business, as Morin's repeated corrections of himself make plain<sup>1</sup>. Morin once jestingly remarked about his feeling that a certain sermon, of which he had only seen an extract or two, must be by Augustine: 'l'esprit de divination m'avait bien servi, cette fois encore'<sup>2</sup>, and in truth sometimes his remarks about particular sermons which he attributes to Augustine or to Caesarius of Arles do look a little like a kind of divination, and occasionally, though very rarely, he disagrees with Dom André Wilmart<sup>3</sup>. This latter, for instance, considers as not by Augustine the two first sermons published by Michael Denis, but Morin regards the second as undoubtedly authentic<sup>4</sup>.

Such disagreement between eminently and uniquely competent scholars might seem to cast doubt upon the following remark of Dom Wilmart: 'I feel sure that no student acquainted with St. Augustine's works will suspect for one moment the

<sup>1</sup> For instance, he attributed to Faustus of Riez the pseudo-Jerome letter *De Septem Ordinibus*, *Revue Bénédictine*, Mars 1891, pp. 97—104; an attribution which he later withdrew, in his review of August Engelbrecht's *Patristische Analecten*, Wien 1892, cf. *R. Bénédictine*, 1892, p. 425. His attempts to identify the Ambrosiaster by internal evidence are almost classic. Sometimes, too, his attributions sound brusque; for instance, his assignment, against the opinion of Coustant, to Caesarius of Arles of the Easter sermon, n. CCIII, in his ed. of Caesarius, p. 817, with the assertion that it is composed largely of bits from the Eusebian homilies. He may be right, but the sermon is redolent of the blessing of the Easter candle on Holy Saturday, and the ideas seem too common to identify — but I speak again as one very much less wise.

<sup>2</sup> *Revue Bénédictine*. 40 (1928) p. 216.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. *Revue Bénédictine*. 40 (1928) p. 223—224, v. g. about *Sermo* 10 on Ps. 149, PL 46, 843—846.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. *Nouveau sermon inédit de S. Augustin sur la Chananéenne et le Psaume 38*, *Revue Bénédictine*. 40 (1928) p. 224; and *Sancti Augustini Sermones post Maurinos reperti*, in: *Miscellanea Agostiniana*, vol. 1, Roma 1930, p. 11, note before the text.

genuineness of these discourses (Easter sermons of St. Augustine). To read them or even to glance over them is quite enough. But it is possible to gather, either from the Biblical quotations or from the recurrent ideas and expressions, several arguments strong enough (I venture to think) to convince a fastidious doubter. For this purpose, I have added some observations immediately after the text of each sermon, but of course without pretending at all to exhaust the subject. It is rather a matter of stray examples. Lengthy comments would be quite out of proportion with these short sermons, and no more effective to convince an obdurate unbeliever.<sup>1</sup>

Nevertheless the methods of 'internal criticism', that is, judgement by style and thought, when manuscript and historical evidence is indecisive, can give and has given the most certain results; and the disagreement of scholars such as Morin and Dom Wilmart is so rare as to be the exception which proves the rule. When Engelbrecht thought that Morin relied too much upon merely internal evidence, the latter met him with a passage of some twenty-seven lines, entitled *Prologus sive Humilis Suggestio*, which had been published once by Hohenreicher from a manuscript of the seventh or eighth century, and again by Max Keuffer from a fifteenth century manuscript, and which neither they nor any one else had assigned to any author. Morin selected twelve sentences and phrases from this very brief *Prologus* and showed no less than seventy-nine correspondences in the authentic works of Caesarius of Arles, so that no one can reasonably doubt that the passage was really written by Caesarius. It was a demonstration of the certain results which may be obtained by purely 'internal criticism'. There is no doubt that Morin could have done much the same with almost every sermon which he identified as Caesarius's or as Augustine's. In both these authors there are words, turns of phrase, ways of approaching a truth or developing a thought or using texts of Scripture or pointing a contrast ... a hundred and more indications of the author, which are as convincing

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<sup>1</sup> The Easter Sermons of St. Augustine, *Journal of Theological Studies* 27 (1926) p. 337.

to one familiar with him as are personal characteristics of speech or walk or manner in a living man. But, as Dom Wilmart says, in many cases it is not worth while detailing them all, since a real student of the author will recognize them at once and the details may well be lost on any one else. This is particularly true of voluminous writers like St. Augustine and St. Caesarius of Arles; and it would be a bold man who would dare to defend the authenticity of works which scholars like Mabillon, Montfaucon, Coustant, Morin and Dom Wilmart reject, and reject upon grounds of style alone.

Another conspicuous example of a triumph of 'internal criticism' was Alexander Souter's *Study of Ambrosiaster*, which proved, mainly on considerations of style and language, that the same author wrote both the Pseudo-Augustinian *Quaestiones in Vetus et Novum Testamentum* and the Pseudo-Ambrosian *Commentaries on St. Paul*. The identity of authorship has since then been generally accepted<sup>1</sup>.

In the case of Faustus of Riez, however, the difficulty is greater than in the case of people like St. Augustine, St. Ambrose, St. Jerome and St. Caesarius of Arles, because his acknowledged writings are fewer and briefer. Nevertheless the authentic writings give sufficient grounds for comparison, in spite of his use of the Vulgate cutting off one invaluable aid to identification, such as exists in writers who use differing versions of the Old Latin. Moreover the Homilies attributed to him are numerous, at least over eighty, and two or three being proved to be by Faustus will give further grounds of comparison applicable to other Homilies or extracts from Homilies. It must be confessed, however, that the work so far done is not sufficient to carry absolute conviction about all the Homilies, great as may be the conviction of some of those who have examined them. The reasons for this conviction have yet to be fully expounded.

Would it be worth while taking the trouble involved in making an exact identification of Faustus's writings? I think it would.

<sup>1</sup> Cambridge Texts and Studies, VII, n. 4, 1905. Morin has some penetratingly true remarks about 'internal criticism' in 'La critique dans une impasse', *Revue Bénédictine*, 40 (1928) pp. 251—252.

Further light might be thrown upon the complex history of Semi-Pelagianism; and the Pseudo-Eusebian Homilies not only contain a considerable body of doctrine, but were unusually influential upon medieval thought. One of the Homilies is still read in the Roman Breviary on the Octave of the Ascension and the next day, though under the name of St. Augustine. The sermon on Confirmation through the use made of it by the Pseudo-Isidore was taken as almost normative by many medieval theologians. The sermon on the Eucharist, the fifth of the Easter sermons in the Pseudo-Eusebius, was also very often and widely quoted under the name of 'Eusebius Emissenus': by Paschase Radbert in the middle of the ninth century, in three extracts<sup>1</sup>; by Witmund, the fellow student of St. Anselm under Lanfranc, in the eleventh century<sup>2</sup>; by Ivo of Chartres at the end of the eleventh or the beginning of the twelfth<sup>3</sup>; by Alger of Liège, a. 1130 or 1135, (than whom no one in the twelfth century wrote better about the Eucharist), in many passages<sup>4</sup>; by Gratian<sup>5</sup>; and by Peter the Lombard<sup>6</sup>. The whole of this sermon on the Eucharist, in one manuscript at least, is attributed to St. Jerome<sup>7</sup>. From the editions of these writers it is impossible to make any useful judgement upon the manuscripts used, although I incline to think that there were at least three manuscripts involved.

Thus upon medieval Eucharistic doctrine the Pseudo-Eusebius had considerable influence. Two things seem to have impressed those who cited him, first his development of the

<sup>1</sup> Letter on the Body and Blood of the Lord, to Frudegard, ch. 1, PL 120, 1324.

<sup>2</sup> De corporis et sanguinis Christi veritate, lib. 1, PL 149, 1434.

<sup>3</sup> Decretum, 2, 4, a long extract, PL 161, 139; Panormia, *ibid.* 1073.

<sup>4</sup> De sacramentis corporis et sanguinis Domini, 1, 5, PL 180, 754; 1, 10, *ibid.* 771; 1, 12, *ibid.* 777; 1, 15, *ibid.* 783 and 785; 3, 8, *ibid.* 841. Peter the Venerable, of Cluny, is said to have compared the works of Lanfranc, Witmund and Alger on the Eucharist, and to have judged Lanfranc to have written *bene, plene et perfecte*, Witmund *melius, plenius et perfectius*, but Alger *optime, plenissime et perfectissime*, cf. Hurter, Nomenclator, 5, Oeniponte 1903, p. 1054.

<sup>5</sup> Decretum, de consecr. 2, 35, Friedberg's ed. p. 1325.

<sup>6</sup> Scriptum super sententias, 4, d. 8, ed. Moos, p. 300.

<sup>7</sup> PL 30, 271—276.

theme '*qui auctor est muneris testis est veritatis*', and second, his application of Exodus 16, 18, 'neither had he more that had gathered more: nor did he find less that had provided less': '*quod corpus sacerdote dispensante tantum est in exiguo quantum esse constat in toto: quod cum Ecclesia fidelium sumit, sicut plenum in universis, ita integrum esse probatur in singulis*', which, as J. B. Malou, the editor of *Alger of Liège*, remarks, comes close to the famous hymn of St. Thomas Aquinas:

*Fracto demum sacramento  
Ne vacilles sed memento,  
Tantum esse sub fragmento  
Quantum toto tegitur.*

As to sources used by Faustus and the Pseudo-Eusebius, it is clear that he knew St. Augustine through reading either his works or those of Prosper of Aquitaine<sup>1</sup>; and there seem echoes of Ambrose and the Ambrosian rite, and, of course, continual echoes of Cassian. I venture the conjecture that he may, through the Syrians who formed a small colony in southern France at the period, have possibly read Homily XXII of Narsai, which so emphasizes the military comparison with reference to the anointing: 'Like brave soldiers they stand at the king's door and the priest at their head like a general at the head of his army. He sets their ranks as if for battle at the hour of the mysteries, that they may be casting sharp arrows at the foe . . . with His name he is branded that he may serve as a soldier according to His will.'<sup>2</sup> Narsai was exiled from Edessa about the year 457; and that the Pseudo-Eusebius had relations with the East is suggested by Morin, who thinks that the most famous of the Easter sermons, the first, was dependent

<sup>1</sup> For instance he uses exactly the same argument from John 6, 53, as St. Augustine against the Pelagian distinction between the kingdom of heaven and eternal life, cf. *Magna Bibliotheca Patrum*, 560 H; Augustine, *De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione*, 1, 22, 33, CSEL LX, 33, 2, and often.

<sup>2</sup> R. H. Connolly, *The Liturgical Homilies of Narsai*, Texts and Studies, vol. VIII, Cambridge 1909, pp. 43—44.



upon a Homily of Eusebius of Alexandria, a mysterious person about whom little is known<sup>1</sup>.

Until, however we have a full account of the library at Lerins, such as we have, for instance, of that at Vivarium<sup>2</sup>, we can only proceed on the somewhat fortuitous method of recognizing occasional resemblances; and we must hope that some scholar will investigate more carefully what collections of manuscripts existed at Lerins. This might well be a by-product of a much-needed edition of Faustus and of the Pseudo-Eusebius.

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<sup>1</sup> Une ancienne adaptation latine d'un sermon attribué à Eusèbe d'Alexandria, *Revue Bénédictine* 24 (1907) pp. 530—534.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. A. Souter, *Cassiodorus' Library at Vivarium: some additions*, *Journal of Theological Studies* 41 (1940) pp. 46, 47, and the references there given.

# The Dietary Laws in Rabbinic and Patristic Literature

S. STEIN, London

Food prohibitions exist in many ancient civilisations and primitive communities. Sometimes they apply to everybody, sometimes to priests<sup>1</sup> or kings only. Positive or negative magic has been claimed for early usages of this kind. Certain animals or plants are eaten to obtain desirable qualities with which they are supposed to be endowed, whilst others are avoided, lest one should acquire undesirable qualities, with which they are said to be infected<sup>2</sup>.

The dietary laws in Leviticus XI, 2—47 and Deuteronomy XIV, 3—21, as they stand, exclude any connexion with magic belief or practices, however difficult it may be to circumscribe their exact historico-ideological stratum or to assess their original *Sitz im Leben*. They may imply a protest against the sacrificial rites of neighbouring pagans, they may be due to the repulsive appearance or dirty habits of certain animals, and they may have sanitary or dietetic reasons. The main stress, however, is laid on the distinction between clean and unclean and on the concept of detestation and abomination. Connotations and contexts are religious and not hygienic. The holiness of God is said to be the determining cause of the legislation, the holiness and separateness of the people is its purpose<sup>3</sup>.

Only the Book of Daniel conveys some information about the observance of food restrictions<sup>4</sup>. Daniel decides that he would

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<sup>1</sup> For biblical restrictions limited to priests, cf. Ezekiel XLIV, 31.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. J. Frazer, *The Golden Bough*, London 1949, pp. 21f.

<sup>3</sup> The oldest MS. evidence for the Pentateuchal dietary laws is preserved in the small Qumran fragment of Leviticus XI, 10—11. It is written in the ancient Phoenician handwriting and belongs to the 4th or 5th century B. C. The few preserved words do not differ from the massoretic text. Cf. D. Barthélemy and J. T. Milik, *Discoveries in the Judean Desert I*, Oxford 1955, p. 55.

<sup>4</sup> The denunciation of the eating of pork and the offering of swine's blood in Isaiah LXV, 14 and LXVI, 3, 17 is mainly connected with the aversion to idolatrous rites.

not defile himself with the King's food nor with the wine<sup>1</sup> which he was offered (Daniel I, 8, 16).

The Maccabean struggle and the politico-religious conflicts preceding it bring the discussion of the "special laws", which distinguish Israel from the nations, to the fore. For the next three to four hundred years and beyond, the Jews had to defend their dietary laws, and much else, against the reproach of unwarranted seclusion, of superstition, and of a literal, unspiritual method of scriptural exegesis. There is an occasional word of admiration for Jewish steadfastness and faithfulness, but on the whole secular rulers, the Greek and Roman *intelligentia*, the early leaders of the Church, and the Gnostics vie with one another in their attempt to show what seemed to them the transitoriness of the Law or the senselessness or irreverence of Jewish perseverance. The Apocrypha, Pseudepigrapha, Philo<sup>2</sup>, the Zadokite Documents, and early rabbinic literature provide the Jewish answer to the pagan as well as to the later New Testament and patristic challenge.

We have to distinguish between incidental remarks like those quoted from the Book of Daniel, and full independent inquiries into the meaning of the dietary laws like those to be cited later from the Letter of Pseudo-Aristeas and from Philo. There are points of contact between the various genres of literature — such as the acceptance of the divine character of the Law<sup>3</sup> — but there are also differences of approach, methodology, and religious fervour which cannot be ignored. The Apocrypha of the late second and the early first century B. C. — whether originally written in Hebrew, Aramaic or Greek — do not, on the whole, go into details about the reasons of the dietary laws. But their heroes, as in the case of the Maccabees, refusela "to make their souls abominable with all manner of unclean-

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<sup>1</sup> For rabbinic codifications of the relevant laws cf. Mishnah, 'Abhodah Zarah II, 6 and Gemara, *ibidem* 31b.

<sup>2</sup> Josephus did not deal systematically with the dietary laws. His intention to do so remained unfulfilled. Cf. i. a. Antiquities III, 259, in Loeb's Classical Library.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. I. Heinemann, *Ta'ame Ha-mišwoth*, Jerusalem 1949, pp. 32, 37.

liness, and prefer to die rather than be defiled with forbidden food"<sup>1</sup>.

The strong outside criticism<sup>2</sup> against Jewish *amixia* is mirrored in the Third Book of Maccabees. There it is argued against the Jews that they provoke hatred, because they hold themselves apart in the matter of food. The author replies that their specific faith necessitates an exclusive way of life (III Mac. III, 4ff.)<sup>3</sup>. Neither Judith (XI, 5; XII, 2, 19) nor Esther — according to the *Greek Additions* (IV, 28) and to the midrashic *Targum Sheni* on II, 7<sup>4</sup> — nor Tobith (I, 10) partake of forbidden food even under most difficult circumstances<sup>5</sup>.

Early halakhic regulations such as the prohibition to partake of pagan bread, wine, oil and cheese, find their repercussions in these tales, or to put it differently, life and law condition and complement each other in a situation which is saturated with an increasing awareness of the religious necessity of separation from the Gentiles and their idolatrous worship<sup>6</sup>. The extreme of the old-new principle is summed up in *Jubilees* XXII, 16: "Separate thyself from the nations, do not eat with them, do not act according to their deeds, and do not associate with them, because their work is uncleanness, all their ways contamination, detestation and abomination. They slaughter their sacrifices to the dead and pray to demons".

The few dietary laws in the *Zadokite Documents* form another

<sup>1</sup> Cf. I Mac. I, 48, 62; II Mac. V, 27; VI, 19; VII, 7. Most quotations will henceforth be given in abbreviated form.

<sup>2</sup> For a recent detailed list of bibliographical references cf. R. H. Pfeiffer, *History of New Testament Times*, New York 1949, p. 191.

<sup>3</sup> Towards the end of the book, the king who had previously persecuted the Jews, allows them to make the dietary laws compulsory amongst their co-religionists. More than three hundred of those, who "because of their belly transgressed the Divine Laws" are killed. It is not certain to which historical event this story of the liberation of Alexandrian Jews refers. But it is the setting of the problem with which we are here concerned.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. also Meghillah 13a and Pirke R. Eliezer 50.

<sup>5</sup> Special arrangements for the observance of the dietary laws are also made for the Jewish elders in Alexandria (Aristeas 182f.). Cf. also *Antiquities* XII, 94—97; XIV, 226, and *Life*, § 3.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. also IV Mac. V, 2.

incidental link between the Biblical legislation on meats and its later development: "Let nobody defile himself" — the term is the same as in the Pentateuch — "with any living being or creeping thing by eating of them: from the larvae of the bees<sup>1</sup> (in honey) to all the living things that creep in the water". The *Zadokite Document* takes the legislation of the Torah for granted and only adds some prohibitions of its own which sometimes show similarities with later Karaite usage. The context of this law makes it quite clear that the author or authors of the document were not vegetarians<sup>2</sup>. There is a regulation about the sending of burnt offerings to the altar, and there is a prohibition to sell clean animals or birds to Gentiles for sacrifice, which the sectarians must have owned<sup>3</sup>. The spiritual temper of the document is altogether not yet that of the New Testament. It is not that of the allegorizing or philosophizing Jewish Hellenists either. The *Manual of Discipline*, otherwise so closely connected with the *Zadokite Documents*, does not mention the dietary laws at all. Members of the sect are only warned not to eat or drink anything that comes from the "wicked, unclean people"<sup>4</sup>.

Coherent pre-New Testament discussions on the dietary laws are only to be found in the Fourth Book of Maccabees and, in greater detail, in the Letter of Aristeeas and in the writings of Philo. Outwardly the Fourth Book of Maccabees appears as an essay or solemn public address on the theme of self-control through devout reason. In reality, stoic philosophy is equated with, or subordinate to, the Law of Moses: "Reason can control our desire . . . Even if we wish to partake of fish, birds or animals or any kind of food, forbidden by Law, we refrain from doing

<sup>1</sup> This translation follows C. Rabin, *The Zadokite Documents*, Oxford 1954, p. 61. S. Schechter, *Documents of Jewish Sectaries I*, Cambridge 1910, p. LI, offers a slightly different interpretation of the term 'eghle ha-debharim and adds explanatory karaite and rabbinic references.

<sup>2</sup> Dr. Teicher's arguments to the contrary in the *Journ. of Jewish Stud.* V, 3 (1954) 93 are not convincing.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Rabin, *o. c.*, pp. 59ff. For rabbinic references cf. Schechter, *o. c.*, p. 50.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. M. Burrows, *The Dead Sea Scrolls II*, New Haven 1951, V, 16. Regarding sacrifices the position of the *Manual* (IX, 3—5) is more complicated.

so through the power of reason" (I, 32—35)<sup>1</sup>. To eat unclean food, on the other hand, means subjugation of reason to slavery (XII, 2f.). "Yet we know that the Creator of the universe . . . feels with us. He allowed us to eat what is fit for our soul and forbade us detestable meats" (V, 25f.)<sup>2</sup>. In other words, the Law is reasonable. To disregard it is an abrogation of Judaism — and reason (IV, 26)<sup>3</sup>.

Pseudo Aristeeas, now generally held to be earlier than the Fourth Book of Maccabees, also maintains that good life consists in the observation of the laws. He too believes in the power of reason, which disciplined by the detailed dietary laws, prevents the Jew from thoughtless action and injustice (162). Yet the High Priest Eleazar, the Alexandrian author's spokesman, is the first to introduce the allegorical method in defence of Jewish law. Others, though unknown to us, almost certainly preceded him as we see from Philo's frequent reference to *παλαιὰ ἀλληγορία*<sup>4</sup>. But we have no further evidence to illustrate its earlier use. Dependence on Greek antecedents is unmistakable. Ever since the sixth century, allegorical methods were applied for the interpretation of Homer. In Hellenistic times, and particularly among the Stoics, allegorical exegesis became an almost regular procedure for the re-adaptation of the legacy of classical antiquity to "modern" susceptibilities<sup>5</sup>.

Eleazar admits that most people find the biblical food restrictions not understandable. If God is the Creator of everything, why should His Law be so severe as to exclude some

<sup>1</sup> A Palestinian dictum by R. Eleazar b. Azariah (second century) in the Sifra at the end of Kedhoshim has a similar tendency. It merely substitutes openly God and His Law for reason: "A man should not say . . . I do not want to eat pork, he should rather say I want to eat pork, but my Father in Heaven has decreed otherwise".

<sup>2</sup> For a related concept cf. Wa-yikra Rabbah XXIII, Debharim Rabbah IV, and Tanhuma Shemini, Buber, p. 30: "God forbade this and allowed this" . . . with reference to a number of commandments, including the dietary laws.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. V, 16—24; VII, 14.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. C. Siegfried, Philo von Alexandria als Ausleger des Alten Testaments, Jena 1875, p. 26.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Aristeeas to Philocrates, edited and translated by M. Hadas, pp. 16f.

animals even from touch (128f.)? His first answer still links the dietary restrictions with the danger of idolatry, a method familiar to us from the Apocrypha and indeed from the Bible itself. Moses, instructed by God, surrounded us with an impenetrable fence, lest we should cultivate intercourse with any other nation, so as to remain pure in body and soul, worshipping the one God above all creatures (132—139).

The second answer attempts to refute specific charges by means of allegorical exegesis. Each law about forbidden food has its deep reason. Moses did not enumerate the mouse or the weasel out of a special consideration for them (143f.). On the contrary, mice are particularly obnoxious because of their destructiveness, and weasels, the very symbol of malicious tale-bearing, receive through the ear and give birth through the mouth (164f.).<sup>1</sup> Rather have these holy laws been given for the sake of justice to awaken in us devout thoughts and to form our character (161—168). The birds, for instance, the Jews are allowed to eat, are all tame and clean, as they live on corn only. Not so the wild and carnivorous birds who fall upon lambs and goats, and even human beings. Moses, by calling the latter unclean, admonished the faithful not to do violence to the weak and not to trust their own power (145—148). Cloven-footed animals which part their hooves symbolize that all our actions must betray proper ethical distinction and be directed towards righteousness. They also indicate that the Jews are different from all other human beings who contaminate themselves by sexual vices from which they have to keep apart (150—152). Chewing the cud on the other hand stands for memory. We should continuously remind ourselves of God's power over all the manifestations of Nature (153—161). What applies to the symbolism of clean animals destined for food also applies to sacrifices.

Philo's philosophical eclecticism absorbs the legacy of Greece and especially of early Alexandrian thought and exegesis. On

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<sup>1</sup> Aristotle already scoffs at this legend in his *De animalium generatione* III, 6. But Pliny, *Historia naturalis* VIII, 105 and the *Physiologus*, s. v. weasel, repeat the view expressed by Pseudo-Aristeas. Cf. i. a. L. Ginzberg, *Legends of the Jews*, Philad. 1947, V, p. 55. n. 177.

the question of the dietary laws he adds little that is new. It is, therefore, sufficient to quote from the central passage in his *De specialibus legibus*: (IV, 97—118)<sup>1</sup> “Moses bridled our partaking of food with ordinances most conducive to self-constraint and humanity and, what is chief of all, human piety”. The reference to humanity, *φιλανθρωπία* is obviously directed against the reproach of *ἀμιξία* and *μισανθρωπία*. “The lawgiver sternly forbade all animals of land, sea or air whose flesh is the finest and fattest, like that of pigs and scaleless fish, knowing that they set a trap for the most slavish of senses, the taste, and that they produce gluttony, an evil dangerous both to soul and body, for gluttony begets indigestion which is the source of all illnesses and infirmities . . . Yet there is a midway path — the Aristotelian mean — between rigorous austerity and voluptuous practice. He relaxed the overstrained and tightened the lax, allowing them to eat the gentler tame animals which live on the fruit of the earth and do not attack the life of others, and forbidding them vile carnivorous beasts”.

“Moreover, he gave two signs for testing eatable animals. They must have a parted hoof and they must be chewing the cud. Both signs are necessary as symbols of the method best suited for acquiring knowledge, which can only be gained by chewing the cud, i. e. by memorizing again and again what one has learned. Whole categories of people like the sophists are therefore compared to pigs because they divide as it were the hoof by making hairsplitting distinctions but do not smooth out the roughness that has accrued to their soul by chewing the cud<sup>2</sup>.

Fish with fins or scales, admitted by the law, symbolize endurance and self-control, whilst the forbidden ones are swept away by the current, unable to resist the force of the stream. Reptiles, wriggling along by trailing their belly, signify persons who devote themselves to their ever greedy desires and passions. Creeping things, however, which have legs above their feet, so

<sup>1</sup> For further passages in Philo's writings which have a bearing on the subject cf. I. Heinemann's important study on Philons Griechische und Jüdische Bildung, Breslau 1932, p. 161.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Philo's *De agricultura* 142—145.



that they can leap, are clean because they symbolize the success of moral efforts.

Eagles and the like, in contrast to the tame pigeons and doves, are disqualified because they are carnivorous and venomous and use their strength to attack other fowls and even men".

The system of allegorization of the dietary laws was completed; only details could be added in subsequent generations. Revelation seemed to have found an ethical, devout, and, in the terms of the time, "philosophical" exegesis. Provisions had even been made for a hygienic interpretation of the Law. It is of great phenomenological interest that on the whole the New Testament and early Rabbinic literature — both in Palestine and Mesopotamia — did not accept this particular branch of allegorical exegesis.

The reason for the attitude of the New Testament is clear: "No new cloth is put unto an old garment, no new wine into old bottles".

Jesus, according to Matthew XV, 11, 17, still gives a prudently veiled instruction: "Not that which goeth into the mouth defileth a man, but that which cometh out of the mouth"<sup>1</sup>. Paul's Letter to the Romans is cautious too, though hardly ambiguous regarding its ultimate aim: "The strong ought to bear the infirmities of the weak" (XV, 1)<sup>2</sup>. In other words, the scrupulosity of the early Christians of Rome either from the Gentiles or Jews who still attached importance to the dietary laws should be met with sympathy and understanding: "But the kingdom of God is not meat and drink, but righteousness and peace and joy in the Holy Ghost" (XIV, 17).

Paul's First Letter to the Corinthians is perhaps even more revealing though not less circumspect: "All things are lawful unto me, but all things are not expedient" (VI, 12; X, 23). "But if meat scandalizes my brother I will eat no flesh" (VIII,

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<sup>1</sup> Mark's version adds the significant comment: "If any man has ears to hear, let him hear" (VII, 15, 18, 19). For a more outspoken refutation of the dietary laws and for the formation of new allegories, cf. also Matthew XXIII 23—27; John VI, 27; Hebrews IX, 9—11.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Romans XIV, 2 ff., 19—21.

13)<sup>1</sup>. "Unto the Jews I became as a Jew" — i. e. I observed the Law — "that I might gain the Jews . . . To them that are without the Law, as without the Law, . . . so that I might gain them that are without the Law" (IX, 20ff.). Even regarding sacrifices which the Gentiles used to offer to their gods Paul is as lenient as possible: "If some of them that believe not bid you to a feast — though the food might be consecrated to some idol — eat asking no question for conscience's sake". Nevertheless a warning is given "not to give offence to Jews or Gentiles" (X, 19—33). Other documents make no reservation at all: "No heed should be given to Jewish fables or commands of men that turn from the truth<sup>2</sup>. Unto the pure all things are pure", is the wording of Paul's Epistle to Titus (I. 14f.)<sup>3</sup>.

Everyone familiar with the critical investigations into the text of the New Testament knows that the dates of these utterances cannot be stated with certainty, it is even difficult to trace a development from toleration of the Law to its firm abrogation, because the temper of each message is moulded by, and depending on, audience, occasion and circumstances.

It is only in early non-canonical and in patristic literature that the discussion of the dietary laws on an allegorical basis is taken up again. Towards the end of the first century the *Letter of Barnabas* is the first document to re-introduce it: "God did not really command the Jews to refrain from unclean food but Moses spoke in the spirit, ἐν πνεύματι. By forbidding swine he only wanted us not to associate with people who are like swine<sup>4</sup>. One should also avoid men who are like the eagle and other birds of prey. Such people do not know how to provide their food by toil and sweat and look about to find whom they can

<sup>1</sup> Cf. I Corinthians VIII, 8ff.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. also I Timothy IV, 1—5, Colossians II, 16f, Galatians II, 11—16, Philippians III, 17—19. Dispensation from the dietary laws is forcefully expressed in Peter's vision, Acts X, 11—16.

<sup>3</sup> The difficulty of abolishing all dietary laws in the early Church comes to the fore in Acts XV, 20—29, where even Gentiles are commanded to abstain from meats offered to idols, and from blood, and from things strangled.

<sup>4</sup> The rabbis, following Daniel, compare certain beasts to hostile empires like Greece and Rome. Cf. Leviticus Rabbah XIII.

plunder in their greed"<sup>1</sup>. He carefully enumerates all the familiar allegorizations of Aristeas and Philo, making only an occasional alteration here and there.

Justin Martyr's *Dialogue with Trypho* was composed in the middle of the second century. Judaism and Christianity appear already as separate entities, though Jewish Christians are not yet a historical curiosity<sup>2</sup>. In Justin's view they are not to be excluded from salvation as long as they do not enforce their view on unwilling Gentiles. Trypho, on the other hand, considers Christians as pagans because they despise the festivals<sup>3</sup>.

In contrast to Barnabas who denies that the dietary laws had ever a literal meaning, Justin holds that they had their importance before Jesus. Noah was permitted to eat everything living "as green herbs" (cf. Gen. IX. 3) save flesh with blood<sup>4</sup>. There were no early rules laid down for the bringing of sacrifices either. It was only at the time of Moses that sacrificial usage was regulated so that the Jews should not be influenced by the Egyptians to commit idolatry. He also charged them to abstain from certain foods in order that they may have God before their eyes even in their eating and drinking<sup>5</sup>. The reference to

<sup>1</sup> Cf. E. J. Goodspeed, *The Apostolic Fathers*, New York 1950, pp. 33ff., ch. 10.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. A. Harnack, *Judentum und Christentum in Justins Dialog mit Trypho*, Leipzig 1913, pp. 49f. and 87. It is recognized by all scholars that the Dialogue is not an exact record of the disputation. Trypho still remains unidentified.

<sup>3</sup> We are reminded of the Mishnah Abhoth III, 14, given in the name of Eleazar of Modein (2nd century), who holds i. a. that he who despises the festivals has no share in the world to come. This passage is, of course, also directed against the laxity of Jews, who did not belong to the early Christian Community.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. A. L. Williams, *The Dialogue with Trypho*, London 1930, p. 40f. Williams quotes similar traditions betraying a concept of the gradual development of the biblical dietary laws from Sanhedrin 59b, Midrash Tehillim, Buber, p. 538, Tanhuma Shemini, Buber, p. 30. Whether the version of the Midrash followed or preceded Christian exegesis, can no longer be ascertained. Sanhedrin 59b refers this tradition back to Rabb (early 3rd century). Trypho still argues against Justin. Cf. also Ginzberg, *Legends*, o. c. V, pp. 189f. note 56, and R. E. Wallis, *The Writings of Cyprian, Novatian etc.*, Edinburgh 1869, pp. 384ff., 387f.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Williams, o. c. *ibid.*

the moral influence of the dietary laws goes back to the Jewish Hellenists and finds its repercussions in the frequently quoted rabbinic dicta that commandments are only given to refine man<sup>1</sup> or to give him merit before God (לצרף or לזכות את הבריות)<sup>2</sup>. The concession theory on sacrifices appears also as an old Midrash which goes back to Rabbi Ismael (second century)<sup>3</sup>. It has become famous through the elaborate use Maimonides made of it.

Justin's conclusion as to the ultimate abolition of the Law is, of course, not shared in rabbinic literature, though there are some early passages about the cessation of festivals, dietary laws and sacrifices in eschatological Midrashim which appear to be pre-Pauline<sup>4</sup>. To discuss all references to the dietary laws in patristic literature would amount to chewing the cud without the allegorical meaning attached to it. Only some observations which have a bearing on a certain development of symbolism, on the relationship between Christianity and Judaism, or on rabbinic parallels may here be mentioned. Irenaeus is the first, as far as I am aware, to turn Philo's allegories against the Jews. "They ruminate but have no parted hooves. Heretics have parted hooves but don't ruminate"<sup>5</sup>.

Though he admits the influence of the dietary laws on self-control<sup>6</sup>, Clement of Alexandria goes further still. Scripture calls those who are wild in their faith, dirty in their conduct, and not purified by justice, animlas. Only by faith can such people become human again<sup>7</sup>. It is tempting to connect the view that only a Jew can be called a man אין אדם אלא ישראל — which has

<sup>1</sup> Cf. e. g. Tanhuma Shemini, Buber, p. 30 and notes 81, 83 for a number of similar quotations.

<sup>2</sup> For the different shades of meaning of the word *lezakkoth*, cf. Heinemann, Philons Griechische und Jüdische Bildung, o. c., p. 52.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Leviticus Rabbah XXII and D. Hoffmann, Das Buch Leviticus I, Berlin 1905, pp. 81 ff.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Buber, Midrash Tehillim on Psalm 146, p. 535. Ginzberg's article on "Antinomianism" in the Jewish Encyclopaedia explains these Midrashim in their proper perspective.

<sup>5</sup> Contra haereses V. 8. 3.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. O. Stählin, Des Clemens von Alexandria Der Erzieher, Munich 1934, p. 27.

<sup>7</sup> Stromateis VI, 50 with reference to Isaiah LXIII, 20; cf. also VII, 109.

caused so much misunderstanding — with the same method of allegorical interpretation<sup>1</sup>.

To eat any meat — though not forbidden, if done with moderation — is more suitable for animals and darkens the soul<sup>2</sup>. Clement merely reflects the fairly widespread predilection of his time for vegetarianism<sup>3</sup>, and quotes Pythagoras as his source of information. Again we are reminded of a Midrashic statement which comments on the defectively written *וְטִמְאָה* in the context of the dietary laws (Leviticus XI, 43). Rabbi Ismael connects the form with the root *טִמְאָה*, because to eat forbidden food obstructs man's understanding (Yoma 39a), whilst in the view of the same scholar the expression *הַמַּעֲלָה* instead of *הַמִּצְוָה* in Leviticus XI, 45 indicates that observance of the dietary laws elevates Israel above the nations (*Babha Meši'a* 61b).

Origen too considers the Law as *umbra futurorum*<sup>4</sup>. Yet when he deals with the attacks of Celsus against the Old Testament, allegory serves as a safety valve against paganism and Gnosticism<sup>5</sup>. His contention with regard to the whole of divine scripture is that all has a spiritual meaning, but not all a bodily meaning, for the bodily meaning is often proved to be an impossibility<sup>6</sup>. As an example he refers *inter alia* to 'akko the great stag in Deuteronomy XIV, 5, which Moses allows to be eaten<sup>7</sup>. According to Origen it is a creature that cannot possibly exist. He apparently confused the Biblical 'akko with the rabbinic *koy*, a mixture between a stag and a goat, which is discussed as a peculiar animal, half domestic, half wild, in various rabbinic

<sup>1</sup> Cf. the explanation of Ezekiel XXXIV, 31 in Yebhamoth 61a and Kerithoth 6b. For the halakhic interpretation of this text cf. D. Hoffmann, *Der Schulchan Aruch*, Berlin 1894, pp. 124ff.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. O. Stählin, o. c., p. 20, II, 11, 1 and note.

<sup>3</sup> For general information on the subject cf. J. Haussleiter, *Der Vegetarismus in der Antike*, Berlin 1935.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. In Leviticum homilia VII, 4 (GCS 29, p. 383). He follows Paul's formula in the Letter to the Colossians II. 16.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. H. Chadwick, *Contra Celsum*, Cambridge 1953, pp. 258, 473.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. G. W. Butterworth, *Origen on First Principles*, London 1936, IV, ch. 3, 5, p. 297.

<sup>7</sup> Thus according to the Latin text. The Greek text: "which Moses allows to be sacrificed as a clean animal", makes no sense. Butterworth, o. c. IV, ch. 3, 2, p. 290, did not see this.

passages<sup>1</sup>. The Church father was misled by the translation of the Septuagint, which render *'akko* as *τραγέλαφος*.

The fathers of the Church after the third century merely reiterate the principal Christian objections against dietary laws, circumcision, and festivals, which in their view can only be considered as *σύμβολα*, or *τύποι*, or *αίνιγματικῶς*, in a mysterious manner<sup>2</sup>.

As far as our problem goes even the Syrian fathers Aphraates and Ephrem have hardly anything to add, though one might have expected some influence of the great talmudic academies which flourished in their country<sup>3</sup>.

Earlier rabbinic literature steers on the whole clear of allegorical interpretations, just as the New Testament itself does. The Law, particularly the Oral Law, was the *μυστήριον* of Tannaim and Amoraim. To its unfolding they brought an immense religious devotion and energy. And if evil inclination, i. e. one's own inquiring mind or the nations of the world came to question what to them was ununderstandable or objectionable, it was forbidden to answer. One could only say that this was the unalterable word of God<sup>4</sup>. Or, to quote another Midrash, God pointed with his finger saying: This you may eat, this not<sup>5</sup>. Any allegorization used by Christians for opposite ends could only lead to questionable results or at best to fruitless discussions. On the other hand, references to obedience or moral refinement as the ultimate aim of statutes, the meaning of which one cannot grasp, were not felt to be out of place.

The aforementioned influence of popularised stoic teaching on such evaluations is hardly doubtful, though the context of the

<sup>1</sup> E. g. Mishnah Bikkurim II, 8, Yer. Bikkurim 65b, Hullin 80a.

<sup>2</sup> The following passage may serve as an example. E. H. Gifford, Eusebii Pamphili Evangelicæ Præparationis Libri XV, Oxford 1903, ch. 9, pp. 400ff.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. e. g. Aphraatis Demonstrationes, Paris 1894 (Demonstratio XV: De Distinctione Ciborum, pp. 733, 736f.) and Sancti Ephraem Syri Opera omnia I, Rome 1737, on Leviticus XI.

<sup>4</sup> Sifra, 'Ahare Moth XIII. 10; Yoma 67b.

<sup>5</sup> Tanḥuma Shemini, Buber, p. 29. In Leviticus Rabbah XIII Moses points with his finger.

relevant biblical legislation lends itself easily to similar interpretations.

Yet there are at least two passages which seem to reflect, if only indirectly, the influence of allegorization. One is a Mishnah in *Hullin* III, 6, which introduces the unbiblical term 'of *dores*, a bird which seizes food with its claws, for the classification of forbidden birds<sup>1</sup>. Since Aristeas, the wild character of birds of prey was given as a reason for the prohibition to eat them.

The second passage occurs in the *Pesiḳta de R. Kahana*, Buber, 76a<sup>2</sup>: "God said: the ox is persecuted by the lion, the goat by the panther, the lamb by the wolf. Do not sacrifice unto me from the persecutors but only from those who are persecuted, ox or lamb or goat".

The present investigation does not cover medieval Jewish exegesis and philosophical and kabbalistic literature, but it should be pointed out that the allegorical interpretation of the dietary laws restarted from Saadyah onwards and continued reappearing in all its various forms at least until the time of Abarbanel. After almost a thousand years of consolidation of Halakhah the Hellenistic Jewish attempt at harmonisation between the legacy of Greece and Judaea came to the fore again with unmitigated strength<sup>3</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> That the Rabbis made use of Greek and Roman achievements in the field of natural science for their halakhic rulings has recently been shown by S. Liebermann, *Hellenism in Jewish Palestine*, New York 1950, pp. 180—183ff. He refers to the Mishnah in Niddah VI, 9 and the Baraita in *Hullin* 59a which can be traced back to observations made by Aristotle.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. also the parallel passages in *Ḳohēleth Rabbah* on III. 15 and *Tanḥuma 'Emor*, Buber, p. 46 (Hebrew) and note 121.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. A. Wiener, *Die jüdischen Speisegesetze*, Breslau 1895. He offers valuable source material ranging from the Bible to the nineteenth century, even if many of his evaluations can no longer be accepted.

## On the use of the term “Romani” in the sources of the earlier Middle Ages

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Polyvalence of terms has become a recognized difficulty in research that is focused upon the interpretation of late antique and early medieval texts. The term which I think is particularly susceptible to a polyvalent interpretation is the seemingly innocuous and readily understandable one of Romans, *Romani*. It has hitherto been generally assumed — and unquestionably assumed — that *Romani* could mean one thing only, that is, the people of Rome, the inhabitants of Rome. Hence a purely geographical or territorial meaning is given to the term.

From a close reading of the texts it becomes apparent, however, that this *prima facie* so self-evident meaning of *Romani* is deceptive. The *communis opinio* which sees in this term an exclusively localized designation, seems to me too much influenced by the nation-tied outlook of modern times. For the term in the earlier times bore also, and one might almost be tempted to say primarily, an ideological connotation or religious import. An analysis of the earlier medieval texts yields the one certain result that when the people of Rome, the local inhabitants, were to be correctly designated, the term was invariably *populus Romanus*, and not *Romani*.

*Romani* had a far wider and deeper meaning. It denoted the religious or (in modern and perhaps less elegant parlance) the ideological dependence upon the bishop of Rome. In a negative sense it drew a clear line of demarcation in so far as it did not include those who refused to accept the doctrines as set forth by the Church of Rome: amongst these non-Romans were first included the Aryans, and their place was later taken by the Greeks, i. e. by those who followed the Byzantine exposition of doctrine. This counterpart of the Romans, the *Graeci*, too,



had primarily no territorial or national meaning, but a religious or ideological one. In a positive sense *Romani* came to denote the Western Christians, the Latins (in contrast to the Greeks), those who accepted the papal claim to a primatial position within the Church. I would not deny that in this meaning some overtones of a cultural, historical and also social kind can be heard, but the intrinsically ideological meaning of *Romani* is thereby not changed, on the contrary, it is only confirmed.

There is no need for me to point out the particular importance of this term and its meaning for the early medieval European period, a period in which it is especially imperative to fix the precise meaning of current terms. For the interpretation of texts as well as for a correct ideographical presentation it is of fundamental importance whether the term is taken in its geographical or in its ideological sense. In the one case the term denotes a handful of people who happen to live in the city of Rome; in the other case the term denotes an indefinable and vast multitude of peoples living not in one particular place, but living according to a definite set of ideas. In the one case the term refers to a fact, in the other to a certain programme. The one is concrete, the other abstract.

Within the time available, I can do no more than merely mention in passing some instances of the mass of material which makes abundantly clear that *Romani* had this far wider meaning of a religious character. To go no further back than the second half of the fourth century — Lucifer of Cagliari marks off the *Romani* from the Greeks when discussing the terminology of *δημοδόσιον τῷ πατρὶ*<sup>1</sup>. In the fifth century two weighty testimonies bear out the religious meaning of *Romani*, and both witnesses moreover, come, so to speak, from two quite different corners of the world. St. Patrick in a number of quite unmistakable passages never thinks of giving the term a local or territorial meaning, but an exclusively religious one by equating Romans with Christians. "If you want to be Christians, you

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<sup>1</sup> PL 13, 987 B.

must be Romans."<sup>1</sup> And Bishop Victor of Vita in this same fifth century relates how an Aryan presbyter of the Vandals in Spain warned against the killing of a religious opponent: "You can just as well kill him by all sorts of afflictions, for if you kill him with your sword, the *Romans* will at once proclaim him a martyr."<sup>2</sup> Gregory of Tours in the following century reports in several places that those who accept the teaching of the Church of Rome are called by their opponents *Romani*. "Men belonging to our religion they call Romans." Upon seeing a miracle worked the king is said to have exclaimed "*ingenium Romanorum*"<sup>3</sup>.

There is then what can rightly be called a conflation of *Romanitas* and *Christianitas*, and with the disappearance of Aryanism and the ascending force of Byzantinism, the term begins to assume its antithetical meaning as regards the Greeks. This is particularly noticeable from the late seventh and early eighth centuries onwards. It is not, however, in the strictly historical accounts only that the term *Romani* is given its religious meaning, but also in such sources as Penitentials, for instance, in the one ascribed to Theodore of Canterbury, that the ideological conception of *Romani* is contrasted with that of the Greeks. The numerous sacramentaries with their prayer texts for the security of the *Romani* were only to endorse this religious conflation of *Romanitas* and *Christianitas*. Nowhere can be found any evidence that the term had in these and similar texts a geographical or territorial, let alone a national import, as a number of most distinguished modern writers have boldly proclaimed. The letters of St. Boniface and Alcuin constitute a mine of information, concerning the a-national and ideological use of the term *Romani*. That in particular the

<sup>1</sup> Book of Armagh, ed. J. Gwynn, Dublin 1913, p. 17; cf. also Patrick's *Epistola* written to Coroticus in Ireland, ed. J. D. White in Proceedings of the Royal Irish Academy XXV (1905) p. 254, cap. 2; also p. 257, cap. 14; see also editorial notes at p. 297 ad cc. 2, 14.

<sup>2</sup> CSEL VII. 19, cap. 44, lines 14ff.

<sup>3</sup> Liber in gloria Martyrum, cap. 78, ed. in Mon. Germ. Hist., Scriptores Rerum Merovingicarum, I. 541, lines 4—5; cap. 79, p. 541, lines 36—37; cap. 24, p. 502, lines 29—30, etc.

official papal letters emanating from the Roman chancery in prolific quantities employ the term *Romani* in this same ideological sense, cannot indeed cause any surprise. More than that, the papal chancery in pursuit of the religious employment of the term *Romani* equates the *Graeci* with heretics. Romans are, to the papacy, all those who support the papal claim to primacy: Greeks are those who do not and consequently are labelled heretics.

From the point of view of the history of early Christianity as well as from that of general medieval history it is therefore a matter of no small concern to apply these findings to the period when medieval Europe decisively and definitely came into the Roman orbit, the period, that is, when we first find the very name of *Europa* in the sources designating a certain more or less well-defined unit. Contemporary legislation and governmental activities all bear the Roman stamp<sup>1</sup>. And it is not the least significant feature of this period that particularly in liturgy and doctrine — in precisely these two departments where East and West stood opposed to each other — the Roman character is so much stressed. It is therefore of some importance to realize that in this same period the antithesis between Greek and Roman begins to be supplemented by the antithesis between Greek and Latin, that is, a linguistic criterion is introduced to bring the ideological or religious distinction into clearer relief. Romans and Latins henceforward are tautological expressions and bear an antithetical character to Greeks. In the ninth century the sources — and they flow even more richly than in the preceding century — attribute the same ideological meaning to *Romani* or *Latini*<sup>2</sup>. But it should not be assumed that this a-national idea of *Romani* was confined to the earlier Middle Ages, for as late as the outgoing twelfth century I have found the ideological employment of *Romani* in no wise different from that, say, of the eighth century<sup>3</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. W. Ullmann, *The Growth of Papal Government in the Middle Ages*, London 1955, pp. 104—110.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. op. cit., pp. 163, 157, 215ff.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. the passages transcribed in *English Historical Review* LXVII (1952) p. 435, note 1. A characteristic example of a political (as opposed

The question uppermost in one's mind is, How did this ideological meaning originate? In whatever clear language the texts themselves speak about the actual meaning of the term, they are excruciatingly silent about this point. They seem to imply that the readers knew exactly what is meant by the term and therefore no explanation was called for. Only a very tentative answer can be given to this question. It seems to me that with the replacement of the antithesis Aryan-Roman by that of Greek-Roman this antithesis assumed the complexion of a religious as well as a political contrast. For we should never forget in investigations of this kind that we move in the peculiar twilight of what is today called religion and politics; or in contemporary terms we move within the intellectual precincts of Old Rome and New Rome, certainly from the fifth century onwards. Now, New Rome embodied a political idea, the idea that the old Roman empire was continued in the East uninterruptedly; the sole and merely incidental change being that of the capital of the empire; hence the insistent claim that they, the Easterners, were the true heirs to the Romans. Opposed to this political idea of *Romani* was the religious one, symbolized in Old Rome, whose leadership had come with increasing vigour into the hands of the papacy, with the further consequence that the old Roman idea of world citizenship was replaced, nay, sublimated by the religious idea. No longer was a Roman held to be simply the member of an earthly empire, but the member of a divine institution, the body of Christ, that was ruled by him whose seat was in Old Rome. Consequently, those Christians who upheld the papal claim to primacy, were styled *Romani*, whilst those who rejected the claim, were

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to religious) use of *Romani* cf. Lupold of Bebenburg, *De jure regni et imperii* (circa 1340), cap. 12 and 17: *populus Romanus* as the whole people subjected to the Imperium Romanum, and not merely the local Romans nor, of course, the Byzantines. Summarizing the great Bartolus's ideas, the late Woolf said that "Western Europe was thought of as the *populus Romanus* rather than as the *populus christianus*" and that Bartolus "drew a sharp line between the Christian *populus Romanus* and the *populi extranei* who none the less include the Greek Christians", C. N. S. Woolf, *Bartolus of Sassoferrato* (Cambridge, 1913), pp. 103, 107.

labelled heretics and did not deserve the honouring name of Romans. The concept of *Romani* as held by the East, must be viewed from the angle of a political fiction which nevertheless was a necessity dictated by the exigencies of legitimacy. The concept of *Romani* as held by the West, must be viewed from the angle of a religious programme. The localized meaning of *Romani* falls, naturally, quite outside the scope of these abstract notions.

The Augustinian doctrine of teleology may well have helped to foster this a-territorial, a-national conception of *Romani*. Notably in the earlier Middle Ages when St. Augustine held undisputed sway, be it on his own account or on that of his followers such as Orosius<sup>1</sup>, the idea was prevalent that Christianity was destined to transform the Roman empire and to raise it to a higher plane altogether. In this process of transformation, naturally, the earth-bound concept of *Romani* was to undergo a corresponding change, raising it, as it were, onto the religious level. In the eleventh century St. Peter Damian bears witness to the idea of papal Rome having sublimated the ancient Rome<sup>2</sup>.

This process of sublimation was, again for understandable reasons, considerably furthered by the Roman papacy; in fact, there is sufficient evidence to warrant the confident assertion that the Roman papacy was very instrumental in bringing about this expansion of the term's meaning. For, certainly since the second half of the fourth century, the papacy had held itself to be what can be called the epitome or quintessence of what it considered to be true Christianity, and according to this claim, the indubitably strong links which the papacy entertained with the West, lent colour to the claim that the Christians in the West were Romans in the religious sense. The Roman

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<sup>1</sup> Cf., inter alia, E. Frauenholz, *Imperator Octavianus Augustus in der Geschichte und Sage des Mittelalters*, *Historisches Jahrbuch* XLVI (1926) pp. 90ff.; E. Lewalter, *Eschatologie und Weltgeschichte in der Gedankenwelt Augustins*, *Zeitschrift f. Kirchengeschichte* LIII (1934) pp. 1—51; W. Kamlah, *Christentum und Geschichtlichkeit*, 2nd ed., Stuttgart 1951, pp. 302ff.

<sup>2</sup> See his *Carmen* no. 204.

Church, in other words, was said to be the *Fons vivus*, the *Fundamentum totius christianitatis*, the *Fundamentum fidei*, in which all Christianity was, so to speak, epitomized. With an unparalleled insistence the claim was put forward that Christianity was in fact derived from Rome.

It is not therefore surprising that in pictorial presentations from the fifth century onwards, if not earlier, Rome was depicted as the source of numberless rivers — the *rivuli* — that made the waters flow. Hence the very suggestive use of *de-rivare*, de-rive, which can be found in this very same context in so many letters from the fifth century onwards. The further consequence was that those Christians who accepted the primatial position of the Roman Church — and they were of course the Westerners — could be spoken of as Romans de-riving their doctrine and faith from that Church<sup>1</sup>. Furthermore, and still within these metaphorical boundaries, since the Roman Church was the *Fundamentum totius christianitatis*, damage inflicted upon it redounds to the detriment of all those who are claimed to be Romans. If the Roman Church is endangered, the whole of Christendom will be endangered. This is what can rightly be called the principle of indispensability of the Roman Church, at least as far as the West is concerned. In an age, in which the concrete sensuality of religious life was a most conspicuous feature, these allegorical considerations should not be underrated in an attempt to find the properly contemporary meaning of certain terms.

It may have become sufficiently clear by now that this question of the meaning of *Romani* is by no means a merely terminological one. And a further examination of this question would, I think, lead us to the very involved and entangled problem

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<sup>1</sup> A number of characteristically medieval terms, which so far have defied a correct interpretation, may be become more easily accessible to understanding, such as '*Patricius Romanorum*', '*Imperator Romanorum*', '*Respublica Romanorum*', when used by Western writers. As late as the early fourteenth century this allegorical usage can be found. See Clement V in 1310: *Romana ecclesia ... a qua veluti a primitivo fonte ad singulas ecclesias eiusdem fidei rivuli derivantur ...* (Raynaldus, *Annales Ecclesiastici*, XIV. 145, ed. Col. Agr., 1618).

of the replacement and substitution of symbolism by linguistic terms. For the name 'Roman Church', down to the twelfth century, was in reality merely a shorthand device for the more correct designation as 'Lateran Church'. Because the Lateran Church was preeminent amongst the local Roman churches, its appellation as the Roman Church could come into current usage without appreciable difficulties. Now it is of great significance that to this Roman Church, that is, to the Lateran Church, were attributed the qualities and functions of the cosmic stone — by a multitude of theologians spanning the period between the fifth and twelfth centuries — of that cosmic stone which biblical exegesis had held to be the source of life. This transference of the *Petra* symbolism, of the cosmic stone, of the *Lapis angularis*, to the Lateran Church, or better the idea that the Lateran Church was built upon the *Petra*, the *Lapis angularis* — for which there is abundant philological, iconographic, architectural and liturgical evidence<sup>1</sup> — enables us to understand the purely linguistic expression of the Roman Church as *Fons vivus*. Since therefore the *Petra* or the *Lapis angularis* was the life giving source, and since furthermore Christ Himself was the *Petra* — we recall St. Paul: "*Christus enim erat petra*" — the appellation of the Lateran-Roman Church as the *Fons vivus* was not merely the effluence of this symbolism, but also the expression of a profound symbolism in easily understandable current terminology. From that one Roman Church (the Lateran Church) built upon the Rock, the *Petra*, and therefore a cosmic foundation, flowed the many *rivuli* — the allegorical channels conveying the faith derived from that cosmic foundation: and those who were nourished by that faith, could be termed *Romani*.

But, as I have already indicated, this ideological meaning of the term *Romani* had by no means spent all its force by the later Middle Ages, which in so many respects seems merely a long drawn-out continuation of late Roman times. It seems to

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<sup>1</sup> One of my research pupils is actively engaged in working out this symbolism with particular reference to the structure of papal supremacy in the eleventh and twelfth centuries.

me, however, that from the twelfth century onwards the ancient-political and the medieval-religious conceptions live, so to speak, for a time side by side, and it may not always have been clear to individual writers in which sense they were using the term. To this must be added the ever increasing consciousness of individual nationhood which naturally played havoc with pure ideological conceptions. One might be inclined to say that when the term *Romani* shrinks again to a merely local designation, the truly Roman and hence medieval period begins to wane: the universalist trend that is so strongly impregnated upon this ideological or religious conception, visibly fades into the background. Nor should one forget the distance which thought had travelled from the late Roman times to, say, the fourteenth century: by this time the indubitably naturalistic and atomistic orientation of thought (engendered to a large extent by the revived and thoroughly absorbed Aristotle) entailed rapidly mounting difficulties in apprehending ways of thought which were utterly opposed to the ancient and therefore properly medieval modes of thinking. This proposed analysis undertaken against a wide background, may help to elucidate new aspects of familiar terminology, aspects which might prove helpful to the general historian and especially to the historian of early medieval Christianity.





## IX. THEOLOGICA

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## *Μυστήριον* in the Sacramental Teaching of John of Damascus

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As the title of this paper shows it is concerned with John of Damascus' definition of the word *Μυστήριον* in his Sacramental teaching. I must however explain that I have not confined myself to the examination of the word *Μυστήριον* solely in the Sacramental writings of John of Damascus, but I have carefully studied and noted its special characteristics and its use in the whole range of his writings. In this paper I shall deal with two points:

- a) John of Damascus' definition of the word *Μυστήριον*.
- b) How many Sacraments (i. e. *Μυστήρια* in the modern sense of the word) does John of Damascus refer to.

It is not easy to define precisely how many acts or ceremonies of the Church are accepted as Sacraments *Μυστήρια* by John of Damascus. To understand John of Damascus' mind on this matter it is necessary that we should first discover what he means by the word *Μυστήριον*. It is important to notice that nowhere in his expositions either on the Sacraments to which he refers i. e. Holy Eucharist and Holy Baptism or in his other writings does he define what a Sacrament i. e. *Μυστήριον* is. At the time when he wrote the word *Μυστήριον* was used in no precise technical sense. It had been used by several writers of the early centuries and by Fathers of the Church with various and differing connotations<sup>1</sup>. For some the Incarnation of the Son of God, was *Μυστήριον* for others the Baptism of Christ, for many the word meant the Holy Eucharist, and other wonders of the Christian Faith. John of Damascus who in every page that he ever wrote speaks of his respect, even veneration

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<sup>1</sup> See the word *Μυστήριον* Greek Lexicon, E. A. Sophocles p. 774.

for the teaching of the Fathers of the Church uses the word in a less particular sense to signify everything that is incomprehensible or inexplicable. This use of the word *Μυστήριον* is frequent in his writings. We have however to admit that John of Damascus did not use the word in the sense in which we use it to-day. For him *Μυστήριον* is the name given to all those things which surpass reason and thought, all that is incomprehensible to us<sup>1</sup>. He uses the word in examining the Incarnation of the Son of God<sup>2</sup>,

<sup>1</sup> „αὐτὸς γὰρ τὴν ἡμῶν σωτηρίαν εἰργάσατο, ἐπὲρ ἧς πᾶσα γραφή καὶ ἅπαν μυστήριον.“  
(E. O. II. Ch. 90. PG. 94, 1176 A.)

„ἔδει τοὺς τῆς θείας οἰκονομίας φυλάττεσθαι μάρτυρας πιστοτάτους, ἐσομένους τοῖς ἔθνεσι κήρυκας, ὡς αὐτόπτας καὶ ὑπηρέτας τῶν θείων μυστηρίων ὑπάρξοντας.“ (Λόγος εἰς τὸ ἅγιον Σάββατον. Ch. 33. PG. 96, 636 C.)

„ἔκρεπε γὰρ τῇ εἰκόνι τῶν οὐρανίων λειτουργῶν, τὴν εἰκόνα τῶν θείων μυστηρίων σκιάζεσθαι.“ (Λόγος Πρώτος πρὸς τοὺς διαβάλλοντας τὰς ἀγίας Εἰκόνας. Ch. 15 PG. 94, 1244 C.)

„εἰ γὰρ τις ταῖς γλώσσαις τῶν ἀνθρώπων λαλῇ καὶ τῶν ἀγγέλων κἂν ἔχη πιστίν, ὥστε ὀρη μεθιστάνειν, καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν γνώσιν, καὶ εἶδη πάντα τὰ μυστήρια . . . ἀγάπην δὲ μὴ ἔχη, χαλκὸς ἢ ἥχων γέγονεν.“ (Λόγος εἰς τὴν Μεταμόρφωσιν Ch. 10. PG. 96, 560 D. 561 A.)

„ἐξιτήριά τε καὶ τελευταῖα προσφθεγγόμενοι φήματα, (οἱ ἀπόστολοι σὺν παντὶ τῷ τῆς ἐκκλησίας πληρώματι τῇ μακαρίᾳ παρθένῳ) . . . τοῦ παρόντος βίου τὸ βενυστὸν καὶ ἐσπάραιστον διαγγέλλοντα, καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἀγαθῶν τὰ κεκρυμμένα μυστήρια εἰς τοῦμφανές ἄγοντα“  
(Λόγος Δεύτερος εἰς τὴν ἐνδοξον κοίμησιν τῆς Θεοτόκου Ch. 9. PG. 96, 736 B.)

<sup>2</sup> „Εἰ δὲ δοκῇσι γέγονεν (τὸ τοῦ Κυρίου σῶμα), φενακισμὸς καὶ σκηπὴ τὸ τῆς οἰκονομίας μυστήριον.“  
(E. O. II. Ch. 72. PG. 94, 1100 B.)

„μέγα γὰρ ὁμολογουμένως τὸ τῆς θείας οἰκονομίας μυστήριον.“  
(Λόγος εἰς τὸ ἅγιον Σάββατον Ch. 1. PG. 96, 601 B.)

„τοῦτο γὰρ τὸ ὄνομα (θεοτόκος) ἅπαν τὸ μυστήριον τῆς οἰκονομίας συνίστησιν.“  
(E. O. II. Ch. 56. PG. 94, 1029 C.)

„καὶ μερικὰς δογματίζοντες οὐσίας τὸ τῆς οἰκονομίας συγχέουσι μυστήριον.“  
(Περὶ Αἱρέσεων Ch. 83. PG. 94, 744 B.)

„εἰ μὲν οὖν τὸ δεύτερον (δηλ. διανοίας ἀνάπλασμα αἱ δύο ἐν Χριστῷ φύσεις) φαντασία καὶ φενακισμὸς τὸ τῆς οἰκονομίας μυστήριον.“  
(Τόμος πρὸς τὸν Ἐπίσκοπον δῆθεν Τουδαράδας τὸν Ἰακωβίτην PG. 94, 1452.)

„ἰστέον γὰρ ὅτι τιπὲς τῶν πατέρων τὸ τῆς κράσεως ὄνομα ἐπὶ τοῦ κατὰ Χριστὸν μυστηρίου οὐκ ἐδέξαντο, τὴν κατὰ σύνθεσιν (ἐνωσιν) ἅπαντες.“  
(Φιλοσοφικὰ Κεφάλαια Ch. 65. PG. 94, 664 A.)

„οἱ ἅγιοι πατέρες τῷ παραδείγματι τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐχρήσαντο ἐπὶ τοῦ κατὰ Χριστὸν μυστηρίου.“ (Περὶ Συνθέτου Φύσεως ἢ κατὰ Ἀκεφάλων PG. 95, 120 D.)

„καὶ ὁ τὰ μάταια πονήσας Ἰωάννης ὁ τριθείτης τὸ τῆς κοινῆς ἀρνούμενοι σωτηρίας μυστήριον.“ (Περὶ Αἱρέσεων PG. 94, 744 A.)

the Holy Trinity<sup>1</sup>, the Holy Eucharist<sup>2</sup>, the Death on the Cross<sup>3</sup> and the wonders on the life and the death of the Holy Virgin<sup>4</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> „Βαπτίζεται δὲ οὐχ ὡς αὐτὸς χεῖρων καθάρσεως . . . ἀλλ' ἵνα κλύσῃ τὴν ἁμαρτίαν . . . ἵνα τὸ τῆς Τριᾶδος ἀποκαλύψῃ μυστήριον.“  
(E. O. Π. Ch. 82. PG. 94, 1124 B.)

„ἐντεῦθεν τοὺς κορυφαίους τῶν ἀποστόλων προσλαμβάνεται μάρτυρας τῆς οικείας δόξης τε καὶ λαμπρότητος. Τρεῖς δὲ τὸν ἀριθμὸν, τῆς Τριᾶδος τὸ σεπτὸν ὑπεμφαίνων μυστήριον.“ (Λόγος εἰς τὴν Μεταμόρφωσιν PG. 96, 557 C.)

<sup>2</sup> „ἔνιοι δὲ αὐτῶν μῆτε κοινωνῆσαι αὐτοὺς τῶν μυστηρίων λέγουσιν, εἰ μὴ τῆς παρουσίας τοῦ πνεύματος αἰσθητῶς αἰσθῶνται, γενομένης κατ' ἐκείνην τὴν ὥραν.“  
(Περὶ Αἱρέσεων PG. 94, 736 A.)

„καὶ βαπτιζόμεθα ὕδατι τε καὶ πνεύματι καὶ διπλῶς τῷ κυρίῳ ἐνούμεθα, τῶν μυστηρίων μετέχοντες, καὶ τῆς τοῦ πνεύματος χάριτος.“  
(E. O. Π. Ch. 85. PG. 94, 1133 B.)

„οἱ δὲ γε μύσται καὶ αὐτόπται τοῦ λόγου οἱ τὸν τοῦ κόσμου γύρον ζωγραφῶντες μαθηταὶ τοῦ Σωτῆρος καὶ θεῖοι ἀπόστολοι, ἐπὶ τῶν φρικτῶν καὶ ἀχράντων καὶ ζωοποιῶν μυστηρίων μνήμην ποιῆσαι τῶν πιστῶν κοιμηθέντων ἐθέψισαν.“  
(Περὶ τῶν ἐν πίστει κεκοιμημένων Ch. 3. PG. 95, 249 B.)

<sup>3</sup> „οὐκ αὐτὸς δὲ πάλιν Μωϋσῆς ῥάβδῳ παλεῖ τὴν θάλασσαν, . . . καὶ θανατοῖ Φαραὼ τὸν διώκοντα, καὶ σώζει τὸν Ἰσραήλ; ἐπεὶ καὶ ὁ Χριστὸς ἐθανάτωσεν μὲν τὸν θάνατον, σώζει δὲ πάντας τοὺς εἰς αὐτὸν πιστεύοντας. Ταῖς δὲ τῶν χειρῶν ἐκτάσει, τρέπων μὲν τὸν Ἀμαλῆκ, τροπαιοφόρον δὲ τὸν Ἰσραήλ ἐργαζόμενος, τὸ αὐτὸ προεμφαίνει τοῦ σωτῆρος μυστήριον.“  
(Λόγος εἰς τὸ ἅγιον Σάββατον Ch. 25. PG. 96, 625 A.)

„αὐτὸς μὲν γὰρ ὁ Ἰσαὰκ ζῶν τῷ πατρὶ πρὸς Θεοῦ χαρίζεται. ἀμνὸς δὲ τῶν κερμάτων ἐν φωτὶ Σαβὲκ κατεχόμενος ἐγένετο σφάγιον· καὶ γίνεται τοῦ διπλοῦν, τοῦ κριοῦ τε καὶ τοῦ Ἰσαὰκ μυστήριον, τύπος ἀληθῆς Χριστοῦ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἡμῶν.“  
(Λόγος εἰς τὸ ἅγιον Σάββατον Ibid. col. 624 C.)

„Νῦν τὸ ἀπ' αἰῶνος κεκρυμμένον μυστήριον ἐκαλύπτεται. νῦν τὸ τῆς θείας οἰκονομίας κεφάλαιον ἐκπεραίνεται· νῦν ἡ κορωνὶς τῆς τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγου σαρκώσεως ἐπιτίθεται.“  
(Λόγος εἰς τὸ ἅγιον Σάββατον Ch. 2. PG. 96, 601 C.)

<sup>4</sup> „Ὁρᾶτε, φίλοι Θεῷ πατέρες καὶ ἀδελφοὶ τῆς παρουσίας ἡμέρας τὴν χάριν. ὁρᾶτε τῆς νῦν εὐφημουμένης τὸ ὑψηλὸν καὶ σεβάσμιον; οὐ φρικτὴν τὰ ταῦτης μυστήρια (τῆς παρθένου).“ (Λόγος Πρώτος εἰς τὴν ἐνδοξὴν κοίμησιν τῆς Θεοτόκου Ch. 4. PG. 96, 705 A.)

„ἀλλ' εἰ δοκεῖ, τίς αὐτῇ, καὶ πόθεν, καὶ πῶς τῷ παρόντι χαρισθεῖσα βίῳ δῶρον ἀπάντων τῶν τοῦ Θεοῦ δωρημάτων ὑψηλότερον ἅμα καὶ προσφιλέστερον δέδοται. οἶαν τε τὴν ἐν τῷδε τῷ βίῳ διατριβὴν πεποιήται, καὶ οἶαν μυστηρίων ἡξίωται, διεξίωμεν.“  
(Ibid. 705 C.)

In the case of the Holy Eucharist he uses the word in its full sense. Just as in the Incarnation the conception of Christ in the Virgin's womb and His birth, was something unexplained and mysterious so in the Holy Eucharist, the changing of the bread and wine into the very Body and Blood of Christ was something incomprehensible, mysterious. He used the word *Μυστήριον* in the plural *ἀχράντων μυστηρίων* to mean the Holy Eucharist. Moreover it would be wrong to suppose that John's use of the word *μυστηρίων* in plural to denote the Holy Eucharist was nothing more than another instance of his use of the word to describe the great wonders of the Faith. In his use of it to denote the Holy Eucharist there are the beginnings of the precise limiting and particular connotations of a word that marks a technical term.

For John of Damascus the Holy Eucharist is: *ἅγια καὶ ἀχραντα μυστήρια* i. e. Holy Sacraments. One might be lead by this to assume that John is using the word, as we do to day and he would go on to read into the words *ἀχράντων μυστηρίων* whatever it appears in John's writings, all that through the centuries the Church has defined as *Μυστήρια*.

But it is quite certain that by the words *ἁγίων ἀχράντων μυστηρίων* John of Damascus does not signify anything less than the Holy Eucharist. The title of the treatise on the Holy

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„ὁ πληρῶν τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ τὴν γῆν, ὃ ὁ οὐρανὸς θρόνος, ἡ δὲ γῆ ὑποπόδιον, ἐνδύχωρον ἐνδιαίτημα, τὴν γαστέρα τῆς οικίας δούλης ἐποιήσατο, καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ τὸ πάντων καινότερον ἀποτελεῖ μυστήριον. Θεὸς γὰρ ὢν, ἀνθρώπος γίνεται, ὑπερφυσῶς τε τῷ χρόνῳ τῆς κηρύσεως τίκεται, . . . ὃ μυστηρίων τῶν ὑπὲρ φύσιν καὶ ἔννοιαν . . . τί τοῦτο τὸ μέγα περὶ σε, ὃ ἱερὰ μήτερ καὶ παρθένε, μυστήριον;“

(Ibid. Ch. 8. col. 712 A.)

„τί τοίνυν τὸ περὶ σέ τοῦτο μυστήριον ὀνομάσομεν; θάνατον;“

(Ibid. Ch. 10. col. 716 A)

„μετὰ δὲ τὴν τρίτην ἡμέραν . . . παρόντες οἱ ἀπόστολοι, . . . ἤρριξαν τὴν σορόν. καὶ τὸ μὲν σῶμα αὐτῆς τὸ πανύμνητον οὐδαμῶς εὐρεῖν ἠδυνήθησαν, μόνον δὲ αὐτῆς τὰ ἐντάφια κείμενα εὐρόντες, . . . ἠσφαλίσαντο τὴν σορόν. καὶ τὸ τοῦ μυστηρίου τὸ θαῦμα ἐκπλαγέντες, τοῦτο μόνον εἶχον λογίζεσθαι.“

(Λόγος Δεύτερος εἰς τὴν ἐνδοξὸν κολήσιν τῆς Θεοτόκου Ch. 18. PG. 96, 749 B.)

„εἰσέλθωμεν προσκυνήσοντας, καὶ γνῶμεν τοῦ μυστηρίου τὸ ξέον, ὡς ἔρται, ὡς μεμετέρωσται, ὡς πρὸς οὐρανὸν ἐληπτται.“

(Λόγος Τρίτος εἰς τὴν ἐνδοξὸν Κολήσιν τῆς Θεοτόκου Ch. 5. PG. 96, 761 B.)

Eucharist is: *Περὶ τῶν ἁγίων καὶ ἀχράντων τοῦ Κυρίου μυστηρίων*<sup>1</sup>. The use of the words *ἀχράντων μυστηρίων* in the title is the only occasion on which the word appears in the whole treatise. It stands in the title as a definition of the subject matter of the whole book which is solely concerned with the Holy Eucharist. This usage rules out any idea that *ἀχράντων μυστηρίων* could mean as Eastern Orthodoxy does mean the whole Sacramental system as it is now in the acceptance and use of the Seven Sacraments. It should also be noted that the word *Μυστήριον* nowhere appears in this treatise „*Περὶ τῶν ἁγίων καὶ ἀχράντων τοῦ Κυρίου Μυστηρίων*“. The last two words are a definite reference to the Holy Eucharist as the Body and Blood of Christ.

Since however John of Damascus nowhere mentions the definition of the Sacraments it is necessary to discover whether he refers to any definition given by the Church, and how many of the Sacraments accepted in his own time he refers to.

Of the seven Sacraments *Μυστήρια* John of Damascus has written at length only two: The Holy Eucharist and the Holy Baptism. The other five are not the subject of any of his works. References to some of them are incidental and brief and generally undefined and vague<sup>2</sup>. In contrast to this treatment the two

<sup>1</sup> This title is found in all the 32 MSS of the "Exposition of the Orthodox Faith". The eldest of these MSS now in the Bibliothèque Nationale is of the Xth and the beginning of XIth Century.

Apart from this writing this expression with the same meaning appears once more in another of John of Damascus' writings:

„οἱ δὲ γε μύσται καὶ αὐτόπται τοῦ λόγου οἱ τὸν τοῦ κόσμου γύρον ζωγράφσαντες μαθηταὶ τοῦ Σωτῆρος καὶ θεῖοι ἀπόστολοι, ἐπὶ τῶν φρικτῶν καὶ ἀχράντων καὶ ζωοποιῶν μυστηρίων μνήμην ποιεῖσθαι τῶν πιστῶν κοιμηθέντων ἐθέτισαν.“  
(*Περὶ τῶν ἐν πίστει κεκοιμημένων* Ch. 3. PG. 95, 249 B.)

<sup>2</sup> John of Damascus considers the anointing with oil as a part of the whole ceremony of Baptism. He says that through it Man receives the mercy of God. „Τὸ ἔλαιον βαπτίσματι παραλαμβάνεται μυστήριον τὴν χάριν ἡμῶν καὶ χρυστὸς ἡμᾶς ἐργαζόμενος, καὶ τὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ ἡμῖν ἐπαγγελλόμενος διὰ τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος ἔλεος.“

(„*Ἐκδοσις Ὁρθοδόξου Πίστεως*“ Ch. 82. PG. 94, 1125 B.)

„καὶ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ βαπτίσματος, ἐπειδὴ ἔθος ἀνθρώποις ὕδατι λούεσθαι καὶ ἔλαιον χρῆσθαι, συνέλεξε τῷ ἔλαιῳ καὶ ὕδατι τὴν χάριν τοῦ πνεύματος καὶ ἐποίησεν αὐτὸ λουτρὸν ἀναγεννήσεως.“

(„*Ἐκδοσις Ὁρθοδόξου Πίστεως*“ Ch. 86. PG. 94, 1141 B.)



Sacraments of the Holy Eucharist and Holy Baptism are studied and explained at length and in such a way as to leave no doubt that John regards them as blessed and sanctified ordinances necessary to salvation. But as I have already said it is important to note that nowhere in his exposition of these two Sacraments does he define what a Sacrament i. e. *Μυστήριον* is. He does not even once mention the word to denote either the Holy Eucharist or the Baptism<sup>1</sup>.

In his writing on the Holy Baptism which is one of the two Sacraments i. e. *Μυστήρια* considered in any of his writings and which together with the Holy Eucharist is examined in John of Damascus' great treatise „*Ἐκδοσις ἀκριβῆς τῆς Ὁρθοδόξου Πίστεως*“, we find him discussing Baptism without mentioning the word *Μυστήριον*. He says that Holy Baptism is one of the supremely important acts of the Church<sup>2</sup>. The

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As it is shown from the above two passages Chrism with oil after the Baptism is an indispensable act.

John of Damascus demands, as a necessity, that a preparation should be made before receiving the Holy Eucharist: „διό μετὰ παντός φόβου καὶ συνειδήσεως καθαρᾶς καὶ ἀδιστακτοῦ πίστεως προσέλθωμεν . . . τιμήσωμεν δὲ αὐτὸ πάση καθαρότητι, ψυχικῇ τε καὶ σωματικῇ.“

(„Ἐκδοσις Ὁρθοδόξου Πίστεως“ Ch. 86. PG. 94, 1149 A.)

One of the indispensable requirements for partaking of the Holy Eucharist is the cleansing of soul and body. John does not say how one can clean his body and soul, before partaking of the Holy Eucharist. It is difficult to decide whether or not he had in mind confession and repentance, as the means by which one purifies one's conscience and prepares oneself to receive the Holy Sacraments. But it is certain that an act through which the cleansing of the soul and body will be accomplished must precede the partaking of the Holy Eucharist.

<sup>1</sup> In one only occasion John speaks about the Holy Eucharist as *Μυστήριον* and that is in his treatise on Heresies when he examines the sect of *Βαρσανουφίται*. Since however his treatise on the Heresies is a complete transcription of the works of Epiphanius, Theodoret of Cyrus and Timothy the Presbyter this reference has no great significance. John simply makes a transcription without any comments. „*Βαρσανουφίται*. . . σεμίδαλιν γὰρ προστιθέασι τοῖς ἀπὸ Διοσκόρου δῆθεν προσκομισθεῖσι, καὶ τῷ ἄκρῳ δακτύλῳ ἐφαπτόμενοι γένονται τοῦ ἀλεύρου, καὶ τοῦτ' ἀντὶ μυστηρίου δέχονται, προσκομὸν καθόλου μὴ ποιούμενοι. Ἐλάσαντες γάρ, ὡς εἰρηται, τὰ Διοσκόρου κοινωνίας, προστιθέασι τὴν σεμίδαλιν καθότι δαπανηθεῖη κατὰ βραχὺ καὶ τοῦτο αὐτοῖς ἀντὶ κοινωνίας λελόγισται.“ (Περὶ Αἱρέσεων PG. 94, 756 B.)

<sup>2</sup> „οἱ μὲν θεῖον βάπτισμα οὐ δέχονται, οὔτε τῆς θαλας κοινωνίας μετέχουσιν.“ (Περὶ Αἱρέσεων Κεφ. Ἀποσχίσται PG. 94, 777 A.)

same thing appears in those of John of Damascus' writings which apart from the „*Ἐκδοσις τῆς Ὁρθοδόξου Πίστεως*“, contain few references to Baptism.

In his exposition on Baptism John is mainly concerned with two fundamental questions: a) The institution of Baptism, b) The conditions of a valid Baptism.

The exposition of the Sacrament of the Holy Eucharist is very fully and detailed. It begins with an examination of the Institution of the Sacrament and concludes with an exposition of the requirements necessary for a valid performance of the Rite. In it John gives a full account of the common teaching of the undivided Catholic Church about this Sacrament how it was instituted by her Founder Jesus Christ and how afterwards it was developed by Christ's successors the Apostles and Fathers of the Church. Then he defines the Faith and Doctrine of the Church concerning this Sacrament against the attacks made by many which would have overthrown the fundamental beliefs of the Church as to the conditions of a valid performance of the Eucharistic Rite. John who in every page of his writing speaks of his respect for the source of his teaching and always appreciates and rejoices in the living Tradition of the One Catholic Church in the sections of his works dealing with the Holy Eucharist, bases again his teaching on the Common teaching of the Church and on his predecessors' teaching. It is however important to note that he does not make a full use of their Sacramental writings but confines himself to the examination of the Holy Eucharist and Holy Baptism without mentioning the word *Μυστήριον*.

The exposition of only these two Sacraments does not necessarily imply that in the time of John of Damascus there were only these two Sacraments accepted as such by the Church of his time and by his predecessors<sup>1</sup>. Just as he left aside the examination

<sup>1</sup> John in his I Oration against those who attacked the Holy Icons speaks about Sacraments which through orally tradition were given to us. In the 23rd Chapter of his I Oration he is discussing how the Ecclesiastical Tradition given to us by the Fathers of the Church has survived:

„Ὁὐ μόνον γράμμασι τὴν ἐκκλησιαστικὴν θεσμοθεσίαν παρέδωκαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀγράφοις τισὶ παραδόσει.“ He then cites a passage from St. Basil's

of other theological questions, as for example the Doctrine of the Church, he also did not examine any other of the Sacraments of the Church which are generally accepted to day.

We have therefore to conclude that: a) John of Damascus does not give a precise definition of what *Μυστήριον* is.

b) He does not examine any other Sacrament except the Holy Eucharist and the Holy Baptism.

c) He does not call these two Sacraments *Μυστήρια*, but from his teaching we find that he recognizes both as indispensable for Man's salvation and as Holy Rites instituted by Christ. These characteristics show that although he does not use the word *Μυστήριον* to define the Holy Eucharist and Holy Baptism he gives them the same value as the Church to day.

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treatise to Amphilochius, concerning the Holy Spirit to show that St. Basil taught us to remain faithful in what we received from the old Tradition which was either written or survived orally, and continues:

„πόθεν γὰρ ἴσμεν τὸν Κρανίου τόπον τὸν ἄγιον, τὸ μνήμα τῆς ζωῆς; Οὐ παῖδες παρὰ πατρὸς ἀγράφως παρεληφότες; . . . Πόθεν τὸ τρεῖς βαπτίζειν; Πόθεν τὸ κατ' ἀνατολὰς εἰσεσθαι; Πόθεν ἡ τῶν μυστηρίων παράδοσις;“  
(*Λόγος Πρῶτος πρὸς τοὺς διαβάλλοντας τὰς ἀγίας εἰκόνας* Ch. 23. PG. 94, 1256 C.)

It is however difficult to define whether John of Damascus had in mind a Sacramental system accepted as such through oral Tradition by the Church or whether he used the word in the plural to mean the Holy Eucharist or the great wonders of the Faith. Lequien and Migne translated the above expression as follows: „*Unde Sacramentorum institutio* f“ without making any comments.

## The Notion of Nature in St Augustine

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The word "nature" can be understood in very different senses. It can mean the aggregate of things, either with the exception of the Creator, as when we say "God is the author of nature", or even with God included. In a lecture given at Keble College the Revd T. A. Lacey showed that St. Augustine used "nature" (*rerum natura*) or "the order of natures" (*ordo naturarum*) to denote everything that exists. Thus, the will acts badly when it acts against the order of natures, which extends from the highest degree of being to the lowest *ideo male, quia contra ordinem naturarum, ab eo quod summa est ad id quod minus est* (*De civitate Dei* l. 12, c. 8; PL 41, 355). (T. A. Lacey, M. A., *Nature, Miracle and Sin: A Study of St. Augustine's Conception of the Natural Order*, London, 1916, p. 30.)

But we speak also of the "nature" of a single being, a man, an animal, a plant, or a stone. Sometimes we denote in this way some characteristic which is clearly accidental, as when we say of someone "It's his nature to make jokes". More often we wish to indicate a set of characteristics which are deep and permanent, without committing ourselves as regards the ontological foundations of these characteristics. But there is a stricter sense, that of a determined and immutable essence, orientated towards its proper end and enjoying a definite activity; it is in this sense that the concept of nature acquires an importance of the first order in theological problems. Indeed, if we deny that such natures exist we can, for example, hardly know anything about the human nature of Christ except what Scripture states explicitly; no deduction from what the experience of men reveals to us will be possible, for we could think that Christ was man without being man as we are. Or consider

original sin and its consequences. Whether we affirm or deny that our nature is corrupt, our opinion has no meaning unless human nature itself has a definite essence and properties, above which we must speak of supernature and beneath which is a state of corruption. In particular, the supernatural, if it is not a chimera, requires as its correlative a "natural" which is clearly defined. Lastly, with the supernatural is associated the miraculous, which also is conceivable only if there exist natures in the strict sense. Indeed, if you remove from the activity of natures their proper distinctness and their inviolable boundaries, you can no longer affirm that the intervention of God is needed to account for any fact at all, however marvellous and however strange to our ordinary experience it may be. In short, no theology seems to be possible unless the notion of nature, in the strict sense which we have given it, applies objectively.

Now, the doubt has been raised whether St Augustine ever possessed this notion, and we must admit that some of the reasons urged are rather impressive. There are, we are told, three series of texts which seem to establish that the great Doctor knew nothing of an intrinsic consistency of natures. In the first place, he frequently understands by human nature the state in which Adam was created. To explain why he had written in one of his works that by nature no soul is evil, he goes so far as to say: *Respondemus naturam in his verbis meis me intelligi voluisse illam, quae proprie natura dicitur, in qua sine vitio creati sumus* (*Retractationes*, l. 1, c. 15, n. 6, PL 32, 610). Is this not to confuse that which is of the essence and that which is a gratuitous gift which may be lost; to confuse ontology and history? Furthermore, he declares that natures are what God wills them to be. He writes: *Id erit cuique rei naturale quod ipse fecerit* (*Contra Faustum*, l. 26, PL 42, 480). And again: *Quomodo est contra naturam quod Dei fit voluntate, cum voluntas tanti utique Conditoris conditae rei cuiusque natura sit* (*De Civitate Dei*, l. 21, c. 8, n. 2, PL 41, 721). Is this not an anticipation of the Cartesian conception which derives essence from a free act of the divine will? Lastly, he sees no difference between ordinary everyday phenomena and the most astoun-

ding miracles, and this indeed seems to throw down the barriers that safeguarded the individual possessions of each nature.

On the other hand, is it really likely that a theologian as profound as St Augustine was ignorant of a notion which is so necessary for the exposition of Christian dogma? It is worth while looking more closely and considering all the texts (for there are others than the above) to see whether there is a sense which can satisfy them all.

I must first point out that it is certainly an exaggeration to assert that St Augustine is purely and simply ignorant of the notion of nature in the strictest sense. There is at least one case in which he shows himself to be acquainted with a nature which cannot be other than it is and whose activity, even when it is free, follows intangible laws. This is the divine nature, which is absolutely and infinitely distant from created natures, to which alone belongs the fulness of being, and from which alone radiate goodness and justice, in such a way that, in spite of the weakness of our understanding, we can say, in many respects, what this nature is not and what it cannot in any way will to do.

Here is one text among a thousand: *Omnino enim Dei essentia, qua est, nihil mutabile habet, nec in aeternitate, nec in veritate, nec in voluntate; quia aeterna ibi est veritas, aeterna charitas; et vera ibi est charitas, vera aeternitas; et chara ibi est aeternitas, chara veritas* (*De Trinitate*, l. 4, n. 1, proem., PL 42, 887). Neither change, nor error, nor disorder can be found in the divine nature, which is thus a necessary and immutable essence.

For this very reason, created natures have at least this impassable limitation, that they cannot attain the divine attributes. Their difference from divinity is sharp and definitive. And it is certain also that there are constitutive differences between them, which arise out of their essence and their end, and which are the basis of the laws of their activity. There are degrees of perfection between them, which are degrees of being. According to their nature things have more or less of being. There is a ladder of beings; God is at the top, and below are the various natures, arranged in accordance as they are greater or less. *Cum enim Deus summa essentia sit, hoc est summe sit,*

*et ideo immutabilis sit: rebus quas ex nihilo creavit, esse dedit, sed non summe esse, sicut ipse est; et aliis dedit esse amplius, aliis minus; atque ita naturas essentialium gradibus ordinavit* (*De civitate Dei*, l. 12, c. 2, PL 41, 350).

We must not forget that Augustine was a Platonist. He attributed an immense importance to the doctrine of Ideas. Without it, he writes, no one can call himself a philosopher: *tanta in eis vis constituitur ut nisi his intellectis sapiens esse nemo possit* (*De divinis quaestionibus LXXXIII*, q. 46, n. 1, PL 40, 29). The ideas of things live in the divine intelligence without lessening its unity and simplicity; they are the exemplars after which the various beings have been made. *Neque enim multae, sed una sapientia est, in qua sunt immensi quidam atque infiniti thesauri rerum intelligibilium, in quibus sunt omnes invisibiles atque incommutabiles rationes rerum, etiam visibilium et mutabilium, quae per ipsam factae sunt* (*De civitate Dei*, l. 11, c. 10, PL 41, 327). Natures whose being is governed by these immutable exemplars are necessarily determinate and permanent essences.

The Creator has made individuals; he had therefore the idea of each of them. But he had also the idea of the specific nature which is found in several individuals and which gives the same name to them all. When he created man, he could not contemplate only the ideas of individual men, but also contemplated the idea of the human species. (*Epist.* 14, n. 4, PL 33, 80; CSEL 34, 34). Again, man, who is made in accordance with this notion, has a fixed definition: *animal rationale*, that is to say, one to whom reason belongs by nature, *cui natura inest ratio* (*Sermo* 43, c. 3, n. 4, PL 38, 255). Between individual men there is not only a resemblance of natures which might themselves be diverse; there is one nature which is common to all and which we can attribute to each one: *Abraham quippe et Isaac et Jacob commune habent id quod est homo*; and that is why we can say that they are three men: *itaque dicuntur tres homines* (*De Trinitate*, l. 7, c. 4, n. 7, PL 42, 940).

When he adopts this standpoint Augustine does not include in nature everything that was given to it at the beginning, but only that without which it would lose claim to its name.

The angels were created with the gift of grace; but since they can be angels without having grace, Augustine distinguishes what belongs to them by nature from what God added to it: *simul eis condens naturam et largiens gratiam* (*De civitate Dei*, l. 12, c. 9, n. 2, PL 41, 357; CSEL 40, 1 p. 580, l. 18).

It is thus in a different sense that in other places he gives the name of nature to the original state of beings. We cannot say that he confuses this "historical" nature with the specific nature strictly so called.

From the clearly determinate constitution of natures there follows their activity, which is equally specific and ordered to its proper end. They defend, as their property, the being which constitutes them; they find in it their beauty, goodness and peace: *Naturae igitur omnes, quoniam sunt et ideo habent modum suum, speciem suam et quamdam secum pacem suam, profecto bonae sunt. Et cum ibi sunt, ubi esse per naturae ordinem debent, quantum acceperunt, suum esse custodiunt.* (*De civitate Dei*, l. 12, c. 5; PL 41, 352; CSEL 40, 1, p. 572).

As for their activity, it too is governed by their degrees of being; every nature has its own motion, which the Creator can of course arrest or modify but which, except in the case of a miracle, he allows them to exercise freely. *Sic itaque administrat (Deus) omnia quae creavit ut etiam ipsa proprios exercere et agere motus sinat* (*De civitate Dei*, l. 7, c. 30; PL 41, 220; CSEL 40, 1, p. 346 ll. 20—21).

Julian of Eclanum gave the Bishop of Hippo an opportunity of explaining this doctrine. How, he objected, could the sin of Adam be transmitted, since it is a quality, and a quality can exist only in the subject which bears it? He invoked Aristotle in his support. Augustine replies that no doubt a quality of one subject does not emigrate to another, and this is what Aristotle meant; but, while remaining in its own subject, it can have an action which communicates to another subject a quality of the same species. Thus, for example, the colour of parents is communicated to their children. Every nature has its own action and produces its own effects. In the government of the universe God allows those laws to act which he has given to the activity of



beings: *Neque enim Deus*, concludes Augustine, *ita naturas creat, ut leges auferat quas dedit motibus uniuscuiusque naturae* (*Contra Iulianum*, l. 5, c. 14, n. 51, PL 44, 813).

If we wish to enter fully into the thought of Augustine and to understand how, on the one hand, as we have seen, he stresses the consistency of natures, based upon the immutability of the divine ideas, and how, on the other hand, he sometimes seems to suspend the essences from the divine free-will, we must consider his doctrine of creation.

For exegetical reasons, and perhaps also under the influence of some Plotinian or Stoic philosophy, Augustine comes to think of creation as being accomplished as a whole in one instant. It is true that all creation did not exist at this first moment in its proper and perfect form; but it was all there, either as realised in its actual existence or else as contained virtually in its causes, as in a seed. This is the theory of *rationes seminales*. Now these *rationes* are of two sorts. Some are hidden in the beings already formed; they appear at their proper dates as the ages roll on, in accordance with perfectly definite laws. Thus is established the ordinary course of nature. The *ratio seminalis* of a plant, for example, leads in the course of time to a seed in the strict sense, from which their subsequently arises an individual of a determinate species. The species is in accordance with the seed, and the seed is in accordance with the *ratio seminalis*. This determinism is rigid: *Unde fit ut de grano tritici non nascatur faba*“ (*De genesis ad litteram*, l. 9, c. 17, n. 32; PL 34, 406; CSEL XXVIII, p. 291, l. 18). God allows this movement of natures to deploy itself, as it results from the primary constitution of the world.

There are, however, other *rationes* which God has not inserted in the universe, but which he has reserved in his power in order to introduce them at a definite point into the natural course of things and to obtain an effect which the natural course could not have produced. These extraordinary causes are not opposed to the ordinary causes; they are different from them. They do not change the natures; they guide or supplement them. This is what Augustine means when he assures us that God does nothing

against nature, but only against the ordinary course of nature (Cf. *Contra Faustum*, l. 26, c. 3; PL 42, 480). *Si autem non omnes causas in creatura primitus condita praefixit, sed aliquas in sua voluntate servavit, non sunt quidem illae quas in sua voluntate servavit ex istarum quas creavit necessitate pendentes: non tamen possunt esse contrariae quas in sua voluntate servavit illis quas sua voluntate instituit* (*De genesi ad litteram*, l. 6, c. 18, n. 29; PL 34, 351; CSEL XXVIII, p. 192).

To take an example, Augustine thinks it more likely than not that Adam's body was formed in the adult condition. There were two possible ways of producing this effect. Either God wrote into the prime creation the causes of this formation, in such a way that, as a necessary consequence and without any other divine intervention, the working of these causes produced the adult body of the first man, or else God did not write into things at the beginning all the causes of this formation but reserved to himself the right to intervene later on and to add fresh causes in such a way as to make this same body of a fully made man appear. In acting in this second way, the latter causes would not enter into conflict with the former, but would simply associate themselves with them and complete them. The former would allow the latter to insert themselves into the fabric of the world's history and produce in it their own effects.

Such a conception not only does not diminish in any way the existence of firmly determinate natures and the certainty of the proper effects of their activity; it is also designed to be their safeguard. If things are left to their constitutive being and to the motions which derive from it, they will always produce the same effects. For something new to appear outside this determinism God himself must intervene and posit causes proportionate to the new effect.

Nevertheless, he can intervene. And so it is that Augustine's conception shows itself to be fully adapted to explaining the miraculous and the supernatural in the strict sense. We shall now go on to see this.

When we think of a miracle, we envisage it especially as the sign of a special divine intervention. If it is brought about

in support of a doctrine or to authorise a divine messenger, it is, as it were, a witness borne by God to this doctrine or this message. For this it is necessary that the powers of nature, left to themselves, cannot produce it. In the multiplication of the loaves which Jesus brought about to feed the crowds which followed him we recognise an occurrence which ordinary laws could not produce and which in consequence requires the action of a higher cause; and we thereby understand that this cause is on the side of Christ and authenticates his mission.

Now all this is found quite clearly in the theory of Augustine. The nature of the five loaves and the two fishes is such that they cannot be distributed among four thousand persons and leave seven baskets over. God has therefore posited another cause which is proportionate to this effect; and he has manifested that he is with Christ. Augustine knows as well as anyone what is the role of miracles in apologetics. (Cf. *De civitate Dei*, l. 22, c. 8, PL 41, 760ss.).

However, St Augustine sees something else in a miracle as well. Apart from its value as a sign, a miracle has other uses which Augustine stresses precisely because people only too often overlook them. A miracle is a marvellous, astonishing and wonderful thing indeed; but the holy Bishop does not wish to stop here. In the first place, it is not more wonderful than what happens every day in nature; it is perhaps less. Does not he who once fed a few thousand man by a miracle feed all men every day? Does not he who changed into wine the water at Cana change the rain that falls from heaven into the juice of the vine every year? Let miracles then be made the occasion for wonder at the everyday work of God in the universe. Because familiarity has blunted the perception of men who see God's works in nature without ever thinking of praising him, the Creator has reserved to himself a small number of unusual works in order to wake them from their sleep. *Servavit sibi* — these are the *rationes* which are held in reserve in the divine will and which, as we have seen, do not destroy but complete or supplement natures. But what a mistake it is if we only wonder at miracles! (Cf. *In Ioannis evangelium* tr. 8.)

Furthermore, Christ's miracles were performed not only to astonish us, nor even to give authority to the Gospel message, but also to instruct us. They have a spiritual sense, on which our faith should feed. We must not then stop short at the marvellous. Christ's intention goes beyond that. *Neque enim tantum miracula propter miracula faciebat; sed ut illa quae faciebat mira essent videntibus, vera essent intelligentibus* (*Sermo* 98, c. 3, n. 3; PL 38, 592). Again, Augustine seeks at length in his sermons this deep meaning of the miracles. This teaching function is not, of course, reserved to miracles; but because Augustine expounds in miracles those properties which they share with other divine or human actions we must not conclude that he does not discern what is peculiar to miracles alone, namely their value as signs, which presupposes a precise idea of natures.

I think that the foregoing considerations throw light upon a more delicate and at the same time very important question which Augustine may not himself have asked explicitly, but which his interpreters have answered in different ways. Did he admit the existence of a supernatural order? For those who do not find in Augustine a firm notion of nature, the answer is in the negative. In my opinion, however, the question remains to be answered. We can pin-point it in the following way: Is the vision of God, which Augustine puts forward constantly as the last end of the hope of man and as the reward of a life passed in righteousness, of a supernatural order or not? We must further divide up the problem: Is human nature, left to itself, able to win this vision; and, if it is not able, is God bound, by his justice or his wisdom, to grant the vision to it?

On the first point, no controversy is possible. According to the Doctor of Hippo, our nature is certainly capable of receiving the vision of the divine essence; but it cannot receive it, and still less procure it, by its own powers. Since original sin has come in we are saved only by grace. The grace which saves the sinner belongs to the order of causes which God has not inserted into nature but has reserved in the secret of his power (*De genesi ad litteram*, I, 9, c. 18, n. 34). But even an innocent nature, like that of the angels, or like that of the first man

before the Fall, must receive from God that constant goodwill of which the beatific vision will be the crown. Together with their nature God gave the angels grace: *condens naturam et largiens gratiam* (*De civitate Dei*, l. 12, c. 9, n. 2), as he gave to Adam the help without which he could not have persevered. *Sine quo per liberum arbitrium perseverare non posset* (*De correptione et gratia*, c. 12, n. 34; PL 44, 937).

The second point remains. Was God bound to give the vision of his essence to those intelligent creatures whom he had made capable of receiving it? So far as I know, Augustine does not give an explicit answer to this question; but it appears from his ideas as a whole that he upheld God's freedom in this matter. Here are my reasons for this interpretation.

In the first place, Augustine speaks of man's destination for the vision of God in the same way as other Fathers do who, as is commonly held, recognise its supernatural character. We are concerned with a divine filiation which is an adoption; and it is of the nature of adoption to be free. (Cf. *Contra Faustum*, l. 3, c. 3, PL 42, 215—216; *De peccatorum meritis*, l. 2, c. 8, n. 10; PL 44, 157—158) etc.

Again, human nature, even if it is left without the vision of God, can possess great goods, and among these a love and a knowledge of God which are themselves very precious. We can apply to this what Augustine made clear with regard to the gift of integrity made to Adam, in virtue of which Adam was spared the troubles of concupiscence. The holy Bishop maintained to the end that God was free to give or to withhold this gift; even if the gift was refused to man in his innocence, man ought still to praise God, from whom he would have received nothing but good. (*Retractiones*, l. 1, c. 9, n. 6: *quamvis ignorantia et difficultas, etiamsi essent hominis primordia naturalia, nec sic culpandus, sed laudandus esset Deus* PL 32, 598).

Furthermore, the whole order of grace belongs to a mystery which the Apostle declares is hidden in God. The order of nature is such as to render the order of grace possible, but it does not demand it, just as (the comparison is Augustine's own) the first institution of nature involved that human nature should have

two sexes, but in no way required that the woman should be drawn from the side of Adam as he slept; it merely left it possible: *tantum hoc habuit, quia et sic fieri posset... Quid autem fieret, ut omnino aliud futurum non esset, absconditum erat in Deo* (*De genesi ad litteram*, l. 9, c. 18, n. 34; PL 34, 407).

Finally, the descriptions which Augustine gives of the beatific vision are such that we can only conceive it as the freest of all free gifts. It is sufficient to transcribe these sentences from the twelfth book of *De Genesi ad litteram*: "There is seen the brightness of the Lord, not through the medium of a vision, whether corporeal, as on Mount Sinai, or spiritual, as was seen by Isaiah or by John in the Apocalypse, not through images but by its essence (*per speciem*), in so far as the human mind can grasp it, under the grace of God, who assumes the mind to himself, so that God speaks mouth to mouth to the man whom he has made worthy of such a conversation, not by the mouth of the body but of the mind" (c. 26, n. 54; PL 34, 476). Who could maintain that God cannot create an intelligent nature without being obliged to grant it so intimate an intercourse?

This is a blessing as desirable as we could wish, but it is the free gift of a Creator who has deigned to make himself our Father: such is the beatific vision according to St Augustine.

We can see how great a share pertains to the divine will in the constitution and the history of natures. From among all the possible participations of his ideas God chooses those which he wills to realise; they exist only because he wills that they shall exist. There are even natures which can exist in several states at the pleasure of the divine will, such is the richness of their essence. One of these is the human soul, which was created with an adornment of gifts which might, without any injustice, have been withheld from it: *Quid enim indignum si etiam sic voluit Creator ostendere usque adeo excellere creaturis corporeis animae dignitatem, ut ab eo gradu possit esse ortus alterius, ad quem alterius perductus est occasus?* (*De libero arbitrio*, l. 3, c. 20, n. 56, PL 32, 1298). Furthermore, the determinism of the initial causes in no way binds the divine will, which can intervene when it sees

fit in order to bring about effects which exceed the powers of the prime creation.

Thus Augustine was able to say, without any contradiction, that the will of God determines the nature of everything. It cannot however do this without the light of the intellect, for there are things that God cannot do and cannot will to do. This is not a lack of power, but the opposite: *non deficiente non potest, sed potenter* (*Contra sermonem Arianorum*, c. 14; PL 42, 694).

I have, in making this study, deliberately taken account of all the texts which bear upon my subject. The doctrine which results from this is coherent in itself and does not conflict with other Augustinian doctrines. We can, in my opinion, conclude that the notion of nature in St Augustine is more precise and more consistent than one might think if one paid attention only to a few isolated texts.

(Translated by E. L. Mascall)

## La doctrine sur le Saint-Esprit dans le «Thesaurus» de saint Cyrille d'Alexandrie

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La place occupée par la doctrine sur le Saint-Esprit dans le *Thesaurus* est fort restreinte: deux chapitres seulement sur trente-cinq, les chapitres XXXIII et XXXIV<sup>1</sup>; à quoi il faut ajouter une quarantaine de brèves mentions dans le reste de l'ouvrage<sup>2</sup>.

Dans ces deux chapitres, Cyrille se propose de démontrer, contre des adversaires dont il ne précise pas l'identité, la divinité réelle du Saint-Esprit. Notre but n'est pas de résumer son argumentation, où les redites ne manquent pas, ni d'examiner sa façon de présenter les preuves, dans lesquelles les citations scripturaires jouent un rôle de premier plan<sup>3</sup>. Ce que nous avons voulu ici, c'est essayer simplement de reconstituer, d'après les indices qu'il nous en donne au cours de son exposé, l'idée que Cyrille se fait de l'Esprit-Saint, de sa nature, de ses rapports avec le Père et le Fils, de son activité dans les créatures, spécialement dans les hommes, et des conséquences que cela entraîne en nous.

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<sup>1</sup> PG LXXV, 565B—617B. — Tous les textes employés se trouvant dans ce volume, nous nous contenterons désormais de renvoyer à la colonne.

<sup>2</sup> Nous avons relevé les passages suivants: 12 A, 25 B, 81 B, 164 D—165 A, 173 C—176 D, 185 D, 192 CD, 204 D—205 A, 205 B, 216 D, 225 C, 225 D—228 B, 228 D—229 A, 232 A, 232 C—233 A, 308 C, 309 C, 320 BC, 328 A, 332 A, 333 D, 341 C, 352 CD, 369 D—372 B, 432 D, 433 D, 480 BC, 492 A, 500 B, 504 D, 508 BD, 521 AB, 528 BC, 536 CD, 540 CD, 561 D—564 A et 565 A.

<sup>3</sup> Sur les procédés d'argumentation cyrilliens, voir J. Liébaert, *La doctrine christologique de saint Cyrille d'Alexandrie avant la querelle nestorienne*, Lille, 1951, p. 35—43 et N. Charlier, *Le «Thesaurus de Trinitate» de saint Cyrille d'Alexandrie. Questions de critique littéraire*, dans *Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique*, t. XLV, 1950, p. 25—81.



Le Saint-Esprit n'est pas une créature; il n'est ni inférieur à l'essence divine, ni séparé d'elle<sup>1</sup>, ni étranger (*ἀλλότριον*, *ἀπεξενωμένον*) à la nature ou à l'essence (*ἐτεροούσιον*) de Dieu, du Verbe ou du Sauveur<sup>2</sup>. Il ne subsiste pas du dehors (609 A), il n'est pas engendré<sup>3</sup>, mais il est Dieu, en Dieu et de Dieu par nature<sup>4</sup>, pour ainsi dire, essentiellement enfoncé en lui<sup>5</sup>, subsistant réellement et personnellement<sup>6</sup> de l'essence ou de la nature divine, du Père ou du Fils<sup>7</sup>, uni à la divine essence par l'identité de nature<sup>8</sup>, consubstantiel à Dieu<sup>9</sup>. Il est puissance et réalité sanctifiante<sup>10</sup>, opération naturelle, vivante, essentielle et immanente, qui procède sans séparation de l'essence suprême, incompréhensible et divine<sup>11</sup>, qualité subsistante, pourrait-on

<sup>1</sup> *Ὡςπερ τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον οὐ μερισμὸν ὑπομένει περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν . . .* (81 B); *Πῶς οὐκ ἔσται ὁῦλον, ὥς οὐ διώρισται (τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον) τῆς οὐσίας τῆς θείας, ἀλλ' ἐξ αὐτῆς φυσικῶς ἐκπεμπόμενον, ὅλην ἔχει τοῦ Πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ Υἱοῦ τὴν ἐνέργειαν;* (581 B). Nous ne citerons que les principaux textes qui concernent la nature du Saint-Esprit; pour le reste, nous ne donnerons que des références.

<sup>2</sup> 568 C, 577 A, 580 A, 581 C, 592 A.

<sup>3</sup> L'affirmation n'est pas explicite, mais est déduite d'un raisonnement *ex absurdo*: *Εἰ τὸ κτίσμα τοῦτο καὶ γέννημα, κτίσμα δέ, ὥς φασι, τὸ Πνεῦμα, ὁῦλον ὅτι καὶ γέννημα. Ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν Πατὴρ, οὐκ ἐστὶ μονογενὴς ὁ Υἱός. Εἰ δὲ Υἱός, ἔσται Υἱός Υἱοῦ, εἴπερ τὸ κτίσμα τοῦτο καὶ γέννημα τυγχάνει* (309 C). On peut voir un raisonnement quasi identique en 308 C.

<sup>4</sup> 508 C, 565 D, 576 B, 616 B.

<sup>5</sup> *Τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἔστι φυσικῶς ἐνυπάρχον αὐτῷ, καὶ οὐσιωδῶς ἐμπεπηγός, ἢ οὕτως εἰπωμεν, καὶ ἀμερίστως ἐξ αὐτοῦ προϊόν (565 C).*

<sup>6</sup> *. . . Ἀλλ' οὕτως ἡνωμένον, εἰ καὶ ἔστιν ἰδιουσύστατον, ὥς αὐτὸ τε ὑπάρχει ἐν Υἱῷ, καὶ Υἱὸν ἐν αὐτῷ, διὰ τὴν τῆς οὐσίας ταυτότητα* (568 C).

<sup>7</sup> 585 A, 608 B, 612 B.

<sup>8</sup> *. . . φοροῦν δὲ πάλιν ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὸν ποιητὴν διὰ τῆς φύσεως ταυτότητα, καὶ τὸ τῆς οὐσιώδους ποιότητος ἀπαράλλακτον* (569 B); *. . . καὶ νοεῖν ὅτι ἡ καρπὸς τις ὥςπερ ἔστι τῆς θείας οὐσίας, ἐν αὐτῇ τε ὅν καὶ ἐξ αὐτῆς ἀμερίστως τε καὶ ἀχωρίστως προσερχόμενον, καὶ ἡνωμένον κατὰ τὴν ταυτότητα τῆς φύσεως* (584 A). Voir aussi 568 C, cité dans la note 6.

<sup>9</sup> *. . . πῶς ἂν εὐλόγως ἀποτέμενοιτο τῆς πρὸς Θεὸν ὁμοουσιότητος;* (613 A).

<sup>10</sup> *Ὅν ἄρα ἐκ μετοχῆς, οὐδὲ ἐκ συνθέσεως ἅγιον, ἀλλ' οὐσία καὶ φύσις ἀγιαστικὴ καὶ τῆς τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ Πατρὸς θεότητος, ἢ οὕτως εἰπω, ποιότης, ὥςπερ οὐ καὶ ὁ γλυκασμός τοῦ μέλιτος, ἢ καὶ ἐξ ἁνθους εὐωδία* (596 A); *Αὐτὴν γὰρ ἐκείνην τὴν ἐκ Πατρὸς φυσικῶς προϊούσαν δύναμιν ἀγιαστικὴν τὴν τοῖς ἀτελέσι τὸ τέλειον παρεχομένην, φάμεν εἶναι τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον* (597 A).

<sup>11</sup> *. . . οὐκ ἀλλότριον ἄρα τῆς θείας οὐσίας ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ὥς ἐνέργεια φυσικὴ τε καὶ οὐσιωδῆς καὶ ἐνπρόστατος, ἐξ αὐτῆς προϊούσα καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ μένουσα πάντα ἐργάζεται τὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ* (580 A); *. . . οὐκ ἀλλότριον τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ Υἱοῦ τὸ*

dire, de la divinité du Père et du Fils, de la seigneurie de Dieu sur toutes choses<sup>1</sup>, fruit naturel de Dieu<sup>2</sup>, participation relative à l'essence suprême<sup>3</sup>.

Honoré comme Dieu par les divines Ecritures (592 C), il reçoit et porte réellement en lui-même tout ce qui est propre et particulier à l'essence divine<sup>4</sup>, possédant toute la puissance et toute la force du Père et du Fils<sup>5</sup>, la dignité qui convient au Seigneur ou à Dieu (569 C, 600 AB). Il est appelé bon (585 D), il connaît le jour du jugement (369 D—372 B), il scrute et connaît les profondeurs de Dieu<sup>6</sup>, si bien que les mystères de Dieu sont appelés spirituels (*πνευματικά*) (589 A).

Sa sainteté n'est pas le produit d'une participation (593 AD, 597 C) ou d'une composition (593 D—596 A), comme il arrive chez les créatures; elle n'est pas en lui une fonction accidentelle, dont il pourrait, à la rigueur, être privé; mais elle constitue son essence même (596 A—597 A).

L'expression *ἐκ Θεοῦ* ne doit pas s'entendre de la même manière lorsqu'il s'agit de lui ou des créatures: employée au sens propre au sujet de l'Esprit-Saint, elle l'est par catachrèse pour signifier que Dieu est l'auteur des créatures (565 C—568 A, 568 D—569 B).

Esprit de Dieu et Esprit du Christ ou du Fils<sup>7</sup>, le Saint-Esprit est l'image inaltérable du Fils, comme le Fils l'est du Père

*Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον. Ἄλλ' ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ, καὶ ὥσπερ ἐνέργειά τις φυσικὴ πάντα δυναμένη πληροῦν ὅσα καὶ βούλεται* (581 C); ... *τῆς θέας ὑπάρχον οὐσίας ἐνέργεια φυσικὴ τε καὶ ζῶσα καὶ ἐνυπόστατος* ... (596 C); ... *ἐνέργειά τις φυσικὴ καὶ ζῶσα, καὶ ἰν' οὕτως εἰπωμεν, ποιότης τῆς θεότητος τοῦ Υἱοῦ τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον ἐστίν* (604 AB); ... *οὐ κτιστὸν τὸ Πνεῦμα ἢ ποιητόν, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῆς ἀπερινοήτου καὶ θέας οὐσίας, ὡς δύναμις αὐτῆς καὶ ἐνέργεια φυσικὴ* (608 C). Voir aussi 581 B, cité dans la page 188, note 1.

<sup>1</sup> *Ὁλοῦν ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ Υἱοῦ τὸ Πνεῦμα, ποιότης τις, ἰν' οὕτως εἰπωμεν, ὑπάρχον τοῦ κυριεύοντος πάντων Θεοῦ* (588 A); *Εἰ παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ Πατρὸς ἐκπορεύεται τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον, καὶ ὥσπερ τις καρπὸς ἡ ποιότης ἐστὶ τῆς οὐσίας αὐτοῦ* ... (617 B). Voir aussi 569 B, 596 A, et 604 AB, cités respectivement dans les notes 8, 10 et 11 (p. 188).

<sup>2</sup> Voir 584 A (p. 188, note 8), 617 B (note 1) et 609 A.

<sup>3</sup> ... *τῆς ἀνωτάτω πασῶν οὐσίας μετέληψις σχετικὴ* (572 C).

<sup>4</sup> 508 C, 568 A, 576 C, 608 A.

<sup>5</sup> 573 BC, 580 C, 581 B.

<sup>6</sup> 369 D—372 B, 565 D, 568 B, 612 D—613 A.

<sup>7</sup> 508 C, 568 C, 569 D.

(572 AB). De même que le Christ est appelé Esprit (568 C), le Saint-Esprit est appelé Seigneur (573 D—576 C), Esprit de la Vie (600 CD) et de la Vérité qu'est le Christ (589 AB), intelligence (*νοῦς*) du Christ<sup>1</sup>. Bien que recevant du Fils (164 D—165 A, 372 B), il est unique<sup>2</sup>, simple<sup>3</sup> et parfait (596 D—597 A). L'Écriture l'appelle le visage et la main de Dieu, le doigt du Fils, qui est lui-même le bras ou la droite du Père, par qui le Père accorde la sanctification (576 C—577 B).

L'Esprit-Saint étant de l'essence du Fils (608 B, 609 A), celui-ci accomplit par lui tout ce qu'il veut (581 C), ne lui faisant dire que ce qu'il veut et tout ce qu'il veut (584 BC, 593 AD) éclairant tout homme par l'illumination de l'Esprit comme par un rayon de sa propre nature (589 BC), se laissant guider par l'Esprit, qui est sa force, usant de lui, de sa puissance vivifiante, pour vaincre le diable au désert et faire des miracles en Galilée (580 BC), pour se ressusciter lui-même et détruire les liens de la mort (597 D—600 A).

Ainsi donc l'Esprit procède naturellement et essentiellement du Père dans le Fils (577 A). Il est du Père, envoyé de lui, par le Fils, dans les créatures et dans les saints<sup>4</sup>. Dieu avec le Père et le Fils selon l'identité de la nature divine, le Saint-Esprit unit, rassemble et parachève dans la plénitude la Trinité sainte, adorable et consubstantielle (608 B, D, 616 B), à qui est due

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<sup>1</sup> Cyrille affirme que I Cor. II, 16: *Ἡμεῖς δὲ νοῦν Χριστοῦ ἔχομεν* se rapporte au Saint-Esprit, qui habite en nous. Il en tire d'abord une preuve de la divinité du Saint-Esprit (576 B). Puis, afin de montrer que celui-ci n'est pas imparfait bien qu'il reçoive du Christ, il le compare, d'une manière assez peu rigoureuse d'ailleurs, à l'intelligence humaine. La parole humaine, dit-il, n'est pas imparfaite par le fait qu'elle procède après avoir été formée dans l'intelligence et avoir tout reçu d'elle; il nous faut admettre quelque chose de semblable pour le Saint-Esprit: intelligence (*νοῦς*) du Christ, il dit aux disciples tout ce qui est dans le Christ, ne leur communiquant aucun autre vouloir que celui du Christ, en qui et de qui il est (584 AC).

<sup>2</sup> 81 B, 432 D, 601 D—604 A.

<sup>3</sup> 589 C—592 A. — Aux adversaires, qui affirmaient que l'Esprit est de l'ordre des parfums et donc d'une autre essence que Dieu qui oint, Cyrille répond qu'il ne peut en être ainsi, puisque tout parfum est sans raison et composé de nombreuses et diverses parties.

<sup>4</sup> 569 C, 576 C, 581 B, 600 C.

une seule et unique adoration, dont le règne et l'activité sont uniques: du Père par le Fils avec ou dans le Saint-Esprit<sup>1</sup>.

Après avoir examiné la nature du Saint-Esprit et son activité en Dieu, considérons comment, selon Cyrille, il agit dans les créatures et en nous.

Il crée et renouvelle toutes choses (561 D—564 A). C'est lui seul qui révèle les mystères de Dieu (565 D, 572 C) et rend apparentes les choses cachées (612 D—613 A). Il parle dans l'Écriture et par les prophètes<sup>2</sup>, nous livrant la Vérité (565 A), appelant les apôtres (581 C), les guidant et leur donnant des ordres (500 B). Comme le Christ, qui est la Vie, lui, l'Esprit de Vie il porte des lois (588 CD), qui sont la détermination en nous de son propre vouloir (600 C—601 A). En lui, le Christ chasse les démons (616 D). C'est lui qui remplit toutes choses de Dieu et rend Dieu présent partout (580 D). Il réalise les promesses que Dieu avait faites de susciter des pasteurs à son peuple et de le sanctifier (577 D—580 A). Il opère avec puissance toutes les œuvres de Dieu (580 A), donnant à toute créature sa perfection, en la sanctifiant et en la faisant participer de lui<sup>3</sup>. Il crée dans la Vierge le temple divin (616 C).

Passant naturellement du Père, par le Fils, en ceux qui sont aptes à le recevoir (572 C), l'Esprit-Saint y opère, comme dans la création, les œuvres de Dieu. Il est le souffle divin infusé à l'âme humaine dès le commencement (584 D). Il agit en nous par lui-même (597 BC). Il habite dans les saints, infusant Dieu, le Père et le Fils, dans leurs cœurs par sa présence<sup>4</sup>. Il renouvelle en nous l'image primitive, en nous faisant apparaître conformes à Dieu (225 D—228 B, 584 D—585 A). Il nous délivre de la servitude (601 B), nous absout et nous justifie (604 CD, 609 BC), nous vivifie (605 BC, 608 A), nous rénove (608 A) et nous régénère pour l'unité avec Dieu (592 C), pour le salut par la foi au Christ (617 A). Il nous sanctifie<sup>5</sup>, nous divinise (592 D) en nous appelant

<sup>1</sup> 185 D, 433 D, 480 BC, 565 C, 580 C, 585 C.

<sup>2</sup> 216 D, 232 A, 320 B, 328 A, 332 A, 432 D, 492 A, 504 D, 536 CD.

<sup>3</sup> 585 A, 596 C, 597 A.

<sup>4</sup> 576 C, 581 AB, 592 A, 600 BC, 608 CD, 613 D—616 A.

<sup>5</sup> 596 D—597 A, 597 C, 604 CD.

à la dignité et à la liberté de la filiation (569 BC), et nous transforme en nous rendant participants de sa propre nature<sup>1</sup>. Il forme en nous le Christ (577 D, 609 A), imprimant en nous ses propres caractères, dessinant la nature de l'homme en vue de la beauté de Dieu (609 A), nous réformant à sa propre ressemblance et nous spiritualisant (577 D), pour l'incorruption et la vie éternelle (572 A).

Il imprime en nous l'image de la divine essence, les marques de la nature inengendrée; invisiblement, mais avec justesse, comme dans de la cire, il presse son sceau dans les cœurs de ceux qui le reçoivent, dessinant la nature, par la communion et la similitude avec lui-même, sur le modèle de la beauté du type primitif et nous faisant apparaître selon l'image de Dieu (609 D—612 A). Il devient ainsi pour nous les arrhes de la vie (605 BC), les prémices d'une participation plus parfaite à la divinité dans le siècle à venir (601 C).

Il nous donne aussi la foi (601 D). Sans en pâtir, il opère diversément en tous (81 B), fortifie de ses dons ceux en qui il réside (600 AB), et distribue comme il le veut les charismes divins selon la mesure suffisante et propre à chacun<sup>2</sup>.

C'est dans l'Esprit-Saint que sont racontés les mystères de Dieu; ceux qui l'ont reçu prophétisent; c'est à lui que parlent ceux qui s'expriment en langues (572 C, 605 B). Mentir à l'Esprit, c'est mentir à Dieu (577 C), et accuser l'Esprit de mensonge est un blasphème (320 BC) aussi grave et aussi sévèrement puni que le blasphème contre Dieu (592 BC).

Ayant reçu l'Esprit par participation, nous possédons Dieu, Fils et Père, en nous (572 A, 608 BD) et nous sommes en lui (576 C), nous devenons les temples saints (540 CD, 612 BC, 617 B) et les maisons de Dieu (605 A), qui habite et circule en nous (572 D—573 A). Parce que nous avons cru au Christ et avons été oints du Saint-Esprit (613 CD), nous avons été instruits par l'Esprit dans la piété et la rectitude de vie (609 BC), nous avons appris toutes choses de lui et n'avons plus besoin des doctrines humaines (613 CD).

<sup>1</sup> 225 C, 228 B, 569 CD, 592 C, 596 C, 597 C, 601 B, 604 D—605 A, 608 CD.

<sup>2</sup> 588 BC, 601 D—604 A, 613 AC.

C'est dans l'Esprit que nous vivons, que nous nous mouvons, que nous sommes en Dieu (581 A). En lui, par la participation à lui, nous participons du Père par le Fils (228 D—229 A), réformés à l'image de Dieu (585 A), en vue de Dieu (609 D), nous sommes en quelque sorte engendrés de l'Esprit comme le Verbe est vraiment engendré du Père (341 C), amenés à Dieu le Père, de la nature de qui nous sommes déclarés participants (569 BC, 612 A), en même temps que nous connaissons le Seigneur (588 A) et devenons un avec Dieu (204 D—205 A). C'est dans le Saint-Esprit du Fils uniquement que nous pouvons confesser le Christ (205 B), dire que Jésus est le Seigneur (12 A), crier: « Abba, Père »<sup>1</sup>, n'étant plus de la chair, mais de l'Esprit (352 CD, 592 C).

De plus, parce qu'il participe à l'Esprit divin et, par lui, à la nature divine, l'homme est l'image et la gloire de Dieu; tout comme la femme est la gloire de l'homme, ayant reçu, pour être constituée, une partie de ses membres (585 BC).

Enfin, lorsque le Père nous exauce, il le fait avec le seul Fils et, par le Fils, dans le Saint-Esprit (192 CD).

Contrairement donc à ce qu'une lecture rapide du *Thesaurus* aurait pu laisser entrevoir, la doctrine de saint Cyrille sur le Saint-Esprit nous y apparaît riche et fort nuancée. Il serait intéressant de la comparer à celle de ses prédécesseurs, afin de déterminer ce que notre auteur y a apporté d'original. Il resterait ensuite, avant de se hasarder à bâtir une synthèse de la pensée cyrillienne sur le Saint-Esprit, à faire pour chacune des œuvres du grand Alexandrin un travail de recherche similaire à celui auquel nous venons de nous livrer. Ainsi, peu à peu, sera-t-il possible de faire revivre, à côté du Cyrille, théologien de l'Incarnation, et toujours un peu éclipsée par lui, la figure de Cyrille, théologien de la Trinité.

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<sup>1</sup> 173 CD, 528 BC, 569 BD.

## L'image de Dieu dans la théologie d'Origène<sup>1</sup>

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La place du thème de l'image de Dieu chez Origène — sans parler des idées qui lui sont connexes, ressemblance, participation, imitation, images diaboliques et bestiales — est considérable, et l'on peut s'étonner que certains travaux modernes l'aient fortement sous-estimée. Cette doctrine est intimement liée à tout le symbolisme de l'exégèse origénienne qui voit dans les récits de la Bible, comme d'ailleurs dans tous les êtres du monde, des images des réalités célestes : si Dieu a fait l'homme suivant son image, « il a peut-être fait les autres créatures à la ressemblance de certaines autres images célestes », d'après le Commentaire du Cantique.

S'il est une distinction à laquelle Origène reste toujours fidèle — et il est peu dans ses habitudes d'observer fidèlement les distinctions qu'il pose —, c'est celle de l'Image de Dieu, titre qui convient au Verbe selon Col. I 15 et qu'Origène lui attribue de façon exclusive, et du « selon-l'image », c'est à dire de l'ange ou de l'homme qui a été créé seulement selon l'image de Dieu d'après Gen. I 26—27. Cette Image de Dieu d'après laquelle l'homme a été fait est donc le Verbe, qui a servi à la fois de cause exemplaire et de cause instrumentale à la création du monde : en tant que Sagesse il est en effet le monde intelligible, le réceptacle des idées et des *logoi* qui sont les modèles de toute créature ; en tant que Logos il est l'agent qui exécute *ad extra* la volonté du Père, l'ouvrier intelligent qui bâtit le monde, comme le constructeur d'une maison ou d'un vaisseau, suivant les idées qu'il a dans l'esprit.

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<sup>1</sup> Nous ne donnons ici que les résultats de notre étude qui à déjà paru sous le titre « Théologie de l'Image de Dieu chez Origène », dans la Collection Théologie, Aubier (Editions Montaigne), Paris.

Le Verbe n'est pas seulement l'Image du Dieu invisible, il est son image invisible, car l'image doit être de même nature que son modèle, lorsqu'elle exprime la ressemblance d'un fils à son père. C'est dire que le Christ est image avant tout par sa divinité, secondairement par son humanité: de même il est médiateur entre Dieu et l'homme par sa divinité même, non en tant qu'Homme-Dieu. Il manifeste le Père en le révélant intérieurement à l'âme et c'est ainsi qu'il est l'agent de toutes les théophanies de l'Ancien Testament: cela vaut aussi pour le Nouveau, car il ne suffit pas de voir l'homme Jésus pour apercevoir en lui le Verbe et à travers le Verbe le Père. Certes l'humanité du Christ est elle aussi une image de Dieu, mais une image médiate, une image du Verbe. L'intensité de l'amour qui joint au Logos l'âme humaine du Christ est telle, que possédant le Verbe dans sa plénitude, elle se change en quelque sorte en lui, comme le fer plongé dans le feu devient feu, et c'est ainsi qu'elle est son image. Cette image du Verbe est aussi appelée l'« ombre du Christ Seigneur, sous laquelle nous vivons parmi les nations »: elle nous livre la divinité, mais en atténue l'éclat, pour que nous puissions la contempler avec nos yeux terrestres.

La qualité d'Image de Dieu qui appartient au Verbe se confond avec sa filiation divine et on la retrouve chaque fois qu'Origène essaie de spéculer sur la génération du Fils par le Père. De même que l'intelligence s'exprime dans une parole faite à son image, le Père profère en son Fils les « théorèmes de la Vérité », c'est à dire les idées, *logoi* et mystères qui font du Verbe un monde intelligible. C'est dans son incessante contemplation du Père que le Fils reçoit constamment l'existence et la divinité, l'empreinte de toute la réalité paternelle. Le Fils est pensé par le Père et il pense le Père, et cet échange de pensées détruit la solitude de la *νόησις νοήσεως* d'Aristote. Enfin — et ce sont là les modes les plus courants suivant lesquels Origène représente la génération du Fils — il est le rayonnement qui sort de la lumière, dans un acte à la fois éternel et continu, et la manifeste ainsi au dehors; il est enfin la volonté émise par l'intelligence pour accomplir ses œuvres *ad extra* et cette conception volon-



tariste de l'image, suivant laquelle Origène pense les titres donnés à la Sagesse en Sap. VII 25—26, équilibre la conception contemplative. Image de la bonté de Dieu et fils de son amour, le Verbe manifeste par son Incarnation et sa Passion l'immense amour de Dieu pour les hommes. L'activité et l'amour ne sont pas pour Origène un état inférieur qu'il oppose à la connaissance. Ne définit-il pas à plusieurs reprises la connaissance par cette phrase de la Genèse: «Adam connut Eve»? La connaissance et l'amour sont joints par lui dans une unité indissoluble et le Fils est image parce qu'il révèle non seulement la nature de Dieu mais aussi sa bonté.

La question de la consubstantialité entre le modèle et l'image, entre le Fils et le Père, n'est pas commode à résoudre parce que le mot *οὐσία* n'a pas un sens précis: dans plusieurs textes de l'*In Joannem* l'*οὐσία* désigne en effet ce que l'on appellera plus tard l'*ἐνότητος* et Origène affirme l'altérité d'*οὐσία* pour rejeter l'opinion des modalistes qui faisaient du Père, du Fils et de l'Esprit, non trois personnes, mais trois modes ou aspects d'un même Dieu. Mais un grand nombre d'expressions équivalentes nous assurent qu'Origène a tenu le consubstantiel. Les cinq essais de spéculation sur la génération du Fils, le refus de la comparer à une génération humaine parce que cette dernière suppose une division de la substance paternelle, l'affirmation qu'il n'y a entre les deux Personnes qu'une seule volonté, une seule bonté, un seul amour, une seule lumière, supposent que le Fils ne quitte pas la substance du Père. Mais la représentation qu'Origène se fait du consubstantiel, représentation qu'on trouvera constamment chez les Grecs même après Nicée, n'est pas la même que celle des théologiens latins. Ces derniers en effet, de mentalité plus analytique, distinguent la question de l'origine de celle de la nature et parlent d'une nature divine qui est la propriété commune des trois: tel est déjà l'esprit du symbole *Quicumque* qui est d'origine latine en dépit de son attribution erronée à Saint Athanase. Les Grecs au contraire — à commencer par le symbole du concile de Nicée — ne distinguent pas les deux questions et montrent par conséquent le Fils comme naissant de l'essence du Père, *ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ πατρὸς*: la

nature divine est donc le bien premier du Père, qui la communique au Fils et à l'Esprit dans l'acte même de leur génération ou procession. C'est ainsi qu'Origène peut représenter le Fils comme recevant constamment sa divinité de sa contemplation du Père ou affirmer qu'il est continuellement nourri par le Père.

Cette hiérarchie entre les trois Personnes reste légitime tant qu'elle traduit seulement la relation d'origine. Mais Origène n'a pas vu toujours très clairement la question et a souvent tendu à transformer cette hiérarchie d'origine en une hiérarchie de puissance. Il serait erroné cependant de faire de l'inégalité des Personnes que semblent impliquer certains textes une doctrine tenue expressément par l'Alexandrin, car d'autres textes penchent vers l'égalité. Il s'agit plutôt d'une insuffisance théologique, bien excusable à cette époque, incapable d'arriver à une solution satisfaisante entre les textes évangéliques qui témoignent de la supériorité du Père, et ceux qui professent l'égalité et même l'unité des deux Personnes. L'influence du Logos philonien et celle de la deuxième hypostase du Moyen Platonisme, très inférieure à la première, a certainement aidé cette tendance et de même l'attribution de la fonction médiatrice au Logos dans sa divinité seule : puisqu'il prépare les hommes à la connaissance de Dieu, il risque d'en devenir une copie diminuée.

Nous avons vu que si le Christ est seul Image de Dieu l'homme est dit constamment « selon-l'image » : il ne possède qu'une participation à cette Image de Dieu qu'est le Christ. Origène interprète à la suite de Philon, mais dans un sens différent, les deux récits de la création de l'homme suivant la Genèse de deux créations séparées. La première, la seule qui se soit produite selon l'image, concerne les intelligences, les *νοεῖς*, dans la pré-existence : mais après la faute originelle, conçue à la manière de l'Alexandrin, Dieu a façonné le corps terrestre — et c'est là la seconde création — comme l'établissement de correction où l'intelligence pécheresse pourra se racheter. On peut donc en déduire que des trois éléments qui constituent l'être humain, le *πνεῦμα*, la *ψυχή*, le *σῶμα*, l'image ne se trouve ni dans l'esprit, entraîneur de l'âme, don divin qui ne fait pas partie à proprement parler de la personnalité, ni dans le corps, façonné dans la seconde

création; il ne concerne même pas l'âme dans son ensemble, car son union au corps l'a contaminée, la doublant d'une partie inférieure, principe des imaginations et des passions, presque identifiée à la concupiscence. Le lieu du selon-l'image est seulement la partie supérieure de l'âme, identique à l'intelligence préexistante, appelée *νοῦς*, *λόγος* ou *ἡγεμονικόν*, organe de la contemplation mystique et de la vertu. Participation à l'existence de Dieu et à sa divinité, participation à la filiation du Fils, à ses multiples dénominations (*ἐπίνουαι*) comme Sagesse, Vie, Vérité, Lumière, surtout comme Logos, le selon-l'image a un contenu beaucoup plus surnaturel que naturel. Même la participation à l'existence de Dieu est entendue la plupart du temps dans ce sens, car le mal n'existe pas à proprement parler, seul existe vraiment celui qui n'a pas rejeté sa participation à Celui qui est. Cette signification surnaturelle est encore plus nette pour la qualité de *logikos*, participation au Logos, qui n'insiste guère sur la possession d'une raison naturelle, mais recouvre, comme le selon-l'image, ce que les théologiens postérieurs appelleront grâce sanctifiante. Si tout homme est *logikos* dès l'origine, il progresse ou régresse dans cette qualité selon ses actes de vertu ou ses péchés: seul le saint est vraiment *logikos*, les démons et damnés s'assimilent, par un acte de liberté, aux animaux *ἄλογα* et il faudrait peut-être réviser, en tenant compte de ces données, les critiques faites à l'apocatastase origénienne. En tout cas cette participation à Dieu et à son Verbe ne saurait être ramenée, en dépit des accusations de Saint Jérôme, à une véritable consubstantialité panthéiste avec Dieu, qu'Origène rejette expressément.

Le péché est venu troubler cette participation originelle à l'image de Dieu, donnée à l'homme plus comme une divinisation potentielle et inchoative que comme une divinisation actuelle et complète. Origène représente le trouble apporté par le péché comme la superposition d'images adverses qui viennent cacher le selon-l'image. C'est l'image du Terrestre, selon I Cor. XV 49, Terrestre qui n'est pas Adam mais le diable, et cette image est opposée à celle du Céleste qui est le Christ: nous avons été créés avec l'image du Céleste, mais le péché originel et les

péchés actuels lui ont substitué celle du Terrestre, le Christ par sa Rédemption vient restaurer la première image. Il est aussi question directement d'image et de filiation de Satan, acquise par le péché, et dans plusieurs commentaires de l'épisode du tribut à César et de celui du statère trouvé dans la bouche du poisson l'image de César qui orne la monnaie est interprétée comme l'image du diable: exégèse conforme au thème des anges et des démons qui gouvernent les nations et qui en dit long sur les sentiments que pouvait éprouver un chrétien du III<sup>e</sup> siècle à l'égard du pouvoir impérial. Enfin les péchés impriment sur nous des images de bêtes, différentes suivant la nature de la faute ou du vice: images bestiales qui se confondent avec les images démoniaques comme le montrent de nombreux textes assimilant démons et animaux. Si ces derniers en effet sont des *ἄλογα* par leur origine, les premiers le sont devenus par un acte libre de leur volonté. Ce thème des images bestiales, qui reste purement moral et symbolique, est une adaptation chrétienne de la métempsychose platonicienne et cela explique peut-être l'accusation portée par Saint Jérôme et par Justinien sur ce point: accusation irrecevable, puisqu'une dizaine au moins de textes clairs, placés dans les œuvres les moins discutables d'Origène, condamnent la métempsychose, la traitant de stupidité, et la déclarant contraire à l'enseignement de l'Eglise. Ces diverses images diaboliques ou bestiales n'effacent pas à proprement parler le selon-l'image: il subsiste par en-dessous, comme l'eau dans les puits d'Abraham que les Philistins ont comblés, et seul le Christ, notre Isaac, a le pouvoir de nettoyer les puits de notre âme des immondices que les ennemis y ont jetés. Il est en effet l'unique Rédempteur, le seul qui puisse guérir le libre arbitre de l'esclavage où le péché l'a placé, pour qu'écartant les images adverses l'homme puisse dégager sa participation à l'image de Dieu: cette libération du péché se fait par la conformation de l'homme dès cette terre à la mort et à la résurrection du Christ.

Mais puisque le selon-l'image n'est qu'un début et une puissance de divinisation, il nous faut le faire progresser jusqu'à la divinisation en acte qui est la ressemblance. Ce concept

d'origine hellénique, Origène croit le lire en Gen. I 26: si Dieu a associé la ressemblance à l'image dans l'énoncé de son projet au verset 26, l'Écriture n'en parle plus au verset 27 qui montre le projet réalisé; c'est que, si l'image est donnée dès le début, la ressemblance est réservée pour la fin des temps. Origène exprime la même distinction dans l'*In Joannem* par les termes de semence de Dieu et de fils de Dieu: nous naissons avec la semence de Dieu, il nous faut la cultiver pour devenir ses fils, mais cette filiation ne sera complète que dans le monde des ressuscités. Certains thèmes se rapportant au progrès spirituel, de l'image à la ressemblance, sont à mettre en relation avec ceux que nous étudions: l'imitation de Dieu et de son Verbe, la formation du chrétien par le Verbe et du Verbe dans le chrétien, la conception très mystique qu'Origène se fait de la vertu comme une participation à l'essence même du Christ qui est par lui-même chaque vertu, le mimétisme spirituel qui transforme selon II Cor. III 18 le contemplateur en l'image glorieuse du Seigneur, enfin l'action de l'Esprit Saint comme « la puissance qui mène à maturité la semence », comme l'agent qui fait croître le selon-l'image en ressemblance parfaite. L'étude de ces divers thèmes, comme celle de l'image de Dieu dans son ensemble, montre qu'Origène échappe, malgré certains textes que nous trouvons maladroits parce que nous leur demandons ce qu'ils ne signifient pas, à toute accusation de pélagianisme et de semi-pélagianisme: Dieu, son Verbe et son Esprit ont partout l'initiative.

La ressemblance ne sera donc parfaite que par delà la mort dans le monde de la résurrection. Notre résurrection se fera sur le modèle de celle du Christ: nous serons alors parfaitement conformés à sa mort et à sa résurrection, et non plus comme en ce bas monde, « à travers un miroir, en énigme ». Nous vivrons désormais par delà les images et les ombres dans le royaume des vraies réalités. Nous deviendrons conformes au corps glorieux du Christ, à son âme image du Verbe, au Verbe lui-même et à travers lui à Dieu: nous serons des dieux, participant à la connaissance et aux vertus des Personnes divines, ainsi qu'à leur bonheur. Nous contemplerons Dieu face à face, comme le

Fils lui-même le contemple: ce n'est pas que la médiation du Fils soit alors un stade dépassé, car les hommes n'obtiennent la qualité de fils qui permet une telle contemplation que par l'action du Dieu Fils Unique et par leur union éternelle avec lui. Toute âme unie au Logos, Dieu sera tout en tous: mais cette affirmation, d'après les textes d'Origène, n'est pas à prendre dans un sens panthéistique.

Puisque la participation de l'homme à l'image de Dieu constitue « sa principale substance », c'est à dire l'essentiel même de son être, la nature terrestre qu'il a assumée à la suite du péché n'est que du surajouté. C'est affirmer l'étroite dépendance de l'homme à l'égard de Dieu: l'homme est un être excentré, il a son centre en Dieu, et il ne continue d'exister vraiment, au sens surnaturel qu'Origène donne à ce mot, que dans la mesure où il ne refuse pas cette participation. On peut voir par ce bref exposé toute l'importance que revêt le thème de l'image de Dieu, aussi bien dans la christologie et la théologie trinitaire d'Origène, que dans sa doctrine spirituelle.

## Absolution and Satisfaction in St. Cyprian's Theology of Penance

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Penitential reconciliation was, for St. Cyprian and his colleagues, as it had been for their predecessors, essentially an ecclesiastical rite. Cyprian, it is true, lays much stress upon the necessity of due penance and condign satisfaction on the part of the sinner. Yet the neglect of penance was only one of the factors which could render reconciliation invalid. More important still, in Cyprian's eyes, was the neglect of the Church's discipline of reconciliation and of the Bishop's supreme authority over the administration of Penance. With scarcely any exception, every passage in which Cyprian stresses the need for true penance on the part of the sinner, emphasises equally the need for the intervention of ecclesiastical authority<sup>1</sup>. This alone could reward the sinner's efforts and bestow the fruit of penance by restoring to him the Church's peace. Important though the sinner's own penitential works were, it was not primarily to them that Cyprian ascribed the efficacy to remit sin, but to the Church's peace which followed them. The sinner's satisfactions had efficacy only when completed by the absolution of the Bishop<sup>2</sup>. St. Cyprian's conviction that the satisfactions of the penitent are of themselves incapable of obtaining Divine forgiveness, is evident above all in his insistence that when satisfaction has been performed the Church's reconciliation must be granted, lest the penitents' efforts be frustrated and deprived of their effect<sup>3</sup>. The granting of reconciliation is com-

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<sup>1</sup> Vide Ep. 15. 1; 16. 2; 17. 2; 25; 33. 2; 34. 1, 3; 43. 3; 55. 28—9; 56. 2; De Laps. 15, 16, 21, 29, 35, 36.

<sup>2</sup> Ep. 43. 3; 55. 29; De Laps. 29.

<sup>3</sup> Ep. 55. 28; cf. 68. 5.

manded by God's Mercy. The pardon which ecclesiastical reconciliation effects is equated with the Divine pardon promised in the Scriptures<sup>1</sup>.

Sinners who performed penance, but were allowed to die without the Church's peace, were regarded as being in peril of their salvation<sup>2</sup>. On the other hand, sinners who received the Church's peace from proper authority before the completion of their penance, were considered to have their sins remitted<sup>3</sup>. St. Cyprian and his colleagues admitted various reasons for shortening the period of penance which would normally be deemed necessary for the guilt incurred. In any event, danger of death was always regarded as a sufficient reason for granting reconciliation even when the period of penance was not completed, and the reconciliation so granted was valid even if the danger of death were only apparent, and the penitent recovered health<sup>4</sup>. Good dispositions and manifestly sincere sorrow on the part of the penitent were also legitimate causes for lessening the period of penance which would otherwise be enjoined<sup>5</sup>. It is therefore clear, that the performance of works of penance was only a part, and indeed a subordinate part, of the penitential process which effected remission of sins. The remission of guilt, the cleansing of the conscience, the rendering of the sinner worthy to receive the Eucharist, were regarded as the effect of the whole penitential process, including the satisfactions of the penitent and the absolution of the Church. But the chief element in this process, the only element which could not be dispensed from, the element without which the penitents' acts were unavailing, was the Church's absolution, imparted through episcopal imposition of hands. Although it was the whole penitential process which secured remission, it was to

<sup>1</sup> Ep. 55. 27 and 29.

<sup>2</sup> Ep. 66. 5; 68. 1; 72. 2.

<sup>3</sup> Ep. 64. 1; cf. Ep. 55. 13. Note the reconciliation after a very brief penance, of some apostates who had redeemed their lapse by suffering exile for the faith.

<sup>4</sup> Ep. 55. 13.

<sup>5</sup> Ep. 56. 1—2.



ecclesiastical reconciliation performed by the Church's ministers, that remissive efficacy was chiefly attached<sup>1</sup>.

Reconciliation was effected by the ceremony of 'imposition of hands in penance', which was performed by the Bishop accompanied by the Clergy, in the presence of the assembled Christian Community<sup>2</sup>. Though the Bishop and Clergy are so frequently associated with one another in connection with Penance, it is clear that the ordinary minister of reconciliation was the Bishop<sup>3</sup>. His supreme authority over the administration of Penance is strongly emphasised<sup>4</sup>; and tradition is invoked in favour of this authority<sup>5</sup>. There are undoubted anticipations in Cyprian of the idea of episcopal jurisdiction as applied to Penance. Presbyters are reprehended for reconciling sinners without consulting the Bishop and against his instructions; and it is chiefly their disregard of episcopal authority which is held to render the premature reconciliation granted by them null and void<sup>6</sup>. It is not the fact that this reconciliation is premature which properly causes invalidity, since reconciliation granted prematurely by a Bishop is held to be valid<sup>7</sup>. It was felt that whereas a Bishop acted in his own right and with proper authority in regard to penance, presbyters were subordinate to the Bishop and must act in obedience to his penitential authority. Presbyters could, however, grant reconciliation with

<sup>1</sup> Vide Ep. 16. 2; 17. 2; 18. 1; 19. 2; 20. 3; De Laps. 16.

<sup>2</sup> Ep. 15. 1; 16. 2; 17. 2.

<sup>3</sup> It is to be noted that *'Sacerdos'* (so often mentioned by Cyprian in connection with Penance) invariably means Bishop. *Sacerdos* is identical with *Antistes* in Ep. 59. 18 and De Laps. 22. The same equation is clear from Ep. 3. 1; 15. 1; 16. 1; 20. 2; 38. 2; 43. 2; 55. 7—8; 59. 5, 13, 16; 64. 1; De Laps. 18, 29, 36.

<sup>4</sup> Ep. 17. 2; 19. 1; 34. 1, 2; 43. 3; 65. 5; De Laps. 18, 29, 36; Ep. 30. 6, 7; 31. 6; 36. 3.

<sup>5</sup> Ep. 16. 1.

<sup>6</sup> Ep. 16. 1, *cum contumelia et contemptu praepositi totum sibi vindicant*; cf. *ibid.* 3; Ep. 15. 1; 17. 2; 43. 3; 59. 13, 16; De Laps. 15. 33.

<sup>7</sup> Ep. 64. 1. This is a synodical letter from 66 African Bishops, who dealt, *inter alia*, with a question of premature reconciliation granted, in violation of the Conciliar Decrees, by a Bishop Therapius. The Bishop's act is held to be unlawful, yet the reconciliation is upheld as valid and therefore (since it admitted the penitent to worthy reception of the Eucharist) effective of a true remission of sins.

the approval of the Bishop. As we have just seen, the presbyteral college normally joined with the Bishop in performing the ceremony of reconciliation. The laity were also interested in the reconciliation of penitents. Though they had no kind of authority over Penance, the Bishop had to reckon with the lay reactions to his penitential judgements, and had always, in reconciling sinners, to provide against the danger of scandalising the faithful<sup>1</sup>.

The granting of reconciliation was preeminently an exercise of judicial authority. We have already seen that the imposition of penance was determined by a careful examination made by the Bishop or authorized presbyter into the sinner's guilt and dispositions. This examination took account of different species and degrees of guilt, of circumstances that could attenuate the gravity of the sin committed, of the spiritual and temporal needs of the sinner. On the basis of this examination a just penance was imposed, which would be adequate to the guilt and proportionate to the capacities of the penitent. It was, however, left to the discretion of the Bishop to reduce this penance and even to dispense from it entirely in consideration of the penitent's needs and dispositions<sup>2</sup>. The penance was, as we have seen, concluded by a further examination of the penitent's dispositions, meant to reveal his fitness to be reconciled. The final reconciliation was an act of judgement restoring to the sinner what he had forfeited by the sentence of excommunication. The sentence of reconciliation did not restore the sinner to the Church alone; it was not merely an act of ecclesiastical jurisdiction. It was an act of Divine Judgement<sup>3</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Vide Ep. 17. 1; 19. 2; 30. 5; 64. 1.

<sup>2</sup> Public Penance was regularly dispensed from in the case of sinners (even lapsi and other grave sinners) who had become schismatics and later returned to Catholic Unity (Ep. 59. 18 et al.). It was probably, in whole or in great part, dispensed from in the case of many of the libellatics, who were promised reconciliation on easy terms by the First Council and were reconciled soon after it. The possession of letters from the martyrs probably supplied almost entirely for Public Penance in the case of many who were reconciled on their deathbed in the early days of persecution. (Epp. 18, 19, 20.)

<sup>3</sup> Ep. 66. 9.

It proceeded from a judge who acted in the place of God and exercised authority given by God<sup>1</sup>. As we shall later see more clearly, it effected remission of sins in the sight of God. We have thus, in the Church's Penance, all the features of a judicial process terminated by a judicial sentence<sup>2</sup>.

The judicial aspect of Penance is more prominent in Cyprian than it had been in Tertullian, and is indeed the aspect most emphasised by Cyprian. Yet it is recognised that the ecclesiastical judges who preside over Penance are subordinate judges, and that their sentence cannot prejudice the sentence of God, the Supreme Judge of sin and sinners<sup>3</sup>. The subordinate nature of their authority and the limitations of their judgement are frequently expressed by Cyprian in formulae which represent the Church's part in Penance as an impetration offered to God to secure the sinner's pardon. The judicial aspect of Penance is balanced in Cyprian by its intercessory aspect. It is this which permits the intervention of the Martyrs in Penance; for their special favour with God made the prayers offered by them for sinners of special efficacy in His sight<sup>4</sup>. The impetratory character of penance makes more imperative the need for patience and humility on the part of penitents, since the Church's prayer for them would be more efficacious if their dispositions were worthy of the favour for which she prayed<sup>5</sup>. In deference to this idea, Cyprian represents the Bishop's duty towards his

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<sup>1</sup> Ep. 59. 5. The Bishop is *iudex vice Christi*; cf. Ep. 66. 3. For the Divine Authority of his judgement. vd. Ep. 59. 1, 13, 14, 15; 55. 22; 61. 8; 66. 1, 2; 68. 1; De Laps. 25.

<sup>2</sup> Judicial Language is habitually applied to the penitential process culminating in reconciliation. Note the use of the terms *iudicium* (Ep. 52. 3; 59. 14; 36. 1); *cognitio* (Ep. 34. 4; 52. 3; 66. 5); *iudicare* (Ep. 17. 1; 18. 1; 19. 2; 59. 14); *audire, examinare* etc. (Ep. 26; 27. 2; 41. 2; 59. 16; 66. 5; cf. 30. 5; 49. 1—2); *causam dicere* (of penitent) (Ep. 34. 3); Bishop as *iudex* (Ep. 59. 5; 66. 3).

<sup>3</sup> Ep. 55. 18; De Laps. 17, 18, 19, 36. Cf. Ep. 8. 1; 30. 8; 49. 2.

<sup>4</sup> Ep. 15. 3; 21. 2, 3; 37. 4; De Laps. 17, 18, 36.

<sup>5</sup> Ep. 36. 3; cf. Ep. 30. 6, 7 (Both from Roman Clergy); cf. Cyprian, Ep. 55. 13, 18; De Laps. 32.

penitents as in great measure a duty of prayer for them<sup>1</sup>. But Cyprian, like his predecessors, regards this prayer as having efficacy through the prayer of Christ. As the African Catholics of an earlier generation had done in their controversy with Tertullian and the Montanists<sup>2</sup>, Cyprian looks to the Prayer of Christ, the Advocate of sinners before the Father, for justification and guarantee of the absolution granted by Bishops. This conception of Penance as attaining its efficacy through intercession helps us to understand some of the difficulties experienced by Cyprian in reconciling the Judgement of the Church with the supreme independence of the Judgement of God.

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<sup>1</sup> Ep. 55. 18, *petant (schismatici) fundi pro se preces atque orationes antistitis*; Cf. Ep. 34. 1; 43. 6; 68. 4; De Laps. 18, 19, 22, 32. Compare Pacian Ep. I 7; Ambrose De Poenit. I 16 (414); II 10 (436—7).

<sup>2</sup> See The Sacrament of Penance in Tertullian-IV, by C. B. Daly, in the Irish Ecclesiastical Record, Series V, vol. LXX (Sept. 1948) pp. 842—3.

## La Christologie d'Apollinaire de Laodicée

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G. L. Prestige in memoriam

Il y a sept ans, dans un article de *Dominican Studies*, j'avais essayé de montrer que la christologie apollinariste était fonction directe d'un système original qui ne saurait s'identifier sans autre, même en sa seule substance, avec la christologie dite « alexandrine »<sup>1</sup>. Une étude attentive des textes d'Apollinaire me paraissait en effet indiquer que son système ne vise pas tant à établir l'unité de personne du Christ qu'à exprimer en une définition de son humanité les données du Mystère de l'Incarnation.

Les données que j'ai l'honneur de présenter ici développent et amplifient celles que j'avais exposées alors. Elles constituent le résultat partiel de recherches conduites sous la direction de mon vénéré maître, G. L. Prestige, dans le cadre d'un travail d'ensemble sur l'apollinarisme. Si elles peuvent prétendre à quelque originalité, ceci serait dû au fait que ces recherches ont utilisé l'ensemble du matériel exégétique qui nous reste d'Apollinaire, en plus des œuvres recueillies par Lietzmann. M'étant expliqué au Congrès de 1951 sur les enquêtes relatives à l'établissement du texte des fragments exégétiques d'Apollinaire, jeme contenterai de dire ici que le plus grand soin a été donné pour en établir une présentation critique et s'assurer de son authenticité<sup>2</sup>.

Les textes d'Apollinaire sont cités d'après l'édition de Hans Lietzmann, *Apollinaris von Laodicea und seine Schule, Texte und Untersuchungen*, Tübingen, Mohr, 1904. Pour les textes exégétiques encore inédits, je donnerai la cote et le folio du manuscrit dont je le tire. J'espère être en mesure de donner sous peu l'édition du Commentaire sur les Psaumes et une introduction générale, déjà présentée au Congrès de 1951, sur l'ensemble du matériel exégétique. La substance de cette introduction paraît dans le numéro de juillet des *Recherches de Science Religieuse*.

<sup>1</sup> Henri de Riedmatten, *Some neglected aspects of Apollinarist Christology*, *Dominican Studies*, I, 1948, pp. 239—260.

<sup>2</sup> La doctrine trinitaire d'Apollinaire n'éclaire qu'indirectement sa christologie; j'aurai l'occasion d'y revenir sous peu à l'occasion de la publication du texte critique de la correspondance Basile/Apollinaire dans un prochain numéro du *Journal of Theological Studies*.

## I

Les ouvrages publiés par Lietzmann se laissent classer *grosso modo* en deux sections, selon que l'anthropologie qui y est professée, apparaît « dichotomite » ou « trichotomite »<sup>1</sup>. Rufin rapporte expressément qu'Apollinaire aurait, en fait, passé d'une anthropologie dichotomite *ψυχή/σάρξ* à un schéma trichotomite *νοῦς / ψυχή / σάρξ*, pour parer à l'objection de textes scripturaires mentionnant expressément l'âme du Christ<sup>2</sup>.

Les œuvres d'apparence trichotomite utilisent une série d'arguments bien attestés par les contemporains d'Apollinaire<sup>3</sup>. Achevez l'humanité du Christ par un *νοῦς* humain, et vous aurez deux « parfaits », dit Apollinaire ; si l'un est fils par nature, l'autre ne l'est que par adoption<sup>4</sup>. Cet homme, en définitive, sera non pas Dieu, mais un saint, uni à Dieu par illumination. S'il faut appeler Dieu le bénéficiaire d'une telle union, « il y aurait beaucoup de dieux, car nombreux sont ceux qui reçoivent Dieu »<sup>5</sup>. Un fragment exégétique décrit à propos des Apôtres cette réception de l'Esprit divin par « énergie » :

« Ainsi les Apôtres ayant, de par l'insufflation du Seigneur, l'Esprit vivifiant, accueillent l'Esprit Principal, l'Esprit envoyé du Ciel ; non qu'il y ait Esprit sur esprit, autre plus autre, mais une autre « énergie » dans l'esprit lui-même . . . »<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Du côté dichotomite : A Jovien, De Unione, De Fide et Incarnatione, Première Lettre à Denys, les fragments de la polémique contre Diodore ; du côté trichotomite : Lettre aux Evêques de Diocésarée, Anacephalaïosis, *Katà Mégros Illois*, Apodeixis, A Julien, Tome Synodal.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Rufin, Histoire Ecclésiastique, XI, 20, ed. Mommsen, p. 1024 l. 8—14 ; une allusion aussi dans Epiphane, Panarion, LXXVII, 23, ed. Holl, p. 436 l. 23—24.

<sup>3</sup> Au sujet de ceux-ci, cf. mon article, Sur les notions doctrinales opposées à Apollinaire, Revue Thomiste LI (1951) pp. 553—572.

<sup>4</sup> Apodeixis, fr. 81, p. 224.

<sup>5</sup> Apodeixis, fr. 83, p. 224 ; cf. fr. 70, p. 220.

<sup>6</sup> *Ὅτι καὶ οἱ Ἀπόστολοι πνεῦμα ζωοποιῶν ἔχοντες ἀπὸ τῆς ἐμφυσήσεως τοῦ κυρίου, πνεῦμα κομίζονται τὸ ἀρχικὸν τὸ ἐξ οὐρανοῦ καταπεμπόμενον· οὐ πνεῦμα ἐπὶ πνεύματι, ἕτερον ἐφ' ἑτέρῳ, ἀλλ' ἐνέργειαν ἑτέραν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ πνεύματι . . .* Ce texte revient à deux reprises dans la Chaîne sur le Pentateuque, In Num. XXVII, 18, Cod. Lambeth 1214, fol. 177 ro., Paris. gr. 128, pp. 434—435 ; In Deut. III, 28, Lambeth, fol. 206 ro., Paris., p. 456, et aussi cette fois, Coislin gr. 113, fol. 399 vo. Nicéphore le donne dans sa Chaîne aux col. 1364 et 1438.

Un seul moyen d'échapper à cette alternative: faire du Verbe lui-même un *νοῦς ἐνσαρκος*; le Christ répondra alors à la définition scripturaire de l'homme, *νοῦς ἐν σαρκί*<sup>1</sup>. L'Apôtre n'oppose-t-il pas le premier homme « psychique » et l'homme « pneumatique », le « premier homme de la terre » et le « second homme du Ciel »? On ne saurait mieux rendre compte de la différence qu'en substituant chez le nouvel Adam, Dieu au *νοῦς* humain: *τὸ δὴ πνεῦμα τοῦτέστι τὸν νοῦν θεὸν ἔχων ὁ Χριστὸς μετὰ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος εἰκότως « ἄνθρωπος ἐξ οὐρανοῦ » λέγεται*<sup>2</sup>.

La présence de deux esprits dans le Christ provoquerait au reste une distension de la personnalité; distension d'autant plus intolérable que la volonté divine est impeccable et immuable, tandis que la volonté humaine étant par nature versatile, le péché ne saurait *a priori* être exclu de ses possibilités<sup>3</sup>. Ceci d'autant moins que le péché originel a déclenché un tel déséquilibre chez l'homme que son esprit ne se soustraira plus aux assauts de la chair avec une perfection exempte de tout élément peccamineux<sup>4</sup>.

Les fragments exégétiques nous apprennent que ces données sur la liberté humaine et ses avatars, Apollinaire les avait soigneusement élaborées. Son Commentaire sur l'Épître aux Romains dont il reste un nombre respectable de fragments, nous le montre tout au long d'une exégèse perspicace, soucieux de maintenir les droits et l'office du libre arbitre, sans pour autant amoindrir la part de la grâce divine. Il le dit d'une phrase, en commentant Rom. VII, 7, « Dieu qui opère en nous l'agir et le vouloir »: *οὐχὶ τὸ ἀντεξοφύσιον ἡμῶν περικόπτων, ἀλλὰ τὴν παρὰ θεοῦ δύναμιν εἰς ἀρετὴν ἐξηγούμενος*<sup>5</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Apodeixis, ffr. 71 et 72, p. 221.

<sup>2</sup> Apodeixis, fr. 25, p. 210; cf. ffr. 16—19, p. 209; ffr. 26—29, p. 211.

<sup>3</sup> A Julien, ffr. 150—151, pp. 247—248.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. le texte cité inf. à p. 213 n. 1.

<sup>5</sup> In Rom. VII, 7, ed. Staab, Pauluskommentare aus der Griechischen Kirche, Münster, Aschendorff, 1933, p. 64 l. 22—23; tout le commentaire de ce verset est important, *ibid.*, pp. 63—65; voir aussi à propos de l'endurcissement du cœur du Pharaon, *ibid.*, pp. 67—68.

Aussi bien le mal ne naît-il que de notre choix, car c'est le choix qui fait l'acte<sup>1</sup>. Mais une fois le mal posé, celui-ci entraîne la volonté et impose sa contrainte. Alors que le bien ne règne que par le seul appel à l'inclination de la volonté, le mal soumet cette dernière à un régime de violence :

« Ceux qui ne veulent pas de plein gré se soumettre au bien, sont guidés par la violence, et non à l'obéissance ; le règne du bien en effet ne s'exerce pas selon la nécessité mais selon l'inclination. Qui ne se laisse pas guider ainsi vers la jouissance du bien, est guidé par la violence comme par la bride vers le mal et les passions. »<sup>2</sup>

Pareille violence, l'homme seul est responsable de l'avoir déchaînée ; de l'extérieur rien ne pouvait attenter à l'autonomie de son esprit<sup>3</sup>. Dieu, l'ayant remis à sa propre décision, ne lui fera jamais violence :

« Pour moi, ayant une fois voulu que l'homme soit de nature libre et l'ayant fait maître de sa décision, je ne saurais le rendre ensuite esclave d'autres : que si lui-même s'y veut asservir, alors il aura à le subir. »<sup>4</sup>

En assurant *a priori* l'impeccabilité d'un *νοῦς* humain du Christ, Dieu corromprait donc son ouvrage en immobilisant

<sup>1</sup> In Num., XXXV, 29—31 : κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν τὰ πράγματα κρινεῖσθαι δεῖ, ἐτέρας οὐδης τῆς πράξεως, ὅταν καθ' ἐτέραν προαίρεσιν γένηται. Cod. Lambeth 1214, fol. 194 ro. (dans Nicéphore, col. 1411).

<sup>2</sup> Τὰ ἐκουσίως ὑπακούειν τῷ ἀγαθῷ μὴ ἐθέλοντα βία ἀγεται, οὐ πρὸς ὑπακοήν· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ βασιλεία πρὸς ἀνάγκην ἀλλὰ κατὰ πόθον. τὰ δὲ μὴ οὕτως ὑποταττόμενα πρὸς ἀπόλαυσιν ἀγαθῶν, βία καθάπερ ὑπὸ χαλινῷ πρὸς κακὰ καὶ κολάσεις ἀγεται. In Ezech., XXIX, 4, Cod. Ottob. gr. 452, fol. 219 vo., Chigi gr. 45, fol. 409 ro., Paris. gr. 159, fol. 293 ro., Coislin gr. 17, fol. 191 ro. Mai n'a pas édité ce fragment.

<sup>3</sup> In Num. XXV, 2 : οὐδὲν ἐξωθεν ἰσχύει κατὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, εἰ μὴ παρ' αὐτῶν μορφωθῇ τὸ βλάβος, ἐκουσίως ὑπαχθέντων εἰς τὸ κακὸν καὶ διὰ ἡδονῆς ἐλευσθέντων. Cod. Lambeth 1214, fol. 170 vo., Paris. gr. 128, p. 429 (dans Nicéphore, col. 1349).

<sup>4</sup> Ἐγὼ γὰρ ἐλευθέρας φύσεως ἄπαξ τὸν ἄνθρωπον βουλευθεὶς εἶναι καὶ αὐτεξούσιον αὐτὸν κατασκευάσας, οὐκ ἂν ποτε δοῦλον ἐτέρων ποιήσαιμι· εἰ δὲ δουλεύσειεν ποτέ τισιν θαντὸν καταδουλώσας, ταῦτ' ἂν πάθοι. In Is. L, 1, Cod. Ottob. gr. 452, fol. 123 vo., Chigi gr. 45, fol. 212 vo., Paris. gr. 159, fol. 205 ro., Paris. gr. 155, fol. 150 vo. (édité dans Mai, Nova Patrum Bibliotheca, VII, 2, pp. 129—130).



la liberté; mais le Créateur de la nature ne saurait la corrompre<sup>1</sup>! C'est la chair qui requiert direction d'autre qu'elle; l'unir à un esprit qui la guide, — esprit humain ou Dieu —, est parfaitement convenable puisqu'une telle union exclut au départ toute « violence ». La christologie d'Apollinaire reste parfaitement cohérente avec son anthropologie:

« Le genre humain ne sera donc pas sauvé par l'assomption du νοῦς et de l'homme « entier » mais par l'assomption de la chair à qui être guidé est naturel; besoin donc était d'un νοῦς immuable, ne lui cédant pas par défaut de science mais se l'adaptant sans violence. »<sup>2</sup>

Qu'est-ce que cet esclavage de la liberté dont il faut à tout prix préserver le Christ par l'attribution d'un νοῦς qui ne soit pas humain, pas versatile, pas enchaîné? Il s'agit du conflit entre la chair et l'esprit dont nous parle l'Écriture. Apollinaire s'est efforcé d'en serrer de près les notions<sup>3</sup>. Ce combat constitue un état permanent qui rend inconcevable une soumission parfaite de la chair à l'esprit<sup>4</sup>. Dans le texte cité à l'instant, on ramenait cette incapacité à un manque de « science »<sup>5</sup>. Un autre passage permet de mieux préciser la pensée d'Apollinaire; il figure au κατὰ μέρος πλῆσις selon le texte transmis par l'*Adversus fraudes Apollinistarum*<sup>6</sup>. On y oppose la condition peccamineuse de l'homme « entier » (νοῦς et chair) et celle du Christ. L'homme « entier » ne saurait être exempt de péché en cette vie parce qu'il est incapable d'amener ses propres « énergies » à coïncider avec les « énergies divines »; carence

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Apodeixis, fr. 87, p. 226.

<sup>2</sup> Οὐκ ἄρα σώζεται τὸ ἀνθρώπινον γένος δι' ἀναλήψεως νοῦ καὶ ὅλου ἀνθρώπου, ἀλλὰ διὰ προσλήψεως σαρκός, ἥ φυσικὸν μὲν τὸ ἡγεμονεύεσθαι· ἐδεῖτο δὲ ἀτρέπτου νοῦ μὴ ὑποκρίπτοντος αὐτῇ διὰ ἐπιστημοσύνης ἀσθένειαν, ἀλλὰ συναρμόζοντος αὐτῇ ἀβιάστως ἐαυτῷ. Apodeixis, fr. 76, p. 222. On notera la nuance entre ἀναλήψεως et προσλήψεως, l'homme entier ne serait qu'« élevé », la chair est « prise à soi », appropriée.

<sup>3</sup> Il y a au reste trouvé un argument en faveur de la trichotomie, cf. Apodeixis, fr. 22, p. 209.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Anacephalaiosis, 30, p. 246 l. 13—18.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. sup. n. 2.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. à ce propos ma Communication, Problèmes de la pseudépipgraphie apollinariste, à paraître prochainement. M. Richard a, le premier, signalé l'authenticité de cette version.

qui provient des affections (*παθήματα*) présentes de la *ψυχή* et de la chair :

« Et puisque selon les Ecritures, l'homme « entier » n'est pas pur de péché dans la vie présente, faute de pouvoir amener à coincidence ses propres énergies avec les énergies divines, et qu'à cause de cela il n'est pas libre de la mort, Dieu, s'étant uni à la chair humaine, retient pure sa propre énergie, étant un *νους* in-soumis aux affections psychiques et charnelles et guidant la chair en ses mouvements charnels d'une façon divine et impeccable . . . »<sup>1</sup>

C'est dans cette perspective qu'il faut entendre les termes « parfait » et « perfection » qu'Apollinaire applique à l'humanité du Christ, en signifiant à la fois perfection morale et perfection ontologique. Notre texte poursuit en effet :

« Vrai « un » Celui qui, « sans chair », est apparu dans la chair, parfait d'une perfection vraie et divine : ni deux *prosopa*, ni deux natures parfaites pour elles-mêmes. »<sup>2</sup>

La section des œuvres d'apparence dichotomite, argumente sur une ligne assez différente. Une série de termes techniques y tient une place prépondérante, celui de *φύσις* avant tout autre<sup>3</sup>. Commençons par la *Première Lettre à Denys*, tout entière consacrée à établir l'unicité de la *φύσις*. Apollinaire distingue soigneusement les tenants hérétiques d'un dualisme de type « samosatéen » et les partisans des deux *φύσεις*. Ces

<sup>1</sup> Ἐπειδήπερ ὁλος ἄνθρωπος οὐ καθαρὸς ἀμαρτίας ἐν τῇ παρούσῃ ζωῇ κατὰ τὰς γραφὰς διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι ταῖς θείαις ἐνεργείαις εἰς ταῦτόν ἄγειν τὰς ἑαυτοῦ καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὐδὲ ἐλεύθερος θανάτου, θεὸς δὲ σαρκὶ ἐνωθεὶς ἀνθρωπεῖα καθαρὰν ἔχει τὴν ἰδίαν ἐνέργειαν, νοῦς ἀήττητος ὢν τῶν ψυχικῶν καὶ σαρκικῶν παθημάτων καὶ ἄγων τὴν σάρκα καὶ τὰς σαρκικὰς κινήσεις θεϊκῶς τε καὶ ἀναμαρτήτως, καὶ οὐ μόνον ἀκράτητος θανάτῳ, ἀλλὰ καὶ λύων θάνατον. Κατὰ μέρος πλῆστις, recension longue, pp. 178 l. 10—p. 179 l. 4.

<sup>2</sup> Εἰς ἀληθινὸς ὁ ἄσαρκος ἐν σαρκὶ φανερωθεὶς, τέλειος τῇ ἀληθινῇ καὶ θεῷ τελειότητι· οὐ δύο πρόσωπα, οὐ δύο φύσεις τέλειαι καθ' ἑαυτάς. Ibid., p. 179 l. 5—6.

<sup>3</sup> Dans la section « trichotomite », je ne relève au κατὰ μέρος πλῆστις que deux emplois de *φύσις* référés à la christologie, p. 179 l. 6 et l. 14 ; à l'Apodeixis le terme revient cinq fois, fr. 32, p. 211 l. 27, fr. 81, p. 224 l. 15, fr. 87, p. 226 l. 5, fr. 102, p. 231 l. 10—11, et une fois *φυσικόν*, fr. 76, p. 222 l. 22, mais pas une seule fois dans une perspective définitivement christologique ; de même pour le seul emploi du terme au Tome Sydonal, p. 263 l. 12. Il en va différemment de A Julien et de l'Anacephalaïosis. Je reviendrai sur l'important fr. 107.

derniers sont des orthodoxes à qui manque le sens vrai de l'unité du Christ, si fortement affirmée en des textes comme Jo. I, 14 ou I Cor. VIII, 6<sup>1</sup>. Il y a une nature, continue Apollinaire, parce que ni le corps, ni la divinité prise selon l'Incarnation, ne constitue de «nature propre». On peut bien diviser un corps humain en parties qu'on appellerait «natures»; n'empêche qu'en fait et nonobstant la diversité de ses composantes, il n'est qu'une nature, *μία δὲ φύσις ἐστίν*<sup>2</sup>. Qui dit deux natures, s'ôte le droit de parler du Fils de l'Homme descendu du Ciel, du Fils de Dieu né de la Vierge. Tel n'est pas l'enseignement de l'Ecriture qui parle de ces choses *ὡς περὶ ἐνὸς κυρίου*<sup>3</sup>. Puisque c'est son usage de traiter le «tout» — *τὸ ὅλον* — de Dieu et de traiter le «tout» d'homme, faisons comme elle<sup>4</sup>! On n'y parviendra qu'en reconnaissant «l'un selon l'union» — *τὸ καθ' ἑνωσιν ἐν* —; comme l'homme n'est qu'une nature, ainsi en va-t-il du Christ fait dans la ressemblance des hommes<sup>5</sup>.

La conclusion du petit traité *De Unione* résume bien la portée de cette christologie:

«Celui qui reconnaît les propriétés et qui garde l'unité, ni n'errera sur la nature, ni n'ignorera l'unité.»<sup>6</sup>

«Reconnaître les propriétés!» le schéma anthropologique permet d'éviter les tendances gnosticisantes qui brouillent chair et divinité en une inextricable confusion. Les fragments du Traité *Contre Diodore* l'affirment sans relâche:

«Les qualités des mixtes ne disparaissent pas ...; mais si les natures des corps ne changent pas, combien moins celles de la divinité!»<sup>7</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Première Lettre à Denys, 1—2, pp. 256—257; et p. 259 l. 14—15: *μὴ οὐν τοῖς διατέμνουσι πρόφασιν διδόντων οἱ δύο λέγοντες φύσεις*; enfin pp. 261 l. 3—5 et l. 18 ssq.

<sup>2</sup> Première à Denys, 3, p. 257 l. 20—p. 258 l. 2.

<sup>3</sup> Première à Denys, 4, p. 258 l. 4—13.

<sup>4</sup> Première à Denys, 10, p. 260 l. 18—20.

<sup>5</sup> *Ὅσοις ἀνθρώπος μία φύσις, οὕτω καὶ ὁ ἐν ὁμοιώματι ἀνθρώπων γενόμενος Χριστός*. Première à Denys, 2, p. 257 l. 17—19; cf. 9, p. 259 l. 23 ssq.

<sup>6</sup> *Ὁ δὲ καὶ τὰ ἴδια γινώσκων καὶ τὴν ἑνωσιν φυλάσσων οὐτε τὴν φύσιν ψεύσεται οὐτε τὴν ἑνωσιν ἀγνοήσει*. De Unione, 17, p. 193 l. 1—2.

<sup>7</sup> Contre Diodore, fr. 127 de Lietzmann, selon le texte critique publié par moi-même dans Das Konzil von Chalkedon, I, Les Fragments d'Apollinaire à l'Eranistes, p. 208 ll. 10, 17—18.

On multiplierait aisément les références aux textes soulignant que l'unité du Christ n'affecte nullement l'immutabilité du Verbe ni la « nature » du corps. Rien pour autant qui affaiblisse la solidité de l'union, de l'*ἄκρα ἔνωσις*<sup>1</sup>. Divinité et chair se combinent entre elles pour constituer un tout dont Apollinaire n'hésite pas à écrire que l'une comme l'autre constituent les parties: *φύσεως μιᾶς ἐξ ἑκατέρου μέρους συνισταμένης*<sup>2</sup>.

L'interprétation qu'Apollinaire propose de la conception virginale, met pleinement au jour la nature de sa thèse et illustre ses méthodes théologiques. Il y a, dit-il, contradiction à admettre la conception virginale et à ne pas distinguer la « nature » du Christ de la « nature » de ceux qui « sont nés de l'homme et de la femme »<sup>3</sup>. Si le Christ n'est que temple de Dieu, la naissance de la Vierge était bien superflue<sup>4</sup>. Le *Traité De Unione* expose en détail cet argument basé tout entier sur le traducianisme. Ce n'est pas à un apôtre plus soucieux d'exposer clairement les vérités de la Foi que de soigner sa terminologie et ses images que nous avons à faire, mais bien à un théologien subtil et averti, prêt à manier l'argument philosophique et scientifique dans toute sa rigueur. Par un enchaînement de sentences évangéliques, Apollinaire arrive à conclure que le Christ lui-même ramène à la conception virginale le fond du Mystère de l'Incarnation<sup>5</sup>. Et Apollinaire d'explicitier avec autant de crudité

<sup>1</sup> Cf. fr. 140, p. 241 l. 9 ssq. Le terme s'y trouve deux fois, on le retrouve fr. 141, *ibid.*, l. 17; fr. 142, *ibid.*, l. 23; dans la Lettre de Timothée de Béryte à Homonius, fr. 181, p. 278 l. 9; et en équivalent *ἄκρως ἡνωμένην σάρκα* dans la Confession de Jobius, p. 287 l. 3. Je ne serais pas surpris que le terme ne vise directement l'expression d'Origène, *ἄκρα μετοχή*, *Contra Celsum*, ed. Koetschau, V, 39, T. II, p. 44 l. 1; VI, 47, *ibid.*, p. 119 l. 4—5; VII, 17, *ibid.*, p. 168 l. 27: J'aurai l'occasion de signaler encore une prise de position contre Origène.

<sup>2</sup> De Unione, 5, p. 187 l. 7—8.

<sup>3</sup> Contre Diodore, fr. 142, p. 241; pour l'interprétation de ce texte, cf. mon article, *Some Neglected Aspects . . .*, pp. 240—241.

<sup>4</sup> *Anacephalaïosis*, 22, p. 244 l. 19—21; cf. A Jovien, p. 251 l. 8 ssq. où les connections causales sont bien marquées par le *διὸ καὶ* du texte scripturaire (l. 11) et le *τοίνυν* (l. 12); De Fide et Incarnatione, p. 195 l. 14—15; *κατὰ μέρος πλῆστις*, p. 181, l. 1—2.

<sup>5</sup> De Unione, 12—13, p. 190 l. 12—p. 191 l. 4 avec la suite du raisonnement.

que d'esprit de suite, en utilisant à ses fins Jo. I, 13. La part de l'homme dans la génération assure l'infusion de l'esprit vital, de l'âme; le mode de la conception du Christ indique donc en suffisance que sa chair est vivifiée autrement que par une âme humaine:

« C'est de la volonté de la chair et de la volonté de l'homme que l'homme ordinaire est animé et vit, la matière « spermatique » qui est émise, charriant la vertu vivifiante dans la matrice qui la reçoit. Mais c'est de par la descente de l'Esprit et de par l'ombre de la Puissance que de la Vierge se fait le saint Enfanté; ce n'est pas la matière spermatique qui a opéré la vie divine, mais bien la Puissance spirituelle et divine qui a infusé à la Vierge la divine fécondation et procuré le divin enfantement. »<sup>1</sup>

On se demande en présence d'un texte aussi explicite comment cet aspect de la doctrine a été jusqu'ici méconnu par tous ceux qui ont traité de l'apollinarisme.

Toute la première partie du *De Unione* rejoint au reste la thèse de la *Première Lettre à Denys*. L'unité du Christ défend de distinguer ses propriétés en les référant les unes à la chair, les autres au Verbe. Cette unité de la nature du Christ qui exclut toute division, c'est l'unité sur le type de la nature humaine, l'unité « biologique » du Verbe et de la chair, donnée précisément du fait de la conception virginale:

οὕτω γὰρ ἐξῆσεν τὸ σῶμα θεότητος ἁγιασμῶ καὶ οὐκ ἀνθρωπίνης ψυχῆς κατασκευῇ<sup>2</sup>.

Que l'on compare la *Première Lettre à Denys*:

κοινωνεῖ γὰρ τὸ ἕτερον τῷ ἐτέρῳ τῆς ὀνομασίας κατὰ τὴν μίαν ζωὴν<sup>3</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Ἐκ θελήματος μὲν γὰρ σαρκὸς καὶ ἐκ θελήματος ἀνδρὸς ὁ κοινὸς ἀνθρώπος ψυχοῦται καὶ ζῇ, τῆς ἐκπεμπομένης σπερματικῆς ὕλης ἐπιφερούσης τὴν ζωοποιὸν δύναμιν εἰς τὴν ὑποδεχομένην μήτραν· ἐκ δὲ πνεύματος ἐφόδου καὶ δυνάμεως ἐπισκiasμοῦ τὸ ἅγιον ἐκ τῆς παρθένου συνίσταται βρέφος, οὐ σπερματικῆς ὕλης ἐργαζομένης τὴν θείαν ζωὴν, ἀλλὰ πνευματικῆς καὶ θεϊκῆς δυνάμεως ἐνδιδοῦσης τῇ παρθένῳ τὴν θείαν κύησιν καὶ χαριζομένης τὸν θεῖον τοκετόν. *De Unione*, 13, p. 191 l. 4—12.

<sup>2</sup> *De Unione*, 12, p. 190 l. 17—19.

<sup>3</sup> *Première Lettre à Denys*, 10, p. 261 l. 1—2.

Et au *De Fide et Incarnatione*:

ὁ εὐαγγελιστὴς μίαν ζωὴν τοῦ λόγου καὶ τῆς σαρκὸς εὐαγγελιζόμενος «ὁ λόγος» φησὶ «σὰρξ ἐγένετο.»<sup>1</sup>

Admis que le corps, en tant que tel, a la même « nature » que le corps des hommes, le *Libelle sur l'Incarnation* précise:

ἀλλὰ τὴν ζωὴν ἐκ θεοῦ καὶ τὴν δύναμιν ἐξ οὐρανοῦ καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν θείαν<sup>2</sup>.

Un fragment transmis par Justinien servira de conclusion à cette partie de l'enquête. Il en résume sans équivoque les résultats et il est d'autant plus précieux qu'il reprend, de façon concise, les aspects « biologiques » de la section dichotomite et les aspects « moraux » de la section trichotomite:

« La chair étant tout-à-fait mobile de par un autre (*ἐτεροκίνητος*), de par qui la meut et la guide (quel que soit celui-ci), et n'étant pas de soi un vivant achevé, mais ayant, pour devenir un vivant achevé, à se composer en unité à l'*ἡγεμονικόν*, la chair a concouru et s'est composée avec l'*ἡγεμονικόν* céleste, appropriée à lui selon sa passivité et prenant le divin qui lui est approprié selon l'énergie. Ainsi, en effet, un vivant unique s'est constitué, du mouvant et du mû; non pas deux ou de deux parfaits et moteurs pour eux, et en conséquence homme, un autre vivant que Dieu et pas Dieu mais serviteur de Dieu. Et même s'il s'agissait de quelque vertu céleste, les choses en vont ainsi; mais la chair devenue chair de Dieu est après cela un vivant, s'étant composée en une seule nature.»<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> De Fide et Incarnatione, 6, p. 198 l. 16—17.

<sup>2</sup> Fr. 6, p. 205, l. 26—27; cf. en outre, *Some Neglected Aspects* . . . , pp. 245—247.

<sup>3</sup> Ἡ σὰρξ ἐτεροκίνητος οὕσα πάντως ὑπὸ τοῦ κινουμένου καὶ ἄγοντος (οἰοῖόν ποτε ἂν εἴη τοῦτο) καὶ οὐκ ἐντελὲς οὕσα ζῶν ἀφ' ἑαυτῆς, ἀλλ' εἰς τὸ γενέσθαι ζῶν ἐντελὲς συνεθεμένη, πρὸς ἐπὶ τῇ ἡγεμονικῇ συνήλθεν καὶ συνετέθη πρὸς τὸ οὐράνιον ἡγεμονικόν, ἐξοικειωθείσα αὐτῷ κατὰ τὸ παθητικόν ἑαυτῆς καὶ λαβοῦσα τὸ θεῖον οἰκειωθὲν αὐτῇ κατὰ τὸ ἐνεργητικόν. οὕτω γὰρ ἐν ζῶν ἐκ κινουμένου καὶ κινήτου συνίστατο καὶ οὐ δύο ἢ ἐκ δύο τελείων καὶ αὐτοκινήτων διάπερ ἄνθρωπος μὲν ἑτερόν τι ζῶν πρὸς θεόν καὶ οὐ θεός, ἀλλὰ δοῦλος θεοῦ. καὶ οὐρανίων ἢ τις δύναμις, ὡσαύτως ἔχει· σὰρξ δὲ θεοῦ σὰρξ γενομένη ζῶν ἐστὶ μετὰ ταῦτα συνεθεῖσα εἰς μίαν φύσιν. Fr. 107, p. 232. Lietzmann rattache ce fragment à l'Apodeixis, sans raison décisive à mon avis.

Nous voilà en mesure, si je ne fais erreur, de définir dès ici le contenu de la fameuse expression *μία φύσις*. Sous la plume d'Apollinaire, cette formule ni ne vise directement l'unité de personne du Verbe Incarné, ni un état particulier de la nature du Verbe dans l'Incarnation. Contrairement à ce qu'on a si souvent avancé, elle ne revêt pas la portée que lui confère Cyrille d'Alexandrie, et son contenu ne reflète pas d'abord la pensée traditionnelle de l'école dite «alexandrine»<sup>1</sup>. Elle ne répond pas non plus à un schéma «platonisant» qui identifiant l'esprit et la personne, se contente de substituer le Verbe à l'âme pour exprimer l'union hypostatique<sup>2</sup>. *Μία φύσις* caractérise la constitution particulière de l'humanité du Christ. Les fonctions et l'interdépendance du principe de vie ou esprit et de la chair y sont soigneusement définies et respectées: mais c'est le Verbe qui assume dans l'unique nature du Christ le rôle attribué dans l'anthropologie au principe vital ou esprit. En un mot, *μία φύσις* désigne le Christ comme homme, comme composé de Verbe et de chair sur le modèle de la *μία φύσις* humaine qui n'est ni l'âme ni le corps, mais le composé des deux. C'est l'indivisible unité de ce composé qui requiert la «communication des idiomes» et non le procédé d'attributions à une unique personne qui est celle du Fils de Dieu.

Un trait important de la christologie d'Apollinaire confirme notre interprétation. Si les contemporains ont souligné jusqu'à l'exagération ce trait, on semble aujourd'hui par trop porté à le négliger; je veux parler des propriétés singulières de la chair du Christ et des termes particulièrement aigus qu'emploie Apollinaire à cet égard. Les raisons de son monophysisme, Apollinaire les puise au fait central du Mystère chrétien. Brisez l'unité du «tout» qu'est le Christ, c'en est fait de sa mort rédemptrice, du baptême en cette mort, du rôle de la chair du Christ et

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. à ce sujet, et sur les auteurs qui tiennent cette interprétation, *Some Neglected Aspects* . . .

<sup>2</sup> On sait que c'est l'interprétation que proposent de la christologie d'Athanase M. Richard et son école; je me suis efforcé d'établir dans *Les Actes du Procès de Paul de Samosate*, que c'était en tout cas la christologie des disciples d'Origène.

aussi du culte que nous lui portons<sup>1</sup>. Apollinaire, pourtant, ne se contente pas de définir le « tout » et de refuser toute division dans les attributions qui lui reviennent de par ses composantes. A coup sûr, il élève une protestation vigoureuse contre l'incrimination de verser dans le gnosticisme, de professer la « divinité » ou la « consubstantialité » de la chair du Christ<sup>2</sup>. Mais il use pour qualifier cette même chair de termes qui sont tout que pondérés. On en interprètera à la rigueur l'un ou l'autre par la « communication des idiomes » au sens défini à l'instant, ainsi l'expression du fragment 153 :

ἡ δὲ σὰρξ κοινωνία τοῦ θεοῦ ἢ μὴ οὐσα καθ' ἑαυτὴν θεός<sup>3</sup>.

Au *De Unione*, en tout cas, Apollinaire dit bien plus :

« On ne saurait dire proprement que le corps est une créature. »<sup>4</sup>

Il affirmait, dès le départ du Traité, que la sainteté du corps du Christ le rend différent de tout autre corps<sup>5</sup>. La suite tend à établir la raison de cette sainteté et, du même coup, de cette différence; c'est la profonde unité « biologique » du corps du Christ avec le Verbe, conséquente à la conception virginale. Au *De Fide et Incarnatione*, Apollinaire entend bien que le souci d'éviter des thèses gnostisantes ne conduise pas à une dépréciation de l'excellence de la chair du Christ. Son raisonnement manifeste jusqu'où va sa pensée :

« Impossible, sans écarter la vie divine, d'écarter les exigences de l'adoration. Celui dont on n'adore pas la chair, on ne l'adore pas lui-même. »<sup>6</sup>

En d'autres termes, c'est à la « vie » même du Christ qu'on s'en prendrait en écartant de la chair les propriétés de la divinité. Ainsi, qu'on se refuse à donner à la chair l'appellation de « consubstantiel », et la voilà totalement aliénée de la divinité ! Du coup, elle cessera d'être salulaire aux croyants puisqu'elle se

<sup>1</sup> Cf. i. al. le *De Fide et Incarnatione* qui développe ces thèmes.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. notamment la Lettre à Sérapion, fr. 159—161, pp. 253—254.

<sup>3</sup> Fr. 153, p. 248 l. 24—25.

<sup>4</sup> Οὐκ ἔστιν ἰδίως κτίσμα τὸ σῶμα εἶπείν. *De Unione*, 2, p. 186 l. 3.

<sup>5</sup> *De Unione*, 1, p. 185 l. 9—11.

<sup>6</sup> Ἀδύνατον γὰρ μὴ διοριζομένης τῆς θείας ζωῆς διορίζεσθαι τὰ τῆς προσκυνήσεως· ὃς γὰρ τις τὴν σάρκα ὃς προσκυνεῖ, τοῦτον ὃς προσκυνεῖ. *De Fide et Incarnatione*, 6, p. 197 l. 21—23.



situe hors de la Trinité. Malgré son souci de ne pas parler d'une consubstantialité intrinsèque de la chair à la divinité, Apollinaire suit la pente naturelle de sa pensée; après avoir conjuré de ne pas amoindrir la chair du Christ sous prétexte de précision au regard de la consubstantialité, il a toutes les peines du monde à donner une formulation satisfaisante:

« Si donc nous croyons que Notre Seigneur Jésus-Christ est venu selon la ressemblance de l'homme . . . , il est inséparable et indivisible de sa chair, et sa chair tient en commun du nom de la consubstantialité selon la nature du Verbe avec son Père . . . ; que si elle n'y tient pas en commun, elle en est totalement aliénée. En effet, le salut ne viendra pas aux croyants d'une Incarnation qui se situe hors de la divine Trinité. Rien en effet d'adorable rien de salutaire en-dehors de la divine Trinité .... »<sup>1</sup>

Il faut bien scruter ce raisonnement pour constater qu'Apollinaire y dépasse le simple problème de noms et d'attributs; ceux-ci sont fonction d'une communion et d'une vertu toutes particulières à la chair du Christ et qui s'originent en plein dans la « vie » du Sauveur. Citons encore deux textes transmis par Timothée de Béryste, un des chefs de l'aile extrémiste du parti, mais aussi un des fidèles de la première heure:

« La chair, comme chair de Dieu, (elle est) Dieu; comme (chair) du Consubstantiel à Dieu, partie unie à lui, Consusubstantiel à Dieu, pas séparé; en effet, elle n'est mue ni séparément ni pour son propre compte, tel un homme vivant qui se meut de lui-même. »<sup>2</sup>

Voilà pour les conséquences de l'union vitale; le second texte va plus loin. C'est un texte difficile dont Turrianus ne s'est tiré qu'en alignant les équivalents latins pour les mots grecs<sup>3</sup>. Son sens général ne fait pourtant aucun doute:

*ζωοποιεῖ δὲ ἡμᾶς ἡ σὰρξ αὐτοῦ διὰ τὴν συνουσιωμένην αὐτῇ θεότητι· τὸ δὲ ζωοποιὸν θεῖόν· θεϊκὴ ἄρα <ἡ> σὰρξ, ὅτι θεῶ συνήφθη· καὶ αὕτη*

<sup>1</sup> Pour tout ce passage, cf. De Fide et Incarnatione, 4—5, pp. 194 à 196.

<sup>2</sup> Ἡ δὲ σὰρξ ὡς θεοῦ σὰρξ θεός, ὡς ὁμοουσίου τῷ θεῷ, μέρος ἡρώμενον αὐτῷ ὁμοούσιον τῷ θεῷ οὐ κεχωρισμένον· οὐδὲ γὰρ κεχωρισμένως οὐδὲ κινεῖται ἰδιαζόντως ὥσπερ ἄνθρωπος ζῶν ἀντενέργητον. Fr. 153, p. 248 l. 20—23.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. dans Canisius-Basnage, Thesaurus, I, p. 606.

μὲν σώζει, ἡμεῖς δὲ σωζόμεθα μετέχοντες αὐτῆς ὡσπερὶ τροφῆς· τὸ δὲ θρεπτικὸν ἐνεργὸν ὃν ἐν τῷ τρεφομένῳ ὁμοούσιον αὐτῷ καὶ οὐ τρεφόμενον ὁμοίως. καὶ εἰ τὸ ζωοποιὸν οὐ ζωοποιούμενόν ἐστιν ὁμοίως τῷ ζωοποιούμενῳ οὐχ ὁμοούσιον αὐτῷ· ἢ γὰρ ἂν ᾔην σῶμα θανάτου ὡς τὸ ἡμέτερον ζωοποιεῖσθαι δεόμενον· οὐ σῶμα δὲ θανάτου ἀλλὰ ζωῆς τὸ σῶμα τοῦ Χριστοῦ· οὐκ ἄρα ὁμοούσιον ἀνθρωπίνῳ τὸ θεῖον<sup>1</sup>.

Si l'on trace une division entre la chair du Christ qui est « divine » et la nôtre qui est « humaine », la raison en est que cette chair nous vivifie. L'allusion à la nourriture indique qu'il s'agit de l'Eucharistie. La chair du Christ détient l'efficace salutaire du sacrement dans sa communion vitale à la divinité. J'ai souligné ailleurs la portée eucharistique de divers textes d'Apollinaire. En voici un nouveau, transmis par les Chaînes sur Saint Jean :

« Impossible de goûter au Verbe de Dieu en vue de la vie éternelle si ce n'est par sa chair. Tant qu'il ne s'était pas mêlé à la chair, toute chair était sous le joug de la mort. Mais maintenant une chair vivifiante nous est donnée, nourrissant son semblable pour la vie par la vertu qui est mêlée à elle et qui se mêle aux chairs qui participent d'elle . . . »<sup>2</sup>

Rappelons également que les développements du *De Fide et Incarnatione* auxquels cette partie de l'exposé puise largement, partent d'une allusion à l'Eucharistie<sup>3</sup>.

Cette utilisation de l'Eucharistie par Apollinaire nous met en mesure d'affirmer ce que tout indiquait par ailleurs : la chair du Christ, du fait de l'« unique nature » en laquelle elle se trouve,

<sup>1</sup> Fr. 116, p. 235.

<sup>2</sup> Οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπολαῦσαι τοῦ λόγου τοῦ θεοῦ πρὸς αἰώνιον ζωὴν εἰ μὴ διὰ τῆς σαρκὸς αὐτοῦ. ἄχρι γὰρ οὐκ ἀνεμύνητο σαρκὶ κατείχετο πᾶσα σὰρξ ὑπὸ θανάτου. νῦν δὲ δέδοται σὰρξ τρέφουσα πᾶν τὸ ὁμογενὲς εἰς ζωὴν διὰ τῆς ἀνακραθελος αὐτῷ δυνάμει καὶ ταῖς μετεχούσαις σαρκί· ἀνεκρινάμενης καθ' ὁμοίωσιν. Je ne crois pas que le mot qui termine le fragment « καθ' ὁμοίωσιν » soit à prendre en un sens qui infirmerait sa portée eucharistique. In Joan., VI, 53—55, Cordier, Catena Patrum Graecorum in S. Johannem . . . , Anvers, 1630, p. 192. M. Reuss a bien voulu m'assurer, sur la base de ses travaux préparatoires à l'édition de la chaîne sur Saint Jean, que rien ne faisait douter de l'authenticité du fragment.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. le « c'est pourquoi » qui, après une allusion à l'Eucharistie introduit la partie de cet ouvrage conservée en grec, p. 193 l. 33—p. 194 l. 1.

passé à un autre ordre de réalités. Elle jouit d'une efficace, d'une vertu, d'une dignité qui lui sont dues non au titre d'un procédé de langage, mais du fait même de son intégration dans une entité dont on ne saurait sous aucun prétexte la dégager. D'où, une exaltation de cette chair et, à cette fin, une acuité d'expression qui dépassent les mesures du tolérable. On aurait donc tort de reprocher aux contemporains d'Apollinaire une simple mauvaise foi ou une totale incompréhension, quand ils s'en prennent à sa doctrine sur la chair du Christ. Celle-ci ne se prêtait que trop, malgré les précautions multipliées par le Maître, aux exagérations de ses disciples. Sa conception de la *μία φύσις* ne conduisait-elle pas tout droit à la thèse synousiaste? Apollinaire s'en est défendu de toute force, mais s'il a su s'arrêter de prononcer le terme que ses disciples sont accusés d'avoir tant prôné, le fond de sa pensée et l'expression dont il la revêtait, côtoyaient l'abîme; c'est le moins qu'on puisse dire.

## II

Je m'efforcerai dans cette seconde partie de serrer de plus près l'anthropologie d'Apollinaire et notamment d'élucider le difficile problème de sa conception de base, dichotomie ou trichotomie? L'arrière-plan philosophique de l'époque est extrêmement confus et, dans l'ensemble, mal étudié. S'il s'agit des formulations et de la technique d'un système, rien ne serait plus fallacieux qu'une simple référence aux grands courants traditionnels de la philosophie grecque. Le beau travail de Verbeke sur la notion de *πνεῦμα* dans la pensée antique a tâché de faire le jour sur un point fort important pour notre enquête<sup>1</sup>. De pareils travaux sur *νοῦς*, *ψυχή*, voire même *σῶμα* et l'anthropologie en général, seraient indispensables pour un traitement pleinement satisfaisant de mon sujet. Je me contenterai, en leur absence, d'essayer, à partir du texte d'Apollinaire, de

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<sup>1</sup> Verbeke, *L'Evolution de la Doctrine du Pneuma du Stoïcisme à Saint Augustin*, Louvain, 1945. La partie consacrée aux Pères est très inégale; le traitement d'Apollinaire en particulier est tout-à-fait superficiel, pp. 485—489.

retrouver les doctrines philosophiques qui inspirent son anthropologie, et par là de mieux la préciser.

Apollinaire, se référant à Saint Paul, définit l'homme, *νοῦς ἐν σαρκί*<sup>1</sup>. C'est incontestablement la vue fondamentale de l'Écriture: l'homme est composé d'un corps et d'une âme; d'une chair soumise au flux de la matière et du temps, d'un esprit jouissant de la permanence et de l'immortalité. Le *νοῦς* qu'Apollinaire identifie au *πνεῦμα*, c'est l'esprit, caractérisé d'abord, dans les écrits de note trichotomite, par le pouvoir d'autodétermination<sup>2</sup>. Les œuvres d'apparence dichotomite insistent, en parlant de l'âme, sur sa fonction de « principe vital ». Je rappelle que les deux points de vue se trouvent synthétisés dans le texte capital transmis par Justinien que j'ai intégralement reproduit plus haut<sup>3</sup>.

D'après le Dr. Raven, le traducianisme d'Apollinaire ne permet de douter que l'hérésiarque a professé la trichotomie toujours, « car aucun Grec aurait jamais imaginé une origine si abjecte pour la faculté intellectuelle et spirituelle de l'homme »<sup>4</sup>. Le précieux apport des fragments exégétiques nous mettra en mesure de juger de la valeur de cette assertion. Notons, au départ, une thèse qui n'a guère d'allure « platonisante », celle du caractère gratuit de l'immortalité de l'âme:

« Gratifié de la promotion à l'immortalité, il (l'homme) ne réalisa pas que ce bien, (fruit) d'une gratification, était au-dessus de sa nature; aussi bien, ayant déchu de la ressemblance de Dieu, celle qui consiste en l'immortalité, il est assimilé de par la mort au bétail. »<sup>5</sup> L'immortalité est don de Dieu parce que toute vie vient de la vie réelle, et toute existence de l'adhésion au « réellement existant ». Le libellé de ces propositions n'est

<sup>1</sup> Apodeixis, fr. 72, p. 221 l. 22—23.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. sup. et fr. 25, p. 210 l. 23: τὸ δὴ πνεῦμα τουτέστι τὸν νοῦν.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. sup. p. 217.

<sup>4</sup> C. E. Raven, *Apollinarianism*, Cambridge, 1923, p. 171.

<sup>5</sup> *Τῇ πρὸς ἀθανασίαν ἀδείξει τετιμημένος, οὐκ ᾔσθετο μείζον ἔχων τῆς φύσεως τὸ ἐκ τιμῆς ἀγαθόν. ὁθεν ἀποπεσὼν τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ ὁμοιώσεως τῆς ἐν ἀθανασίᾳ, κτήρεσιν ὁμοιοῦται κατὰ τὸν θάνατον.* In Ps. XLVIII, 13, Cod. Paris. gr. 139, fol. 130 ro. Il s'agit d'une version refondue mais en suivant de près et fidèlement le texte original. Je ne puis m'étendre ici sur ce problème.

pas si rare chez les Pères, mais Apollinaire en précise les données avec une rigueur de pensée et de terminologie qui aboutissent à un sens pour le moins discutable. De formulation quelque peu floue et imagée d'une Vérité profonde, l'assertion se voit conférer une portée directement métaphysique :

« La vie est la seule existence, « les vivants », dit-il, « te loueront » ; c'est en effet dans l'adhésion à celui qui est que nous avons l'être et la séparation est corruption. »<sup>1</sup>

Et plus fortement encore :

« C'est là l'œuvre de la vie, c'est là l'utilité de l'exister, si nous adhérons à la vie réelle et à l'Existant réellement. »<sup>2</sup>

On serait tenté d'adoucir la portée de ces textes, si la solution de problèmes plus particuliers ne révélait chez Apollinaire une tendance très consciente à ne pas magnifier outre mesure la composante spirituelle de l'homme. Apollinaire, en effet, se pose la question de savoir ce qui advient de l'âme entre la mort et la résurrection des corps. Sa situation, affirme-t-il, est anormale ; l'« âme séparée » soupire à la réunion avec son corps parce que la vie humaine ne se réalise vraiment que dans l'union des deux parties de l'homme, âme et corps. Et à ce propos, il affirme vigoureusement, « l'âme n'est pas l'homme ». Voici à cet égard un texte capital :

« La vie future, c'est la Résurrection, selon que nous apprenons que l'âme n'est ni vie proprement ni vie vraie, si toutefois l'âme n'est pas l'homme. En effet, si elle avait dans sa vie à elle la vérité de la vie, ce qui est mort, n'aurait pas besoin de résurrection. C'est pourquoi aussi bien le Seigneur dit que ceux qui vivent, vivent de par Dieu, comme n'ayant pas encore la vie sinon dans la vertu de Dieu qui les vivifie . . . Car ce n'est pas une vie incorporelle qu'il a donné au début à l'âme, mais, dès

<sup>1</sup> *Μόνη υπαρκτός ή ζωή, ότι «οί ζώντες σέ», φησιν, «αἰνέουσιν». ἐν γάρ τῇ πρὸς τὸν ὄντα συναφείᾳ τὸ εἶναι ἔχουμεν καὶ ἡ διάστασις φθορά . . .* In Ps. CIII, 33—34, Cod. Ambros. F 126 sup. fol. 140 ro.

<sup>2</sup> *Τοῦτο τῆς ζωῆς ἔργον, τοῦτο τοῦ ἐπάρχουσιν ὄφελος, εἰ πρὸς τὴν ὄντως ζωὴν συναπτόμεθα καὶ πρὸς τὸν ὄντως ὄντα.* In Ps. CXLV, 1—2, même Manuscrit, fol. 392 ro.

le départ, la vie dans le corps, ayant insufflé dans le corps le souffle de vie.»<sup>1</sup>

Nous voilà à cent lieues des conceptions chères à Origène selon qui « l'homme est une âme qui se sert d'un corps »<sup>2</sup>. Même après que la doctrine de la préexistence des âmes aura été abandonnée, l'Ecole d'Origène restera fidèle à son anthropologie, et Eusèbe de Césarée dira :

τοῦτο δὲ καὶ τὸν ἀληθῆ ἄνθρωπον τὸν κατὰ ψυχὴν νοοῦμενον,

ou encore :

ἐν ψυχῇ μὲν ὁρίζεται τὸν ἀληθῆ ἄνθρωπον<sup>3</sup>.

Apollinaire suit une autre ligne de pensée et je me défends mal de l'impression que les précisions du texte justement produit ne visent directement Origène et sa doctrine de la préexistence des âmes. Il va plus loin encore. Que fait l'âme sans le corps après la mort? Rien! Pendant le temps intermédiaire, elle est privée de fonctions, car l'homme est « un », un qui est « l'un et l'autre » âme et corps; il n'y a pas de vie si l'un ou l'autre fait défaut :

« Alors ressuscite le mort quand l'âme se trouve avec le corps, non que dans l'intervalle, l'âme ait été dissoute, mais elle était comme sans action et n'ayant pas les propriétés de la vie qu'elle a avec le corps. L'homme, en effet, est quelque chose d'un », l'un et l'autre à la fois et la vie est en commun et il faut les deux pour que la vie se recouvre après la mort.»<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Ζωὴ δὲ ἡ μέλλουσα ἐστὶν ἀναζώσις· καθὼς τὴν ψυχὴν ἰδίαν ζωὴν οὐδὲ ἀληθῆ ζωὴν εἶναι μαθάνομεν, εἴπερ οὐκ ἄνθρωπος ἡ ψυχὴ. εἰ γὰρ ἐν τῇ καθ' ἑαυτὴν ζωῇ τὸ ἀληθὲς εἶχε τοῦ ζῆν, οὐκ ἀναζώσεως τὸ τεθνηκὸς ἔδειτο. διὸ καὶ ὁ κύριος τοὺς τεθνεώτας θεῶς ζῆν εἶπεν ὡς οὐκ τὸ ζῆν ἔχοντας, πλὴν ὅσον ἐν δυνάμει θεοῦ τοῦ ζωοποιήσαντος . . . οὐ γὰρ ἀσώματον ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ζωὴν ἔδωκεν ὁ θεὸς τῇ ψυχῇ, ἀλλ' εὐθὺς τὴν ἐν σώματι, εἰς τὸ σῶμα τὴν πνοήν τῆς ζωῆς ἐμψύχσας. In Ps. CXVIII, 50, Cod. Ambros. F 126 sup. fol. 239 ro. et Paris. gr. 139, fol. 383 vo.

<sup>2</sup> Ἄνθρωπος . . . . . τούτεστι ψυχὴ χρωμένη σώματι, Contra Celsum, Koetschau, VII, 38, T. II, p. 188 l. 24.

<sup>3</sup> Praeparatio Evangelica VII, 40, Gaisford, T. II, p. 134 et 166.

<sup>4</sup> Τότε ἀνίσταται ὁ νεκρός, ὅτε μετὰ σώματος ἡ ψυχὴ· οὐχ ὡς ἐν τῷ μεταξὺ τῆς ψυχῆς διαλεινόμενης, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀπρακτον οὐσης καὶ τὰ τῆς ζωῆς ἴδια, ὅσα μετὰ σώματος, οὐκ ἐχούσης· ἐν γὰρ τι τὸ συναμφοτέρον ἐστὶ ἄνθρωπος, καὶ ἡ ζωὴ κοινῇ

Le titre d'« image de Dieu » nous vient bien de l'infusion de l'âme, mais il qualifie l'homme tout entier. Si Apollinaire reconnaît à l'âme et au corps des origines différentes, il s'empresse, tout en l'affirmant, d'insister sur le fait que les deux éléments ont à se composer pour constituer « l'un »<sup>1</sup>.

« Dans ce texte il paraît ramener à un seul et l'âme et le corps et les ordonner l'un et l'autre en un seul façonnement, puisqu'il dit que Dieu connaît les affections propres de l'âme à partir de son façonnement . . . En effet ce n'est pas dans la division que se fait l'œuvre (qu'est l'homme); mais, bien que la facture de l'âme soit plus belle que celle du corps, n'étant pas œuvre des mains comme le modelage de la matière, mais étant insufflée selon l'existence venant de la vertu divine, néanmoins, Il achève chacun des deux en un seul être, selon que celui-ci tient en commun d'un seul nom, le tout (« l'un et l'autre ») étant nommé tantôt âme, tantôt chair. »<sup>2</sup>

*καὶ ἐκατέρων δεῖ πρὸς τὸ τὴν ἐκ θανάτου ζωὴν πάλιν συντεῖναι.* In Math. XXII, 23, d'après Cod. Coislin gr. 195, fol. 119 et Vatic. gr. 1618 fol. 82 ro., communiqué par M. Reuss. C'est encore dans cette perspective qu'il faut lire la conclusion du fr. 138, p. 240 l. 26—29, où la condition du Verbe est comparée dans la mort à celle de l'âme: *εἰ γὰρ ὑπὲρ τὴν σύνθεσιν ἐστὶ ταύτην, καὶ ὑπὲρ τὴν διάλυσιν· διάλυσιν δὲ ὁ θάνατος· οὕτε γὰρ τῇ συνθέσει περιελήφθη ἢ γὰρ ἂν ὁ κόσμος κεκένωτο· οὕτε ἐν τῇ διαλύσει τὸ ἐκ τῆς διαλύσεως ἐνδεὲς εἶχεν, ὥσπερ ἡ ψυχὴ.* Cf. également ce fragment In Ps. LXXXIX, 13, Cod. Ambros. F 126 Sup., fol. 53 ro. et Paris. gr. 139 fol. 310 vo.: *νύκτα μὲν εἰκότως τὸν χρόνον ἐκάλεσεν ἅπαντα τοῦτον ἐν ᾧ καθεύδει θανατούμενος ἄνθρωπος.* Je croirais assez volontiers que cette thèse est à mettre en relation avec le millénarisme d'Apollinaire, attesté aussi par les textes exégétiques.

<sup>1</sup> L'usage du terme est capital, puisqu'il forme terme technique chez Apollinaire, pour marquer, en référence à I Cor. VIII, 6, l'unité du composé qu'est le Christ.

<sup>2</sup> *Ἐνταῦθα δὲ φαίνεται καὶ ψυχὴν καὶ σῶμα εἰς ἓν τιθεῖς καὶ ὑπὸ μίαν πλᾶσιν ἐκότερα τάττων, οἷον δὴ τῶν ψυχικῶν ἰδιωμάτων τὴν γνῶσιν ἀπὸ τῆς διαπλάσεως ἔχειν φησὶ τὸν θεόν . . . οὐ γὰρ ἐν διαστάσει τὸ ποίημα, ἀλλ' εἰ καὶ καλλίων ἢ τῆς ψυχῆς ποιήσις παρὰ τὴν τοῦ σώματος, οὐχ οἷον εἰς χειροποίητος οὕσα κατὰ τὴν ὅλης μόρφωσιν, ἀλλ' ἐμπνευστὴ κατὰ τὴν ἐκ θεῆς δυνάμειος ὑπόστασιν. ὅλως γοῦν εἰς ἓν ἐκάτερα συντελεῖ, καθὼ καὶ ὀνόματος ἑνὸς κοινῶναι, ποτὲ μὲν ψυχὴ τὸ συναμφότερον, ποτὲ δὲ σὰρξ ὀνομαζόμενον.* In Ps. CXXXVIII, 5, Cod. Ambros. F 126 Sup., fol. 348 vo. Les Fragments Syriaques de Diodore publiés par Briere, Revue de l'Orient chrétien, X (XXX), pp. 231—283, con-

Cette claire explication du mode des attributions au composé humain rejoint exactement les textes produits plus hauts pour établir le caractère particulier de la « communication des idiomes » chez Apollinaire; il confirme l'interprétation que j'en proposais.

On aura pu se convaincre jusqu'ici que l'anthropologie d'Apollinaire n'est pas « platonisante », et on pensera peut-être que Voisin a été singulièrement avisé d'évoquer à son propos l'aristotélisme, tant les thèses qu'il professe ont un relent d'hylémorphisme. Mais un point particulier de la doctrine d'Apollinaire nous oriente de façon plus précise; son traducianisme en effet, trahit une option philosophique assez nette, à savoir vers le stoïcisme qui a vigoureusement enseigné ce point, si conforme avec sa conception de la matérialité du *πνεῦμα*<sup>1</sup>. Non qu'Apollinaire le suive jusque là! Comme toute son époque, il professe en philosophie un syncrétisme; et surtout, il est chrétien et ne met pas en doute le caractère spirituel de l'âme, « l'homme est un *νοῦς* dans la chair selon l'Apôtre ». Ce qui ne l'empêche pas d'imbriquer cette spiritualité dans son traducianisme de façon autrement plus forte que ne paraît le

tiennent un texte qui attribue aux apollinaristes et particulièrement aux Docteurs de la Secte les mêmes affirmations:

« De même en effet que l'homme se compose de l'âme et du corps, de celle-là qui est invisible et immortelle et de celui-ci qui est visible et mortel, et qu'il a été appelé homme, alors que les deux forment une seule hypostase et un seul fils parfait — car ce n'est ni l'âme à part ni le corps (à part) qui est dit le fils de celui qui engendre, mais les deux ensemble, alors qu'ils sont éloignés selon la nature et voisins selon tout le reste; qui, en effet a jamais dit: Le corps d'un tel est mort ou il a été malade, ou il s'habille, ou il mange? qui dit encore: L'âme d'un tel s'est mise en colère, et elle a mal fait, et elle a blasphémé? quoique ceci appartienne à l'âme, et cela au corps, mais nous attribuons à (l'homme) pris en général ce qui est le propre de la nature de chacun d'eux . . . »

loc. cit., fr. 26, p. 269. Une traduction plus préoccupée de la terminologie apollinariste donnerait probablement un son encore plus parent de nos textes.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Zeller, *The Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics*, pp. 210—222, Prächter dans Überweg, *Geschichte der Philosophie*, I, pp. 420—424, et surtout le chapitre sur les Stoiciens postérieurs, particulièrement Marc-Aurèle, p. 500—502; enfin Verbeke, op. cit., pp. 11—174, où l'abondance des citations amenées dans les notes permet un contrôle serré des interprétations.



supposer le Dr. Raven. Les textes mêmes qu'avance celui-ci, nous le démontreront. Il s'agit d'un passage assez conséquent du Commentaire sur Ezéchiel relatif à la vision des os desséchés et revivifiés. Commençons par l'affirmation de base du traducianisme :

« C'est donc par un seul esprit que tous semblent vivifiés, comme tous les hommes de par succession (*ἐκ διαδοχῆς*) vivent en un seul esprit, l'esprit de vie. L'esprit de chacun lui est propre, c'est celui qui, au moment de la résurrection, retourne à son propre corps, selon qu'il est écrit dans l'Evangile : son esprit revint en elle. »<sup>1</sup>

La précision finale se rapporte à la thèse, maintenant connue, sur l'état de l'« âme séparée ». La conception de l'unité profonde d'une espèce se perpétuant par génération joue un grand rôle chez Apollinaire. A plusieurs reprises, il affirme l'unité du générateur avec toute sa descendance en vertu de la *διαδοχή*. Le texte le plus explicite à cet égard me paraît être ce commentaire *In Ps. CXLIV, 1* :

« Ces choses pourraient se prendre selon la vie présente de l'homme qui selon la *διαδοχή* est un, puisque, quand la génération précédente s'en va, leurs successeurs entrent dans leur place. C'est pourquoi tous nous sommes appelés du nom d'Adam, comme étant celui-ci. »<sup>2</sup>

Je ne force pas ce texte en lui donnant un sens ontologique ; Apollinaire se sert de la même donnée en théologie trinitaire pour fonder la consubstantialité et l'unicité de l'*οὐσία*. Il avance aussi que l'*ιδιότης* d'un homme, David par exemple, commence à lui et se trouve comme intégrée dans tous ses

<sup>1</sup> Πνεύματι οὖν ἐνὶ φαίνονται ζωογονούμενοι πάντες, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐνὶ πνεύματι τῷ ζωτικῷ πάντες ἐκ διαδοχῆς ἀνθρώποι ζωοῦνται. Ἴδιον μὲν τὸ πνεῦμα ἐκάστου, ὃ δὲ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀληθοῦς ἀναστάσεως ἐπιστρέφει πρὸς τὸ ἴδιον σῶμα, ὡς ἐν τῷ εὐαγγελίῳ γέγραπται· ἐπέστρεψε τὸ πνεῦμα αὐτῆς. *In Ezech. XXXVII, 10*, Cod. Ottob. gr. 452, fol. 227 vo., Chigi gr. 45, fol. 425 ro., Paris. gr. 159, fol. 309 ro., Coislin gr. 17, fol. 248 vo.

<sup>2</sup> Κατὰ μὲν τὸν νῦν βίον τοῦ κατὰ διαδοχὴν ἐνὸς ἀνθρώπου ταῦτα ἂν εἶναι δύναιτο, ὅτι τῶν προτέρων ἀπύοντων εἰς τὴν ἐκείνων χώραν εἰσὶν οἱ διαδεχόμενοι. διὸ καὶ τῷ τοῦ Ἀδὰμ ὀνόματι καλούμεθα πάντες ὡς ἐκεῖνος ὄντες αὐτοί. *In Ps. CXLIV, 1*, d'après Cod. Ambros. F 126 Sup., fol. 383 ro.

descendants<sup>1</sup>. Le texte le plus important dans cette ligne de pensée se trouve dans le *Quod Unus sit Christus*. Cet opusculé présente les mêmes thèses que le *De Unione*, mais avec une insistance particulière sur le caractère imparfait de la chair qui reçoit d'« être » de par son union au principe spirituel. Ceci se réalise dans la conception virginale sur un mode qui indique la nature extraordinaire du principe vital dans le Christ. Et, pour le prouver, Apollinaire va formuler son traducianisme en termes qui justifieront l'interprétation strictement ontologique que j'ai proposée des textes produits jusqu'ici :

« Car il est impossible qu'une femme soit fécondée sans l'homme, puisque Dieu a déposé dans les pères l'οὐσία de ceux qui sont engendrés; ainsi l'Ecriture dit-elle de Lévi qu'il était dans les reins de son père Abraham. »<sup>2</sup>

L'ensemble de l'argumentation de l'ouvrage sur l'« hypostase » du Verbe incarné, sur le rapport de la chair à cette hypostase, démontre que c'est bien au plan de « l'être » et du donné ontologique qu'il faut entendre les assertions d'Apollinaire sur l'unité de la succession des générations humaines<sup>3</sup>.

Mais que devient dans tout cela l'élément intelligent, le νοητόν? Est-il vraiment transmis dans la génération ou d'autre manière? Le Commentaire sur Ezéchiel répond en termes exprès :

« La vie donc s'est introduite dans le corps de l'homme, envoyée de Dieu au travers de l'esprit cosmique, celui qui entre dans les os d'après la vision. » « Ce n'est pas en effet le νοητόν qui vient pour lui-même, mais en celui-ci et étant comme celui-ci et non comme un autre, comme, au sujet de la vraie création de l'homme, on dit que l'esprit de vie fut insufflé à l'homme par les narines, ce qui est τὸ αὐθιγτόν. »<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Cf. à ce sujet notamment la Correspondance Basile/Apollinaire dans le travail annoncé sup. p. 208 n. 2.

<sup>2</sup> Ἀδύνατον ἄνευ ἀνδρὸς κυῆσαι γυναῖκα, ὅτι τὴν οὐσίαν τῶν γεννωμένων ἐν τοῖς πατράσι κατεβάλετο ὁ θεός· ὡς καὶ τὸν Λεὺι φησιν ἡ γραφὴ ἐν τῇ ὁσφύϊ τοῦ πατρὸς εἶναι Ἀβραάμ. *Quod Unus sit Christus*, 11, p. 301 l. 13—16, et la suite du texte.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. *Quod Unus sit Christus*, 3, pp. 295—296; et surtout, 7—10, pp. 299—301.

<sup>4</sup> Ἐπεισιούσα δὲ ἦν ἡ ζωὴ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου σώματι, παρὰ θεοῦ ἐπιπεμπομένη διὰ τοῦ κοσμοῦ πνεύματος, δὲ δὴ καὶ ἐπεισάγει τοῖς ὁστέοις κατὰ τὴν ὁρασίαν. οὐ γὰρ

Le Commentaire est encore plus explicite sur le verset suivant du Prophète :

« Il y a donc insufflation de l'esprit d'air dans le corps, c'est le ζωτικόν; pour le νοερόν, il ne vient pas du monde, mais d'en-haut en même temps que lui, non pas appelé mais envoyé; car la νοερά οὐσία vient de Dieu, enveloppée dans l'esprit divin. »<sup>1</sup>

Ici, nous touchons la synthèse la plus achevée du traducianisme et du spiritualisme; une relation singulière est posée entre le principe « vital » ou « sensible » et l'intelligence ou pensée. Cette dernière est donnée « en lui » et « étant comme lui », enveloppée en quelque sorte dans le souffle de vie inspiré par Dieu dans les narines d'Adam. Bien que la partie spirituelle de l'homme vienne directement de Dieu, elle est acquise à l'homme au sein même de la génération par la relation étroite qu'elle soutient avec le principe « vital » ou « sensible ».

Ceci pourrait paraître déconcertant et peut-être assez libre dans l'interprétation de mots pris plus dans leur lettre que dans leur esprit. En fait pareille doctrine n'est pas chose inouïe dans l'Antiquité chrétienne. Si nous nous tournons vers les Pères antérieurs à Apollinaire, nous en trouverons un au moins, qui professe une doctrine analogue, et précisément en liaison avec des données stoïciennes; c'est Clément d'Alexandrie<sup>2</sup>.

τὸ νοητὸν ἐρχεται καθ' αὐτό, ἀλλ' ἐν τούτῳ καὶ ὡς τοῦτο ὄν, οὐχ ὡς ἕτερον ὡς καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀληθοῦς ἀνθρωποποιίας λέγεται πνεῦμα ζωῆς ἐμπεφύσεσθαι κατὰ μνηστῆρων ἀνθρώπων, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὸ αἰσθητόν. In Ezech. XXXVII, 5, Ottob. gr. 452, fol. 227 ro., Chigi gr. 45, fol. 424 vo., Paris. gr. 159, fol. 308 vo., Coislin gr. 17, fol. 246 vo. (édité dans Mai, op. cit., p. 90).

<sup>1</sup> Τοῦ πνεύματος ὅρα τοῦ ἀερίου γίνεται εἰσπνευσίς εἰς τὸ σῶμα, καὶ τοῦτο τὸ ζωτικόν τὸ δὲ νοερόν οὐκ ἀπὸ κόσμου ἀλλ' ἀνωθεν ἅμα τούτῳ παραγίνεται, οὐ καλούμενον ἀλλ' ἐκπεμπόμενον παρὰ θεῷ γὰρ ἡ νοερά οὐσία τῷ θεῷ πνεύματι περιεχομένη. In Ezech. XXXVII, 9, Ottob. gr. 452, fol. 227 ro., Chigi gr. 45, fol. 424 vo., Paris. gr. 159, fol. 308 vo., Coislin gr. 17, fol. 248 ro. (édité dans Mai, ibid.). Rapprocher ce fragment In Is. LVII, 16, Ottob. gr. 452, fol. 130 ro., Chigi gr. 45, fol. 225 vo., Paris. gr. 159, fol. 218 ro., (ne se trouve pas dans Mai): καὶ πνοή περιελημμένη καὶ συμπλεκόμενη σώματι ἀλλ' ἀνωθεν ἐκπεμπομένη.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Verbeke, op. cit., pp. 429—440. C'est sur cet ouvrage que je vais appuyer les considérations qui vont suivre, mais j'ai tenu à reprendre personnellement tous les textes afférents de Clément d'Alexandrie, avant d'accepter l'interprétation qu'en propose Verbeke.

Non que Clément diffère beaucoup des dualistes « platonisants » dont Origène est le plus en vue<sup>1</sup>, mais, poussant la ligne « biologique » plus loin que d'autres, Clément a été amené à combiner des notions stoïciennes et péripatéticiennes avec son platonisme. Clément donc, distingue deux *πνεῦμα*; l'un, le *σαρκικόν*, et l'autre, l'*ἡγεμονικόν*. L'intérêt de cette distinction vient de ce que le premier est nettement traité dans la ligne du *πνεῦμα* stoïcien et est appelé à jouer un rôle décisif dans la génération et la croissance de l'embryon. Mais, en outre, le rapport de ce *πνεῦμα* charnel et de l'*ἡγεμονικόν* ne se rend pas en termes de pur dualisme. Verbeke qui dégage ces notions de Clément, s'appuie avec raison sur l'important texte des *Stromata* VI, 16<sup>2</sup>. Le *πνεῦμα* charnel assume bien l'ensemble des fonctions réservées à l'« âme » dans un schéma trichotomite<sup>3</sup>; mais l'*ἡγεμονικόν* qui est le *νοῦς* exalté par Clément en bien d'autres lieux comme le pouvoir libre et vraiment l'image de Dieu en l'homme, soutient avec le *πνεῦμα* charnel une relation qui fait de lui le principe premier de l'animation de l'être vivant, y compris l'âme irrationnelle. Voici les phrases décisives de Clément:

τὸ λογιστικὸν τολῖν καὶ ἡγεμονικὸν αἴτιον εἶναι φαμεν τῆς συστάσεως τῷ ζῳῳ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ τὸ ἄλογον μέρος ἐψυχῶσθαι τε καὶ μόριον αὐτῆς εἶναι<sup>4</sup>.

ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἡ πάντων ἀναφορὰ εἰς ἓν συντέτακται τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν καὶ δι' ἐκεῖνο ζῆ τε ὁ ἄνθρωπος καὶ πῶς ζῆ<sup>5</sup>.

Ayant cité ces deux textes capitaux, je ne puis que renvoyer à Verbeke pour l'établissement des deux thèses subséquentes, à savoir que le dualisme n'en subsiste pas moins entre l'esprit supérieur et l'esprit charnel, et que ce dualisme est exprimé

<sup>1</sup> Cf. à titre d'exemple cette expression du Protrept., X, Stählin, I, p. 71 l. 26 ss.: *εἰκὼν δὲ τοῦ λόγου ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἀληθινός, ὁ νοῦς ὁ ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ*.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Verbeke, op. cit., pp. 430—436; le texte analysé ici, *Stromata*, VI, 16, se trouve dans Stählin, II, p. 499 ss.

<sup>3</sup> *Stromata*, VI, 16, Stählin, II, p. 500 l. 15—20: *αὐτίκα τὴν μὲν ζωτικὴν δύναμιν ἢ ἐμπεριέχεται τὸ θρεπτικὸν τε καὶ αὐξητικὸν καὶ καθ' ὅλον κινήτικόν, τὸ πνεῦμα εἰληγεν τὸ σαρκικόν, ὀξύνηκτον ὄν καὶ πάντη διὰ τε τῶν αἰσθήσεων καὶ τοῦ λοιποῦ σώματος πορευόμενόν τε καὶ πρωτοπαθεῖν διὰ σώματος*.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., p. 500 l. 14—15.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., l. 22—23.

en termes du dualisme paulinien de la chair et de l'esprit. Mais je dois donner ces lignes, toujours tirées de *Stromata* VI, 16, où cette distinction est mise en relation avec la génération; les préfixes grecs sont essentiels au texte dont il me faut présenter l'original:

*ἐπεισκρίνεται δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ προσκρίνεται τὸ ἡγεμονικόν, ὡς διαλογιζόμεθα, οὐ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ σπέρματος καταβολὴν γεννώμενον*<sup>1</sup>.

Qu'on reprenne maintenant la doctrine d'Apollinaire: un traducianisme où l'intelligence est infuse au même moment que le *πνεῦμα* charnel avec lequel la lie un rapport singulier d'intimité; *ἐν τούτῳ καὶ ὡς τοῦτο ὄν οὐχ ὡς ἕτερον*, comme disait le Commentaire sur Ezéchiel. D'un autre côté, Apollinaire dans sa christologie table sur une double caractéristique du principe vital dans l'homme: sa fonction spirituelle de *νοῦς* et sa liberté; par ailleurs le rôle vivificateur du principe supérieur et l'«information vitale» — au sens hylémorphique — que la chair lui doit. Dans des ouvrages nettement trichotomites enfin, l'opposition entre *νοῦς* et «chair» est expliquée en termes du combat paulinien<sup>2</sup>. Qu'on suppose Apollinaire professant l'anthropologie de Clément d'Alexandrie dans les aspects rappelés à l'instant, on obtient exactement les mêmes thèses et les mêmes propositions. Qu'on ajoute le respect presque servile d'Apollinaire pour la lettre de l'Écriture qui facilement suggérerait la trichotomie comme un donné irrécusable, on le verra d'autant mieux disposé à user du schéma stoïcien, tel par exemple qu'on le trouve chez Marc-Aurèle<sup>3</sup>.

Ces notions sont-elles venues après coup à Apollinaire et seraient-elles le fruit de cette évolution dont nous parle Rufin? Il reste en effet que le moment «spirituel» du *νοῦς* caractérise la section «trichotomite» des œuvres. Je crois pourtant qu'il faut répondre par la négative; la preuve décisive m'en paraît résider dans le fait que le *De Unione*, d'apparence décidément «dichotomite» base toute sa démarche sur le «traducianisme».

<sup>1</sup> Ibid., I. 10—11. Cf. Verbeke, op. cit., p. 433.

<sup>2</sup> Apodeixis, fr. 22, p. 209.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Überweg, cité sup. p. 227 n. 1; naturellement le tout est transformé par la notion décidément spirituelle du *νοῦς* que tient Apollinaire.

Or, la cohérence de tous les passages traducianistes montre en suffisance que ce point de la doctrine procède de la vue « stoïcienne » dont je parlais plus haut. Nulle raison donc de songer à une évolution d'Apollinaire dans son anthropologie ! Mais y a-t-il évolution sur le plan christologique en ce sens qu'après avoir conféré au Verbe les fonctions de l'« âme » et du *νοῦς*, Apollinaire aurait finalement restreint la substitution au seul *νοῦς* ? Je n'ose trop tabler sur le fragment 2 dont l'authenticité n'est de loin pas au-dessus de tout soupçon<sup>1</sup>. A côté des arguments coutumiers d'Apollinaire dans les écrits « trichotomites », on y trouve l'expresse attribution à la volonté du Verbe du pouvoir de vivifier et l'affirmation que l'« énergie » du Verbe tient la place de l'« âme » et du *νοῦς* :

*ἀναπληρώσεως τῆς θέλας ἐνεργείας τὸν τῆς ψυχῆς τόπον καὶ τοῦ ἀνθρώπινου νοός.*

Le reste du texte est à l'avenant<sup>2</sup>.

Un fait subsiste : la division des œuvres en deux sections, avec dans chacune un autre thème principal. La division ne doit être ni durcie ni trop absolue, elle existe. Comment l'interpréter ? A mon sens, ce n'est pas la christologie même qui a évolué, c'est l'accent qui s'est déplacé, probablement pour des raisons polémiques. Apollinaire, en effet, tout au long de son œuvre, reste constant à sa thèse fondamentale de la vivification de la chair par le Verbe sur l'analogie de composé humain<sup>3</sup>. Par ailleurs, la polémique de ses premiers adversaires, semble ignorer ce point de sa doctrine sauf sous des déformations, telle

<sup>1</sup> Dans Lietzmann, p. 204. Ce fragment, ainsi que le fr. 110, provient d'un florilège censé avoir été compilé par Anastase le Sinaïte et qui est un ramassis de faux, encore que la distinction entre l'« âme », que le Verbe n'aurait pas prise, et le *σπέρμα Ἀβραάμ*, qu'il a pris, rejoigne bien *Quod Unus sit Christus*, 5, p. 297 l. 17—18. Ces deux fragments sont reproduits par Lietzmann d'après Mai. Sur mes indications, mon confrère le R. P. Audet, que je remercie ici, a entrepris de retrouver le MS de Mai et l'a identifié avec le Vatic. gr. 1409, probablement du XIII s. Les deux fragments s'y trouvent au fol. 179 a et leur texte manuscrit concorde parfaitement avec l'édition.

<sup>2</sup> Fr. 2, p. 204 l. 7—9.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. i. al., fr. 108, p. 232 ; fr. 153, p. 248 ; *Apodeixis*, fr. 76, p. 222 ; fr. 79, p. 223.

la divinisation de la chair ou la transformation du Verbe en chair<sup>1</sup>. Au contraire, les thèses de l'impeccabilité et de l'impossibilité de deux *νοῦς* paraissent leur être familières; et les œuvres d'apparence « trichotomite » — l'*Apodeixis* tout au moins — supposent déjà la rupture avec les orthodoxes<sup>2</sup>. Dans la *Lettre aux Evêques de Diocésarée*, c'est la trichotomie appuyée par l'impeccabilité du *νοῦς* divin qui constitue l'argument premier, ce qui concorde avec les discussions d'Epiphane à Antioche<sup>3</sup>. Comment rendre au mieux raison de ces faits qu'en suggérant qu'Apollinaire a été amené à insister plus sur le caractère spirituel du *νοῦς*, sur la nécessaire impeccabilité du Christ? Et quelle raison assigner à cette insistance, sinon que, ou bien la polémique antiarienne avait trop aiguë déjà l'argument tiré des allusions scripturaires à l'âme du Christ, ou bien plutôt que les exagérations de partisans extrémistes et les suspicions grandissantes des orthodoxes à cet égard n'aient incité Apollinaire à plus de prudence dans la présentation de sa doctrine? Mais où gisait l'importance de la doctrine pour son auteur, rien ne le montre mieux que ceci: faisant allusion à ces exagérations comme à ces suspicions, Apollinaire, nous le notions plus haut, refuse énergiquement de lâcher pour autant, quoi que ce soit de ses positions sur les attributions faites à la chair de par sa singulière union avec le Verbe dans ce qu'il appelle l'« unique nature », et qu'il nous faut appeler l'« humanité *sui generis* » du Christ.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. sup.

<sup>2</sup> Grégoire de Nysse s'identifie tout spontanément avec les gens que vise Apollinaire, *Antirrheticus*, 26, PG XLV, 1177 ss.

<sup>3</sup> *Lettre aux Evêques de Diocésarée*, p. 256, l. 4—10.

## Eschatology in the Patristic Age: an Introduction

G. FLOROVSKY, New York

1. Four "last things" are traditionally listed: Death, Judgment, Heaven, and Hell. These four are „the last things of man“. And there are four "last things" of the mankind: the Last Day, the Resurrection of the Flesh, the Final Judgment, and the End of the World<sup>1</sup>. The major item, however, is missing in this listing, namely "the Last Adam", Christ Himself, and His Body, the Church. For indeed Eschatology is not just one particular section of the Christian theological system, but rather its basis and foundation, its guiding and inspiring principle, or, as it were, the climate of the whole Christian thinking. Christianity is essentially eschatological, and the Church is an "eschatological community", since she is the New Testament, the ultimate and the final, and, consequently, "the last"<sup>2</sup>. Christ Himself is the last Adam because He is "the New Man" (Ignatius, *Ephes.* 20. 1). The Christian Perspective is intrinsically eschatological. "The Old has passed away. Behold, the New has come". It was precisely "in these last days" that God of the Fathers had ultimately acted, once for all, once for ever. The "end" had come, God's design of human salvation had been consummated (John 19. 28, 30: *τετέλεσται*). Yet, this ultimate action was just a new beginning. The greater things were yet to come. The "Last Adam" was coming again. "And let him who heareth say, Come." The Kingdom had been inaugurated, but it did not yet come, in its full power and glory. Or, rather, the Kingdom was still to come, — the King had come already. The Church was still *in via*, and Christians were

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<sup>1</sup> See e. g. Msgr Joseph Pohle, *Eschatology*, Adapted and edited by Arthur Preuss. Herder Book Co., St. Louis, Mo., & London, 1947, p. 2.

<sup>2</sup> See Kittel's *Theologisches Woerterbuch*, vol. III, p. 451/452, s. v. *καρὸς* (Behm).



still "pilgrims" and strangers in "this world". This tension between "the Past" and "the Coming" was essential for the Christian message from the very beginning. There were always these two basic terms of reference: the Gospel and the Second Advent. The story of Salvation was still in progress. But more than a "promise" had been granted unto the Church. Or, rather, "the Promise of the Father" was the Holy Spirit, which did come and was abiding in the Church for ever. The Kingdom of the Spirit had been already inaugurated. Thus, the Church was living in two dimensions at once. St. Augustine describes this basic duality of the Christian situation in a remarkable passage of his "Commentary" on the Gospel of St. John, interpreting the XXIst chapter. "There are two states of life that are known to the Church, preached and commended to herself from heaven, whereof one is of faith, the other of sight. One — in the temporal sojourn in a foreign land, the other in the eternity of the (heavenly) abode. One — on the way, the other — in the fatherland. One — in active work, the other — in the wages of contemplation ... The one is anxious with the care of conquering, the other is secure in the peace of victory ... The whole of the one is passed here to the end of this world, and then finds its termination. The other is deferred for its completion till after the end of this world, but has no end in the world to come" (*in Johan. tr.* 124.5). Yet, it is essentially the same Church that has this dual life, *duas vitas*. This duality is signified in the Gospel story by two names: Peter and John.

2. Christianity was recently described as an "experience of novelty", a "Neuheitserlebnis". And this "novelty" was ultimate and absolute. It was the Mystery of the Incarnation. Incarnation was interpreted by the Fathers not as a metaphysical miracle, but primarily as the solution of an existential predicament, in which mankind was hopelessly imprisoned, i. e. as the Redemptive act of God. It was "for us men and for our salvation" that the Son of God came down, and was made man<sup>1</sup>. Redemption

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<sup>1</sup> The question whether this redemptive purpose was the only reason or motive of the Incarnation, so that it would not have taken place if man had not sinned, was never raised by the Fathers, with one single

has been accomplished, once for all. The union, or "communion", with God has been re-established, and the power of becoming children of God has been granted to men, through faith. Christ Jesus is the only Mediator and Advocate, and His sacrifice on the Cross, *in ara crucis*, was "a full, perfect, and sufficient sacrifice, oblation, and satisfaction". Human situation has been radically changed, and the status of man also. Man was re-adopted as the son of God in Christ Jesus, the Only Begotten Son of God Incarnate, crucified and risen. The catholic doctrine of the Incarnation, elaborated by the Fathers, from St. Irenaeus to St. John of Damascus, emphasizes first of all this aspect of finality and uniqueness, of accomplishment and achievement. The Son of God "was made man" for ever. The Son of God, "One of the Holy Trinity", is man, by the virtue of the Incarnation, for ever and ever. The Hypostatic Union is a permanent accomplishment. And the victory of the Cross is a final victory. Again, the Resurrection of the Lord is the beginning of the general resurrection. But precisely for these reasons the "History of Salvation" should go and is going on. The doctrine of Christ finds its fulness and completion in the doctrine of the Church, i. e. of "the Whole

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exception. The Christian message was from the very beginning the message of Salvation, and Christ was described precisely as the Saviour or Redeemer of mankind and the world, who had redeemed His people from the bondage of sin and corruption. It was assumed that the very meaning of Salvation was that the intimate union between man and God had been restored, and it was inferred therefrom that the Redeemer Himself had to belong to both sides, i. e. had to be at once both Divine and human, for otherwise the broken communion would not have been recovered. This line of reasoning was taken by St. Irenaeus, later by St. Athanasius, and by all the writers of the IVth century, in their struggle against the Arians. Only in St. Maximus the Confessor we find suggestion that Incarnation belonged to the original plan of Creation and in this sense was independent upon the Fall: *quaest. ad Thalassium*, qu. 60, PG XC, c. 621; cf. *Ambigua*, XCI, 1097, 1305, 1308 sq. Cf. the remarks of Fr. Hans Urs von Balthasar, *Liturgie Cosmique*, Maxime le Confesseur, Paris, Aubier, 1947, p. 204—205 (German edition, S. 267—268). See also Aloysius Spindeler, *Cur Verbum caro factum? Das Motiv der Menschwerdung und das Verhältnis der Erlösung zur Menschwerdung Gottes in den christologischen Glaubenskämpfen des vierten und fünften christlichen Jahrhunderts*, „Forschungen zur Christlichen Literatur- und Dogmengeschichte“ herausgegeben von Erhard und Kirsch, XVIII. 2, 1938.

Christ", — *totus Christus, caput et corpus*, to use the glorious phrase of St. Augustine. And this immediately introduces the historical duration. The Church is a growing body, till she comes to "mature manhood", *εἰς ἄνδρα τέλειον*. In the Church the Incarnate is unfailingly "present". It was precisely this awareness of His abiding presence that necessitated the orientation towards the future. It was in the Church, and through the Church, that God was still pursuing His redemptive purpose, through Jesus Christ, the Lord. Again, the Church was a missionary body, sent into the world to proclaim and to propagate the Kingdom, and the "whole creation" was expected to share or to participate in that ultimate "re-novation", which was already inaugurated by the Incarnate Lord, and in Him. History was theologically vindicated precisely by this missionary concern of the Church. On the other hand, history, i. e. the "History of Salvation", could not be regarded as an endless process. The "End of times" and the "Consummation" were faithfully anticipated. "The End" was clearly predicted in the Scriptures, as the Early Christians read them. The goal was indeed "beyond history", but history was inwardly regulated and organized precisely by this super-historical and transcendent goal, by a watchful expectation of the Coming Lord. Only an ultimate and final "con-summation", an ultimate and final re-integration or "re-capitulation" could have given meaning to the flux of happenings and events, to the duration of time itself. The strong corporate feeling compelled the Early Christians to look for an ultimate and inclusive integration of the Redemptive process, in the Kingdom to come. This was plainly stated already by Origen. "*Omne ergo corpus Ecclesiae redimendum sperat Apostolus, nec putat posse quae perfecta sunt dari singulis quibusdam membris, nisi universum corpus in unum fuerit congregatum*" (in *Rom.* VII. 5). History goes on because the Body has not yet been completed. "The fulness of the Body" implies and presupposes a re-integration of history, including the Old dispensation, i. e. "the end". Or, in the phrase of St. John Chrysostom, "then is the Head filled up, then is the Body rendered perfect, when we are all together, all knit together and united" (in *Ephes. hom.* III, ad I.23). *Erit unus Christus, amans*

*seipsum* (St. Augustine, in *Ps.* 26, *sermo* 2, n. 23). — The other reason for looking forward, to a future consummation, was the firm and fervent belief in the Resurrection of the dead. In its own way it was to be a “re-integration” of history. Christ is risen indeed, and the sting of death has been taken away. The power of death was radically broken, and Life Eternal manifested and disclosed, in *Christo*. The “last enemy”, however, is still active in the world, although death does not “reign” in the world any more. The victory of the Risen Christ is not yet fully disclosed. Only in the General Resurrection will Christ’s redemptive triumph be fully actualized. “*Expectandum nobis etiam et corporis ver est*” (Minucius Felix, *Octavius*, 34). This was the common conviction of the Patristic age, since Athenagoras and St. Irenaeus and up to St. John of Damascus. St. Athanasius was most emphatical on this point, and St. Gregory of Nyssa also. Christ had to die in order to abrogate death and corruption by His death. Indeed, death was that “last enemy” which he had to destroy in order to redeem man out of corruption. This was one of the main arguments of St. Athanasius in his *De Incarnatione*. “In order to accept death He had a body” (*de incarn.* 21). And St. Gregory of Nyssa says the same: “if one inquires into the mystery, he will say rather, not that death happened to Him as a consequence of birth, but that birth itself was assumed on the account of death” (*orat. cat.* 32). Or in the sharp phrase of Tertullian: *Christus mori missus, nasci quoque necessario habuit, ut mori posset* (*de carne Christi*, 6). The bodily Resurrection of man was one of the main aims of Redemption. The coming and general Resurrection will not be just a “re-statement” to the previous condition. This would have been rather an “immortalization of the death”, as St. Maximus sharply pointed out (*epist.* 7). The coming Resurrection was conceived rather as a new creative act of God, as an integral and comprehensive “re-novation” of the whole Creation. “Behold, I make all things new”. In the phrase of St. Gregory of Nazianzus, it was to be the third and final “transformation” of human life (“μετάστασις”), completing and superseding the two previous, the Old and the New testaments, a concluding eschatological *σείσιμός* (*orat. theol.* V. 25).

3. The new vision of human destiny, in the light of Christ, could not be accurately and adequately expressed in the terms of the current philosophies of that time. A new set of concepts had to be elaborated, before the Christian belief could be fully articulated and developed into a coherent system of theological propositions. The problem was not that of adjustment, but rather of a radical change of the basic habits of mind. Greek Philosophy was dominated by the ideas of permanence and recurrence. In spite of the great variety of trends, a common pattern can be detected in all systems. This was a vision of an "eternal" Cosmos. Everything which was worth of existence had to have actually existed in the most perfect manner before all time, and nothing could be added to this accomplished fulness. No basic change was possible, and no real "novelty" could ever emerge. The whole, the Cosmos, was perfect and complete, and nothing could be perfected or completed. There could be but a disclosure of the pre-existing fulness. Aristotle made this point with a complete frankness. "What is 'of necessity' coincides with what is 'always', since that which 'must be' cannot possibly 'not-be'. Hence a thing is eternal if its 'being' is necessary; and if it is eternal, its 'being' is necessary. And if, therefore, the 'coming-to-be' of a thing is necessary, its 'coming-to-be' is eternal; and if eternal, necessary. It follows that the 'coming-to-be' of anything, if it is absolutely necessary, must be cyclical, i. e. must return upon itself ... It is in circular movement therefore, and in cyclical 'coming-to-be', that the 'absolutely necessary' is to be found" (*de gen. et corr.* II. 2, 338a). The argument is perfectly clear. If there is any "sufficient reason" for a certain thing to exist ("necessity"), this reason must be "eternal", i. e. there can be no reason whatever, why this thing should not have existed "from eternity", since otherwise the reason for its existence could not have been "sufficient" or "necessary". And consequently "being" is simply "necessary". No increase in "being" is conceivable. Nothing truly real can be "innovated". The true reality is always "behind" ("from eternity"), and never „ahead". Accordingly, the Cosmos is a periodical being, and there will be no end of cosmic "re-volutions". The highest symbol of reality is exactly the recurrent circle. The

cosmic reality, of which man was but a part, was conceived as a permanent cyclical process, enacted, as it were, in an infinite series of self-reproducing instalments, of self-reiterating circles. Only circle is perfect<sup>1</sup>. Obviously, there was no room for any real "eschatology" in such a scheme. Greek Philosophy indeed was always concerned rather with the "first principles" than with the "last things". The whole conception was obviously based on astronomical experience. Indeed, the celestial movements were periodical and recurrent. The whole course of rotation would be accomplished in a certain period ("the Great Year"), and then will come a "repetition", a new and identical cycle or circle. There was no "pro-gress" in time, but only eternal returns, a "cyclophoria"<sup>2</sup>. Time itself was in this scheme but a rotation, a periodical reiteration of itself. As Plato put it in the "Timaeus", time "imitates" eternity, and rolls on according to the laws of numbers (38a, b), and in this sense it can be called "a mobile image of eternity" (37d). In itself, time is rather a lower or reduced mode of existence. This idea of the periodical succession of identical worlds seems to be traditional in the Greek Philosophy. The Pythagoreans seem to have been the first to profess an exact repetition. With Aristotle this periodical conception of the Universe took a strict scientific shape and was elaborated into a coherent system of Physics. Later on this idea of periodical returns was taken up by the Stoics. They professed the belief in the periodical dissolution and "rebirth" of all things, *παλιγγενεσία*, and then every minute detail will be exactly reproduced. This return was what the Stoics used to call the "Universal Restoration", *ἀποκατάστασις τῶν πάντων*. And this was obviously an

<sup>1</sup> On the notion of the circular motion in Aristotle see O. Hamelin, *Le Système d'Aristote*, 2 ed., Paris 1831, p. 336ss.; J. Chevalier, *La Notion du Nécessaire chez Aristote et chez ses prédecesseurs, particulièrement chez Platon*, Paris 1915, p. 160ss., 180ss.; R. Mugnier, *La Théorie du Premier Moteur et l'Evolution de la Pensée Aristotelienne*, Paris 1930, p. 24ss.

<sup>2</sup> See Pierre Duhem, *Le Système du Monde, Histoire des Doctrines Cosmologiques de Platon à Copernic*, t. I, Paris 1914, pp. 65ss., 275—296, and especially t. II, Paris 1914, p. 447ss., — *Les Pères de l'Eglise et la Grande Année*. Cf. Hans Meyer, *Zur Lehre von der ewigen Wiederkunft aller Dinge*, in „Festgabe A. Ehrhard“, Bonn 1922, S. 359ff.

astronomical term<sup>1</sup>. There was a kind of a cosmic *perpetuum mobile*, and all individual existences were hopelessly or inextricably involved in this cosmic rotation, in these cosmic rhythms and "astral courses" (this was precisely what the Greeks used to call "destiny" or fate, ἡ εἰμαμένη, *vis positionis astrorum*). The Universe itself was always numerically the same, and its laws were immutable and invariable and each next world therefore will exactly resemble the earlier ones in all particulars. There was no room for history in this scheme. "Cyclical motion and the transmigration of souls is not history. It was a history built on the pattern of astronomy, it was indeed itself a kind of astronomy"<sup>2</sup>. Already Origen protested most vigorously against this system of cosmic bondage. "If this be true, then the free will is destroyed" (*contra Celsum*, IV. 67 etc.; cf. V. 20—21). Oscar Cullmann, in his renowned book, *Christus und die Zeit*, has well depicted the radical divergence between the "circular" concept of time in the Greek thought and the "linear" concept in the Bible and in the Christian doctrine. The ancient Fathers were fully aware of this divergence. *Circuitus illi jam explosi sunt*, exclaims St. Augustine. Let us follow Christ, "the right way", and turn our mind away from the vain circular maze of the impious. — *Viam rectam sequentes quae nobis est Christus. Eo duce et salvatore, a vano et inepto impiorum circuitu iter fidei mentemque avertamus* (*de Civ. Dei*, XII. 20). — Now, this circular conception of the Universe, as "a periodical being", was closely connected with the initial conviction of the Greeks that the Universe, the Cosmos, was "eternal", i. e. had no beginning, and therefore was also "immortal", i. e. could have no end. The Cosmos itself was, in this

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<sup>1</sup> See Oepke, s. v. ἀποκατάστασις, in Kittel, I, S. 389: „Vor allem wird ἀποκατάστασις terminus technicus für die Wiederherstellung des kosmischen Zyklus.“

<sup>2</sup> A. Lossev, *Essays in Ancient Symbolism and Mythology*, t. I, Moscow 1930 (in Russian) p. 643. This book is one of the most valuable contributions to the modern discussion of Platonism, including the Christian Platonism. It is utterly rare. The book, and other valuable writings of Lossev in the same field, is obtainable in Fritz Lieb's Library, at the University of Basel.

sense, "Divine". Therefore, the radical refutation of the cyclical conception was possible only in the context of a coherent doctrine of Creation. Christian Eschatology does inextricably depend upon an adequate doctrine of Creation. And it was at this point that the Christian thought encountered major difficulties<sup>1</sup>. Origen was probably the first to attempt a systematic formulation of the doctrine of Creation. But he was, from the outset, strongly handicapped by the "hellenistic" habits of his mind. Belief in Creation was for him an integral article of the Apostolic faith. But from the absolute "perfection" of God he felt himself compelled to deduce the "eternity" of the world. Otherwise, he thought, it would be necessary to admit some changes in God Himself. In Origen's conception, the Cosmos is a kind of an eternal companion of God. The Aristotelian character of his reasoning at this point is obvious. Next, Origen had to admit "cycles" and a sort of rotation, although he plainly rejected the iterative character of the successive "cycles". There was an unresolved inconsistency in his system. The "eternity" of the world implied an infinite number of "cycles" in the past, but Origen was firmly convinced that this series of "cycles" was to come to an end, and therefore there had to be but a finite number of "cycles" in the future. Now, this is plainly inconsistent. On the other hand, Origen was compelled to interpret the final "con-summation" as a "re-turn" to the initial situation, "before all times". In any case, history was for him, as it were, unproductive, and all that might be "added" to the preexistent reality had to be simply omitted in the ultimate summing up, as an accidental alloy or vain accretion. The fulness of Creation had been realized by the creative *fiat* "in eternity" once for all. The process of history could have for him but a "symbolic" meaning. It was more or less transparent for these eternal values. All links in the chain could be interpreted as signs of a higher reality. Ultimately, all such signs and symbols will pass away, although it was difficult to see why the infinite series of

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. my article, The Idea of Creation in Christian Philosophy, in the „Eastern Churches Quarterly“, vol. VIII, 1949, 3 Supplementary issue, „Nature and Grace“.



"cycles" should ever end. Nevertheless, all signs have their own function in history. Events, as temporal happenings, have no permanent significance. The only valid interpretation of them is "symbolical". This basic assumption led Origen into insuperable difficulties in Christology. Could the Incarnation itself be regarded as a permanent achievement, or rather was it no more than an "episode" in history, to be surpassed in "eternity"? Moreover, "manhood" itself, as a particular mode of existence, was to be interpreted precisely as an "episode", like all differentiation of the beings. It did not belong to the original plan of Creation and originated in the general disintegration of the Fall. Therefore, it was bound to disappear, when the whole of Creation is restored on its initial integrity, when the primordial world of pure spirits is re-stated in its original splendour. History simply has nothing to contribute to this ultimate "apocatastasis". — Now, it is easy to dismiss this kind of Eschatology as an obvious case of the "acute Hellenization". The true historical situation, however, was much more complex. Origen was wrestling with a real problem. His "aberrations" were in fact the birth-pangs of the Christian mind. His own system was an abortive birth. Or, to change the metaphor, his failures themselves were to become sign-posts on the road to a more satisfactory synthesis. It was in the struggle with Arianism that the Fathers were compelled to a clear conception of "Creation", as distinguished from other forms of "becoming" and "being". The contribution of St. Athanasius was decisive at this point. St. Augustine, from another point of view, was wrestling with the same problem, and his discovery that Time itself had to be regarded as a creature was one of the most relevant achievements of the Christian thought. This discovery liberated this thought from the heavy heritage of the Hellenistic habits. And a safe foundation was laid for the Christian theology of History.

4. No comprehensive integration of human existence is possible without the Resurrection of the dead. The unity of mankind can be achieved only if the dead rise. This was perhaps the most striking novelty in the original Christian message. The preaching of the Resurrection as well as the preaching of the Cross was

foolishness and a stumbling-block to the Gentiles. The Christian belief in a coming Resurrection could only confuse and embarrass the Greeks. It would mean for them simply that the present imprisonment in the flesh will be renewed again and for ever. The expectation of a bodily resurrection would befit rather an earthworm, suggested Celsus, and he jeered in the name of common sense. He nicknamed Christians "a flesh-loving crew", *φιλοσώματον γένος*, and treated the Docetists with far greater sympathy and understanding (apud Origen, *contra Celsum*, V. 14; VII. 36, 39). Porphyrius, in his "*Life of Plotinus*", tells that Plotinus, it seemed, "was ashamed to be in the flesh", and with this statement he begins his biography. "And in such a frame of mind he refused to speak either of his ancestors or parents, or of his fatherland. He would not sit for a sculptor or painter." "It was absurd to make a permanent image of this perishable frame. It was already enough that we should bear it now" (*Life of Plotinus*, 1). This philosophical asceticism of Plotinus should be distinguished from Oriental dualism, Gnostic or Manichean. Plotinus himself wrote very strongly "against Gnostics". Yet, it was rather a difference of motives and methods. The practical issue in both cases was one and the same, — a "flight" or "retreat" from this corporeal world, an "escape" from the body. Plotinus himself suggested the following simile. Two men live in the same house. One of them blames the builder and his handiwork, because it is made of inanimate wood and stone. The other praises the wisdom of the architect, because the building is so skilfully constructed. For Plotinus this world was not evil, it was the "image" or reflection of the world above, and probably the best of images. Still, one had to aspire beyond all images, from the image to the prototype. One should cherish not the copy, but the pattern (V. 8.8). "He knows that when the time comes, he will go out and will no longer have any need of a house." It is to say that the soul was to be liberated from the ties of the body, to be disrobed, and then only it could ascend to its proper sphere (II. 9. 15). "The true awakening is the true resurrection from the body, and not with the body", *ἀπὸ σώματος, οὐ μετὰ σώματος, ἀνάστασις*, — since the

body is by nature opposite to the soul (τὸ ἀλλότριον). A bodily resurrection would be just a passage from one "sleep" to another (III. 6. 6). The polemical turn of these phrases is obvious. The concept of the bodily resurrection was quite alien and unwelcome to the Greek mind. The Christian attitude was just the opposite. "Not for that we would be unclothed, but that we would be clothed, that what is mortal may be swallowed up by life" (2 Cor. 5.4). St. Paul was pleading for an ἀπολύτρωσις τοῦ σώματος (Rom. 8.23)<sup>1</sup>. As St. John Chrysostom commented on these passages, one should clearly distinguish the body itself and "corruption". The body is God's creation, although it had been corrupted. The "strange thing" which must be put off is not the body, but corruption (*de resurr. mortuor.* 6). There was a flagrant "conflict in anthropology" between the Christian message and the Greek wisdom. A new anthropology had to be elaborated in order to commend the Christian hope of Resurrection to the Gentiles. In the last resort it was Aristotle and not Plato who could offer help to Christian philosophers. In the philosophical interpretation of its eschatological hope, Christian theology from the very beginning clings to Aristotle<sup>2</sup>. Such a biased preference may appear to be unexpected and strange. For, strictly speaking, in Aristotle there was no room for any "after-death" destiny of man. In his interpretation man was entirely an earthly being. Nothing really human passes beyond the grave. Man is mortal through and through. His singular being is not a person and does not survive death. But yet in this weakness of Aristotle was his strength. He had a real understanding of the unity of human existence. Man was to him, first of all, an individual being, a living unit. Man was one just in his duality, as an "animated body", and two elements in him exist only together, in a concrete and indivisible correlation. Soul and body, for Aristotle they are not even two elements, which are combined

<sup>1</sup> See Büchsel, s. v. ἀπολύτρωσις, in Kittel, IV, 355.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. the most interesting remarks of E. Gilson in his Gifford lectures: *L'Esprit de la Philosophie Médiévale*, 2nd edition, Paris 1944, the whole chapter IX, „L'anthropologie chrétienne“, p. 175 ss. Gilson seems to have underestimated the Aristotelian elements in the Early Patristics, but he gives an excellent *mis au point* of the whole problem.

or connected with each other, but rather simply two aspects of the same concrete reality. "Soul and body together constitute the animal. Now it needs no proof that the soul cannot be separated from the body" (*de anima*, 413a). Once the functional unity of the soul and body has been broken by the death, no "organism" is there any more, the corpse is no more a body, and a dead man can hardly be called man at all (*meteor.* IV.12, 389b: *νεκρὸς ἄνθρωπος δμῶνιμος*; cf. *de part. anim.* 641a). No "transmigration" of souls to other bodies was possible for Aristotle. Each soul abides in its "own" body, which it creates and forms, and each body has its "own" soul, as its vital principle, "eidos" or form. This anthropology easily lends itself to a biological simplification, when man is almost completely equated with any other living being. Such indeed was the interpretation of many followers of the Stagirite, including the famous Alexander of Aphrodisias. Aristotle himself has hardly escaped these inherent gangers of his conception. Of course, man was for him an „intelligent being", and the faculty of thinking was his distinctive mark. But the doctrine of νοῦς does not fit very well into the general frame of the Aristotelian psychology, and probably is a survival of his early Platonism. It was possible to adapt the Aristotelian conception for Christian purposes, and this was just what was done by the Fathers, but Aristotle himself obviously "was not a Moslem mystic, nor a Christian theologian"<sup>1</sup>. The real failure of Aristotle was not in his "naturalism", but in that he could not admit any permanence of the individual. But this was rather a common failure of the Greek philosophy. Beyond time Greek thought visualized only the "typical", and nothing truly personal. Hegel suggested, in his *Aesthetics*, that Sculpture gives the

<sup>1</sup> R. D. Hicks, in the Introduction to his edition of *de anima*, Cambridge, at the University Press, 1934, p. LVI. Cf. Anton C. Pegis, *Saint Thomas and the Greeks*, The Aquinas Lecture, 1939, 3rd printing, Marquette University Press, Milwaukee, 1951, p. 171. Already E. Rohde, *Psyche, Seelencult und Unsterblichkeitsglaube der Griechen*, 3. Aufl. 1903, Bd. II, S. 305, suggested that the whole doctrine of *Nous* was simply a survival of Aristotle's early Platonism. This idea was recently upheld by Werner Jäger, *Aristotle, Fundamentals of the History of his development*, E. translation by Richard Robinson, 2nd edition, Oxford, at the Clarendon Press, 1948, p. 332f.

true key to the whole of Greek mentality<sup>1</sup>. Recently, a Russian scholar, A. Th. Lossev, pointed out that the whole of Greek philosophy was just "a sculptural symbolism". He was thinking especially of Platonism, but his suggestion has a wider relevance. "Against a dark background, as a result of an interplay of light and shadow, there stands out a blind, colourless, cold, marble and divinely beautiful, proud and majestic body, a statue. And the world is such a statue, and gods are statues; the city-state also, and the heroes, and the myths, and ideas, all conceal underneath them this original sculptural intuition . . . There is no personality, no eyes, no spiritual individuality. There is a "something", but not a "someone", an individualized "it", but no living person with his proper name . . . There is no one at all. There are bodies, and there are ideas. The spiritual character of the ideas is killed by the body, but the warmth of the body is restrained by the abstract idea. There are here beautiful, but cold and blissfully indifferent statues"<sup>2</sup>. And yet Aristotle did feel and understand the individual more than anyone else in his tradition. He provided Christian philosophers with all the elements out of which an adequate conception of personality could be built up. His strength was just in his understanding of the empirical wholeness of human existence. Aristotle's conception was radically transformed in this Christian adaptation, for new perspectives were opened, and all the terms were given a new significance. And yet one cannot fail to acknowledge the Aristotelian origin of the main anthropological ideas in early Christian theology. Such a christening of Aristotelianism we find already in Origen, to a certain extent in St. Methodius of Olympus as well, and later in St. Gregory of Nyssa, who in his thrilling *De Anima et Resurrectione* attempted a daring synthesis of Origen and Methodius. The break between the "Intellect", impersonal and "eternal", and the soul, individual but mortal, was overcome and healed in the new self-con-

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<sup>1</sup> Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik*, *Sämtliche Werke*, Bd. X. 2, S. 377; cf. the whole section on Sculpture, which was for Hegel a peculiarly „classical art“, S. 353f.

<sup>2</sup> Lossev, *Essays in Ancient Symbolism and Mythology*, I, p. 670, 632, 633, — in Russian.

sciousness of a spiritual personality. The idea of personality itself was propably the greatest Christian contribution to philosophy. And then the tragedy of death could be visualized in its true dimension. For Plato and Platonists death was just a welcome release out of the bodily bondage, "a flight to fatherland". For Aristotle and his followers it was a natural end of earthly existence, a sad but inevitable end, "and nothing is thought to be any longer either good or bad for the dead" (*ethic. Nicom.* III. 6, III. 5a). For Christians it was a catastrophe, a frustration of human existence, a reduction to a sub-human state, abnormal and rooted in the sinful condition of the mankind, out of which one is now liberated by the victory of Christ. The task of Christian theologians was now to relate the hope of Resurrection to the new conception of man. It is interesting to observe that the problem was clearly seen and stated in the first theological essay on the Resurrection which we possess. In his brief treatise *De resurrectione mortuorum*, Athenagoras of Athens begins with the plain statement that "God gave independent being and life neither to the nature of the soul itself, nor to the nature of the body separately, but rather to men, composed of soul and body". There would no longer be a man, if the completeness of this structure were broken, for then the identity of the individual would be broken also. "And if there is no resurrection, human nature is no longer human" (*de resurr. mort.* 13, 15). Aristotle concluded from the mortality of the body to the mortality of the soul, which was but the vital power of the body. Both go down together. Athenagoras, on the contrary, infers the resurrection of the body from the immortality of the reasonable soul. Both are kept together<sup>1</sup>. Thus, a safe foundation was laid for the further elaboration.

<sup>1</sup> On the Aristotelian background of Athenagoras' conception see Max Pohlenz, in *Zeitschrift für die wissenschaftliche Theologie*, Bd. 47, S. 241ff.; cf. E. Schwarz, index graecus to his edition of Athenagoras, in „*Texte und Untersuchungen*“ IV. 2, 1891, s. v. *εἶδος*, S. 105. Cf. E. Gilson, *L'Esprit de la Philosophie Médiévale*, p. 197. „Lorsqu'on pèse les expressions d'Athénagoras, la profondeur de l'influence exercée par la Bonne Nouvelle sur la pensée philosophique apparaît à plein. Créée par Dieu comme une individualité distincte, conservée par un acte de création

5. The purpose of this brief paper was not to give a complete summary of the eschatological thought and teaching of the Fathers. It was rather an attempt to emphasize the main themes and the main problems with which the Fathers had to wrestle. Again, it was also an attempt to show how deeply and closely all eschatological topics are related to the core of the Christian message and faith, to the Redemption of man by the Incarnate and Risen Lord. Only in this wider perspective, in the total context of Christian doctrine, can one fully and faithfully understand even the variations of the Patristic thought. The eschatological hope is rooted in the faith, and cannot be understood except in this context. The Fathers never attempted a systematic exposition of Eschatology, in a narrow and technical sense. But they were fully aware of that inner logic which had to lead from the belief in Christ the Redeemer to the hope for the age to come: the end of the world, the final consummation, the resurrection of the dead, and life everlasting.

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continué dans l'être qu'il a reçu de lui, l'homme est désormais le personnage d'un drame qui est celui de sa propre destinée. Comme il ne dépendait pas de nous d'exister, il ne dépend pas de nous de ne pas exister. Le décret divin nous a condamné à l'être; faits par la création, refaits par la redemption, et à quel prix. Nous n'avons le choix qu'entre une misère ou une béatitude également éternelles. Rien de plus résistant qu'une individualité de ce genre, prévue, voulue, élue par Dieu, indestructible comme le décret divin lui-même qui l'a fait naître; mais rien aussi qui soit plus étranger à la philosophie de Platon comme à celle d'Aristote. Là encore, à partir du moment où elle visait une pleine justification rationnelle de son espérance, la pensée chrétienne se trouvait contrainte à l'originalité."

## Tertullian's Doctrine of Sin and the Power of Absolution in '*de pudicitia*'<sup>1</sup>

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Tertullian's *de pudicitia* is founded on, and motivated in its arguments by, a paradox constituted by two contradictory propositions. The first says that sins are 'either forgivable or unforgivable; that is to say, sins for which penitence can obtain pardon, or sins for which penitence cannot obtain pardon in any way — *nullo modo* — in Tertullian's emphatic phrase<sup>2</sup>. The second says that sins which are unforgivable, and for which penitence cannot obtain pardon, nonetheless can obtain pardon from God. The first thus consists of a fundamental distinction between forgivable and unforgivable sins. The second asserts the paradox of sin which, though said to be unforgivable, nonetheless can be forgiven by God.

We find this double proposition stated by Tertullian in its most paradoxical form at the outset of his argument, in *de pudicitia* 2—3. Tertullian himself here raises the question through a fictitious opponent whom he introduces in his usual manner: if unforgivable sins cannot obtain pardon, do such sins ask for any penitence which would only be done in vain? He has no trouble in answering coolly that they most definitely do, and that such penitence is not done in vain, since it can earn pardon from God.

But each of these two contradictory propositions also serves respectively as the theme of one the two parts into which Tertullian's treatise is divided.

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<sup>1</sup> This paper summarizes some of the results of a detailed study of '*de pudicitia*', part of a larger study of Tertullian's concept of the Church which I am preparing for publication and to which I have to refer for much that could not be discussed adequately, if at all, within the scope of a short communication.

<sup>2</sup> *de pudic.* 2, C(orpus) S(criptorum) E(cclesiasticorum) L(atinorum) 20, p. 224, 16.



In the first part Tertullian applies the distinction between forgivable and unforgivable sins to carnal sin and proves to his complete satisfaction that carnal sin ranks, together with murder and idolatry, as one of the unforgivable sins.

In the second part Tertullian explains how unforgivable sins can nonetheless obtain pardon from God, namely *ex potestate*, by the power defined by him as the Spirit that is God. „*Quid potestas? Spiritus. Spiritus autem deus*<sup>1</sup>.“ *Potestas*, power of absolution from sin which otherwise is unforgivable, is one and the same with the power which manifests itself in the working of miracles. It is the personal charisma of prophets and apostles; and it belongs by definition to the Church, if the Church, *proprie et principaliter*<sup>2</sup>, is the Spirit. The Church therefore can forgive any sin through a *homo spiritualis*<sup>3</sup>, one who like a prophet or apostle has the Spirit. But *potestas* is not a power which can be claimed by the bishop by virtue of his office, from his succession to the power of the keys given in the person of Peter to the Church.

Can such a paradox as forms the basis of *de pudicitia* be maintained in reason? I believe and hope to be able to show that on certain assumptions made by Tertullian this is possible; and that there is no need to follow Poschmann<sup>4</sup> in accepting it as a self-contradiction in which Tertullian was caught, while trying to defend at all costs the Montanist penitential discipline against the Church and in conflict with his own former principles.

To begin with Tertullian's fundamental distinction between forgivable and unforgivable sins, this must be considered to represent a teaching defining sin as being of a double kind, pardonable and unpardonable, not unto death and unto death, and a teaching concerning individual sin according to this distinction. This, however, is a teaching which can be given by one alone, by God Himself, in divine revelation. Being a divine

<sup>1</sup> de pudic. 21, CSEL 20, p. 268, 31 — p. 269, 1.

<sup>2</sup> de pudic. 21, CSEL 20, p. 271, 3—4.

<sup>3</sup> de pudic. 21, CSEL 20, p. 271, 9.

<sup>4</sup> Paenitentia Secunda, Bonn, 1940, p. 314.

teaching and instruction, it carries with it authority by which certain sins — a certain class of sin — can be forgiven; and it withholds such authority in respect of other sins. It divides sins into those for which penitence can obtain pardon, and those for which, in the absence of divine authority, penitence cannot obtain pardon, *nullo modo*. Thus the distinction between forgivable and unforgivable sins is introduced by Tertullian in *de pudicitia* c. 2 as given, or rather as claimed by him to be given, by a divine instruction in the Scriptures, "*hinc dimittentes, hinc retinentes delicta*"<sup>1</sup>.

But scriptural instruction, the dominical and apostolic tradition, is of two kinds: *fides* or *disciplina*<sup>2</sup>. Like *fides*, *disciplina* is a divine teaching in the form of precept or law — an essential unity of doctrine and law. But whereas in *fides* God teaches intellectual truth — the truth of Himself and his works — the content of that right belief which it is necessary for man to hold in order to be saved, *disciplina* teaches practical truth, the things to be done or not to be done, for performance and observance, for the good life necessary for salvation. *Fides* and *disciplina* offer an exact parallel, in religion, to theory and practice in classical philosophy — *doctrina* and *disciplina* in Cicero's version<sup>3</sup>. The divine *disciplina* taught by Christ and the apostles, founds the polity of the Church; it institutes Baptism and the Eucharist, and the second penitence; it teaches prayer and worship; and it gives moral instruction. *Disciplina* is divine practical instruction; and it is accordingly the practice of the Church, from a double use of *disciplina*, both for the cause and the effect, in which, again, Tertullian follows classical usage. It is accordingly the way in which peace and unity are secured in the churches; in which the sacraments are admin-

<sup>1</sup> de pudic. 2, CSEL 20, p. 224, 4: *de ista differentia iam et quasdam praemisimus altercationes scripturarum hinc retinentium hinc dimittentium delicta*.

<sup>2</sup> The following, summarizes the interpretation of "*disciplina*" in my study of Tertullian's concept of the Church. For the fundamental distinction between *fides* and *disciplina*, cf. V. Morel, *Disciplina*, *Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique*, vol. 40, 1944—45, pp. 17 sqq.

<sup>3</sup> cf. H. I. Marrou, *Bull. du Cange*, 9, 1934, pp. 10—11.

istered; in which prayer and devotion, the worship of God are observed; and it is the Christian's guide for walking in the ways of God, the Christian *conversatio*. Thus *disciplina* rules and governs the Church as *Nomos* ruled and governed the ancient *Polis*.

The divine instruction concerning sin, then, is given in Tertullian's terminology, by the divine *disciplina*. It is *disciplina*, divine practical instruction, which defines sins as forgivable or as unforgivable, so as to authorize the pardon to be given to certain sins, and to exclude other sins from any such pardon. Thus sins are divided into forgivable or unforgivable sins according as they can or as they cannot be forgiven *ex disciplina*.

*Disciplina* in particular is divine moral instruction, the divine moral law. It is the Christian moral order founded and ruled by Christian moral law. In this order and under this law sins, in real truth, are forgivable and unforgivable, as they are thus defined and constituted in their respective natures by the divine *disciplina*. To the moral order, to this distinction between forgivable and unforgivable sins in the moral and under the moral laws, however, there exists an exact analogy in the natural order and the division, in it and under the laws by which it is constituted, between the things which are possible and the things which are impossible. To this analogy we are directed by Tertullian by the mention of miracles<sup>1</sup>, the doing of what is impossible and cannot be done in any way from natural causes, from potentialities that exist in nature.

It is not only that what is impossible can be, and has been done. What is impossible in the natural order and under the natural law is not conceivable other than as capable of being done by God, so that saying that something is impossible is only saying at the same time that it can be done by God. That which is impossible excludes any other conception by reason of the existence of God and therefore of divine power which is a necessary attribute of deity — the infinite power of God which transcends the law imposed by Him on nature and

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<sup>1</sup> cf. de pudic. 21, CSEL 20, p. 269, 7 sqq.

transcends what in the natural order and under the natural law is possible. Correspondingly sins which in the moral order and under the moral law are unforgivable or which cannot be forgiven *ex disciplina*, in principle are conceivable only as forgivable, by God, *ex potestate*, from the necessary relation in which all that is and that can or cannot be, is to God and the power which is the attribute of deity. The fact that in the context of Scripture there are sins for which penitence cannot obtain pardon in any way, reserves, in principle, such sins to God and divine power for the pardon they can receive, in analogy with the working of miracles. It is thus divine power which gives cause and maintains the paradox of sin which — being unforgivable — nonetheless can be remitted; of things that — being impossible — nonetheless can be accomplished; its being the self-same power that operates in the moral sphere as power of absolution from unforgivable sin and, in the natural sphere, as power of working miracles.

*Potestas*, power, however, embodies two entirely different concepts as *Exousia* and *Dynamis*, *auctoritas* and *vis*<sup>1</sup>. The *Exousia tou theou* is the power which God holds and wields over all, and of which God the Father "*a quo omnia*" is the Fountainhead. On the other hand, the *dynamis tou theou* is an allpotency whereby whatever is and can be in God's will is also in His power. This power is the inalienable property of deity: the one deity, and therefore the one power in Father, Son and Spirit — the power that is the Spirit that is God.

The Spirit, however, is also given to man, in two ways: —

- 1) by participation — the gift of the Spirit as it is possessed by all members of the Church:
- 2) in full — the special gift of the Spirit that is given to prophets and apostles, and which appears also to have been recognised in confessors and martyrs<sup>2</sup>. The full gift of the Spirit

<sup>1</sup> cf. E. Evans' Tertullian's treatise against Praxeas, London, 1948, pp. 55 sqq.

<sup>2</sup> cf. de exhort. cast. 4, ed. Oehler I, p. 744: *Proprie enim apostoli spiritum sanctum habent qui plene habent in operibus prophetiae et efficacia virtutum documentisque linguarum, non ex parte, quod ceteri.*

is the gift of Spirit in the fulness of His deity and therefore also in the fulness of His power: the power of prophecy, the power of miracles, the power of absolution from unforgivable sins.

Thus a distinction between forgivable and unforgivable sins and its application to carnal sin, in the first part of *de pudicitia* leads, in the second part of Tertullian's treatise to a discussion of power, its being claimed for a *homo spiritualis* and denied to the bishop. The same problem is discussed by Tertullian first on the basis of *disciplina* and second on the basis of *potestas*. In this way *de pudicitia* is founded on paradox: a paradox which, as we have shown, Tertullian was able to maintain in strict reason.

As for both this distinction between types of sin and this concept of power, I have no doubt that they are derived by Tertullian from the *disciplina ecclesiastica*, the established practice of the Church; and that accordingly the doctrine of sin and its remission, which is the basis of *de pudicitia*, merely realizes in formal terms, a potential doctrine inherent in this practice. We are told by Tertullian as a plain fact that those guilty of murder and idolatry, two of the three unforgivable sins, were not given peace in the churches<sup>1</sup>. This can only mean that those guilty of such sins were not admitted to the second penitence; and that accordingly murder and idolatry ranked, in practice, as sins which were not and could not be forgiven *ex disciplina*. We are also informed by Tertullian of the recognized practice by which relief from carnal sin was sought from confessors and martyrs, by reason of their distinctive gift of the Spirit and therefore of the power of absolution which in the belief of the Church they were held to possess<sup>2</sup>. If this was the only way in which relief from carnal sin could be found, carnal sin would have ranked as sin which, unforgivable *ex disciplina*,

<sup>1</sup> de pudic. 12, CSEL 20, p. 242, 26 sqq.: *hinc est, quod neque idololatricae neque sanguini pax ab ecclesiis redditur.*

<sup>2</sup> de pudic. 22, CSEL 20, p. 271, 12: *at tu iam et in martyras tuos effundis hanc potestatem . . .* *ibid.*, p. 272, 18: *si dominus tantum de potestatis suae probatione curavit, uti traduceret cogitatus et ita imperaret sanitatem, ne non crederetur posse delicta dimittere, non licet mihi eandem potestatem in aliquo sine eisdem probationibus credere.*

by way of the second penitence could be forgiven *ex potestate*, the power that is the Spirit that is God.

In *de pudicitia* then, Tertullian the Montanist may seem to have returned to the task which he had originally chosen for himself: that is, the *apologia* of the *disciplina*, the practice established by the *disciplina Christi et apostolorum*. *Disciplina* is one of the themes of *de pudicitia*. The other is the power which Tertullian insists is the power of the Spirit, as against the bishop's claim to succession to the Petrine power of the keys. In this clash we can watch the conflict between two conceptions of the Church, the one of the past and the other of the future: the *Ecclesia Spiritus* on the one hand, and on the other the Church founded on the one episcopacy.

## The Augustinian Conception of Grace

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If one would understand the Augustinian conception of grace, basic for the subsequent theology of western Christendom, it is necessary both that one penetrates to an understanding of its philosophical presuppositions and that one sets forth its relation to the Pauline doctrine of grace, upon which it to such a large extent rests. At the same time certain problems in Augustine's theology and philosophy which are of decisive importance for his conception of grace must be considered, among them primarily the problem of predestination.

The Augustinian conception of grace, as is well known, is closely connected with the doctrine of predestination. This historical fact has been interpreted in various ways. Often predestination has been conceived as the very essence of Augustinianism<sup>1</sup>, but the opposite view has also been maintained that the doctrine set forth in the later writings on certain points represents a secondary development, if not a deviation, in relation to the classical Augustinian conception of grace<sup>2</sup>. It is undoubtedly true that Augustine in his later writings from the period after 417/418 gives considerably more attention to the doctrine of predestination than what had previously been

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<sup>1</sup> This view, traditional among protestant theologians, is to-day also held by several roman-catholic scholars. This development is not least due to the essay of O. Rottmanner, *Der Augustinismus*, München 1892, reprinted in his collected essays *Geistesfrüchte aus der Klosterzelle*, München 1908. A French version was published in *Mélanges de science religieuse* VI, 1949, p. 31ff.

<sup>2</sup> See for example J. Mausbach, *Die Ethik des heiligen Augustinus I*, Freiburg i.Br., 1929<sup>a</sup> p. 19, and H. Rondet, *La liberté et la grâce dans la théologie augustiniennne* (Saint Augustin parmi nous) Paris 1954, p. 222.

the case<sup>1</sup>. Some of his last writings are devoted almost entirely to this theme<sup>2</sup>, and it is apparent from Augustine's own statements that he considered the preaching of predestination as an invulnerable defense against the Pelagian doctrine of works<sup>3</sup>. These circumstances, however, do not justify us in drawing the conclusion, that the strongly pronounced doctrine of predestination merely represents an extreme position, called forth by the hard necessity of anti-Pelagian polemics<sup>4</sup>. On the contrary if one considers the matter more closely, the idea of predestination is deeply anchored in Augustine's mature theological thought as reflected in his main writings of the period after 400, where it enters as an organic and necessary element<sup>5</sup>.

In the investigation of the Augustinian concept of predestination, much weight has often been laid upon its biblical origins, and rightly so<sup>6</sup>. Surely Augustine arrives at his doctrine of

<sup>1</sup> A. M. Jacquin, La prédestination d'après saint Augustin, *Miscellanea Agostiniana* II, Roma 1931, p. 855.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *De praedestinatione sanctorum* X, 19 — XX, 42 and *De dono perseverantiae* VII, 15—XXIV, 67 (428/29).

<sup>3</sup> Cf. e. g. *De dono perseverantiae* XXI, 54: „*praedestinatio praedicanda est, ut possit vera Dei gratia, hoc est, quae non secundum merita nostra datur, insuperabili munitione defendi.*“

<sup>4</sup> See among others W. Bright, *Select Anti-Pelagian Treatises of St. Augustine*, Oxford 1880, p. XIII, and H. Rondet, *Gratia Christi*, Paris 1948, p. 141 f. This seems also to be presupposed by O. Rottmanner, *Der Augustinismus*, München 1892, p. 5.

<sup>5</sup> First of all should here be mentioned *De trinitate* (400—416), *De genesi ad litteram* (401—415) and *De civitate Dei* (413—426). Dating according to the tables in F. Cayré-F. van Steenberghe, *Les directions doctrinales de saint Augustin*, Paris 1948, p. 101 ff.

<sup>6</sup> This opinion is stressed somewhat onesidedly by theologians belonging to or influenced by the tradition from Calvin. Modern representatives of this view are A. D. R. Polman, *De praedestinatieleer van Augustinus*, Thomas van Aquino en Calvijn, Franeker 1936, and H. Diem, *Augustins Interesse in der Prädestinationslehre*, *Theologische Aufsätze Karl Barth zum 50. Geburtstag*, München 1936, p. 362 ff. We find the same tendency uncritically to identify all that is said about predestination with a biblical line of thought, while statements about free will are traced to a rationalizing tendency in A. F. N. Lekkerkerker, *Römer 7 und 9 bei Augustin*, Amsterdam 1942. One thereby overlooks the fact that Augustine's theology constitutes an articulated whole with a definitely determined ideational structure, which does not allow an element to be considered apart from its relationship with the others.



predestination under the direct influence of Pauline ideas<sup>1</sup>, but at the same time it is well not to forget that the doctrine of predestination also has its given background in Augustinian philosophical thought. It is, in fact, impossible to understand how Augustine views grace and free will and to explain the important differences which, nonetheless, prevail between the Augustinian and the Pauline understanding of grace if one disregards these particular Augustinian presuppositions. We must therefore briefly sketch the main outlines of the Augustinian doctrine of creation<sup>2</sup>, which may be characterized as a synthesis of the biblical account of creation and the Neoplatonic philosophical world view.

First we must bear in mind, that God's eternal decree (*propositum Dei*) for Augustine is closely connected with the concept of *Verbum Dei*. In God's eternal Word the whole creation has its ground, both the spiritual creation, which has the primacy in that it immediately intuits the eternal grounds (*rationes aeternae*) and the corporeal creation, which is directed by its own inherent formal principles (*causales rationes, rationes*

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The idea of predestination isolated from its given philosophical background is no longer Augustinian, and its significance can not satisfactorily be explained solely from the Bible passages which Augustine cites in his exposition of the doctrine. The strongly biblicistic feature in much contemporary protestant theology which makes itself felt in historical theology as a latent valuational element can be considered as a counterpart to the scholastic dogmatic tradition which burdens historical theology in Roman Catholicism. Both the biblicistic and the scholastic methods represent a marked dogmatism, and both are by reason of their atomistic approach unable to understand the development of theological thought in the concrete context of the history of ideas.

<sup>1</sup> This appears as well from Augustine's own later witness as from in *Ad Simplicianum* (396/97), where Augustine during the interpretation of Rom. 9 for the first time is forced to accept the idea of the absolute and unconditional predestination. Cf. P. Platz, *Der Römerbrief in der Gnadenlehre Augustins*, Würzburg 1938, p. 188 ff.

<sup>2</sup> For the following general statements see above all *De genesi ad litteram*. For further documentation on this point and on other points mentioned in this paper the reader is referred to my dissertation „Das Prädestinationsproblem in der Theologie Augustins“, Lund 1956.

*seminales*), laid down among its elements in the original creation. At the same time, however, the corporeal creation is subordinated to the spiritual creation, which here appears as a kind of secondary causal factor alongside of God as *causa prima*. It creates nothing but is entirely the servant of God's will in that it develops the potential causality of the world according to the grounds established in the original creation<sup>1</sup>.

God has also retained certain causes for himself without placing them in the original creation. Just as this is the case with respect to miracles, which break the usual order of nature, so it is also the case with respect to grace through which the sinner is saved<sup>2</sup>. In this connection it must be observed, however, that God does nothing contrary to the causes laid down in the original creation. *Causales rationes* are rather both designed to serve in the ordinary natural processes, as well as to serve a stronger will, whichever God may intend, whose will involves necessity for things<sup>3</sup>. Which place does then the idea of the human free will have in this apparently strictly deterministic view?

Generally with respect to creation God's almighty power is the reason for its existence. If he withdrew the power of his wisdom, the whole creation would at once cease to exist<sup>4</sup>. Within the field of natural providence therefore the creation is totally dependent upon the Creator. It is also only through return to *Verbum Dei*, from which it has originally received its existence, that the spiritual creation can be formed into a wise and righteous life. On the other hand, since for the spiritual creation to be and to be good are not identical concepts, as is the case with being and life, it has the possibility to live an unformed life, turned away from the eternal wisdom<sup>5</sup>. Here Augustine draws a clear distinction between God's providence on the natural and on the volitional level<sup>6</sup>, and it is to be noted,

<sup>1</sup> De genesi ad litteram IX, 15, 28; cf. De trinitate III, 9, 16.

<sup>2</sup> De genesi ad litteram IX, 18, 33.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid. IX. 17, 32 and VI, 14, 25f.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid. IV, 12, 22.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid. I, 5, 10.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid. VIII, 9, 17 and 24, 45.

that the work of grace takes place in the context of the latter, where God works only through the actions of men and angels<sup>1</sup>. Thereby the natural integrity of the will is always respected, and the only coercion exercised against it occurs externally<sup>2</sup>. (An internal coercion would be the same as to abolish the nature of the will). So Augustine emphasizes the fundamental difference between causality in the natural and in the spiritual field, and God's foreknowledge, which is related to the certainty of the causal order, does not abolish the nature of the will, since it is just as will that it is foreseen and enters into the causal chain<sup>3</sup>. Augustine also expresses God's relation to rational spirits so: He uses them all in accord with the unchangeable determination of his will, the good spirits through his grace, the evil spirits through their own free will<sup>4</sup>. How then does Augustine combine these ideas with the doctrine of predestination?

Here we must touch upon a main theme in Augustinian theology: the idea of the two cities, which, from their origin in God's eternal decree, runs through history toward the eternally predetermined twofold goal, heaven and hell<sup>5</sup>. It has often been found difficult to conceive the negative side of this opposed pair as based in God's eternal will, and naturally Augustine does not mean that God wills evil in and for itself. But he wills the difference between good and evil. Even a created being, which only through the warning example of evil can be made to do the good, is something good. Thus God permits the earthly city to arise as an antipode to the heavenly city for the fostering of the coming saints<sup>6</sup>. This at the same time does not exclude the fact that God's judgement upon evil is righteous. Through

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid. IX, 18, 33.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. VIII, 23, 44.

<sup>3</sup> De civitate Dei V, 9.

<sup>4</sup> De trinitate III, 4, 9.

<sup>5</sup> De genesi ad litteram XI, 15, 20. De civitate Dei books XI—XXII develop these ideas most fully.

<sup>6</sup> De genesi ad litteram XI, 3, 5—12, 16. Cf. De civitate Dei XI, 17ff.

Adam human nature sinned by deliberate choice and thus merited the severest punishment<sup>1</sup>.

The positive side of the decree, however, perhaps involves an even greater difficulty. In the man Jesus God takes up human nature to fellowship with his eternal Word<sup>2</sup>. The man Jesus Christ, the only mediator between God and man, is by Augustine presented as the clearest and most enlightening example of predestination<sup>3</sup>. Yet it would seem that the necessity emanating from God's hidden will, which expresses itself in Christ's predestination as head, just as in the predestination of Christians to be members in Christ's body<sup>4</sup>, could hardly be united with Augustine's idea of man's moral responsibility basic for his theological thought<sup>5</sup>. The conception of *meritum malum* is ultimately based on human nature's free choice in Adam, but the conception of *meritum bonum* does not correspond to any deliberate choice from human nature whether in Christ nor in the members of his body.

If one would find the solution to this riddle, one must trace the Augustinian doctrine of man's nature to its innermost

<sup>1</sup> As early as in *Ad Simplicianum* the idea of original guilt is clearly developed. It presupposes that Adam represents human nature as such due to the seminal connection between him and all subsequent generations. This means on the one hand that we, as participating in the same human nature, share its volitionally contracted guilt, on the other hand that our present situation with respect to free choice is not the same as Adam's, since the possibility actually to choose the good, i. e. the assistance of grace, has been lost as a punishment of Adam's sin. The last consequence with reference to this difference between Adam's situation and ours with regard to freedom of choice are drawn in *De correptione et gratia* XI, 29 ff., where Augustine in a very instructive way distinguishes between Adam's grace and ours.

<sup>2</sup> *De trinitate* book IV; *De civitate Dei* IX, 15; XIII, 23; *De correptione et gratia* XI, 30.

<sup>3</sup> *De praedestinatione sanctorum* XV, 30 f.; *De dono perseverantiae* XXIV, 67.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. E. Mersch, *Le corps mystique du Christ* vol. II, Paris 1951<sup>3</sup>, p. 63 ff. especially p. 71 ff.

<sup>5</sup> It is obvious, not at least from *De gratia et libero arbitrio* (426/27) that the concept of *liberum arbitrium*, the necessary basis for the theology of *meritum*, has lost nothing of its central importance during the last period of Augustine's life.

origins. The basic factor which we must there consider is that man is created in the image of God (*imago Dei*). Yet this does not refer to man in his wholeness, but only to the soul in its highest form, *mens rationalis*<sup>1</sup>. Augustine finds therefore in the cognitive function of the soul the basic and most adequate revelation of God's trinitarian nature to be found in the created world<sup>2</sup>. This train of thought can be developed in two directions. The dogmatic questions can be illustrated analogically from psychology<sup>3</sup>, but the psychological phenomena can also be interpreted with respect to their metaphysical significance<sup>4</sup>. Here our special interest is in the latter line, since we hope to find the key to the solution of the predestination problem in Augustine's metaphysical speculations peculiarly interwoven with epistemological investigations.

Without going further into the details of this subtle speculation we might summarize the original contribution of Augustine's philosophy of religion thus: Human psychological manifestations are not as commonly to be viewed as attributes and conditions of a subject existing in space and time. Rather acts of knowledge and will are an immediate revelation of the human soul, its existential form. The spiritual nature of man as expressed in being, knowing and willing is thereby conceived as a personal unity, in analogy with God's triune nature. There is already in the causal relation between the Creator and the creation a basis for a certain essential conformity, which is the reason that one can gain a certain general knowledge of God from created things<sup>5</sup>, but only the soul is created in God's image<sup>6</sup>. With the help of revelation reason is able to discover the metaphysical connection between God's trinitarian nature

<sup>1</sup> De trinitate XII, 7, 12.

<sup>2</sup> De trinitate book XI.

<sup>3</sup> M. Schmaus, Die psychologische Trinitätslehre des hl. Augustinus, Münster i. W. 1927.

<sup>4</sup> For this interpretation see E. Benz, Marius Victorinus und die Entwicklung der abendländischen Willensmetaphysik, Stuttgart 1932, p. 364 ff.

<sup>5</sup> Here Augustine constantly refers to Rom. 1, 20.

<sup>6</sup> Gen. 1, 26. The plural form refers, according to Augustine, to the trinity, which suggests that man is created in the image of the trinity.

and the human soul and to understand man's spiritual essence in its reference to God's nature. It is evident that theological thought receives a revolutionary new form of expression through this metaphysically oriented concept of personality.

Whether this new expression is logically consistent is another question. Étienne Gilson, in an important addition to the third edition of his well-known book on Augustine<sup>1</sup>, points out a series of inconsistencies in the Augustinian epistemology, due apparently to the fact that Augustine took over neo-Platonic concepts without being aware that they implied presuppositions which he as a Christian thinker fundamentally rejected. Thus the Augustinian theory of illumination builds on the principle that man through his reason stands in immediate contact with divine truth—something which is self-evident from a neo-Platonic point of view—whereas Augustine otherwise in principle decisively denies that man can participate in God's essence. Gilson's observation in reality has considerable more far-reaching consequences than his own interpretation of Augustine suggests<sup>2</sup>.

There can hardly be any doubt about the fact that Augustine's conception of free will refers in the final analysis to the conception of freedom in God<sup>3</sup>. In God freedom and eternal unchangeable will are identical. From the position of neo-Platonism it would be both natural and logically consistent to hold that free will and predestination are not contradictory. Augustine is

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<sup>1</sup> É. Gilson, *Introduction à l'étude de Saint Augustin*, Paris 1949, p. 141ff.

<sup>2</sup> Gilson himself states p. 144 «S'il s'agit bien là d'un fait, comme tout invite à le croire, c'est un fait d'une importante capitale pour l'intelligence de l'augustinisme en général et de l'épistémologie en particulier.» He does not use these ideas, however, in the chapter on Christian freedom, p. 185ff.

<sup>3</sup> As Benz indicates, Plotinus explains the question of the freedom of the will through examining God's freedom. Although Augustine in his trinitarian speculation usually makes the opposite approach, even this approach presupposes an analogous metaphysical view as its background. It is in this connection instructive to see how Augustine, when he explains how necessity of freedom can be united, always falls back upon God's (and the holy angels) freedom.

involved, however, in some measure of inconsistency here, because, while he accepts this view, he emphatically rejects the fundamental presupposition on which it rests, namely, that the human soul is part of deity in the third hypostasis. In fact the effects of this central inconsistency extend to every point in his theology, and when we say that the solution to the Augustinian predestination problem might be found in his fundamental metaphysical presuppositions this reservation must be remembered.

One must, accordingly, not forget that the Pauline teaching on grace appears refracted by this specific religio-philosophical medium when it arises anew in Augustine's doctrine of grace. It is of fundamental importance for an understanding of Augustine's theology and its relation to the Pauline doctrine that one notes the reformulation which all the basic theological concepts and questions receive by being placed in this new metaphysical context. This development appears in a particularly clear and instructive way at a point basic for the doctrine of grace if one compares Paul's and Augustine's manner of speaking of grace and works in relation to salvation.

Paul maintains in his wellknown antithesis that the Christian is justified by faith, and not by works. Of course this does not mean that human will and activity are to be banished from the context of justification by faith. On the contrary, faith involves an active pattern of behavior on man's side associated with a long series of volitional acts, embracing the whole of the Christian life. What Paul seeks to emphasize with his antithesis is simply that human activity in relation to God means receiving, because grace and salvation from beginning to end are a gift of God. This means that the gift of eternal life is not bound to any conditions which must be fulfilled from man's side. On the contrary, God's unconditional grace is the starting-point from which the Christian message appeals for faith and works. That an indicative thus goes before the imperative and prepares its way is a characteristic and wellknown feature of the whole New Testament

proclamation. To be sure on the day of judgement there will be question about works, but even on the last day the hope of the faithful for salvation rests entirely on Christ. If judgement were to be made according to works no man would stand. On this matter Paul does not leave us in doubt. The ethics expressed in the Pauline letters builds on the preaching of Christ, the proclamation of God's grace freely given to man, to be received in faith; it does not build on the law's demands for works, from which demand the man who lives in Christ is free<sup>1</sup>.

For Augustine, on the other hand, faith has in itself a purely theoretical content. It means the same as assent, or to use his own expression, to think with assent. This faith, which even demons have cannot of itself justify<sup>2</sup>. To it love must be added. In this connection it is to be noted that Augustine cites Paul's words about faith working through love in an altogether new meaning: Faith justifies, he thinks, because it is active in love<sup>3</sup>. In this way Augustine builds law and grace together in an unified scheme. Law demands good works, grace grants them. The good works thus achieved are the essential condition for man's salvation, nor is the situation altered by the fact that the merit for the fulfillment of the law is entirely attributed to grace. The demands of the law therefore also characterize Augustinian ethics, quite in contrast to Pauline ethics.

At the same time one must beware lest one over-simplifies the situation. The problem law-grace in Augustine's theology is not entirely the same as it was in Paul's reckoning with Judaism. But on the other hand one must maintain that the two views do not lose all connection to each other through the demonstration that the Augustinian approach does not simply correspond to the Pauline understanding of the question.

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<sup>1</sup> These questions are discussed in more detail elsewhere, See p. 260 note 2 *supra*.

<sup>2</sup> De praedestinatione sanctorum II, 5: „... ipsum credere, nihil aliud est, quam cum assensione cogitare.“

<sup>3</sup> De gratia et libero arbitrio VII, 18: „Non ergo habent (sc. daemones) istam fidem ex qua iustus vivit, id est quae per dilectionem operatur, ut reddat ei Deus vitam aeternam secundum opera eius.“



The Pauline question remains for Augustine, but in an altered form and under new conditions.

Among these new conditions we must first of all consider the previously mentioned view of man's spiritual essence and his relation to God, which is expressed in Augustine's trinitarian speculation, because it exercises a very deepgoing influence on Augustine's positive exposition of theology. According to this view faith, which primarily expresses the theoretical side of the God relationship, must be formed by the purposively directed energy of the will if it is to result in a righteous life. The cleavage, which here occurs in the Christian life into a theoretic and a practical factor corresponds to an analogous feature in Augustine's doctrine of incarnation and justification. Christ's life and work are seen primarily as a communication of knowledge, an incarnation of the divine wisdom, completed through Christ's sending out of preachers, who in their teaching continue this revelation. It is only through God's preparing of the human will that the human life is drawn actively into the sphere of divine life. As God infuses his *caritas* into the hearts through the Holy Spirit, man's affections are really changed fervently to embrace God's eternal wisdom, where by a righteous life comes into being, which in its turn merits further graces (faith is here only a preparatory though necessary step) and, in the last analysis, the reward of eternal life. Thus the trinitarian scheme forces Augustine to a transformation of the Pauline teaching on a very central point. Characteristically enough Augustine is unable to understand Paul's words, that eternal life is not given as a reward for works until he brings them into his scheme, according to which eternal life is a reward for works, only one must not conceive them as one's own but as God's work in us<sup>1</sup>.

We have here only sought to fix attention upon just what is new in the reception of the Pauline doctrine of grace into Augustinian theology. The Augustinian transposition of early Christian thought comes finally to this, that the words of the

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid. VIII, 19f.

Bible are refracted by the medium of the Augustinian philosophy of religion. From being in their biblical context the message from the Lord to his people judgement and of salvation, — this applies just as much to the words of Moses and the prophets as to Jesus and his apostles —, the biblical texts receive in the Augustinian theology the task of mediating knowledge of God's eternal nature and will, the order of the world and the meaning and goal of human existence. It is important to realize that the religio-philosophical framework providing the medium which refracts the biblical ideas is a variant of the concept of natural religion in Greek philosophy<sup>1</sup>. Through the testimony of the Confessions we learn of the thorough influence it had on Augustine, especially in the form of neo-Platonic spiritualism. It is a paradoxical fact that it was this philosophical theology which led Augustine to appropriate for himself the fundamental ideas of New Testament thought.

It is true that Augustine gave Paul's doctrine of grace a place of honour in his theology, but in so doing he related it to law and works in a way that is not at all Pauline. Because our whole theological tradition, catholic and protestant alike, is really dominated by Augustine's statement of the problem it is of great importance that we remain constantly sensitive to the tension between Augustine and Paul with regard to the conception of grace.

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<sup>1</sup> For this conception cf. W. Jaeger, *The Theology of early Greek Philosophers*, Oxford 1947, F. Solmsen, *Plato's Theology*, Ithaca N. Y. 1942, and A.-J. Festugière, *La révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste*, I—IV, Paris 1944—54.

## A Homologia of Nectarius of Jerusalem

A. OAKLEY, London

I wish first of all to make an apology for the very late date of the document I am venturing to bring to your consideration<sup>1</sup>. We have in this Conference been allowed to make a *terminus ad quem* for Orthodox matters in the date 1453, the Fall of the Imperial City. It is therefore a considerable licence to treat, however cursorily from the strictly historical point of view, material that dates a couple of centuries later. I would plead, however, apart from the fact that time has a somewhat different rhythm in the East, that the material of this Confession of the Orthodox Faith has very clear lines of descent from documents of the same character, the most famous of which is the Confession of St. John Damascene, so highly considered in both East and West. Added to this, the Iron Curtain of its day that descended upon the Oriental Church from the time of the Ottoman conquest, brought in its train a considerable time-lag, as compared with the West, in the articulation and expression of Orthodox mystical, i. a. sacramental theology.

The title *Ὁμολογία* is of interest. *Ὁμολογία* is by derivation a Confession that is assented to, i. e. assented to by superior ecclesiastical authority and conforms strictly to that definition. It was however not until the 17th century that the Orthodox found it necessary to have further authoritative expositions of their faith. Then with the answers of the Patriarch Jeremiah to the Lutherans, a model of pure Orthodoxy, we begin to find a series of Confessions. With the serious theological crisis

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<sup>1</sup> The Orthodox Confession of the Catholic and Apostolic Church of the East, with a preface by Nectarius, ex-Patriarch of Jerusalem, and subscribed to by Parthenius of Constantinople, Joannicius of Alexandria, Macarius of Antioch and Paisius of Jerusalem. 1642.

that was created by the writings (whether false or no) of the Ecumenical Patriarch Cyril Lucar in the matter of Calvinism, the Orthodox Church hastened to correct the errors attributed to him in the Synods of Jassy and Jerusalem. Meanwhile, in Little Russia Peter Mogila consecrated Metropolitan of Kiev in 1632, drew up with the aid of three bishops an Exposition of the faith of the Russian Church and submitted it to the Synod of Jassy in 1643. This exposition or Confession, passing through a number of revisions, finally appeared authenticated by the signatures, among many others, of the four senior Patriarchs, and has since become something in the way of a standard of Eastern doctrine. It is prefaced by a long explanatory introduction from the pen of that very able and distinguished Patriarch of Jerusalem for some time, Nectarius, who undoubtedly had much to do with its correction and revision. Those of us who know the *μετόχιον* of Jerusalem opposite the Phanar in Constantinople with its gardens facing the Golden Horn and the ancient Byzantine house at its gate of a former Princess of the Cantacuzènes, will recognise from whence it was issued, at a time when a number of the occupants of the Oriental Patriarchates were normally resident at the Phanar. It is this document that I am referring to in this Communication.

It should however be noted at this juncture that such "Confessions" as a method of teaching and exposition of the Faith are new to Orthodoxy. They have sometimes been given the general term of the Symbolic Books, i. e. the books which treat of the Creed. The need for such in the period under review would appear to have arisen as an answer to the Symbolic Books of the Reform. In the sense that these Confessions of Protestantism are constitutional charts serving as the foundation of new ecclesiastical societies, Orthodoxy, along with patristic Christianity, has no Symbolic Books that can take the place of the living and continuous Tradition of the Church. They are in no case binding or *de fide*, and enjoy only a restricted authority.

The interest for patristic study lies in the fact that through these "Confessions" an opportunity is provided for expressing

an earlier, less articulated, less objectified tradition of the whole Church as to the operation of the Holy Spirit, Who abides in the Christian Community Himself, communicating Himself to each member of it, and His gifts according to the needs of each. If in the scientific field, an Einstein is able to say that the most incomprehensible thing about the Universe as seen by the man of Science is its degree of comprehensibility, what are we to say *a fortiori* of that realm of the spiritual life and the mysterious commerce of God with man, the whole furniture, panoply of Heaven, which the Sacraments attempt to chart? This is perhaps most strikingly demonstrated by the use of the Orthodox term *Μυστήριον*, which is the equivalent of and yet something more than, the term *sacramentum*, first brought into use by Tertullian<sup>1</sup>. For *μυστήριον* points to the initiation into the Christian Religion, and more generally to the communication of sacred and mysterious things. It stresses the age-long insistence of the Orthodox, following classical, patristic teaching, that the Sacraments, being divine acts, are ultimately incapable of explanation as to their mode, and although they are not incommunicable in the sense that the pagan mysteries claim to have been, yet they are inexhaustible by intellectual processes, and belong to the unseen divine order. In this direction it may be suggested, there is a difference of treatment of the sacraments, particularly of the Eucharist in the East and the West. While it would seem that the West has become anxious to exhibit, expose the Most Holy Sacrament to the public sight for devotion and adoration, the East tends through reverence to withdraw it from the common view, within the Holy Bema, in the Divine Liturgy and the Artophorion, until it is revealed for purposes of Communion.

This Confession takes the form of catechetical question and answer, and is divided into three parts: on Faith, which involves an exhaustive explanation of the Creed of Nicaea; on Hope, treating of the Lord's Prayer, the Beatitudes and the works

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<sup>1</sup> See adv. Marc. 2. 27. For use of the term St. Cypr. Epistola 73, 22. St. Aug. on St. John 80, on Ps. 73. St. Hugo of St. Victor's *de Sacramentis Christianae Fidei*.

of mercy; on Love, treating of the cardinal virtues, the mortal sins and the ten Commandments. In many ways the exposition, especially in eucharistic matters, shews Latin influence. This is in part a legacy of the teaching of Gennadius II, first Ecumenical Patriarch under the Othman rule, in part the necessary reaction from the Calvinistic influences of Cyril Lucar (or at least the influences attributed to him, which were in any case real enough), in part as far as Peter Mogila is concerned a necessary result of the surrounding influences of some centuries in Little Russia under Polish pressure; largely of course owing to the fact that the Orthodox lost their centres of higher university education after the Fall of Constantinople, and became more and more dependent on the Western centres of learning. By the time however that this Confession left the hands of its revisers, a good measure of this element had been corrected. Before the period of the 12th and 13th centuries, throughout Christendom the sacramental system would appear to have been fluid, in the sense that the number of the Sacraments was not definitely or rigidly fixed. There is mention by the Fathers of two<sup>1</sup>, three<sup>2</sup> and four<sup>3</sup> sacraments. This applies to both East and West. In the West, the system of the seven Sacraments (doubtless on the analogy of the seven gifts of the Spirit and seven the perfect Hebraic number) was first used by Peter Lombard and Alexander III in the 12th century, and in the East by the Monk Job in 1270, and by the Emperor Michael Palaiológos at the Synod of Lyons in 1274. But in the East especially, certain forms of blessing — of a church, of water, particularly at Epiphany, of fruits and all kinds of objects, the ceremonies of Christian funerals and the making of monastic vows, all at one time or another were suggested as *Mysteria*, since all tended to satisfy their definition.

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<sup>1</sup> St. Justin Martyr *Apologia* 1; St. Augustine on Ps. 108; St. John of Damascus *Expositio* IV. 9—13.

<sup>2</sup> St. Cyril of Jerus. *Catech.* 1—3; 1—4; St. John of Damascus *op. cit.* IV. 4—13; St. Ambrose *de Sacramentis* 3—4.

<sup>3</sup> St. Augustine *de baptis.* 5. 20.

The interest of this "Confession" lies in this direction, and also in the particular turn that Orthodoxy, inheriting an unbroken tradition, gives to the whole subject.

First of all, the parallelism between the seven Sacraments of the West and the Mysteries as set forth here is not so close as might appear at first sight. The Orthodox *τάξεις* is as follows:

I. The Mysteries of Initiation

- a) Baptism
- b) Chrismation (*τὸ μύρον τοῦ χρίσματος*)
- c) Eucharist

II. Ordination (*ἡ μυστηριώδης ἱερωσύνη*)

- a) Honourable Marriage
- b) Repentance (*μετάνοια*)
- c) Prayer-Oil (*εὐχέλαιον*).

Of these Chrismation would appear to have a special role, in that it is an episcopal Mystery. Although normally administered by the priest, it is episcopally consecrated, and considered to be the means of access to the life of Grace in the Church through participation in all the other Mysteries, except of course Baptism. For this reason from very early times, it was the method of reconciling heretics or schismatics to the Church whose Baptism could be accepted. This discipline, however, seems to have been more characteristic of Eastern than Western practice.

It is hardly possible at this time to specify further divergencies, although they patently exist. I would however attempt to consider in some detail the definition of this "Confession" firstly as to what a Mystery is, and secondly what are the essentials of all Christian Mysteries:

I. To the question, What is a Mystery? the answer is as follows: A Mystery is a certain sacred ceremony (*μία τελεντή*) which, under or through a certain visible sign is the cause of (*αἰτία*) and conveys to the soul of the believing person the unseen Grace of God; regulated (*διαταχθέν*) by our Lord, through which each member of the faithful receives divine Grace<sup>1</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> *Ὁμολογία* Question 99. part. I.

II. To the question, How many things (*πράγματα*) are to be looked for (*ζητούνται*) in a Mystery? the answer is as follows: "Three. 1. Suitable matter (*ἔλη ἀρμόδιος*), such as water in Baptism, bread and wine in the Eucharist, oil etc., according to the Mystery. 2. The priest, who must be lawfully (*νομίμως*) ordained, or the bishop. 3. The invocation of the Holy Spirit (*ἡ Ἐπίκλησις τοῦ Ἁγ. Πνεύματος*) and the formula or shape (*εἶδος*) of the words with which the priest consecrates the Mystery in the power of the Holy Spirit, with his fixed intention to consecrate it."<sup>1</sup>

Here then is a very careful statement and definition, which apart from an apparent effort to secure a synthesis of Orthodox and scholastic forms of expression<sup>2</sup>, presents more than one point of interest. The first is that every Mystery must be at the hands of a bishop or priest, baptism included. At the same time, it is admitted in the section of this Confession<sup>3</sup> that deals with the administration of Baptism that in case of necessity, the Mystery may be performed by any man or woman, any ordinary, i. e. lay person (*κοσμικὸν πρόσωπον*). There are reasons however for thinking that this must be an interpolation, as it does not appear in all editions<sup>4</sup>. Further, it may be said on this point that the validity of baptism by non-Christians e. g. does not appear even to have ever been considered dogmatically in the Orthodox Church; in addition Orthodox opinion on baptism administered in necessity by Christian lay-people is not unanimous. St. Basil and St. Gregory Nazianzene do not admit it, but St. Cyril of Jerusalem does. The Greek Encyclopaedia published in Athens in 1927 admits the validity of baptism by layfolk.

The second point is the third essential of a Mystery, *the Invocation of the Holy Spirit*. We are accustomed to the technical use of the term *Epiklesis* with special and even exclusive

<sup>1</sup> *Ὁμολογία* Question and Answer 100. part I.

<sup>2</sup> Vide Commentary on Mogila's Confession by A. Malvy and M. Viller, *Orientalia Christiana* vol. X, Rome 1927.

<sup>3</sup> *Ὁμολογία* Answer 103. part I.

<sup>4</sup> Smith, *Eccles. Gr.* 104 omits these words.



reference to the Eucharist, and its characteristic Orthodox emphasis there. While it would be dangerous and unjustifiable to put too much dogmatic stress on the present statement, one may point out that the teaching of the Orthodox about the consecration of the prepared Gifts by the invocation of the Holy Spirit, after due recitation of the Dominical words of Institution, is not so much peculiar to the Eucharist alone, however essential it may be considered in that context, but is the supreme example of an essential that belongs to the due administration of every Mystery, whether the Epiklesis is formally uttered or no. I venture to suggest that in this particular Confession, taking into account its special circumstances and provenance, the statement is eirenic, and an example of the synthesis mentioned before in this paper. To those, it may well imply, who regard Orthodox teaching on the Eucharist as peculiar, it is pointed out that the importance of the Epiklesis in the eucharistic anaphora is in accordance with the whole rationale of the Mysteries, which are, every one of them, the direct work of the Holy Spirit, in which, as St. Paul says, worketh (*ἐνεργεῖ*) One and the same Spirit, dividing to every man severally as He will<sup>1</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> I Cor. 12, 11.

## La Théologie Eucharistique de S. Irénée, Évêque de Lyon

V. PALASHKOVSKY, Paris

Mon exposé aura pour objet non pas la communication de découvertes intéressantes en patrologie, mais plutôt une mise au point des études antérieures de patrologues éminents.

Ayant entrepris des recherches sur les formes primitives des liturgies occidentales, je fus amené dès 1948 à constater la dépendance réciproque des conceptions théologiques et des formules liturgiques.

Cela m'a incité à entreprendre l'étude de la doctrine de l'eucharistie chez les Pères anténicéens et en premier lieu chez S. Irénée. J'espérais pouvoir vous en faire part. Cependant le souci de ne pas trop alourdir mon exposé ne me permet pas de vous présenter mes conclusions dans toute leur ampleur. Je vais me borner afin de ne pas dépasser les limites assignées par le temps accordé à faire d'abord un bref exposé de la théologie irénéenne en général et de ses incidences sur la doctrine de S. Irénée sur l'eucharistie.

Je m'arrêterai ensuite plus particulièrement sur *l'Adversus haereses*, IV, XVIII, 3—5 et V, II, 2—3.

S. Irénée dans son *Ἐλεγχος καὶ ἀνατροπὴ τῆς ψευδωνύμου γνώσεως* s'arrête plusieurs fois sur le thème de l'eucharistie qui selon lui semble jouer un grand rôle dans l'économie de notre salut. Les deux textes sur lesquels j'ai l'intention aujourd'hui d'attirer votre attention se sont conservés dans leurs passages essentiels non seulement en latin, mais aussi en grec dans les *Sacra Parallela*, grâce aux mss. Berol. 1450, Hierosolym. 15 et Coislin. 276.

Avant de passer à l'examen attentif de ces textes il me semble nécessaire de m'arrêter un peu à la doctrine théologique de S. Irénée en général qui est sous-jacente à sa théologie eucharistique en particulier.

Dieu absolu, transcendent à la création, se rend immanent grâce à ses deux « mains » : son Logos (ou Fils) et sa Sagesse (ou Esprit). C'est le Logos qui est l'Artisan de la création de l'Univers et de sa conservation. Il pénètre la matière toujours et sans cesse. C'est lui qui donne forme à tout et qui soutient l'Univers en l'imprégnant : « Au Père appartient la volonté du bien et le commandement. Le Fils exécute et construit. L'Esprit nourrit et fait croître » (*Adv. haereses*, I, II, 1).

Remarquons cependant que dans les autres textes que devons examiner la nourriture et la croissance sont imputé au Logos.

L'homme est l'objet d'une providence spéciale de Dieu. C'est le Logos qui a communiqué à l'homme le *πνοή ζωής* (Gen. 2, 7) — le souffle de vie, cette *ἐπίπνοια πνεύματος*. C'est le Verbe du Père : « Faisons l'homme . . . » et l'Esprit de Dieu (le souffle de Vie) qui formèrent Adam. Celui-ci a été créé à l'image de Dieu. Or l'image de Dieu est le Fils. Ainsi Adam avait la forme de Dieu. « L'humanité dans la création, formée de la poussière du sol, reçut la forme de Dieu » (*S. Grég. Naz., Or. 5, 31*).

Façonné par le Logos, l'homme était parachevé, vivifié par l'Esprit.

Crée à l'image de Dieu, l'homme devait réaliser sa ressemblance à Dieu, parvenir à la stature pour laquelle Dieu l'a créé.

La chute d'Adam et d'Eve a entravé cette réalisation de l'homme.

Cependant le Verbe n'a jamais cessé d'agir dans ce monde. Les théophanies de l'Ancien Testament sont des apparitions du Logos qui est le *מְלִאָךְ יְהוָה*, l'Ange du Grand Conseil, le Vivant qui vit (Gen. 17, 22).

D'après S. Irénée « Il est la véritable Pensée, (Lui) le Verbe de Dieu, qu'ils (les prophètes) ont annoncé, né des temps les plus reculés, qui a participé à la formation de toutes choses, qui a créé l'homme, qui se fit tout en tout . . . C'est lui-même qui gouverna l'arche, guida Abraham, se lia à Isaac . . . , eu le commandement avec Moïse<sup>1</sup>, dicta les lois au peuple, fit

<sup>1</sup> sous la forme de la colonne de feu et de nuée.

avec Josué le partage des terres aux tribus, chanta avec David, prit chair de la Vierge, naquit à Bethléem ... (*fragm. I, PO t. XII*). Le Logos s'incarne enfin grâce à la descente du S. Esprit sur la Vierge Marie: «L'Esprit Saint viendra sur toi et la Puissance du Très-Haut te couvrira de ton ombre» (Luc. I, 33)<sup>1</sup>.

C'est sa venue dans ce monde sous la forme concrète de l'Union hypostatique. Le Verbe s'est unie à notre humanité, mais non pas à chacun de nous en particulier.

Afin d'accomplir pleinement son oeuvre il faut qu'il pénètre en chacun de nous et que par cette pénétration nous devenions tous son corps ecclésial. Cette action, il l'accomplit par l'Eucharistie. Par conséquent le corps historique du Christ par le moyen de son corps eucharistique s'étend à son corps ecclésial.

La venue du Verbe dans ce monde fut rendue possible par la descente du S. Esprit sur la Vierge Marie, elle fut suivie par la descente du S. Esprit sur l'humanité du Christ le jour de son baptême dans le Jourdain, — annonce de la descente du S. Esprit sur nous, c'est à dire sur le corps ecclésial du Christ le jour de la Pentecôte. De même que la descente du S. Esprit sur la Vierge a formé le corps historique du Christ, sa descente sur les apôtres a formé son corps ecclésial: l'Eglise. Mais, ainsi que nous l'avons dit, pour être membre de l'Eglise chacun de nous doit être nourri du Corps et du Sang du Christ par la Sainte Eucharistie. A cause de cela la Pentecôte est précédée par la Sainte Cène, par la venue du Logos sur les espèces eucharistiques qui, en en prenant possession, en fait son corps et son sang et par cette nourriture et ce breuvage il compénètre les fidèles, les rendant membres de son corps ecclésial, les introduisant dans son Eglise.

Cette idée est tellement importante que S. Irénée y revient à trois reprises à *Adversus haereses*: IV, XVIII, 5; V, II, 2 et V, II, 3:

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<sup>1</sup> Remarquons que ce texte a une application aussi bien dans le cadre de la liturgie pontificale byzantine que dans celle des liturgies occidentales.

## 1) IV, XVIII, 5:

ὁ  
  
ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς  
ἄρτος  
προσλαβόμενος  
τὴν  
ἐπίκλησιν  
τοῦ Θεοῦ  
οὐκέτι κοινὸς ἄρτος  
ἐστίν  
ἀλλ'  
εὐχαριστία  
ἐκ δύο πραγμάτων  
συνεστηκυῖα ἐπιγείου  
καὶ οὐρανίου

## 2) V, II, 2:

ὁ  
  
γεγονώς  
ἄρτος  
ἐπιδέχεται  
τὸν  
λόγον  
τοῦ Θεοῦ  
  
γίνεται  
  
εὐχαριστία  
  
σῶμα  
  
Χριστοῦ

## 3) V, II, 3:

τὸ ξύλον τῆς  
ἀμπέλου, ὁ κόκκος  
τοῦ σίτου  
  
προσλαμβανόμενα  
τὸν  
λόγον  
τοῦ Θεοῦ  
  
εὐχαριστία  
γίνεται  
ὁπερ ἐστὶ  
σῶμα  
καὶ αἷμα τοῦ  
Χριστοῦ

A IV, XVIII, 5 le pain ayant pour ainsi dire acquis l'invocation de Dieu n'est plus selon S. Irénée du pain ordinaire, mais eucharistie — union de deux éléments: le terrestre et le céleste.

Cette idée est reprise par lui à V, II, 2 avec cette différence que le pain y reçoit le Logos de Dieu et l'ayant reçu devient, de même que dans le texte que nous venons d'examiner, — eucharistie. Cette eucharistie, non pas dans le sens d'action de grâce, mais dans celui du résultat de cette action, est explicité dans ce texte. L'union des deux éléments, le céleste et le terrestre — c'est le Corps du Christ, ou plutôt si nous comparons ce texte à celui de V, II, 3, c'est son Corps et son Sang. La comparaison avec IV, XVIII, 5 nous donne pour l'éléments terrestre le pain, pour le céleste le Logos de Dieu. Non pas les *Sermones Domini*, mais bien le *Verbum Dei* comme le dit le texte latin.

Dans le troisième de ces textes S. Irénée nous parle du grain de froment et du cep de la vigne y voyant les éléments du pain

et du vin. Ayant reçu le Verbe de Dieu, ils deviennent eucharistie — Corps et Sang du Christ.

Etant donné que l'homme vit physiquement grâce aux aliments dont le pain et le vin sont les prémices, c'est à cette nourriture et à ce breuvage commun présenté à Dieu en oblation que le Logos s'unit pour que l'être humain en s'en nourrissant soit alimenté non seulement physiquement, mais aussi et surtout spirituellement, pour qu'il soit par cela même sanctifié et ayant mangé du fruit de ce nouvel arbre de vie, il devienne immortel.

Ainsi l'eucharistie est le prolongement organique de la création et de l'incarnation. De même que la venue du Logos dans ce monde se nomme incarnation, sa venue lors de l'Eucharistie aurait pu être appelé «in-panation», si ce terme n'avait été utilisé dans un sens spécifique. En effet nous avons là non pas une apparition mystérieuse du Corps et du Sang du Christ, soit avec persistance subsistante du pain et du vin, soit sous le forme d'accidents eucharistiques privés de leur substance naturelle, mais bien une prise de possession totale par le Verbe de Dieu des éléments eucharistiques, les assumant pleinement, les faisant son propre Corps et Sang. Comme l'écrit le p. Jugie dans son article du Mémorial Chaine: «de Sacrament de l'eucharistie chez S. Irénée»: «l'évêque de Lyon compte parmi les Pères grecs les plus réalistes, qui ne voient dans l'Eucharistie, après la consécration, qu'une seule chose, à savoir le Corps et le Sang de Jésus Christ.» (Bibliothèque de la Faculté catholique de Théologie de Lyon, vol. 5 Lyon, 1950, p. 222).

## Logos and Son in Origen, Arius and Athanasius

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The categories of thought which Origen uses in the construction of his theological system are the categories of Middle-Platonism (cf. J. Daniélou, *Origène*, pp. 85—108) and the central problem which he seeks to solve is the same as that of Middle-Platonism and Neo-Platonism, namely the problem of Providence, the problem, that is, of relating God and the created *Cosmos*, of relating the *One* and the *Many* (cf. E. Ivanka, *Hellenisches und Christliches im frühbyzantinischen Geistesleben*, ch. I). Origen achieves his solution of this problem by means of the Logos-concept; the Logos is an intermediary between God and the *cosmos* of created rational beings. The Logos-concept was demanded by his cosmology, as also were his two key doctrines concerning the Logos. The intermediary between God and eternal created beings must Himself be eternally generated, while, on the other hand, God, being Simple and One, the Logos cannot be *ὁ πρῶτος θεός* but is only a *δεύτερος θεός*; He cannot be *ὁ θεός* (God with the article), but is only *θεός* (God without the article). In other words, the doctrines of the Eternal Generation of the Logos and of the Subordination of the Logos to God are both necessary cosmological postulates in the system which Origen constructed, and there is no contradiction between them within the framework of his system.

Origen, however, was more than a cosmologist; he was also a Christian. His system demanded an intermediary who was both co-eternal with God and yet subordinate to Him, but his faith as a Christian demanded something more, for a cosmological concept could not bear the full weight of the Church's faith in Jesus Christ as the revelation of God and the Saviour of men. Faith could only be satisfied with a religious concept,

a theological concept, the concept of the Sonship of Jesus Christ. There is, then, in Origen's thought, a tension between metaphysics and religion, between the cosmological Logos-concept and the religious-theological Son-concept.

Origen explicitly recognizes the inadequacy of the Logos-concept and the necessity of passing beyond it to the Son-concept as regulative for Christian thinking about Jesus Christ; but the cosmological basis of his system prevents him from effectively replacing the Logos-concept with the Son-concept. In his *Comm. in Johan.*, I, 24, he criticises those who attach too much importance to the title *Logos*. He says, 'It is impossible for anyone to understand how a Logos which is spoken is a Son'. That is, we must ask rather what we mean when we call the Son *Logos*. Thus he recognizes quite clearly that the regulative concept is not the Logos-concept but the Son-concept. *Son* is not a title of the Logos; *Logos* is a title of the Son.

Before he attempts to discover what is meant by calling the Son *Logos*, Origen discusses all the other titles which Scripture gives to the Son—*Light*, *Resurrection*, *Way*, *Truth*, etc. As he does so, he reveals that he has been unable to make the Son-concept regulative, for he interprets these titles in terms of the Logos-concept. To give but one example, discussing the title *Shepherd*, he says, 'As He is a lover of men, and approves the impulse of human souls towards better things, even of those who do not hasten towards reason (*ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον*), but like sheep have a weakness and gentleness which is not closely inquired into but unreasonable (*ἄλογον*), so He is the Shepherd' (Origen, *Comm. in Johan.*, I, 29).

While Origen was aware, then, of the inadequacy of the Logos-concept and while he recognized that the regulative concept for Christian thought and Scriptural exegesis must be the Son-concept, he was unable to make it regulative for his own thinking and exegesis. The task of replacing the Logos-concept with the Son-concept Origen bequeathed to succeeding generations, and, coupled with it, the further task of transposing the doctrines of Eternal Generation and Subordination from the cosmological key into the theological key. His successors



who tried to keep his system intact—Dionysius of Alexandria, Theognostus, Pierius, and Eusebius of Caesarea—could not make the transposition because, like their master, they could not pass beyond the Logos-concept as regulative. It was the Arian Controversy which forced the Church to achieve the transposition.

1. The Arians tried to achieve the transposition and accomplish the task bequeathed by Origen, in the first place, by drawing a rigid distinction between the *Logos* and the *Son*.

The Encyclical Letter of Alexander of Alexandria, to which Opitz assigns the date *circa* 319, and which probably came from the pen of Athanasius who was at that time secretary to the Bishop of Alexandria, records that Arius had asserted that the Son 'is not by nature the Father's true Logos nor is He true Wisdom . . . but he is erroneously (*καταχρηστικῶς*) called Wisdom and Logos, since He Himself was made by the Logos which is proper to God, (*ἐν τῷ ἰδίῳ τοῦ θεοῦ λόγῳ*) and the Wisdom which is in God, by which God has made all things and Him also'. For Arius the Logos which is proper to God is an attribute of God and has no separate hypostatical existence of its own. It is by the exercise of this attribute, coupled with that of Wisdom, that God creates the Son out of nothing in order that, through the Son as an intermediary, He might create all the rest.

I suspect that Arius, in making this distinction, is revealing the influence of the old Syrian tradition which found an extreme expression in Paul of Samosata, as well as the influence of Origen. The weight of evidence indicates that Paul taught that the Logos was an attribute of God without a separate hypostasis before the Incarnation. Origen taught that the Logos-Son was the intermediary between God and the *Cosmos*, co-eternal with God. Arius, in dividing the Logos from the Son, ascribes to the Logos eternal pre-existence as an attribute of God, but ascribes to the Son a pre-mundane, but not eternal, existence, as the creative intermediary between God and the world. Arius' Son-concept seems to be a compromise between Paul's *Son* and Origen's *Logos*.

2. In the second place, Arius asserted that while the Son is not God's proper Logos, He may have the title *Logos* by grace.

Athanasius (*de decretis*, 16) says that the Arians 'mutter something about Logos and Wisdom being only names of the Son'; and in the first Oration he quotes Arius as having said that the Son 'is not the true and only Logos of the Father, but is in name only called Logos and Wisdom' (*Or. c. Ar.*, I, 9.).

Having drawn a rigid distinction between the Logos and the Son, the Arians proceeded to call the Son *Logos*. They thus confuse the issue as well as the minds of their opponents; it is only possible to make sense of the Arians' statements in the fragments collected by Père Bardy ('*La Thalie d'Arius*', in *Revue de Philologie*, vol. LIII [1927] pp. 211—233; '*Asterius le Sophiste*', in *Revue d'Histoire Ecclésiastique*, vol. XXII [1926] pp. 221—272; also in *Recherches sur saint Lucien d'Antioche et son école*, Paris, 1936), if we are careful to ask, wherever the term *Logos* occurs, whether the Arians are talking about God's proper Logos, or Him who is only called *Logos* by grace.

When he asserts that *Logos* may be used as a title of the Son, Arius is following Origen, and is making the Son-concept regulative. He says (Athanasius, *Or. c. Ar.*, II, 37) that 'He who is really Son is only notionally (*κατ' ἐννοίαν*) called *Logos*, in just the same way as He is called *Vine*, and *Way*, and *Door*, and *Tree of Life*'. But the Son, for Arius, fulfils all the functions of Origen's Logos as a cosmological intermediary.

3. The Arian confusion grows worse yet, however; not only does Arius assert that *Logos* is only a title which the Son has by grace, but he also asserts that *Son* is a title which the Son has by grace. He says (Ath. *Or. c. Ar.*, I, 5), that 'the Son is named *Logos* and *Son* according to grace'. If *Logos* and *Son* are both only titles which the Son has by grace, we must ask who the being is that possesses these titles. The answer which one would expect is 'Jesus Christ'. But that could not be Arius' answer, for to assert that Jesus Christ is called Son by grace would savour too much of the adoptianism of Paul of Samosata. But what he has done has been to transfer the adoptianism of Paul into the premundane sphere. According to Arius, God gave the title *Son* to the premundane intermediary whom He had created, because He foresaw that He would not rebel against

Him; according to Paul the title *Son* was given to Jesus of Nazareth because of 'His life full of virtue' (Bardy, *Paul de Samosate*, Fragment 20). It is only by introducing the idea of God's foreknowledge and foresight that Arius evades the adoptionism of Paul, and Paul's view at least has more Scriptural warrant than that of Arius.

Arius has tried to accomplish the task bequeathed by Origen, but he does so by denying the identity of the Logos and the Son, by dehypostatizing the Logos, by reducing the concept of eternal generation to premundane origination, by making the Son a creature, and by interpreting the concept of subordination in the sense of posteriority and inferiority of essence.

Athanasius was quick to see the inadequacy of Arius' solution of the problem. It seems likely that at first he did not recognize that Arius was drawing a rigid distinction between *Logos* and *Son*. In the Encyclical Letter already quoted, Alexander (Athanasius?) asks, 'How, if the Son is the Logos and Wisdom of God, was there once when He was not? For that is the same as if they said that God was once devoid of Logos and Wisdom (*ἄλογος καὶ ἄσοφος*).' This argument has force against Arius only if Arius agrees that Logos and Son are identical, which, as we have seen, he does not; and Arius would definitely agree with Alexander that God is never *ἄλογος καὶ ἄσοφος*.

However, later, Athanasius (*de decretis*) argues against the Arian assertion that the Son is called *Logos* and *Son κατὰ χρηστικῶς*, and asserts that the Logos and the Son are identical with each other and that both are identical with Jesus Christ. The Arians seem to have divided the statements of Scripture into two mutually exclusive groups, one of which they referred to the eternal Logos and the other to the premundane Son. Athanasius, on the other hand, laid down the rule that all Scriptural passages which assert or imply the Son's co-eternity and co-essentiality with God refer to the Son as divine, while all those which assert or imply the Son's posteriority and inferiority to God refer to the Son as human. It is, however, the one Person, Jesus Christ, who is the subject of both groups of statements.

Athanasius accomplished the task bequeathed by Origen. He asserted the identity of the Logos and the Son, while at the same time making the Son-concept regulative. He transposed the doctrine of eternal generation into the theological key by asserting the co-eternity and co-essentiality of the Son with the Father as the Only-begotten Son of the Unbegotten God, interpreting *μονογενής* in the sense of 'unique', 'only one of its kind'. He transposed the doctrine of subordination into the theological key by asserting that the Eternal Son of God became *man*, born of Mary in the fulness of time, and that, as man, He is both posterior and inferior to God the Father. In doing so, Athanasius is brought very close to the position taken up by Irenaeus and the Western Church which had never made the Logos-concept regulative, which had always identified the Logos and the Son, and had assumed the co-eternity, or consubstantiality, of the Logos-Son with the Father. But even in his ante-Nicene writings Athanasius had already asserted this position, and I am convinced that Athanasius' theological ancestry is to be traced, not to Origen, but to the *simpliciores* who had opposed the cosmological constructions and allegorical interpretations of Clement, Origen and Dionysius. Athanasius is ultimately the defender, not of Origenism of the right wing, as is frequently asserted, but of the 'simple faith' of the Church, embodied in the *regula fidei* and catechetical instruction, in Jesus Christ as the Eternal Son of God who has accomplished for men what only God can do in saving them from their sin, recreating in them the defaced or destroyed Image of God, and reconciling them to God the Father. Whereas for Origen Eternal Generation and Subordination were cosmological postulates, for Athanasius they were soteriological postulates. Only one who is eternally God and yet at the same time really Incarnate as man can save mankind.

The Arian controversy is thus the arena in which we see soteriology triumphing over cosmology, Biblical faith becoming victorious over philosophical construction, for there the Church was forced to replace the Logos-concept with the Son-concept as the central and regulative concept in Christian thought.

## The Relation of Philosophy to Faith in the Teaching of St. Augustine

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It often is assumed, and sometimes emphatically asserted, that St. Augustine's spiritual pilgrimage from paganism to Christianity represents a victory of "faith"—not to say credulity—at the expense of reason, and that he who first sought salvation in philosophy was led at the last, in deference to those "reasons of the heart" which, as Pascal has taught us, the reason knows not of, to repudiate the philosophic quest entirely. It is argued that by the time he came to write his *Confessions* he had well realized how wide is the gulf between, on the one hand, an autonomous philosophical understanding, the certitude of which is intrinsic, but which nevertheless is of itself alone of no use for, and even an obstacle to, salvation, and, on the other, a religious life wholly independent of that of the speculative intellect<sup>1</sup>. To speak, therefore, of Augustine's teaching as providing in any sense the type of a "Christian philosophy" is erroneous; he knew of no philosophy save that of Plato and Plotinus, and for this, as a Christian, he could eventually find no real service or indeed sanction<sup>2</sup>.

How far do the facts to be adduced from the saint's life and writings justify this view? There can, I believe, be no real doubt of the answer. Augustine regained his Christian faith not despite but—under the grace of God—by means of his natural reason,

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<sup>1</sup> See e. g. E. Bréhier, "Y a-t-il une philosophie chrétienne?" in *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*, 38<sup>e</sup> année, no. 2 (Avril-Juin 1931), pp. 136—140. Also the same author's *Histoire de la Philosophie*, t. I, fasc. 2 (éd. 1948), 513—516.

<sup>2</sup> «On voit croître peu à peu la défiance de saint Augustin envers la philosophie grecque, mais non pas du tout pour la remplacer par une autre philosophie qui serait 'la philosophie chrétienne' (Bréhier, «Y a-t-il une philosophie chrétienne?», p. 137).

penetrating, critical, even sceptical as it was. Across the fluctuating movement of his thought during the crucial years 383 to 386, the conviction gradually arose that salvation could not be found save in the supernatural truth of Christianity. Without, as yet, recovering faith in the divinity of Christ, he perceived ever more clearly that no philosophy which omitted Christ from its purview could satisfy him.

Over-eager indeed in his desire for rational explanations, Augustine allowed himself to be carried away by the specious promises of Manichaeism. This dualistic doctrine, the false "spirituality" of which serves only to emphasise its essential materialism and determinism, long entangled him, yet without affording the enlightenment and spiritual peace which he craved. But it did not fail to leave its mark. After his conversion he again and again attacked it in his writings, whilst its sombre fanaticism left a stain upon his own thinking which the modern world has been quick to detect. Yet if Manichaeism penetrated Augustine's mind so deeply the more surprising is his deliverance from it. Is it too much to claim that he lacked rational conviction of its truth? At first beguiled, but at bottom unconvinced, by the teachings of the celebrated Faustus, he then received the impress, gradual, but, as the outcome proved, permanent, of Ambrose' "sweet discourse"<sup>1</sup>, along with that of Plotinus' *Enneads*, which had taught him the meaning of the truth that God is spirit<sup>2</sup>. These factors, assistant to the vital appeal of the mysteries of the Christian creed itself, had no small part in the event of September, 386.

The fact is that Augustine, as a man for whom the demands of the intellect could never merely be shelved, was able by the light of reason to free himself not only from the trammels of a

<sup>1</sup> Confessions, V. 23.

<sup>2</sup> Aristotle's *Categories* had suggested to the young Augustine the idea rather of a God who is both material and contingent (Conf., IV, 28f.). But Plotinus, in Victorinus' Latin translation, had opened his eyes to the true nature of the spiritual. See Conf., VII, 13f. On the whole question of Augustine's debt to "the books of the Platonists" consult R. Jolivet, *Saint Augustin et le néoplatonisme* (Paris, 1931) and P. Courcelle, *Recherches sur les Confessions de saint Augustin* (Paris, 1950).

superstition which had bound him for nine years, but also from the sceptical probabilist philosophy of the "New Academy" which had detained him for a further three. Not much, perhaps, can be attributed, at least directly, to the lingering effects of his boyhood upbringing at the hands of the pious Monica. It is exceedingly doubtful whether, throughout this earlier period of his life, such influences were sufficient of themselves to afford him either inspiration or correction. His ardent search for truth drew its stimulus primarily from his intellectual need; but if at times reasons deceived, it also was a guide which eventually brought him to the parting of the ways and enabled him to see, with revealing clarity, such at least as were false.

Before, then, Augustine could experience for himself the truth of his famous *crede, ut intelligas, verbum Dei*<sup>1</sup>, his mind had first to wrestle with its converse, *intellige, ut credas, verbum meum*. That is to say, before reaching, in maturity, a positive faith having manifold rational implications, he had, as its prior condition, to enterprise the task of weighing the reasons for believing at all. What he recommended to others he had, to begin with, to take upon himself: "Before faith, understand in order that thou mayest believe. After faith, believe in order that thou mayest understand. Before faith, thou comprehendest the reason for believing. After faith, thou dost taste and penetrate the contents of faith. But only in heaven shall the mystery be revealed."

From a consideration of the circumstances of Augustine's life we must conclude that his development followed the course set by his critical judgement. What to-day is called "fideism", with its inherent distrust of the rational, is insufficient to account for it. And can we say that reason so tenaciously followed before conversion is likely to have been abandoned by him after it? His express teaching on the relations of philosophy and faith corroborates the impression created by the biographical testimony. Faith is not self-grounded; its basis is in reason. Philosophy, therefore, is the prolegomenon to theology and

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. Sermo XLIII, 9; in psalm. CXVIII, sermo XVIII, 3.

attempts to meet the question, What are the foundations of belief? The natural reason is not to be denied or disparaged, for by it comes the assurance both that God exists and also that he must have provided the means of man's salvation<sup>1</sup>. It alone can determine the initial choice of an authority: *cui sit credendum*<sup>2</sup>; for belief must rest on evidence: *turpe est sine rationem cuiquam*<sup>3</sup> credere. Although the saving truth cannot be reached without an act of faith, yet once revelation has been accepted reason must prosecute its task of intelligent comprehension; not, we are to suppose, in the hope of an eventually complete understanding of what must ultimately remain a mystery, but with a view to the study and elucidation of (so to say) the structure of revealed truth, its fitness and harmony—in a word, its essential rationality. Herein, for a Christian, lies the constructive function of philosophy.

Space here permits no more than a brief indication of St. Augustine's central teaching on this subject, of which however illustration may be afforded by a single document. The earlier treatises—*contra Academicos*, *de beata vita*, *de ordine*, the *Soliloquies*, *de quantitate animae*, *de magistro*—give a succinct account of what he believes the true relations of faith and reason to be, but the treatment is summary. In the ensuing philosophical dialogues and apologies, especially *de utilitate credendi* and *de vera religione*, his thoughts on this matter receive a generally fuller, more searching and more assured expression. But it is only when we reach the later writings, on which Augustine's fame as an author principally rests—the *Confessions*, the *City of God* and the treatise on the Trinity—that we can survey the completed doctrine in its magisterial

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<sup>1</sup> In M. Gilson's view the primary emphasis must be laid on the part of faith in the formation of Augustine's mind; but, he writes, «se demander si la raison seule peut ou ne peut pas atteindre certaines vérités sans le secours de la foi, c'est poser une question qu'Augustin résoudrait sans nul doute par l'affirmative, et sa réfutation purement philosophique du scepticisme suffirait à la prouver» (Introduction à l'étude de saint Augustin, 2 me éd., Paris, 1943, p. 41).

<sup>2</sup> De vera relig., 45.

<sup>3</sup> De util. cred., 31.



range and depth. Having found and trodden the way of faith, the only sure route, it yet behoves him, as a philosopher, to attempt to conceive God metaphysically. The famous seventh Book of the *Confessions* relates in words unforgettably moving the course of his intellectual progress: "With a hidden goad Thou didst urge me, that I might be restless until such time as the sight of my mind might discern Thee for certain<sup>1</sup>."

The evidence to be considered here, however, is that simply of the epistle to Consentius, dating from 410<sup>2</sup>. Concerned mainly with the dogma of the Trinity, this letter is of particular value for the indications it affords us of the writer's presuppositions at once as a Christian and as a philosophical thinker. He first reminds his correspondent that there can be no progress in the knowledge of the truth without prior fulfilment of the necessary moral conditions. Nevertheless it is an affront to God himself to suppose that he should hate in us his creatures the very faculty by virtue of which we rank first in the order of living things. Faith therefore does not exclude rational criticism; rather is it reason informed by religious perception. "God forbid", he declares, "that we should suppose there to be no need to accept or to seek a reason for what we believe, since it would not even be possible to believe if we had not rational souls." In certain matters, he continues, "pertaining to the doctrine of salvation", which we cannot yet understand, it is right that faith should precede reason, for faith "purifies the heart, rendering it capable of receiving and enduring the great light of reason". In the words of the Prophet, *nisi credideritis, non intelligetis*<sup>3</sup>. But if it is reasonable that in these things faith should have the precedence, yet "it is without doubt true that it is reason, in however small degree, which persuades us to it, so that reason itself precedes faith — *ipsa ratio antecedit fidem*". Accordingly "the Apostle St. Peter admonishes us to be 'ready always to satisfy everyone that asketh you for a reason

<sup>1</sup> Conf., VII, 16.

<sup>2</sup> Ep. CXX (PL XXXIII, cols. 452—462, CSEL XXXIV, pp. 704 to 722).

<sup>3</sup> Is. VII, 9 sec. LXX.

of that hope which is in you'"<sup>1</sup>. An unbeliever who, because of his unbelief, fails to understand, is to be reminded "how preposterous it is to demand before believing the reason of those things which he cannot understand"; whereas in the case of the believer seeking intellectual satisfaction, "his measure of intelligence must be considered and a reason given him within the limits of his comprehension, so that he may add to his faith as much understanding as he is capable of"; only let him see to it, however, "that in attaining to the plenitude and completion of knowledge he does not depart from the way of faith"<sup>2</sup>. For in pursuing it to the end the more likely will he be to achieve the goal of his quest—possession of the truths that are spiritual and immutable, and the vision of God. It is by this persevering faith that simple Christians are able to attain the heights of beatific contemplation, whilst the philosophers, however well-informed upon the meaning of "spirit", will never, through their failure to take this way of Christ, succeed in gaining the haven of heavenly rest.

This notable epistle is worthy of the esteem in which it is held as an expression of Augustinian teaching. Whereas we are to be clear that reason cannot take the place of faith, its argument implies that the Christian *qua* Christian is led to philosophy by the exercise of his reason upon the data of faith. It affords us, in fact, a sketch plan, so to say, of the Augustinian method, which repudiates not *ratio* but only *falsa ratio*, and turns for guidance, in what pertains to the former, even to the philosophies of paganism, and above all to the Platonists, whose enthusiastic disciple Augustine had become<sup>3</sup>—to the extent indeed, as he records in the *Confessions*, of discovering in their doctrine plain and unmistakable anticipations of the mysteries of revelation itself<sup>4</sup>. Did his enthusiasm later cool? There are numerous indications that it did; or at least, that

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<sup>1</sup> I Pet. III, 15.

<sup>2</sup> Ep. CXX, 3, 4.

<sup>3</sup> Conf., VII, 13, 26, 27; contra Academ., III, 41; ep. CXVIII, 20—34.

<sup>4</sup> Contra Academ., III, 43; Conf., VII, 13, 14; in Ioan., tract. II, 4.

he came to see more clearly what that doctrine did not contain<sup>1</sup>. And the critic may try to base on these the contention that Augustine himself realized the incompatibility of an authoritative faith and an autonomous reason. But what he did not doubt and never retracted is that faith gives reason its supreme vocation, inasmuch as Christian truth is in the deepest harmony with all that is best even in fallen humanity. For faith and reason are not, in Augustine's mind, two formally contrasted, still less antithetic, principles. He cannot conceive of a faith without reason; and he is certain that reason, in its upward flight, approaches faith. Christianity is thus the true philosophy, the necessary and sufficient wisdom. (On the other hand, with philosophy as confined to purely mundane enquiries—or, as we would say, with science—Augustine had no concern. "I desire", he says, "to know God and the soul. Nothing besides? Nothing at all"<sup>2</sup>. That reason alone could save mankind was a view which he rejected by the very fact of his embracing the Gospel. But he certainly never rejected philosophy. Revelation was a reality, a divine datum, and as such must needs be accepted in humble submission of heart; yet there could be no acceptance by us even of revelation, unless reason fulfilled its inherent obligations. Is it not upon the basis of this conviction that every attempt to construct a Christian philosophy—Augustinian or any other—must be made?

<sup>1</sup> De civit. Dei, XXII, 28; Retract., I, 1, 4; 4, 2, 3; 11, 4, etc.

<sup>2</sup> Solil. I, II, 7. For Augustine's idea of *scientia* see de Trin. XII, XII, 17.

## “Filioque” in Patristic Thought

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Two years ago, here in Oxford, in a lecture which was later published by the Anglo-Orthodox Magazine *The Christian East*<sup>1</sup> and then by the Roman-Catholic *Eastern Churches Quarterly*<sup>2</sup> I ventured to put the question on the “*filioque* dispute and its importance”. Now I hope, if God pleases, to give the answer based on patristic thought.

“Who proceedeth from the Father”—what does it mean that mysterious<sup>3</sup> word “proceedeth” (*ἐκπορεύεται*)<sup>4</sup>? Father Bulgakov emphatically denies any special meaning of that term which, in his words, only signifies but does not explain the mystery<sup>5</sup>, as *γέννησις* does in connection with the Only-Begotten Son. That is a widespread opinion, both in the East<sup>6</sup> and in the West<sup>7</sup>. In Gibson’s words: “the meaning of the *ἐκπόρευσις* will always remain a mystery in this world”.

What does the word *γέννησις* mean in its traditional interpretation? The whole Father is revealed in His Logos as in

<sup>1</sup> Summer 1953, vol. II, no. 5—6, pp. 151—161.

<sup>2</sup> Winter 1953, vol. X, no. 4, p. 177.

<sup>3</sup> “The Third Person of the Holy Trinity has no proper name . . . the name Holy Spirit has been given to Him according to scriptural usage. We meet the same difficulty when we wish to define the mode of origin of the Holy Spirit . . .” Prof. V. Lossky, *The Procession of the Holy Spirit*, East. Ch. Quart. supplementary issue 7 (1948) 43.

<sup>4</sup> *Καὶ εἰς τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον, τὸ κύριον καὶ ζωοποιόν, τὸ ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς ἐκπορευόμενον*. Symbol. Constan. (Denzinger, *Enchiridion symbolorum*, Friburgi 1932).

<sup>5</sup> Утѣшитель (The Paraclete) YMCA Press 1936 (in Russ.) p. 94.

<sup>6</sup> “. . . when we wish to define the mode of the origin of the Holy Spirit, contrasting his ‘procession’ with the ‘generation’ of the Son . . .” Lossky, loc. cit.

<sup>7</sup> E. C. S. Gibson, *The 39 Articles*, London 1898, p. 208.

His whole and only *γέννημα*<sup>1</sup> and Image<sup>2</sup>; the whole of His nature is in His Word and Wisdom<sup>3</sup>. Nothing is left out. No place is left for any other<sup>4</sup>. The Father is revealed completely and only by His Only-Begotten Son (*ὁ μονογενὴς υἱός*). The term *γέννησις*, thus, is not a mysterious sign, but is meaning something quite definite and revealing.

The term *ἐκπόρευσις* was in patristic thought similar to that, though it meant something different<sup>5</sup>. The idea of a difference between the *γέννησις* as comprehensive, and the *ἐκπόρευσις* as non-comprehensive was not traditional patristic<sup>6</sup>. It came forth after St. John of Damascus as a result of a long linguistic process and became fatal in the East-West dispute<sup>7</sup>. The *filioque* clause in the West and the failure to treat it theologically in the East — were both due to that strange non-patristic idea.

Scholars who studied the *filioque*-problem agree that *ἐκπορεύεται* does not correspond to its translations<sup>8</sup>. *Πόρος* is "a means of passing a river", a ford or ferry, a bridge or a passage through. The verb *πορεύω* which is derived from *πόρος*

<sup>1</sup> . . . τῆς δὲ τοῦ πατρὸς οὐσίας μόνον ἴδιον γέννημα ὁ υἱός, St. Athanas., *Con. Arian.* 1, 56 (PG 26, 129).

<sup>2</sup> . . . ἐν τίνι δὲ ὁ πατὴρ χαίρει, ἡ βλέπων ἑαυτὸν ἐν τῇ ἰδίᾳ εἰκόνι, ἥτις ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος αὐτοῦ (*ibid.* 2, 82; col. 320).

<sup>3</sup> . . . γέννημα τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς οὐσίας ὃν ὁ υἱός· καὶ αὐτὸς μὲν δημιουργός, τὰ δὲ δημιουργεῖται παρ' αὐτοῦ· καὶ αὐτὸς μὲν ἀπαύγασμα καὶ λόγος, καὶ εἰκὼν, καὶ σοφία τοῦ πατρὸς ἐστι, *ibid.* 1, 58, (col. 133); γέννημα τέλειον ἐκ τελείου (2, 35; col. 221); τὸ γέννημα τοῦ γεννήσαντος· εἰκὼν γὰρ ἐστὶν αὐτοῦ, καὶ πάντα τὰ πατρὸς τοῦ υἱοῦ ἐστὶν (3, 4; col. 328); πλήρης γὰρ καὶ τέλειός ἐστιν ὁ πατὴρ, καὶ πλήρωμα θεότητός ἐστιν ὁ υἱός (3, 1; col. 324); τοῦ γὰρ εἰδους καὶ τῆς θεότητος τοῦ πατρὸς οὐσης τὸ εἶναι τοῦ υἱοῦ ἀκολούθως ὁ υἱὸς ἐν τῷ πατρὶ ἐστὶν, καὶ ὁ πατὴρ ἐν τῷ υἱῷ (3, 3; col. 328); ὅλος καὶ πλήρης θεός (3, 6; col. 332).

<sup>4</sup> . . . ὥστε τοῦ μὲν πατρὸς εἶναι μονογενῆ τὸν υἱόν, διὰ τὸ ἐξ αὐτοῦ μόνον αὐτὸν εἶναι, *ibid.* 2, 64 (col. 284).

<sup>5</sup> See below p. 299 n. 3.

<sup>6</sup> Neither St. Augustine (*De Spiritu sancto verissime dicitur: Processionem eius quis enarravit*, c. Maximin. 2, 14; PL 42, 770) nor St. Gregor. Naz. (Or. 34, Bulgakov, op. cit., p. 94) are speaking of the procession only, but of both (*γέννησις* and *ἐκπόρευσις*); see below p. 303 n. 3.

<sup>7</sup> Joan. Damasc., *De fide orth.* 1, 8 (PG 94, 821); see below p. 303 n. 1 and 2.

<sup>8</sup> The exposition of Prof. Zikos Rhossius, lecturer in the Univ. of Athens, at the 5th Conf. at Bonn 1875; H. P. Liddon, Report of the proceedings at the reunion conference held at Bonn, 1876, p. 64—65. Cf. St. Maximus to Marinus PG 41, 136.

is "to take some one over a river", to make to go, to carry, to convey. Its main and original meaning is the idea of "forcing somebody to go". With the proposition *ἐκ* (*ἐκπορεύω*) it means: "to force somebody to go out". In the middle form (*ἐκπορεύομαι*) is "I make myself to go out", an idea of the perfect freedom of action as opposite to the passive derivation<sup>1</sup>. *Τὸ πνεῦμα τῆς ἀληθείας δὲ παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς ἐκπορεύεται*<sup>2</sup> means "the Spirit of Truth who makes Himself to go out from the Father" and is not: "who proceedeth from the Father". The Latin translation is entirely wrong, for it can imply a passive subordinate derivation (even generation) without a slightest idea of any freedom of action<sup>3</sup>.

We must note that St. John says: *παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς* and not: *ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς* as we have it now in the Creed<sup>4</sup>. The original much more corresponds to the idea of *ἐκπορεύεται* meaning that the Holy Ghost does not come from the very bosom (*σπλάγχχνον*) of the Father's person as the Son does in His *γέννησις*<sup>5</sup>, but that He freely makes Himself to go out from

<sup>1</sup> Liddell and Scott, *Lexicon*, p. 388, 1195; cf. *A Greek-English Lexicon of the N. Testament* by Grimm (trans. by J. H. Thayer), Edinburgh 1888, p. 199; Swete, *On the History of the Doctrine of the Procession of the Holy Ghost*, Cambridge 1876, p. 9: "It (*ἐκπορεύεσθαι*) had served to describe (in the Old Test. Septuag.) the self-manifestation of Deity."

<sup>2</sup> St. John 15, 26.

<sup>3</sup> *In pedes procedere nascentem contra naturam est*, Plin. 7, 8, 6, § 45. C. T. Lewis and C. Short, *Latin Dictionary*, Oxford 1933, p. 1450. That is why nearly all Latin fathers use the term *processio* for the generation of the Son as well as for the *ἐκπόρευσις* of the Spirit (Bulgakov, op. cit., p. 94). Cf. Lossky, op. cit.: "The term procession cannot be considered to be, in itself, an expression which exclusively envisages the Third Person. It is a general term, which could be applied in abstracto to the Son; Latin theology even speaks of *duae processiones*"; Rev. Paul Henry, *East. Ch. Quart.* 1948, vol. VII, p. 17: "The assumption throughout (the Council of Florence) is that the Second and Third Persons are characterized by their (passive) processions."

<sup>4</sup> "*παρὰ* occurring only in St. John 15, 26. It is probably chosen there to express 'from being with'. The change of *παρὰ* into *ἐκ* in the Creed is curious, and may have been due to imperfect recollection of the original, since no variant exists in any known MS of the Gospel", Swete, op. cit., p. 10.

<sup>5</sup> The term *σπλάγχχνον* first occurs in St. Theophilus of Antioch (177 to 186 A. D.) and then is in traditional use among the fathers to describe

His "face"<sup>1</sup>. While in the Son's generation you have the passive attitude, in the *ἐκπόρευσις* of the Spirit you see His own free action, as if He was not of the same substance with the Father (*ὁμοούσιως*) at all.

The Greek fathers, accepting that important difference<sup>2</sup> prove it by their own non-biblical term *προβολεύς*<sup>3</sup> applying it to the Father. Its Latin translation *productor*<sup>4</sup> is more than misleading. The verb *προβάλλω* being composed of *πρό* = forward, and *βάλλω* = to throw, means: "to throw forth", *proiicere* and not *producere*. *προβολή* is "projection" (*prolatio, emissio*) and not "production", and *προβολεύς*, therefore, is a person who puts forth a projection which might not be his own<sup>5</sup>.

The idea is confusing. If the Holy Spirit is *ὁμοούσιος*, of the same substance with the Father as is the Son, He cannot be just an outward projection. He must be produced by Him. Such is logic<sup>6</sup>. Yet the Eastern fathers really meant, with their Greek mind, the original idea of *προβολεύς* which corresponded

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the generation of the Son (*ἔχων ὁ θεὸς τὸν ἑαυτοῦ λόγον ἐνδιάθετον ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις σπλάγχνοις ἐγέννησεν αὐτόν*, Ad Autolycum 2, 10; PG 6, 1064f.). Cf. *ἴδιος δὲ τοῦ πατρὸς ἐν τοῖς κόλποις ὢν αὐτοῦ*, St. Athanas., Con. Arian. 1, 56 (PG 26, 129).

<sup>1</sup> *Λέγω γὰρ ὑμῖν ὅτι οἱ ἄγγελοι αὐτῶν ἐν οὐρανοῖς βλέπουν τὸ πρόσωπον τοῦ πατρὸς μου τοῦ ἐν οὐρανοῖς*, Matth. 18, 10. In the view of the heretics the Holy Spirit was one of those created angels.

<sup>2</sup> The Holy Ghost was "the Gift" and not "the Son". He was given and not born. The term "gift" (*δωρεά, donum*) was used as early as the 2nd century by St. Justin (Coh. adv. Gr. 8, 32; PG 6, 300) and became traditional (St. Athanas., Ad Serap. 1, 20; St. August., De trinit. 4); see below p. 299 n. 3; p. 305 n. 3.

<sup>3</sup> *Ὁ μὲν γεννήτωρ καὶ προβολεύς, λέγω δὲ ἀπαθὼς καὶ ἀχρόνος καὶ ἀσωμάτως τῶν δὲ τὸ μὲν γέννημα, τὸ δὲ πρόβλημα ἢ οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπως ἂν τις ταῦτα καλέσειεν ἀφελῶν πάντα τῶν ὀρωμένων*, St. Gregor. Naz., Or. 29 (PG 36, 76).

<sup>4</sup> Latin transl. *ibid.*

<sup>5</sup> *πρόβλημα* is "anything thrown forward" (Lid. and Scott, vol. 2, 1471) *προβολή* — "putting forward" (1472). *προβολαί* meant "successive emanations" in Gnostic writings (Swete, op. cit., p. 29). But the question is: were those *προβολαί* passive emanations, productions only, or something with much more freedom and independence in them, as the original term suggests and as was typical for Gnostic thought.

<sup>6</sup> Liddell and Scott (Oxford 1888, p. 1275) translate the term *προβολεύς* as "producer" but add that it is an "ecclesiastical" term, apparently under the influence of the Latin church writers and their logic.

so well to their conception of the difference between the Spirit and the Son. They did not close their eyes to the difficulty caused by that difference<sup>1</sup> and did not try to avoid it as the Latin translators did. The heretics — the *πνευματομάχοι* — and their predecessors used just that distinction to prove their arguments<sup>2</sup> and the orthodox did meet the challenge. St. Athanasius was the first to deal with the problem: The Spirit is free to make Himself to go out from the Father — as a gift, and not as a son from His bosom — because He is shining forth from the Father's Word who is the Only-Begotten Son and of one substance with the Father. To use his own words: *ἐκ πατρὸς λέγεται ἐκπορεύεσθαι ἐπειδὴ παρὰ τοῦ λόγου τοῦ ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς ὁμολογουμένον ἐκλάμπει*<sup>3</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> St. Athanas, Ad Serap. 1, 15 (see note 3). Yet that distinction is not plainly contrasted, but presumed as obvious: “He (St. Ath.) does not contrast *ἐκπόρευσις*, used of the Spirit, with *γέννησις* used of the Son . . . He always argues from the terms ‘Son and Spirit’”, C. R. V. Shapland, The Letters of St. Athanasius concerning the Holy Spirit, London 1951, p. 64, n. 13. But you may conclude from the context that he is aware of that difference between those terms.

<sup>2</sup> Didymus, De trin. 2, 5 (PG 39, 492); De Spir. sanc. 62 (PG 39, 1084); Pseudo-Athan., Dial. adv. Maced. 1 (PG 28, 1292); Theodor. Mops., Contr. 18 (PO 9, 658); Dial c. Maced. 1 (col. 1313 B). A. Vacant, Dictionnaire de théologie catholique, Paris 1926, p. t. 9, col. 1477 f.

<sup>3</sup> St. Athanasius gives his reply to the heretics (*tropici*) who apparently were misled by the term *ἐκπορεύεται*. If it was to be understood literally it could only mean a “temporal coming out” of a “gift” as of a creature. Shapland, loc. cit.: “The meaning of the *ἐκπορεύεσθαι* had been a matter of debate more than twenty years before this letter was written . . . It was used by some people as nothing more than the Spirit's descent at the baptism and upon prophets and apostles.” If, on the other hand, the Spirit was coming out from the Father “as a river from a font” (the comment of the earliest Greek expositor of the entire Apocalypse S. Andrew of Cappad., which could be even an earlier tradition; Swete, op. cit., p. 809); if, in other words, it meant, He is *ὁμοούσιος* with the Father (and that was St. Athanasius' own belief), then the Spirit was, in heretics mind, “a second son”. They rejected the term *ἐκπορεύεται* in that sense altogether: *Εἰ μὴ κτίσμα ἐστὶ, μὴδὲ τῶν ἀγγέλων εἰς ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς ἐκπορεύεται· οὐκοῦν υἱὸς ἐστὶ καὶ αὐτὸ καὶ δύο ἀδελφοὶ εἶναι αὐτὸ τε καὶ ὁ λόγος*, Ad Serap. 1, 15 (PG 26, 565, 568). That is why “the word was not yet exclusively appropriated to the Spirit for both (Asterius and other heretics) freely use it of the Son . . . Athanasius seems to hold a position midway between this and that of later writers with whom *ἐκπορεύεσθαι* is used as technical term” (Shapland, op. cit., p. 64 n. 13). His full reply was as



As the Son is the Image of the Father so is the Spirit the Image of the Son<sup>1</sup>. Yet, He is not a son of the Son and is not, therefore, a grandson to the Father<sup>2</sup>. That notion is very important. It means that there is no passive derivation — neither the generation, nor even “procession” neither from the Father nor from the Son. The Spirit is not produced by them in any sense. The Son is the Only-Begotten, He is the only one in the Trinity who fully reveals the Father. The Spirit is not begotten either by the Father, or by the Son. There is nothing, therefore, passive, no “procession” in the Spirit at all. He is the Spirit (τὸ πνεῦμα) of the γέννησις, but is not the γέννησις itself. Being the Spirit of the Son<sup>3</sup> He is in Him when the Son is being born, from Whom He gets everything<sup>4</sup>, and He is, there-

follows: *Καὶ γὰρ ὥσπερ μονογενὴς ὁ υἱὸς ἐστὶν οὕτω καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα παρὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ διδόμενον καὶ πεμπόμενον, καὶ αὐτὸ ἐν ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ πολλά, οὐδὲ ἐκ πολλῶν ἐν, ἀλλὰ μόνον αὐτὸ πνεῦμα. ἐνὸς γὰρ ὄντος τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ ζῶντος λόγου, μίαν εἶναι δεῖ τελείαν καὶ πλήρη τὴν ἀγιαστικὴν καὶ φωτιστικὴν ζωσαν ἐνέργειαν αὐτοῦ καὶ δωρεάν, ἥτις ἐκ πατρὸς λέγεται ἐκπορεύεσθαι, ἐπειδὴ παρὰ τοῦ λόγου τοῦ ἐκ πατρὸς ὁμολογουμένου ἐκλάμπει, καὶ ἀποστέλλεται καὶ δίδεται (col. 577, 580).* Such a reply would be impossible without applying to the *ἐκπορεύεται* its philological meaning as obvious. St. Athanasius apparently accepted that term in its both ways, (1) as a description of the *ὁμοούσιος* and (2) as a “making himself to go out” in an ordinary sense, but most wonderfully combined them together by the generation of the Son. He rejected the idea of the *κτίσμα* as well as of the *γέννημα* saying that *ἡ δωρεὰ ἐκπορεύεται ἐπειδὴ*, since there was only one *γέννημα*, (cf. c. Ar. 3, 4; *ibid.* col. 328) in the Godhead from whom the *δωρεὰ* was *ἐκλάμπων*. It would be absolutely impossible to say that in Latin, under the conception of *duae processiones* (see above p. 297 n. 3).

<sup>1</sup> Ad Serap. 1, 20 (col. 577); 1, 30 (col. 601).

<sup>2</sup> Ad Serap. 1, 15 (col. 567f.).

<sup>3</sup> *Τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ υἱοῦ*. Shapland remarks: “The phrase is characteristic of the whole treatment of the subject by Athanasius. He associated the Spirit primarily with the Son, and it is through the Son that he apprehends His unity with the Father” (op. cit., 62, 5) — apparently owing to the way he understands the word.

<sup>4</sup> *Οὐδὲ λαμβάνων ἐστὶ τὸ πνεῦμα, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον αὐτὸς τοῖς πᾶσι τοῦτο χορηγεῖ καὶ οὐ τὸ πνεῦμα τὸν λόγον συνάπτει τῷ πατρὶ, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὸ πνεῦμα παρὰ τοῦ λόγου λαμβάνει. . . αὐτὸς γὰρ (ὁ λόγος), ὥσπερ εἴρηται, τῷ πνεύματι δίδωσι, καὶ ὅσα ἔχει τὸ πνεῦμα παρὰ τοῦ λόγου ἔχει . . .*, St. Athanas., C. Ar. 3, 24 (PG 26, 373). Cf. Shapland, op. cit., 65, n. 14: “The Spirit derives (in Athanasian teaching) His existence from the Father and receives His mission from the Son; and the former relationship is manifested in and apprehended from that latter.”

fore, free to make Himself to go out from the Son's Father (*ἐκπορεύεσθαι*). It would be absolute nonsense to use in patristic Greek the word *ἐκπορεύεται* applying it to both—the Father and the Son (*filioque*) for it would mean: "The Holy Ghost makes Himself to go out from the Father because He is the Spirit of the Son and from the Son."

That is why we never, before the 7th century, see the word *ἐκπορεύεται* connected with the Son<sup>1</sup>. It is never used even with the famous Greek *δι' υἱοῦ*, "through the Son"<sup>2</sup>. The Greek Fathers, as is well-known, use that term many times, but always with other verbs, like *πρόειπιν*, *προέρχεται*. The object of it is simply to explain what the actual *ἐκπόρευσις* means: why the Spirit, being of one substance with the Father, has that freedom to make Himself to go out from Him. *Πρόειπιν*, and other verbs, are rendered in Latin also by *procedit*. You may say: well, there it is the *per filium* or even in some cases<sup>3</sup> the *filioque*.

But those verbs do not describe, as proper terms, the hypostatic relations of the Spirit to the Father. They are not found neither in the Scriptures, nor in the Creeds. *ἐκπόρευσις* is the only one<sup>4</sup> — and it cannot be "double"<sup>5</sup>. The Spirit's hypostatic action is one, perfectly simple and not a composition of the two. If you insert the *-que* between the *ἐκπόρευσις* from the Father and the *ἐκλαμψις* from the Son, you either double the Spirit Himself, or introduce the homoiusian conception of the Semiarians and Macedonians, or else mix up the Father

<sup>1</sup> St. Thomas Aqu., *Summa Theol. De Trin. Quaest. 361 art. 2.*

<sup>2</sup> Archimandrit Sylvester, *Antwort auf die in dem altkatholischen Schema enthaltene Bemerkung von dem Heiligen Geiste*, St. Petersburg 1875. Cf. Swete, *op. cit.*, p. 151.

<sup>3</sup> *Εἰπερ ἐστὶ τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ πατὴρ καὶ μὴ καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ τὸ οὐσιωδῶς ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἡγοῦν ἐκ πατρός δι' υἱοῦ προχέμενον πνεῦμα . . .* St. Cyril, *De adorat.* 1, (PG 68, 148). Swete concludes: "It appears that in St. Cyril's Pneumatology *δι' υἱοῦ* and *ἐξ υἱοῦ* are of identical meaning, and that by both expressions he intended to convey the idea of an essential derivation from the Son . . ." (*op. cit.*, p. 150).

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.* p. 27.

<sup>5</sup> "The dogma of the double Procession of the Holy Ghost from Father and Son as one principle is directly opposed to the error that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father, not from the Son", A. J. Maas, *Filioque*, *The Catholic Encyclopedia*, vol. 6, p. 73.

and the Son in a semi-Sabellian way as one person. His *ἐκπόρευσις* from the Father and His *ἐκλαμψις* from the Son are not parallel, and not added to each other. That is why St. Athanasius does not link them by *καί*, but by *ἐπειδή*. There is, on the other hand, a difference between the *ἐκπόρευσις* and the *ἐκλαμψις*—just that same difference which distinguishes the Father and the Son as persons. Therefore, you cannot, on the ground of unity of essence, mix them up into the *unica spiratione processio*<sup>1</sup>, as well as separate them saying that the *ἐκπόρευσις* is “hypostatic” and the *ἐκλαμψις* is of “one substance”<sup>2</sup> or of a “temporal mission”<sup>3</sup> only.

The patristic idea is quite clear: The Spirit shines forth from the Word because the Word is spoken by the Father; the Spirit makes Himself to go out from the Father because the Father utters the Word, in either case the Father is the only one *ἀρχή* in the Godhead, the only one Who does the *spiratio* (*προβλημα*) which is supralogically implied in the *γέννησις* of the Son. That “supralogic” is the mystery of the Trinity itself<sup>4</sup>.

You can trace that Athanasian conception in all other greek fathers up to the 6th century<sup>5</sup>. At the end of the 6th century, however, *ἐκπόρευσις* becomes only a term, or better to say “the term” due to the scholastic tendencies of that time<sup>6</sup>. The

<sup>1</sup> *Ex utroque aeternaliter tanquam ab uno principio et unica spiratione procedit*, Conc. Florent. (Denzinger, op. cit., p. 252).

<sup>2</sup> Vlad. Lossky, *La procession de St. Esprit dans la doctrine trinitaire orthodoxe*, Paris 1948, p. 32.

<sup>3</sup> Archim. Sylvester, op. cit., p. 66.

<sup>4</sup> Ad Serap. 1, 30 (PG 26, 600).

<sup>5</sup> Didymus, *De Trin.* 1, 31 (PG 39, 426); St. Epiphanius, *Ancorat.* 8, 9 (PG 41, 1056); St. Basil., *De Spir. s.* (PG 32, 152); Ep. 38, 4 (PG 32, 323—411); St. Gregor. Nyss., *Ep. ad Ablab.* (PG 45, 133); St. Greg. Naz., *Or.* 25 (PG 35, 1221): *ἰδιον δὲ πατρὸς μὲν ἡ ἀγεννησία, υἱοῦ δὲ ἡ γέννησις, πνεύματος δὲ ἡ ἐκπεμψις*. The term *ἐκπεμψις* is the best linguistic and dogmatic explanation of the Athanasian *ἐκπορεύεσθαι* and of its nature.

<sup>6</sup> Beginning with Leontius Byzant. and St. John of Damascus the “eastern scholasticism” starts. Theology becomes “terminology” (Bulgakov, *Агнецъ Божій* (The Lamb of God), YMCA Press 1933, p. 82), *ἐκπορεύεται* from now on “signifies but not describes”, which is a natural linguistic process with nearly all terms.

freshness of its original meaning was lost<sup>1</sup>. When St. John of Damascus wrote his *Exposition of the Orthodox Faith*, he, evidently, was not aware of its original patristic meaning and used that term much more technically than the earlier fathers. He wrote: "We know that there is a difference between the *γέννησις* and *ἐκπόρευσις*, but where is that difference we cannot understand<sup>2</sup>." That was a definite retreat from St. Athanasius' position<sup>3</sup>. Yet, he used the word *προβολεύς*<sup>4</sup>, he correctly described the Spirit's relations to the Father and to the Son,<sup>5</sup> but having lost the sharp understanding of the word *ἐκπορεύεται*, he confused the terms and was the first to say *δι' υἱοῦ ἐκπορευόμενον*<sup>6</sup>.

St. Tarasius, who used that term at the 7th Oecumenical Council — definitely did it under the influence of St. John, to whom he owed so much<sup>7</sup>. But, at the same time, he was the last one to do that — his famous nephew Photius, as is well-known, went back to the original use of the term<sup>8</sup>. St. John and St. Tarasius were both trying to clarify the traditional

<sup>1</sup> You can clearly see it if you compare the texts quoted above p. 302 n. 5 with De fide orthodoxa of St. John Damasc. 1, 8.

<sup>2</sup> *Καὶ ὅτι μὲν ἔστι διαφορά γεννήσεως καὶ ἐκπορεύσεως μεμαθήκαμεν, τίς δὲ δὲ τρόπος τῆς διαφορᾶς, οὐδαμῶς, ibid. (PG 94, 824).*

<sup>3</sup> St. Athanasius described that difference in C. Ar. 3, St. Gregory Naz. repeated it in Or. 29, 34, 35 (A Select Library . . . p. 8, n. 7). Both were speaking of the "incomprehensiveness" of the *ἐκπόρευσις* and *γέννησις* alike. St. John used the same argument: *ἀληπτός τε καὶ ἀγνωστος, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ τοῦ υἱοῦ γέννησις*, ibid. (col. 816). But he was the first in the East to admit, under the influence of St. Augustine (C. Maxim. 2, 14; PL 42, 770) that the difference itself was not comprehensive. He perfectly described the meaning of the *γέννησις* (as far as it was possible in the human words) but stopped altogether as soon as he reached the *ἐκπόρευσις* under the above excuse.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid. 8 (PG 94, 809).

<sup>5</sup> Ibid (col. 821; cf. col. 829, 832).

<sup>6</sup> *Τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα τὸ ἀγιον, ἐκφαντορικῇ τοῦ κρυφίου τῆς θεότητος δύναμις τοῦ πατρὸς· ἐκ πατρὸς μὲν δι' υἱοῦ ἐκπορευόμενῃ ὡς οἶδεν αὐτός, οὐ γεννητῶς, ibid. (col. 849).*

<sup>7</sup> Ep. ad summos sacerdotes (PG 98, 1461). As is wellknown St. John of Damascus was one of the greatest fighters against iconoclasm, and we can presume that his influence on St. Tarasius was not limited only to that.

<sup>8</sup> *Τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ πατρὸς, ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦ υἱοῦ θεολογούμενον ἐκπορεύεσθαι . . . , De sp. s. mystag. (PG 172, 399), he never uses δι' υἱοῦ.*

Eastern idea of the *ἐκπόρευσις*, but in fact they obscured it, the result being—that tragic theological deadlock and the *filioque* dispute. The Eastern theology was too much taken by the difficulties of the terms and never came back to St. Athanasius.

Let us turn now to the West. The Latin *processio* was, from the linguistic point of view, very much similar to the greek *γέννησις* — both signifying passive derivation<sup>1</sup>. And they were much nearer each other than both of them to the *ἐκπόρευσις*. It was only natural, in those linguistic circumstances to speak about the *duae processiones* as the later Latin theologians did<sup>2</sup>. And there seemed to be the only possible way for them to explain the naturally taken *filioque* as the “one spiration by the two”<sup>3</sup>. But dogmatically—if you look at it from the point of view of the early patristic thought—it was entirely wrong<sup>4</sup>.

The first Latin father who introduced the term *filioque*—St. Augustine<sup>5</sup> — never said just that. The learned expositors of the Divine Scriptures, he said, do not say of the Holy Spirit that He is begotten as a son of the Father, for Christ is the only Son; nor as a son of the Son, as though a grandson of the Supreme Father, nor yet that He owes what He is to none, but to the Father of whom are all things—lest we should make two prime origins without an origin, which is most false and absurd. Yet, this Augustinian *nulli debere sed Patri*<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See above p. 297 n. 3.

<sup>2</sup> St. Thomas Aqu., *Summa Theol.* Qu. 27, art. 3.

<sup>3</sup> See above p. 302 n. 1.

<sup>4</sup> It was wrong to assert that the *ex utroque unica spiratione procedit* was the unity of nature of two persons as opposed to the Third (semi-Sabellianism) and that it was done by the following: *Filium quoque esse secundum Graecos quidem causam, secundum Latinos vero principium subsistentiae Spiritus Sancti, sicut et Patrem. Et quoniam omnia, quae Patris sunt, Pater ipse unigenito Filio suo gignendo dedit* (semi-Arianism), Conc. Flor. (Denzinger, op. cit., 252).

<sup>5</sup> Swete, op. cit., 122: “It was from the Bishop of Hippo more than from any other individual teacher that the western doctrine of the Procession received both form and authority.”

*Servant tamen ut non genitum Spiritum Sanctum tanquam Filium de Patre praedicent; unicus enim est Christus; neque de Filio tanquam nepotem summi Patris; nec tamen id quod est, nulli debere sed Patri, ex quo omnia; ne duo constituamus principia sine principio, falsissimum est ac absurdissimum*, De fide et symbolo 19 (PL 40, 191).

which taken out of the context may correspond to the Photinian *ἐκ μόνου τοῦ πατρὸς*<sup>1</sup>, is linked with the "*filioque*" in his later writings<sup>2</sup>. That link was nothing else than the Latin edition of the Athanasian dialectic in Greek<sup>3</sup>, but without its clear greek distinction between the *ἐκπόρευσις* and the *ἐκλαμψις* due to the language difficulties<sup>4</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> *Ἐκ μόνου τοῦ πατρὸς αἰτιατὸν καὶ ἐκπορευτὸν . . .*, the "Orthodox Confession" 1672. Winer, *Confessions of Christendom*, p. 67; Swete, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

<sup>2</sup> *Non tamen dixit (Dominus) "Quem mittet Pater a Me", quemadmodum dixit: "Quem ego mittam vobis a Patre": videlicet ostendens quod totius divinitatis, vel, si melius dicitur, deitatis, principium Pater est. Qui ergo a Patre procedit et Filio, ad eum refertur a quo natus est Filius*, De trin. (PL 42, 908).

<sup>3</sup> St. Augustine understands the nature of the *ἐκπόρευσις* (free action) as distinct from the *γέννησις* (passive derivation, expressing it in the following Latin terms: *Exiit enim, non quomodo natus, sed quomodo datus; et ideo non dicitur filius, quia neque natus est sicut Unigenitus, neque factus . . .*, De trin. 4, 29; PL 42, 921). The difference between the *exiit* (*ἐκπορεύεται*) and *procedit* (not adequate, but expressing the idea of *ἐκλάμπει*) is that: the first is applied only to the Father, while the second to both, but with the different meaning. The Spirit is the Father's Gift (of the Father only). Being the Gift He is neither born, nor created—but freely makes himself to go out (*exiit*) from the Father (only). Yet being the actual communion between the Father and the Son, "the Godhead which the Greeks call *θεότητα*" (De fide et symb. 1, 19; PL 40, 191), He belongs to both, shining forth (in St. Athanasius' language, but in St. Augustine's: proceeding), as their Spirit, from both, as from one principle. While the *exiit* is active, the *procedit* is passive. You can clearly see the influence of St. Athanasius, whom St. Augustine definitely quotes (De fide et symbolo 19; see above p. 304 n. 6). But the linguistic difficulty does not allow him to make it as clear as St. Athanasius did, wherefore the "Western tradition" came forth.

<sup>4</sup> "There is a difference as regard the theological and speculative mode of representing the dogma, inasmuch as the Orientals distinguish between the *ἐκπόρευσις* of the Holy Spirit, in reference to His existence, and His *ἐκλαμψις* or *ἐκφανσις*, while the Westerns know nothing of this distinction", Dölinger at Bonn Conf. Liddon, *op. cit.*, 100—101; cf. Bulgakov, Lossky (*op. cit.*). But I dare to say, that St. Augustine did know the distinction in principle, but could not express it in Latin terms. The difference between him and St. Athanasius, as a result of different linguistic approach could be seen from the following comparison of their texts: Athanas.: *οὐδὲ λαβάνων ἐστὶ τὸ πνεῦμα* (see above p. 300 n. 4); Augustine: *Pater Filio dederit . . .* (see above n. 3). In St. Athanasius' context it was impossible to say *dederit*, in St. Augustine's it was unavoidable and sound. But it led to the subsequent theology in the West.

St. Augustine solves the problem by the following words remarkably similar to those of St. Athanasius: *Filius autem de Patre natus est, et Spiritus Sanctus de Patre principaliter et ipse sine ullo temporis intervallo dante communiter de utroque procedit*<sup>1</sup>. A little earlier St. Augustine said: *Ideo autem addidi principaliter quia et de Filio Spiritus Sanctus procedere reperitur; sed hoc quoque illi Pater gignendo dedit*<sup>2</sup>.

"Three is one and one is three"—might seem to be a contradiction. Yet, it is the fundamental christian dogma. The *ἐκπόρευσις* being its reflection, was for St. Athanasius the trinitarian mystery itself<sup>3</sup>. St. Augustine knew it no less clearly. His *nulli debere sed Patri* and *principaliter procedit* or *exiit* meant the *ἐκπόρευσις*; *et de Filio procedere reperitur* meant the Athanasian *ἐκλαμψις*, paradoxically united by the generation of the Son into one action of the Father and only the Father<sup>4</sup> in His and Son's mutual love, personification of which was the Spirit<sup>5</sup>. He linked them not so much by the *-que* as by *ideo autem addidi* which corresponded to the *ἐνευθῆ* of St. Athanasius.

That was far from the medieval Latin interpretation<sup>6</sup>. Definitely it was not "double" in its present sense. It was, as I should call it "the clarifying filioquinity" and not "the militant filioquism" — the difference being on which word the stress was put, on the *filio* or on the *-que*. St. Athanasius could not say in Greek: *ἐκπορεύεται παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ* or *διὰ τοῦ*

<sup>1</sup> De trin. 15, 47 (PL 42, 1095).

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. 29 (col. 1081).

<sup>3</sup> Ad Serap. 1, 30 (PG 26, 600).

<sup>4</sup> *A quo autem habet Filius ut sit Deus (est enim de Deo Deus) ab illo habet utique ut etiam de illo procedat Spiritus Sanctus: ac per hoc Spiritus Sanctus ut etiam de Filio procedat, sicut procedit de Patre, ab ipso habet Patre*, In Ioan. tract. ibid.

<sup>5</sup> De trin. 15, 37 (PL 42, 1086).

<sup>6</sup> Father Bulgakov admits that you can trace in St. Augustine's doctrine some elements of the future Latin filioquism, "but it does not develop towards the formula of Florence" (The Paracl. 117). Swete quotes the following words: *Pater processionis eius est auctor qui talem Filium genuit et gignendo ei dedit ut etiam de ipso procederet Spiritus Sanctus* (Cont. Maxim. 2, 14, 1; PL 42, 770) and concludes: "At this point Augustine stops short" (op. cit., 130).

υἱοῦ, as St. Augustine could not say in Latin: *ex Patre Filioque* (or: *per Filium*) *principaliter procedit*. It would be a nonsense or heresy in either language. But the militant filioquism of Charlemagne<sup>1</sup> and of his theologians<sup>2</sup> as well as of the Councils of Lyons and Florence<sup>3</sup> did—by imposing their *filioque* on the Greeks in Greek — just that. It was an "infallible" approval of a linguistic failure to understand the original text. We cannot but deplore it.

Photius—from the point of view of the early patristic thought—was quite right in his attempt to preserve the original orthodoxy of the Greek *ἐκπόρευσις* by stressing the *ἐκ μόνου τοῦ πατρὸς*, as the "Orthodox Confession" was right in doing that<sup>4</sup>, in spite of their own theological one-sidedness. The tragedy was due to both—to the bad Latin translation on which the Westerns insisted retranslating it into Greek, and to the subsequent Eastern failure caused by that translation — to see beyond the terms.

Yet, there was a solution of the problem, and we can have it if we humbly recognize both those failures and come back to St. Athanasius and St. Augustine<sup>5</sup>, and to the correct understanding of the difference between the *γέννησις* and the *ἐκπόρευσις*.

To sum it up: The *γέννησις* is the full and only revelation of the whole Father's *σπλάγχχνον*. It is "passive" in the sense of the perfect Sonship (not in any other sense). The *ἐκπόρευσις* is its reflection; being not the Sonship itself, but reflecting it, the *ἐκπόρευσις* is free, active and direct from the Father of

<sup>1</sup> Libri Carolini 1, 3, 3 (PL 98, 1118).

<sup>2</sup> Alcuin, Libellus de process. Sp. S. ad Carol. Magn. (PL 101, 63—82); Theodulphus, De Sp. S. (PL 105, 1239).

<sup>3</sup> Ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων αὐδὼς ὡς ἀπὸ μιᾶς ἀρχῆς καὶ μοναδικῆς προβολῆς ἐκπορεύεται..., Mansi 31, p. 1029.

<sup>4</sup> See above p. 303 n. 8 and p. 305 n. 1.

<sup>5</sup> "The teaching of St. Athanasius on the Holy Ghost would be much more useful if the present divided Christendom took it as a common base for a solution of its sad disagreement on the procession of the Holy Ghost", Dr. Marich, The Christology of St. Athanasius (in Serbian), Belgrade, p. 51. Unfortunately, Dr. Marich does not say, what would be the solution and simply suggests the term δι' υἱοῦ ἐκπορευόμενον.



Whom the Son is born. While the Son reveals the Father, the Spirit reveals the Son from the Father. And that is the nature of the ἐκπόρευσις.

The possible orthodox formula, acceptable to both—the East and the West—would be neither the *filioque*, nor the *per filium*, nor the ἐκ μόνου alone. The acceptance of the original Greek text of the Nicene (Constantinopolitan) Creed as a common base is canonically indispensable for all<sup>1</sup>. But the irenic non-compromising formula, based on patristic language could be set up in English and other languages as follows: *and I believe in the Holy Ghost, the Lord and giver of life, Who, shining forth from the Only-Begotten Son—Whose only Spirit He is, and from Whose generation He gets everything—makes Himself to go out from the only Father.*

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<sup>1</sup> 7th can. of the Council of Ephesus (3rd Oecumen.) re-enacted at Chalcedon (4th Oec.) and Const. (5. 6th Oec.), Mansi 4, p. 1362f.; cf. The Pope Leo 3rd's decision PL 102, 971. Swete, op. cit., 146, 218—222, 228—237.

## Eucharistische Gemeinschaft bei Chrysostomus

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„Einer ist es, der uns gebildet, und eines ist es, wozu er uns gebildet!“<sup>1</sup>

Dieses Wort des Kirchenvaters Chrysostomus muß um der hier erforderlichen Kürze willen eine genauere Einführung ersetzen. Und noch mehr, es ist damit etwas für das theologische Denken des Kirchenvaters Charakteristisches hervorgehoben. Es ist damit nicht nur eine treffende Aussage gemacht über die Eucharistielehre, Eucharistische Gemeinschaft und im Zusammenhang damit über das *Corpus Christi mysticum*, dieses Wort des Kirchenvaters zeigt vielmehr einen Grundzug, ein Grundanliegen seiner Theologie auf.

In unserem Zusammenhang soll dieses Wort in Hinsicht auf die Eucharistische Gemeinschaft vorangestellt sein<sup>2</sup>. Was bedeutet Eucharistische Gemeinschaft? Was versteht Chrysostomus darunter? Man muß sich zunächst davor hüten, hierüber in den Begriffen der späteren Schulen reden zu wollen, man muß schlicht zusehen, was an philologischem und theologischem Gehalt sich darbietet. Auf das erstere auch nur andeutungsweise einzugehen, ist in diesem Rahmen nicht möglich. Das theologische Anliegen stellt sich kurz gefaßt in folgendem dar:

Eucharistische Gemeinschaft läßt sich ziemlich prägnant durch den Ausdruck *KOINONIA* kennzeichnen. Eine welch vielfältige Anwendung derselbe im patristischen Schrifttum gefunden hat, ist bekannt. Bei unserem Kirchenvater ist derselbe geradezu ein *terminus technicus*, er will hiermit etwas Besonderes kennzeichnen, insoweit er über die Themen handelt:

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<sup>1</sup> In I Cor. 12, hom. 30 (PG 61, 251).

<sup>2</sup> Die vorliegende „Communication“ will nur ein Resumé sein einer vor etwa 2 Jahren fertiggestellten Arbeit dieses Themas.

Eucharistie, Eucharistische Gemeinschaft, Eingliederung in Christus usw.

Die Eucharistische Gemeinschaft ist von einer äußeren und inneren Seite her zu beleuchten. Nach der äußeren beinhaltet der Begriff zunächst einmal die gemeinsame Mitfeier der Gläubigen am hl. Opfer, wobei die *μετάληψις* des Leibes und Blutes des Herrn nicht irgendein Moment<sup>1</sup>, sondern einen integrierenden Bestandteil darstellt, schlechthin zur Eucharistiefeyer gehörend. Zu dieser äußeren Seite muß, abgesehen vom Kultus im engeren Sinne<sup>2</sup>, die christliche Liebestätigkeit, ja die christliche Lebensführung der Gläubigen überhaupt gezählt werden. Kurz gesagt, das zuletzt Genannte ist Signum, Kennzeichen für die metaphysische Realität des Bestehens der Eucharistischen Gemeinschaft. Oder anders ausgedrückt: Sakramentale Verbundenheit und sittliche Lebensführung müssen sich entsprechen. Eine Diskrepanz zwischen beiden ist nicht möglich, es sei denn, es bliebe bei der Farce einer nur rein äußerlichen Teilnahme an den gottesdienstlichen Versammlungen, bei der äußeren *μετάληψις* am Leib und Blut des Herrn. Eine *κοινωνία* im Sinne der Eucharistischen Gemeinschaft bestünde jedoch nicht.

Natürlich könnte man hier die Frage nach dem Verbleib der einzelnen Gläubigen im *Corpus Christi mysticum* aufwerfen, die Beantwortung derselben verlangt zuvor eine Klarlegung bzw. Fixierung der inneren Seite der Eucharistischen Gemeinschaft.

Die innere Seite der Eucharistischen Gemeinschaft läßt sich als eine durch die Taufe grundgelegte, durch die Eucharistie gefestigte, immer weiterwachsende, letztlich einmal zur Vollendung kommende realmystische Verbundenheit (Vereinigung) der Gläubigen mit Christus und untereinander charakterisieren.

<sup>1</sup> In Eph. 1, hom. 3 (PG 62, 29/30). Hier und auch noch an anderen Stellen tadelt Chrysostomus ganz scharf jene Gläubigen, die zwar während der Feier der hl. Geheimnisse anwesend sind, aber nicht kommunizieren. Wenn nicht, dann sollten sie gleich den Büßenden und Katechumenen die Kirche verlassen, sobald die eigentliche Handlung des hl. Opfers ihren Anfang nimmt.

<sup>2</sup> Gemeint sind damit auch gottesdienstliche Versammlungen (*συνάξεις*), selbst wenn sie nicht mit der Feier der Eucharistie verbunden waren.

Wie bei seinem großen Zeitgenossen Augustinus<sup>1</sup> ist auch bei Chrysostomus festzuhalten, daß bei ihm die Eingliederung in den „Leib Christi“ mit der Taufe beginnt und durch die Eucharistie vollendet wird. In unserem Fall heißt das, daß die Taufe in ihrer Hinordnung auf die Eucharistie und die dadurch stattgehabte Eingliederung in den Leib Christi schon Eucharistische Gemeinschaft begründet. Die Beantwortung der oben genannten Frage wäre infolgedessen generell möglich, von Chrysostomus her gesehen erfährt sie eine Differenzierung. Halten wir nochmals fest, die Verbundenheit mit Christus (ohne dieselbe hier näher zu qualifizieren), d. h. die Eucharistische Gemeinschaft ist durch die christliche Lebensführung zu erweisen. Wir haben bei Chrysostomus eine unerbittliche Abgrenzung zwischen Sein und Schein, umgekehrt die Forderung nach der größtmöglichen Entsprechung zwischen der vorhandenen Gnadengemeinschaft und der daraus entspringenden sittlichen Betätigung im Leben des Christen. Die Frage nach der Zugehörigkeit zur Eucharistischen Gemeinschaft und damit zum *Corpus Christi mysticum* wird zur Frage nach der christlichen Lebensführung. Die Beantwortung derselben, ob Zugehörigkeit und in welchem Grad, ob lebendiges oder absterbendes Glied am Leib des Herrn, liegt in der Praxis des christlichen Lebens, liegt beim einzelnen.

Die innere Seite der Eucharistischen Gemeinschaft, wie sie unser Kirchenvater darstellt, ist alleinige Vorbedingung, wesensmäßiges Fundament der äußeren Seite, welche ohne jene gar nicht zu verwirklichen wäre. Andererseits ist aber das äußere Moment, mit all seinen Eigenschaften, notwendiger und folgerichtiger Ausdruck der inneren Zusammengehörigkeit und Gemeinschaft, deren Fehlen die innere Verbundenheit der Gläubigen mit Christus und untereinander ebenso fragwürdig erscheinen ließe.

Das Wesentliche scheint damit in kurzen Strichen über die Eucharistische Gemeinschaft bei Chrysostomus aufgezeigt. Ehe wir auf einige Details eingehen, eine entsprechende Zusammen-

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<sup>1</sup> Vgl. Augustinus, De peccatorum meritis et remissione I 20, 27; 24, 34.

fassung: Eucharistische Gemeinschaft bedeutet also, da sie ihren Fixpunkt in der Feier der heiligen Geheimnisse<sup>1</sup> hat, jene Wirklichkeit, die das Wachstum, die Festigung und die Vollen-  
dung sowohl des juristisch-sozialen Bandes des Gottesvolkes wie des *Corpus Christi mysticum* beinhaltet. Von Chrysostomus her wird die Eucharistie überhaupt als *vinculum unitatis et unionis* im sakramentalen Bereich als das kirchenschaffende Element bezeichnet werden müssen. Hierüber ist im einzelnen weiter auszuführen: Chrysostomus sieht die auf der Eucharistie aufruhende Gemeinschaft als das tragende Fundament des christlichen Lebens an, mit all den Wirkungen für Natur und Übernatur. Das Fazit seiner hier aufgegriffenen Gedankengänge findet sich gleichsam in den *Homilien* 30, 31, 32 (Anfang) zum 1. Korintherbrief. Hier klingt die auf dem Eucharistischen Gemeinschaftsgedanken aufruhende Lehre vom *Corpus Christi mysticum*<sup>2</sup> und damit zusammenhängend von der Kirche in einem beachtenswerten Höhepunkt aus. Er geht dabei auf die Anwendbarkeit und Brauchbarkeit der Analogie ein: menschlicher Leib und Leib Christi<sup>3</sup>. Besonders hervorzuheben ist seine Erklärung zu I Cor. 12, 27ff.

Beim menschlichen Leib sei es doch so, daß er seiner Natur entsprechend gehorche. Die Handlungen der Glieder des Leibes Christi erwüchsen aus freier Wahl. Damit wird eine Problematik dieser Analogie sichtbar. Chrysostomus will dieselbe in keiner Weise lösen. Das „Wie“ steht nicht im Vordergrund, vielmehr das „Daß“, die Tatsache, d. h. es ist ihm daran gelegen, die wesentlichen Momente zwischen Bild und Wirklichkeit herausgestellt zu haben. Wenn schon an unserem eigenen Leib, so

<sup>1</sup> Vgl. Hom. de baptismo Christi (PG 49, 372). Hier nennt der Kirchen-  
vater die heilige Eucharistie gleichsam die Mysterien κατ' ἐξοχήν:  
μυστήρια καὶ λέγεται, καὶ ἐστίν.

<sup>2</sup> Zur Zeit des Paschasius Radbertus ist wohl zum ersten Mal das  
Wort *Corpus Christi mysticum* für die Kirche gebraucht worden zum  
Unterschied vom *Corpus Christi verum*.

<sup>3</sup> Daß wir es bei dem Bild des Leibes nicht mit einem solchen im  
üblichen Sinne zu tun haben, vielmehr mit einem jeder rhetorischen  
Metapher enthobenen Ausdruck hinsichtlich einer einzigartigen Realität,  
kann bei Chrysostomus nicht in Zweifel gezogen werden.

folgt er weiter, keine Störungen verursacht werden dürfen, dann erst recht nicht am Leibe Christi<sup>1</sup>.

Dennoch bleibt bestehen, bei den Gliedern am mystischen Leib geht es um das Prinzip der Freiheit. Ein grundlegendes Kennzeichen der Verschiedenheit zwischen Bild und Wirklichkeit, was aber nicht zur Schlußfolgerung berechtigt: wo Freiheit, da Uneinheitlichkeit. Das gerade Gegenteil trifft zu. Das Prinzip der Freiheit soll zu dem der Einheit werden. Die Freiheit ist sozusagen der Adel dieser Glieder, ist das überragende Moment für die Wertschätzung der Einheit der Glieder des mystischen Leibes Christi. Aus dieser freien Tätigkeit heraus sollen sie sich zu gleicher Einheit des sittlichen Handelns verbinden. Um wieviel höher die Gnade über der Natur steht, um soviel mehr müssen Störungen vom Leibe Christi ferngehalten werden. Dann stellt Chrysostomus die Frage, wie das Wort Pauli „dem Anteile nach“<sup>2</sup> zu verstehen sei. Dabei stößt er zur letzten Auswirkung, zum Höhepunkt seiner Lehre vom gemeinschaftsbildenden Charakter der Eucharistie vor. Die letzten und bedeutendsten Auswirkungen zeigen sich in der Einheit, in der Katholizität der Gesamtkirche. Und so fährt der Kirchenvater fort: „Denn er (Paulus) hatte den ganzen Körper genannt; der ganze Körper aber war nicht bloß die Kirche von Korinth, sondern die Kirche auf der ganzen Erde.“ Das ist das große Anliegen der *Una sancta catholica ecclesia*, das Anliegen des großen Kirchenvaters des Ostens. Hier schließt sich ein Kreis, den zu verfolgen uns in diesem Rahmen nicht verstattet ist. Denn dieser Kreis schließt in sich die kleinsten und unansehnlichsten Glieder bis hinauf zu den größten und bedeutendsten der durch die Taufe begründeten Eucharistischen Gemeinschaft. Sie, diese Eucharistische Gemeinschaft, ist konstitutives Element der *ecclesia*, die wir besonders vom *Corpus Christi mysticum* her sehen wollten, konstitutives Element jener Kirche also, deren Haupt der Herr selber ist. Und weiter bemerkt hierzu Chrysostomus: „Darum sagt er

<sup>1</sup> Chrysostomus verläßt fast nie der Gedanke an das sittliche Erfordernis, auch nicht bei sonst grundlegend dogmatischer Materie.

<sup>2</sup> In I Cor. 12, hom. 32 (PG 61, 264).

,dem Anteile nach', d. h. eure Kirche ist ein Teil der allgemeinen Kirche (juridisch-soziales Band) und des Leibes (mystisch-reale Einheit), der aus allen Kirchen gebildet ist; darum müßt ihr, wenn ihr gerecht und zumal Glieder seines Leibes sein wollt, nicht nur untereinander, sondern mit der ganzen Kirche (*οἰκουμένην ἐκκλησίαν*<sup>1</sup>) auf Erden in Frieden leben!"<sup>2</sup>

Wenn wir bei Chrysostomus als einem der größten Repräsentanten der frühchristlichen Ostkirche, als einem der bedeutendsten griechischen Kirchenväter der ersten vier Jahrhunderte das Moment der Einheit und der Katholizität des Gottesvolkes, der Kirche, in einem solchen Maße von der Eucharistie her dargestellt sehen, dann ist dieser Tatsache gerade heute wieder die gebührende Beachtung zu schenken.

Wegen der Bedeutsamkeit für die begriffliche Präzisierung der Eucharistischen Gemeinschaft sind noch einige Hinweise und Bemerkungen über die beiden besonders in Frage kommenden Termini *κοινωνία* und *μετοχή* angebracht. Chrysostomus gebraucht meist *μετοχή* bzw. *μετέχειν* usw. für eine Teilnahme mehr äußerlich wahrnehmbarer Art, nicht aber hinsichtlich des inneren Momentes des Verbundenseins in einer Gemeinschaft. Wohl verwendet er es, insofern die besagte Teilnahme auf Grund des zunächst äußeren Momentes, das die entsprechende notwendige innere Einstellung erfordert, die besagte Gemeinschaft zustandekommen läßt. Es ist also oft die Rede von der *μετοχή* oder der *μετάληψις* der Gläubigen am Herrentische, bei den heiligen Geheimnissen; hingegen das infolge der vollzogenen subjektiv inneren Haltung zustandegewordene Verbundensein, die Gemeinschaft, bezeichnet der Kirchenvater nicht mit *μετοχή* oder einer der Ableitungen dieses Begriffes. Dafür hat er die Worte *ἐκωσις* usw., in unserem Fall *κοινωνία*. Ein Beispiel bzw. eine Gegenüberstellung mag dies besser herausstellen:

<sup>1</sup> Es ist bemerkenswert, daß der Kirchenvater, der diese Bezeichnung wie selten einer verdient, nicht sagt: „mit allen Kirchen“, sondern mit der „ökumenischen Kirche“, mit der Gesamtkirche, mit der einen Kirche.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

Wir zitieren die Stelle I Cor. 10, 16 und deren Auslegung<sup>1</sup>: „„Und das Brot, das wir brechen, ist es nicht Gemeinschaft (*κοινωνία*) mit dem Leibe Christi?‘ Warum sagt er nicht Mitteilung (*μετοχή*)? Weil er etwas Größeres sagen und unser Verbundensein (*συνάφειαν*) ausdrücken will. Denn wir haben Gemeinschaft (*κοινωνοῦμεν*), nicht weil wir davon empfangen (*μετέχειν*) und daran Anteil bekommen (*μεταλαμβάνειν*, eben nur rein äußeren Anteil), sondern weil wir eins werden (*ἐνοῦσθαι*).“ Chrysostomus betrachtet zweifellos *κοινωνία* als etwas von *μετοχή* (und *μετάληψις*) qualitativ Verschiedenes, als etwas grundlegend Tieferes! Es ist nicht irgendeine Gemeinschaft, die er mit *κοινωνία* bezeichnet, sondern eine spezifische, die nur dem Getauften, der die Eucharistiefeyer ihrer Einsetzung gemäß mitfeiert, zukommt. Selbst für einen Katechumenen bliebe es (wie andere Stellen das aufweisen) bei einer nur äußeren Teilnahme (falls er es wagte, während der Eucharistiefeyer anwesend zu sein), nicht aber innerlich wirksamen Gemeinschaft mit Christus und den Gliedern seines Leibes. Bei anderen Kirchenvätern werden wir einer solchen Fassung von *κοινωνία* nicht unbedingt begegnen, wenn auch Chrysostomus mit dem Grundgedanken der hier gemeinten *κοινωνία* in keiner Weise als Ausnahme dasteht. Freilich selbst er verwendet den Begriff, sofern dieser nicht Bezug auf die Eucharistie und die damit zusammenhängenden Fragen nimmt, für Vereinigungen und Gemeinschaften in anderem Sinne.

Noch ein anderes Beispiel mag hier folgen: Zu I Cor. 11, 19 bzw. *In dictum illud Apostoli, oportet et haereses esse in vobis, ut qui* usw., sagt der Kirchenvater: „... Aus diesem Brauch und dieser Gewohnheit entwickelte sich ein geradezu bewundernswertes Zusammenleben in den Gemeinden damals; denn alle Gläubigen, die zusammenkamen, gingen, wenn nach dem Anhören der Belehrung, nach den Gebeten, nach der Gemeinschaft der Mysterien die Versammlung aufgelöst wurde (*τῆς συνάξεως λύσεως*), nicht sogleich nach Hause, sondern die Reichen und Vermögenden, die von daheim Speisen und EB-

<sup>1</sup> In I Cor. 10, hom. 24 (PG 61, 200).



waren mitbrachten, luden die Armen ein und machten gemeinsame Tische (*κοινὰς τραπέζας*), gemeinsames Essen und gemeinsames Trinken (*κοινὰ συμπόσια*) in den Kirchen selbst. So wurden sie von der Gemeinschaft bei Tisch (*ἀπὸ τῆς κοινωνίας τῆς κατὰ τὴν τράπεζαν*), von der Ehrfurcht, die dieser Ort einflößte, und von überall her durch das Band der Liebe verbunden, und es erwuchs ihnen auf der einen Seite große Freude, auf der anderen großer Nutzen.“<sup>1</sup> Dieses Handeln und diese Lebensweise ist also nach Chrysostomus der adäquate Ausdruck der Verbundenheit in Christus und untereinander. Es ist hier nicht zu übersehen, daß der Kirchenvater von *κοινωνία* der hl. Mysterien spricht und auf Grund derselben von der *κοινωνία* bei Tisch, des Liebesmahles! Äußeres und inneres Moment der *κοινωνία* müssen sich entsprechen. Das „Band der Liebe“ fordert von innen her seine Manifestation. Mit derselben Entschiedenheit, mit der Chrysostomus die dogmatische Grundlage aufzeigt, mit der gleichen Unabdingbarkeit weist er auf die sittlichen Folgerungen hin. Dem Gedanken der Eucharistischen Gemeinschaft würde man bei ihm nicht gerecht werden, wenn man darin sein großes Anliegen, seinen Ruf nach dem Durchdrungensein von Christenstand und Christenleben übersähe.

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<sup>1</sup> In dictum Pauli 3 (PG 51, 257).

## St. Irenaeus and contemporary theology

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The subject assigned to me is twofold. Concerning the teaching of St. Irenaeus I cannot add anything to the estimate which I published some five years ago<sup>1</sup>. On the other side of the picture, however, there is a continuously changing situation. Here second thoughts are possible, although I must confess that for me such thoughts will simply provide further illustrations of a thesis already fully set forth.

The bare facts of the contrast between the outlook of Irenaeus and our contemporary modes of handling theological material can be stated objectively in a way which might, perhaps, command general agreement. When we turn to interpretation, however, we are on more difficult ground, — first because such interpretation will depend inevitably upon presuppositions, religious and theological, which are bound to produce very varying estimates; and secondly because at the present time there are two quite different lines of approach to the relevant literature and to its historical context. The second of these two factors, which I have designated 'lines of approach' has no necessary connexion with religious or theological presuppositions. It belongs rather to the sphere of the empirical sciences which have such a predominant place in the characteristic forms of our modern cultural epoch. Until recently, however, there was only one such line of approach generally accepted as providing the correct technique for a satisfactory handling of the religious literature with which Christian scholarship is concerned. I refer, of course, to the literary analysis of documents by methods comparable to those of the natural sciences.

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<sup>1</sup> *Revelation and the Modern World* (A. & C. Black, 1950).

This technique of literary analysis developed long before the sciences concerning the human mind had attained their present prominence. It is this group of sciences, including anthropology and psychology, which are responsible for the rise of a second line of approach to all ancient documents. We may surely hope that these two methods of study, which might be called respectively literary and psychological, will ultimately prove to be complementary. For clearly every document is the product of some human mind; and we cannot take for granted that human minds have always worked in the same way. In fact the anthropological investigations have made it evident that all ancient cultures, including those with which we are here concerned, were the products of human mentalities in certain important respects very different from ours. Here, then, we can return to Irenaeus. He provides a classic illustration of the more ancient way of thinking in so far as it is the special concern of Christian scholarship. For in certain respects he represents accurately a religious outlook which has unbroken continuity with what might be called 'the biblical way of thinking'.

At this point a preliminary question may be raised. Granted that there is a distinct gap between ancient and modern thought processes, may we not say that the vast increases of knowledge which have accumulated in the modern centuries give to the modern mind the final decision concerning the value of ancient contributions? To this question two answers might be given. 1. In the first place, if we are to be judges we must first make sure that we understand what we are judging. We cannot therefore by-pass the contributions made by anthropology and psychology concerning the ancient forms of mentality. For these are essential parts of our modern equipment. 2. But secondly, supposing that the fullest use of these modern aids shows Irenaeus to be a faithful representative of what I described as the biblical way of thinking, does it not follow from the vantage ground of modern knowledge that the whole of that mode of thought is out of date, and that we must re-translate its contributions into language corresponding to our own

mental habits? And will not this involve a repudiation of typically ancient ways of reasoning, both biblical and patristic?

Here we have reached the crux of the whole matter. A great deal of modern scholarship has proceeded along lines which answer these final questions in the affirmative. I believe that the assumptions thus taken for granted were not justified, and that, theologically speaking, they have had disastrous effects. This is not to say that all the advantage lies with the ancient modes of thought. But it does raise the question as to whether the whole problem has not been vastly over-simplified. In fact it brings us face to face with the question as to what we mean by religious revelation; and more particularly it raises an issue as to what are the inevitable limits within which a revelation of deity could be given, when it took a historical form. Further questions, however, must be raised on the other side of the picture. Broadly speaking ancient thought was imaginative and pictorial, whereas all modern scholarship is analytical. Irenaeus is pre-occupied with the unity and wholeness of religious revelation, whereas our scientific humanism has for centuries been busily engaged in making logical distinctions between the various parts of every whole which comes under its scrutiny.

It is only within the last half-century that scientific thought has been compelled to face up to a new problem, — namely, how can detailed analysis cope with material which is proving to be infinitely complex? It looks as if such infinity will by its very nature prove to be always mysterious; and this acknowledgement of mystery is already affecting profoundly the current attitude of science towards reality. On the theological side this problem has already begun to challenge our traditional techniques of empirical inquiry, although there are still areas of Christian scholarship which remain naïvely unaffected by it. If, then, analysis can never be adequate or complete, what can we say about the mysterious whole which thus transcends analysis? All scientific analysis presupposes that the object of study is an ordered whole; and this is a fundamental pre-supposition common alike to ancient and modern ways of thinking. Moreover, as in scripture Israel is seen to be ever-

striving towards 'the whole'<sup>1</sup>, so also it is in all systematic pursuit of knowledge. For the believer in a specific revelation, however, the whole is that which is divinely given; and for Christian faith this means a process of divine self-disclosure in history.

If, now, the wholeness of revelation transcends our finite knowledge and is divinely given in a specific form, then we cannot rightly attempt to separate the given whole from the form in which it is given. That form reaches us in the scriptures of the Old and New Testaments in their entirety; and every part of them is relevant, albeit in very varied ways and degrees. The parts, however, must be viewed always in relation to the whole; and this is precisely what St. Irenaeus does. We must also notice that for him the ordered whole of Revelation has three fundamental aspects as well as three stages of development. The three aspects are Scripture, the order of Creation and the people of God; the three stages are Israel, Christ and the Church. In both triads there is interpenetration between parts, whether aspects or stages of the whole. An illustration of all this may be seen in the Pauline doctrine of the Body of Christ. The analogy identifies the People of God with a living organism which is a structural form fundamental to the order of Creation. Moreover the two phases of the Pauline image, the earlier and the later, both envisage Christ and the church as together forming one organism, and that too comprising the whole order of a new creation.

The example just given shows how biblical images and idioms provide the background of the Irenaean way of thinking. Similarly this father's use of the creation stories in Genesis as a given form of revelation has a solid background in Scripture; but here interpenetration of aspects and stages gives a characteristic shape to his presentation of the revelational whole. For him the process in which revelation is given is a vital aspect of that whole in which the revelation consists. Moreover interpenetration of aspects is held to justify, for example, the

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<sup>1</sup> J. Pedersen, *Israel, its life and culture*, I—II (E. T. Copenhagen and London, 1926), p. 123.

process by which Adam was fashioned to the image being identified with the 'long story' of Israel's schooling. So too the union of Adam and Eve may be not merely a foreshadowing of the union between Christ and the Church. The temporal aspect which would most naturally occur to the modern mind may be absent; for the two bridal pictures are then envisaged as two strands of one pattern compresent together in the counsels of God. This conception is quite explicit in the Pauline Epistle to the Ephesians (5, 22—33), and appears to be implicit in such a passage of Irenaeus as that which describes the 'co-infancy' of Christ with Adam. Here the Holy Child is conceived to be compresent with the child-like Adam, because the formation of the latter is co-terminous with the entire process of the revelational whole in all its three stages (Israel, Christ and the Church)<sup>1</sup>.

In such imaginative thinking there is something typical, apparently, of a whole epoch in primitive Christian theology. There is both simultaneity and process within the revelational whole, as though the one included the other. This is not a platonic concept of eternity nor a modern temporal concept of causal sequence. It seems to have more affinity with the non-temporal, pictorial, implications of the Hebrew verbal tenses. It would, however, be a mistake to regard this ancient form of thought as one which must be held to exclude our modern apparatus of scientific analysis with its minute particularity, its provisional generalities and its tracing of causal sequences. As I see it the modern techniques could be taken into the biblical and Irenaeian way of thinking without damage to either, rather with considerable enrichment of our understanding concerning the revelation and all that flows from it. In important respects our knowledge will be more exact and accurate than that of our spiritual ancestors. But this advantage will be fruitful only so far as it moves within their world of insights with regard to the actual form in which revelation was given.

I must now develope the expression: 'revelation and all that flows from it' in relation to two further aspects of the

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<sup>1</sup> *Advers. haereses*, IV. 38. 2.

revelational whole as Irenaeus apprehends it. The sequence of stages: 'Israel, Christ, the Church' indicates that the process of re-fashioning Adam in a new creation has its nodal centre indeed in the Christ, and reaches back through the old covenant, but also that it reaches forward into the future in the historical process which is the life of the Christian community. All of this is in some sense included within the revelational whole; and with regard to the third stage Irenaeus has two ways of speaking which correspond respectively to two cardinal concepts of Scripture. I refer to man's creation in the divine image and to the function of tradition within the religious community. Recently it has been shewn that throughout scripture and in its immediate Christian successors as well as in their Jewish contemporaries a living tradition of sound teaching is the indispensable channel in and through which revelation continues to be immanent in the life and thought of God's chosen people<sup>1</sup>. For Irenaeus this notion is set within the context of the 'image of God', because the latter is conceived to be extended from Christ into the Church and her members.

Revelation is conceived to be present and operative within the 'living biological phenomenon' of orthodox thinking and teaching, because Christ and the church together constitute the Adam of a restored creation in which the divine image is being manifested and fulfilled. This agrees perfectly with the creationist background of Pauline discussions concerning the Body of Christ, where the healthy functioning of the Body is effected through apportioning of *charismata* by the Spirit of God<sup>2</sup>. The individual participates in the image through incorporation into the *totus Christus*, Jesus in his Church. Once again the Ephesian epistle, which provided Irenaeus with his key concept of *anakephalaiosis*, depicts the living and growing organism of Christ's Body as the sphere within which individual Christians are protected from the deceptive wiles of error by learning from

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<sup>1</sup> I may refer to the works of G. F. Moore, P. Carrington, the late Prof. Fridrichsen and Père Bouyer.

<sup>2</sup> See especially 1 Cor. 12 with its verbal echoes of LXX in Genesis 2.

their teachers 'the truth as it is in Jesus'<sup>1</sup>. In Romans 8, 19ff. the eschatological goal of the Christian life is depicted as final conformation to the image of God's Son through a process of growth which is set upon the background of cosmic restoration, where Creation is personified as Eve in travail with her children. Here again Genesis 3 provides the pictorial imagery for a transformation of the entire created order through the perfecting of the divine image in the whole Christ.

The togetherness and unity of the revelational whole, as we find it in Irenaeus, are not characteristic of our modern world of theological thinking. This aspect of the gap between the past and the present, however, did not emerge all at once. We can trace broadly the stages through which it has passed. In Athanasius, for example, the essential unity of creation, incarnation and redemption is still securely emphasized. In Augustine the doctrine of the image is concentrated into a psychological and therefore also individual form. With Anselm the wholeness of revelation is still further retracted. For redemption no longer has its ancient creationist background. In the centuries of western history that breach is in various ways accentuated, first by a sharp contrast between the natural and the supernatural and then by a restriction of piety to a more intensely individual form. Moreover in the various breaches which occurred in the unity of Christendom the dissipation of the revelational whole into more canalized channels was not peculiar to any one grouping of Christians. In the west, at least, it was certainly characteristic of all.

The Renaissance brought into being a whole world of new knowledge at a time when the original concept of religious tradition had undergone so great an eclipse that the very notion of tradition as possessing an important religious function had fallen under suspicion. What in fact happened, however, was that the biblical and primitive Christian concepts of tradition were largely replaced by more modern traditions; and in the world of Christian scholarship this could easily come to mean

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<sup>1</sup> Eph. 4 as a whole; and cp. 3, 10, where the church manifests the manifold wisdom of God.



a technique of knowledge already becoming traditional wherever science was dominant. A further serious development which still largely controls our contemporary theological thinking must now be mentioned. I will call it 'loss of perspective'. The conviction that revelation has a profound continuity in religious history has been relegated to a very subordinate position, if not dismissed altogether. Main clues to the meaning of the New Testament are sought and found in literature of other cultures parallel in point of time with the rise of Christianity. This leads to curiously diverse results. For example Burney found in the Christological section of the Epistle to the Colossians (ch. 1) a typically Jewish *midrash* upon biblical idioms of speech concerning creation, whereas Dr. Bultmann finds in it a gnostic, pagan hymn, slightly adapted to give it a Christian reference!

Such specialized studies as now preoccupy us have inevitably a partial, perhaps we might say a piecemeal, character. On the other hand, if all lines of approach were kept in view we could be saved from such puzzling contradictions as I have just mentioned. It may, of course, be urged that in the dialectic of learned discussion thesis and antithesis prepare the way for synthesis. The dialectic, however, may also be seen as an age-long process, since at no single epoch can the whole of human response to divine Revelation be gathered up into the wisdom of one particular culture. If revelation was given in the stages of a historical process, it is also apprehended by stages in successive epochs of Christian interpretation. If Irenaeus emphasized process as an essential feature of revelation he also emphasized recapitulation of all things in Christ as that which gave unity and significance to all phases of the process historically unfolded. Now recapitulation of nature in man, the microcosm, was an idea which was not unfamiliar to ancient thought; and to-day it might fairly be said to be one of the most assured results of our scientific progress in knowledge. Moreover, this continuity of structure might be paralleled in the continuity of revelation.

Continuity, however, is only one aspect of that structure in which man appears at the apex in the rôle of microcosm.

Recapitulation is a word which can have a modern scientific meaning; and as such it provides a significant analogy to what that word meant both for the author of the Ephesian epistle and for Christian thought in the second century of our era. It would be a great gain if Christian scholarship to-day could make more use of this guiding concept. Upon that possibility I will make one suggestion. The anthropological line of approach to scripture has revealed the enormous dependence of Hebrew religion upon the wide pattern of fertility cults which in that period covered the whole of what we now call 'the middle east'. Throughout biblical history there is constant assimilation of material from the surrounding cultures into the religion of Israel. Moreover we cannot deny the possibility that this factor is present also in the New Testament. But it is also quite certain that the religion of Israel was not passively moulded by such influences. Under prophetic guidance what was common to Israel and her neighbours underwent transformation; and through the coming of the Christ an even more radical transformation took place.

If now we bring together the three notions of continuity, recapitulation and transformation we have the essential outlines of that unity in the biblical revelation which might safeguard us from undue simplifications, always so liable to appear attractive at any given point of specialized study. Points of affinity, whether mainly literary or psychological, between the New Testament and contemporary cultures would be duly weighed in the deep perspectives of biblical history as a whole, and due regard would be shewn to the organic whole of apostolic interpretation reached under the transforming influence of the gospel. As in the Old Testament so also in the New there may be reflected certain ways of speaking which are common, in part, to the entire *Weltanschauung* of that particular epoch, but which, nonetheless, have a wholly distinctive character in their apostolic setting. Recapitulation would then be seen to be something much more significant than contemporary forms of syncretism, although such mixed forms might bear a certain relation of resemblance to the organic whole of the genuinely Christian tradition.

In the recently published account of *the Jung Codex*<sup>1</sup> a significant theological connexion has been found between the earliest phase of Valentinian *Gnosis* and the speculations of a Jewish community of the Essene type, made accessible to us through the Dead Sea discoveries<sup>2</sup>. The treatment which this theme has received at the hands of its modern interpreters appears to me to provide definite support for the point of view developed in the present paper, and in particular for my concluding reflexions concerning the revelational whole in its relation to modern investigations. In the dialectical movement of recent speculations concerning Christian origins we seem to be passing out of an early phase in which the apostolic writers were thought to have borrowed freely from pre-Christian Gnostic sources. In the later reconstruction the position is largely reversed. In the new view it is the Gnostic systems which appear to be dependent, in effect, upon two main streams belonging to the biblical tradition, namely, upon contemporary Jewish speculations and upon the Christian writings which now form our New Testament.

But further, the current Jewish tendency to give to the divine Name a distinct hypostatic status does not appear to differ in principle from that personification of divine Wisdom which goes back to the Book of Proverbs. Moreover, that same tendency went through several distinct phases in the Christian thought of the first two centuries, witness the Irenaeian identification of holy Wisdom with the Holy Spirit by contrast with the Christological thesis of St. Paul. Orthodoxy in the second century of our era was still in that highly flexible stage when a variety of experiments were possible. Thus the Valentinian *Gospel of Truth* with its Jewish background might well have seemed at first to be a possible interpretation of the biblical tradition until the revelational whole had become more fully

<sup>1</sup> The Jung Codex, A newly recovered Gnostic Papyrus, Three studies. Translated and edited by F. L. Cross. (London, 1955).

<sup>2</sup> The alternative theory that this was a 'non-Pauline' Christian community could not eliminate its Jewish background in view of its typically Jewish speculations concerning the divine Name. (See next paragraph.)

clarified. On the other hand there are indications that in the development of orthodox thought a certain rivalry between the Logos doctrine and 'Spirit-Christology' had not yet been resolved in the thought of St. Irenæus. His doctrine of recapitulation does not suggest a closed system of knowledge but rather a rich treasury of truth within which, perhaps, for us also a wide variety of theological research might prove fruitful.



## **X. PHILOSOPHICA**

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## The Evidences of Christianity in the Apologetic of Origen<sup>1</sup>

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The *Contra Celsum* of Origen discusses an enormous variety of subjects ranging from the art of tight-rope walking to the religious beliefs of elephants. The purpose of this paper is not to analyse the background of the debate between Celsus and his Christian opponent, but rather to ask a simple and quite limited question, namely: What arguments were regarded by Origen as seriously counting for something in his plea for the truth of Christianity? If large parts of the debate are likely to weary the modern reader and to strike him as trivial or even futile, that is not merely because of their antique dress. It is largely because both Celsus and Origen are often content with mere debating-points. For almost all topics on which controversy between human beings is conceivable the Academy and the Stoa had provided a vast arsenal of ready-made argument and counter-argument; it was therefore a simple matter for Origen to notice which side Celsus took, and in order to answer him to take the other<sup>2</sup>. The essential triviality of these debates is only thrown into more pronounced relief by the fact that the pagan and the Christian have so much in common in their basic philosophical presuppositions. All this is of high interest indeed to the student of hellenistic philosophy and to anyone seeking to assess the cultural background of Origen. But is it serious apologetic?

It is possible to be so distracted by the trivialities as to lose sight of the fact that the main thrust of Celsus' attack upon

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<sup>1</sup> In this paper the references are limited to the essential minimum; I hope to treat the subject at greater length in a forthcoming study of Origen to be published by the Cambridge University Press.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. my remarks in Origen, *Contra Celsum*, Cambridge 1953, pp. IX ff.



the Christian defences is directed against the traditional props of apologetic: the miracles of Jesus and the prophecies fulfilled in the events of his life, death, and resurrection. These are arguments which, in the *Contra Celsum*, Origen strains every nerve to sustain. Their purpose was clear; they were intended to provide an unambiguous guarantee of the operation of God in Christ. The miracles were an external, visible manifestation of supernatural force. And if men living some five hundred years previously had exactly predicted the events of Christ's birth and passion (in both he was almost wholly passive, so that he could not be suspected of modelling his actions upon the prophetic pattern), surely no rational mind could doubt for a moment that this was the work of God and not of man. If proofs were required, here was the supernatural demonstrated from startling breaks in the natural order; anyone refusing his assent to proofs so palpable was either a fool or a knave.

Accordingly, Celsus must undermine these two proofs — ἀποδοκιμασι αἰτιολογίας (c. *Cels.* II. 44). He accepts the Jewish argument that the miracles of Jesus were done, if at all, by magic and spells (II. 49), an art which he acquired in youth in Egypt, well-known as a nursery of magicians. To this argument Celsus adds that the two supreme miracles, the virgin birth and the resurrection, are insufficiently attested, the latter being dependent upon the testimony of an hysterical female subject to hallucinations. And Christ's miracles of healing are not as impressive or incontrovertible as those of Asclepius. If the Christians accept biblical miracles, why do they reject others (II. 55)? What is their criterion of authenticity?

The orthodox argument from prophetic prediction is challenged by Celsus on three main grounds<sup>1</sup>. First, the Old Testament prophecies are extremely obscure; no honest reader could really be sure that they refer only to Jesus and could not refer to anyone else (cf. I. 50, 57; II. 28; VII. 1ff.). If the prophecies were really as clear as the Christians claim, and as they must be if the Christian argument is to hold water, why

<sup>1</sup> Celsus is well aware of the Marcionite criticisms of the argument to which he is substantially indebted (cf. c. *Cels.* VII. 2 and 18).

did the Jews fail to believe that Jesus had fulfilled them (I. 52; II. 8)? Secondly, even if the prophets did utter predictions, they cannot have predicted anything so blasphemous as the death of God (VII. 14). Thirdly, why do the Christians accept biblical prophecies, but reject the predictions of the oracles, for example, of Delphi and Claros? (VII. 3; cf. VIII. 45). Again the question is that of criterion. Celsus is curious that the Christians are angry and embarrassed when their religion is compared with others (III. 37). Why do they take Christian superiority for granted?

In his reply Origen is for the most part content to fall back upon the old Sceptic arguments to discredit non-biblical predictions and miracles<sup>1</sup>. But might not these same arguments tell against the Christian position? Is it not arbitrary to deny the validity of the one and to accept that of the other? Origen is fully aware of this problem. The point becomes of the first importance when Origen proceeds to accept the Sceptic contention that in itself the power to heal or to predict is morally neutral, since it is granted to both bad and good alike<sup>2</sup>. If so, healings and prophecies are no certain evidence of divine operation, and it would seem that the ground has been cut away completely from the traditional Christian apologetic arguments. Nevertheless, Origen does not surrender the point. For the miracles of Jesus are differentiated by their possession of a moral quality. His miracles made the beneficiaries better men and women, which cannot be claimed for magicians<sup>3</sup>.

In answering the question "Did the miracles happen?", Origen has three main arguments: (1) That genuine cures were done in Jesus' name is proved by the present effectiveness of exorcisms performed by uneducated Christians<sup>4</sup>. (2) It is surely quite reasonable that miraculous help should have been given to the Church at its inception. Miracles were the swaddl-

<sup>1</sup> See c. Cels. III. 24 ff.; VIII. 45 f. (and notes thereon in my translation).

<sup>2</sup> So c. Cels. III. 25; IV. 95; VII. 5. But the conventional view appears in VI. 10: τὸ γὰρ χαρακτηρεῖται τὴν θεότητα ἢ περὶ μελλόντων ἐστὶν ἀπαγγελία.

<sup>3</sup> I. 38, 68; III. 27.

<sup>4</sup> II. 8; VII. 35; cf. VII. 4.

ing-clothes of the infant Church, even if now it has become independent of such aid<sup>1</sup>. (3) In view of the lack of first-hand evidence, the authenticity of the miracles is now guaranteed by the fact that they fulfilled prophecies<sup>2</sup>. If so, then the argument from miracle depends for its validity upon the argument from prophecy.

The argument from miracle, as Origen was well aware, is particularly open to the difficulty that a lack of absolute certainty is inherent in all knowledge of past events. "To try and substantiate almost any story as historical fact, even if it is true, and to produce complete certainty about it, is one of the most difficult tasks and in some cases is impossible" (c. *Cels.* I. 42). If only one could have been there at the time, one would have been entirely sure. Indeed, even Democritus, Epicurus, and Aristotle who were notoriously sceptical of miracles and oracular predictions, would have been convinced if only they could have seen with their own eyes a miracle done by Moses, one of the prophets, or even Jesus himself (VIII. 45). "We must notice that the miraculous portents were able to move to belief those who lived at the time of the Lord, but that with the lapse of much time they have lost their evidential value and have now even been suspected of being legendary" (*Comm. in Ev. Ioann.* II. 34 (28) = 204). We are therefore driven back upon the Old Testament predictions as guarantees of the authenticity of the New Testament miracles. This argument holds good in particular for the virgin birth and the resurrection (c. *Cels.* I. 32—34; II. 62). Yet it is in Origen's mind a stronger argument for the resurrection that if it was a fiction the disciples would never have risked their lives for something they must have known to be grounded upon a falsehood<sup>3</sup>. That the prophecy was in fact fulfilled is verified by the conviction of the apostles and the consequent mission of the Church to the world.

It seems therefore that if, on the one hand, the argument from miracle depends upon the argument from prophecy, on

<sup>1</sup> III. 28; cf. IV. 80.

<sup>2</sup> VIII. 9.

<sup>3</sup> I. 31; II. 10, 16, 55ff., 77; V. 57; VII. 35.

the other hand the belief that the prophecy was actually fulfilled is made reasonable by something else. In this way Origen is forced back behind the traditional fortifications of Christian apologetic upon a defence which in his own mind counted for much more. This third main argument is the miraculous expansion of Christianity in the ancient world.

How profoundly Origen felt the force of this argument is shown not only by its constant reiteration in the *Contra Celsum* but also by the all-important first chapter of *De principiis* IV, where he observes that in the first three books his arguments have taken for granted the authority not only of the truths of natural theology, authenticated as *κοινὰ ἔννοια*, but also of the biblical writers. Now therefore it is necessary for him to offer some justification for his assumption that the Bible is inspired and authoritative. And pride of place among the proofs which he adduces is taken by the astounding success of the Christian mission. The evangelists and teachers have been few and in many cases half-educated. The opposition from prejudiced mobs and a hostile government has been intense. Nevertheless, Christianity has spread to become universal, and that is inexplicable by any rational standard of judgment unless it is the work of the Spirit of God.

In *De princ.* IV. 1, it is only in the second place that Origen produces the argument from prophecy. And he makes significant admissions that this second argument is not quite as strong as the first. For it is only the fulfilment of the prophecies in Christ which has put beyond all doubt the inspiration of the Old Testament prophets themselves<sup>1</sup>. The acknowledgment of Christ is therefore in some sense prior to the recognition of the prophets' inspiration, not *vice versa* as the conventional form of the argument would run. Moreover, there are admitted difficulties and obscurities in the Old Testament; they are not insoluble, though it would be necessary to investigate each prophecy carefully to show this, which would be wearisome. But

<sup>1</sup> Similarly c. Cels. I. 45: *Καὶ τὸ παρὰδοξόν γε· ἐκ τῶν περὶ Ἰησοῦ ἀποδείξεων ἐν νόμῳ καὶ προφήταις ἀποδεικνύται ὅτι καὶ Μωϋσῆς καὶ οἱ προφῆται ἦσαν προφῆται τοῦ Θεοῦ.*

the devout reader feels the inspiration of the prophets. If there are stumbling-blocks in the path of some readers so that they find it hard to discern the supernatural in the pages of the Old Testament, let them consider that it is entirely congruous with the difficulties experienced in attempts to discern God's universal providence in the realm of nature. (In short, there is no difficulty in revelation not paralleled in nature — a striking anticipation of Bishop Butler's *Analogy of Religion*.) The argument from prophecy may stand therefore, but not quite so securely or with the same confidence as that from the expansion of the Church.

Origen is quite clear that the expansion of Christianity is not to be accounted for by any naturalistic explanations. In one striking and impassioned sermon (*Hom. in Luc. VII*) he declares that "unless the birth of the Saviour had been heavenly and blessed, unless it had been divine and supernatural, his doctrine would never have penetrated throughout the world". The events of the Gospel history are vindicated by the contemporary power of the Christian mission. The handiwork of God may be seen by the congregation in their present moral and religious experience, in the miracle of faith and of moral restoration in their own souls. Christ's birth, passion, and resurrection, are wrought *non solum illo tempore sed etiam nunc in nobis*. The sermon ends with an appeal to the catechumens:

*Quis vos, o catechumeni, in ecclesiam congregavit? quis stimulus impulit, ut relictis domibus in hunc coetum coeatis? Neque enim nos domus vestras singillatim circuimus, sed omnipotens pater virtute invisibili subicit cordibus vestris, quos scit esse dignos, hunc ardorem, ut quasi inviti et retractantes veniatis ad fidem, maxime in exordio religionis, cum veluti trepidi et paventes salutis fidem cum timore suscipitis.*

The power of the Gospel is not in efficient advertising and recruiting, but in the inherent appeal of its message to move souls to repentance and faith.

Nevertheless at this point there is an awkward ambiguity in Origen's language. He is no doubt on safe ground when he says, as he does repeatedly in the *Contra Celsum*, that the evidence of Christianity lies in its moral converting power

over educated and ignorant alike, and that its universality is seen in its transcending of barriers not only of race but also of culture and education. So far so good. But he also goes on by a natural and easy transition to talk as if the sheer numbers of the Christians were in themselves a sufficient argument, as if the divine power of Christ were proved not only by the moral quality of believers but by their quantity.

It is, however, well known that Origen had the gravest doubts about the rapid expansion of the Church. The admission of the multitude meant a reduction in standards. "Consider," he says, "*τὰ πολυάνθρωπα ἀθροίσματα* of the churches: how many are conformed to this world, how few transformed by the renewing of their mind."<sup>1</sup> Or again: "in these days those who are baptized receive merely the outward form of the mysteries; but in the apostolic age they were filled with inward power."<sup>2</sup> Such citations could be multiplied.

In short, the expansion of Christianity which, as Origen correctly prophesied, would shortly dominate the Roman empire, is an ambivalent argument, and only remains of true apologetic value to him provided that quantity and quality are not divorced.

The upshot is that Origen not only becomes a prime architect of the three "historical" arguments which remained the chief pillars of popular apologetic from his time until the eighteenth century; because of his scepticism of the cogency of the arguments from miracle and fulfilled prophecy he may also be said to have anticipated some of the criticisms of these traditional arguments which were to come in full flood with the Enlightenment<sup>3</sup>. For the Church of the third and fourth centuries he provided a platform for a reasoned presentation of the faith to the intelligent thought of the age. It is indeed remarkable for how long the platform that he did so much to construct remained more or less intact.

<sup>1</sup> Comm. in Ev. Matt. XIII. 24.

<sup>2</sup> Comm. in Ep. ad Rom. V. 8; cf. VII. 3.

<sup>3</sup> For this theme cf. my Lessing's Theological Writings, London 1956, pp. 30 ff.

One last distinction must be drawn if Origen's status as an apologist is to be rightly understood. On the one hand, he is happy to admit that apologetic is a second-grade activity of Christian theologians. It is not indeed a waste of time as some would suppose (there are many, he observes sadly, who suffer from the vulgar error that theologians are inane and superfluous<sup>1</sup>). For brethren weak in the faith are helped by such arguments, and also those alien to the faith. But while apologetic may deter people from being argued out of the faith, it is less effective at arguing people into it. It is not therefore the theologian's primary task. On the other hand, Origen will have nothing to do with the notion that the gulf between God and finite, sinful man is so vast that all apologetic is impossible. Certainly in Origen's thought revelation is never on the same plane as reason; yet there is not such an absolute discontinuity between them that revelation becomes an act not of grace but of sheer omnipotence. The total depravity of fallen humanity is a gnostic and heretical doctrine: "a totally depraved being could not be censured, only pitied as a poor unfortunate"<sup>2</sup>.

It follows that in all men the divine image may still be discerned. The Logos lights every man coming into the world; all beings that are rational partake of the true light<sup>3</sup>. The Gospel brings to actuality what in unbelievers is present potentially<sup>4</sup>. It is, therefore, a restoration of the original righteousness of the creature, an ἀποκατάστασις which is a republication of the law of nature, implanted by God in all men. Therefore in the ethics of human relations the sermon on the mount is in complete accord with natural law<sup>5</sup>. When Celsus critically comments that Christian ethical teaching has nothing new to

<sup>1</sup> Hom. V in Ps. XXXVI, 1 (Lommatzsch XII, 221): *solent enim imperiti habere etiam istud cum ceteris pessimum vitium, ut inanes et superfluos putent eos qui verbo et doctrinae operam dederint, et amplectuntur magis imperitiam suam quam illorum studia et laborem; mutatisque nominibus exercitia eorum verbositatem, suam vero indocibilitatem vel imperitiam simplicitatem vocant.*

<sup>2</sup> Comm. in Ev. Ioann. XX. 28. = 254.

<sup>3</sup> Hom. in Ierem. XIV. 10.

<sup>4</sup> Comm. in Ep. ad Rom. VIII. 2.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid. III. 7.

say, his observation is simply accepted. Christianity is the full implementing of the natural law implanted by God. Nevertheless in ethics there is revelation just as there is in doctrine; for although many unbelievers are men of honour and rectitude, they ascribe their righteousness not to God but to themselves or their teachers, whereas the New Testament reveals that God is the source of all goodness, wherever it is found<sup>1</sup>. So philosophers speak of modesty where the Bible speaks of humility<sup>2</sup>.

With such a standpoint Origen need not hesitate to claim for Christianity all that is sound in hellenic culture. Unbelievers raised the complaint, later repeated by Porphyry<sup>3</sup>, that Origen was borrowing Greek tools to rationalize a barbarian superstition. His reply is that in every soul the image of God may be discovered, and therefore good is to be found everywhere<sup>4</sup>.

Accordingly, Origen was able to fulfil the task that falls to the Christian apologist in every age, namely, to create a connecting link between the Gospel and the thought and culture of his own time. Origen allowed himself much liberty in this, and to the more rigidly standardized orthodoxy of the following centuries the freedom he indulged seemed more than intolerable. But perhaps all really successful apologists are regarded by the next generation as having betrayed the faith.

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid. IX. 24.

<sup>2</sup> Hom. in Luc. VIII (Rauer p. 59, 10).

<sup>3</sup> Eus., H. e. VI 19. 5—8.

<sup>4</sup> Hom. in Gen. XIII. 3 (Baehrens pp. 116—117).



## Les citations de Platon chez les Pères

E. DES PLACES S. J., Rome

### Introduction<sup>1</sup>

On a souvent étudié le «Platonisme des Pères», et après les dissertations connues de Th. L. Shear, de K. Gronau, de H. Cherniss, sur le platonisme des Cappadociens, l'article magistral du P. René Arnou dans le *Dictionnaire de Théologie* a donné la synthèse des apports platoniciens à la théologie patristique. Mon propos aurait d'autres ambitions. Il ne s'agirait plus tant d'étudier ce que la pensée de tel ou tel Père doit à Platon, comment il a pu trouver dans les *Dialogues* ou les *Lettres* l'amorce d'un développement ou même le pressentiment d'un dogme: les théologiens ne profiteront de nos recherches qu'au terme de celles-ci, et n'auront guère à retenir que nos conclusions. D'autre part, les allusions innombrables de Clément ou de Basile, par exemple, à des passages platoniciens nous intéressent moins que les citations proprement dites. En effet, seules les citations peuvent servir à l'établissement du texte de Platon, soit qu'elles confirment la leçon d'un des manuscrits de base (A et O pour les *Lois*, l'*Epinomis*, les *Lettres*), soit surtout qu'elles fournissent une variante préférable à la tradition directe. Seules aussi elles permettent, à condition d'être recensées dans leur totalité, de reconstituer le fonds commun où puisent les Pères pour leurs «apologies» du christianisme et qui, mises à part les lectures d'ensemble de tel d'entre eux, comme Clément ou Origène, repose sur un florilège peut-être établi de bonne

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<sup>1</sup> Cette introduction était illustrée d'exemples dont le détail doit paraître dans divers articles: 1. Eusèbe de Césarée juge de la morale platonicienne dans la Préparation évangélique (*Mélanges Diès*, Paris 1956); 2. Le Platon de Théodoret (*Revue des Etudes grecques*, 1955, p. 171—184. *Studi in onore di A. Calderini e di R. Paribeni*, Milan 1956).

heure par un chrétien. La reconstitution de ce florilège, tentée en vain jusqu'ici pour les écoles païennes, apporterait bien des informations sur la culture des Pères et l'importance de cette culture dans leur formation de philosophes et de théologiens.

Le travail, qui aboutirait à un corpus platonicien de la patristique, serait moins immense qu'il ne paraît de prime abord s'il se réduisait aux citations; en tout cas, je l'ai entrepris, à partir des *Lois* et de l'*Epinomis*, pour la *Préparation évangélique* d'Eusèbe de Césarée<sup>1</sup> et la *Thérapeutique* ou *Curatio* de Théodoret: les thèses que le P. Canivet prépare sur ce dernier auteur (édition et traduction de la *Curatio*; étude d'ensemble sur la méthode apologétique de Théodoret) m'ont donné l'occasion d'étendre l'enquête à toutes les citations de Platon alléguées par Théodoret; il faudra faire de même pour Eusèbe, *Préparation* et *Démonstration* surtout, puis pour Justin et pour Cyrille d'Alexandrie dans l'*Adversus Julianum*. Clément d'Alexandrie est plus riche en allusions qu'en citations proprement dites.

C'est en préparant pour la Collection des Universités de France l'édition des livres I—VI des *Lois* et de l'*Epinomis* et en vérifiant sur manuscrits les citations des livres VII—XII que j'ai été amené à étudier de près le texte des extraits de ces deux œuvres, auxquelles j'emprunte les exemples de la façon dont Eusèbe et Théodoret citent Platon.

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. mes articles antérieurs: *La Tradition indirecte des Lois de Platon* (livres I—VI), in: *Mélanges J. Saunier*, Lyon 1944, p. 27—40; *Les Lois de Platon et la Préparation évangélique d'Eusèbe de Césarée*, in: *Aegyptus* XXXII (*Mélanges Vitelli*) 1952, p. 223—231.

## Civitas Dei, civitas terrena: num tertium quid?

H. I. MARROU, Paris

On voudrait reprendre une question, déjà posée au Congrès International Augustinien l'an dernier (*Augustinus Magister*, III, p. 201—204), mais que la discussion n'a pas eu le temps d'aborder; question qui a rebondi depuis dans la controverse entre Mgr. Journet (*L'Eglise du Verbe incarné*, t. II, p. 26—34), Et. Gilson («Eglise et Cité de Dieu chez saint Augustin», ap. *Arch. d'Hist. doctr. et litt. du moyen âge*, XX, 1953, p. 5—23) et moi-même (cf. Ch. Journet, C. R. de ma *Connaissance Historique* ap. *Nova et Vetera*, XXX, 1955, p. 149—154).

La question est précise: y a-t-il place, dans la perspective augustinienne, à côté des deux notions antithétiques *civitas Dei* et *civitas terrena* (ou *diaboli*) pour un troisième élément, *tertium quid*? Son importance, son intérêt apparaissent bientôt: de la solution dépend le jugement porté, au nom de la doctrine augustinienne, sur la valeur de l'activité terrestre de l'homme, sur l'état, la société, la civilisation, la technique, la culture.

Sujet peut-être bien vaste pour une brève communication: ce qui est en jeu est l'interprétation de textes à la portée depuis longtemps controversée. Il ne faut pas se lasser de rappeler les principes fondamentaux qui doivent guider cette interprétation: ne jamais oublier le genre littéraire et le mode d'expression utilisés par saint Augustin, qu'il s'agisse de son œuvre oratoire (*Enarr. in Psalmos*) ou polémique (*de Civ. Dei*). Saint Augustin n'élabore pas des concepts, définis *more geometrico* une fois pour toutes et qu'il utiliserait ensuite pour construire un système synthétique définitif; il se sert de mots qui, enrobés dans un contexte littéraire et dialectique déterminé, doivent faire naître telle conviction dans l'esprit du lecteur, *hic et nunc*, — et peu lui importe si ailleurs, dans un autre con-

texte, les mêmes mots devront être pris dans un autre sens. Sa logique n'est pas celle du mathématicien mais celle du rhéteur : les difficultés au milieu desquelles se débat Gilson dans l'article cité s'éclaircissent dès qu'on veut bien se souvenir que dans l'arsenal de la rhétorique classique figure un trope bien connu appelé catachrèse.

Enfin n'oublions jamais que saint Augustin pense dans une atmosphère platonicienne. Comme je le rappelais l'an dernier, les notions de *civitas Dei*, *civitas terrena* sont des notions d'ordre idéal ou mieux idéel, — ne disons plus, comme on l'a fait souvent « mystique » ; l'ab. Ratzinger (Aug. Mag. t. II, p. 971, n. 1) a utilement insisté sur le contresens habituellement commis sur la formule fameuse, de *Civ. Dei*, XV, 1, « quas etiam mystice appellamus civitates duas » : pour comprendre que *mystice* évoque simplement le sens spirituel de l'Écriture, il suffit de mettre en parallèle la formule qu'on lit, dans un contexte absolument équivalent, en XIV, 1 : « quas civitates duas *secundum Scripturas nostras* merito appellare possumus ».

Ce sont des Idées, « qu'on ne saurait identifier sans plus avec tel ou tel fragment de la réalité empirique », — encore que, bien entendu, cette réalité même, son degré d'être, s'explique en dernière analyse par une participation plus ou moins grande (elle n'est jamais parfaite) à la Réalité supérieure de l'Idée. La « cité de Dieu » c'est tout ce qui dans l'histoire, dans les hommes et dans l'homme est *secundum Deum*, ou comme l'écrit très justement Mgr. Journet (*L'Eglise* . . . , t. II, p. 26) : « le camp des valeurs relevant du Christ » opposé au « camp des valeurs relevant du Prince de ce monde », « le camp de ce qui est bon » opposé « au camp de ce qui est mal ». Elle est identique à l'Eglise *sine macula nec ruga* telle que la foi et l'espérance nous permettent de la contempler dans ce que sera son accomplissement eschatologique (il est essentiel d'intégrer à la notion tout ce qui a été bien observé à ce sujet par W. Kamlah, *Christentum und Geschichtlichkeit*<sup>2</sup>, p. 136—147), ce qui n'empêche pas que, par catachrèse, nous puissions aussi, mais naturellement à l'intérieur de certaines limites (dont saint Augustin plus prudent que certains de ses commentateurs a toujours tenu compte)

identifier aussi avec l'Eglise hiérarchique et sacramentaire (comme jadis avec l'état théocratique d'Israel: *de civ. Dei*, XV, 2.): il ne faut pas être dupe de certaines affirmations en apparence abruptes et se souvenir en combien d'occasions saint Augustin a souligné que la *communio sacramentorum* rassemblait provisoirement des élus et des réprouvés, et que tous les élus n'étaient pas rassemblés dès maintenant *intra parietes ecclesiae* (je ne prétends pas ouvrir aujourd'hui ce dossier si fourni: *de civ. Dei*, I, 35, etc.; cf. Kamlah, p. 146, n. 49). La même logique de la participation explique que, suivant le contexte, la notion antithétique de *civitas terrena* (ou *diaboli*) puisse apparaître momentanément et «practically speaking» comme assimilable à telle société historique empiriquement observée, — hier Babylone, l'empire assyrien, Rome aujourd'hui —, voire à toute société historique empiriquement observable, étant donné que l'expérience prouve que les forces du mal, hélas, ne manquent jamais d'y être abondamment représentées . . .

Mais venons-en au *tertium quid*: l'hypothèse la plus ferme a été proposée par Mgr. Journet; je cite son dernier article (cf. déjà *L'Eglise* . . ., II, p. 28—30): «Au-dessous de la théologie des deux 'cités mystiques', saint Augustin lui-même a signalé la place d'une troisième cité, qu'il ne confond pas toujours avec la cité du diable; c'est la cité de l'homme, avec ses grandeurs infra-valentes (philosophie grecque, valeur romaine, paix terrestre, etc.)» (*Nova et Vetera*, 1955, p. 152b): à la «théologie de l'histoire du salut» qui éclaire le développement de l'histoire humaine «par rapport aux fins dernières supravallentes, suprêmes», théologie qui s'exprime par la doctrine des deux cités, *civitas Dei*, *civitas diaboli*, il faudrait joindre une «philosophie de l'histoire» qui jugerait celle-ci «immédiatement par rapport aux fins infravalentes temporelles et culturelles de toute la caravane humaine» (ibid., p. 151a), étudiant «toutes les activités de civilisation ordonnées directement à la fin intermédiaire du bien temporel, du bien culturel, du bien humain» (*L'Eglise* . . ., II, p. 29).

Je suis bien d'accord, nous le sommes tous aujourd'hui, sur le fait que saint Augustin n'a pas nié «la spécificité irréductible»

de «l'ordre temporel, de sa paix», — et en particulier de la vie politique. Encore une fois, pour saisir sa pensée, il faut rassembler dans une intuition unique toutes les formulations particulières qu'il a été amené à en proposer et ne pas confondre, à propos d'expressions isolées, théologie et rhétorique, antithèse et manichéisme. Précisément parce que les souvenirs de sa période manichéenne ne se sont jamais oblitérés, nous le trouvons très préoccupé, là même où il critique les perspectives «humaines, trop humaines» de la *civitas terrena*, de bien préciser que les biens qu'elle recherche (la paix par exemple et κατ' ἐξοχήν) sont vraiment, authentiquement, des biens: vous avez tous en mémoire les belles formules, de *civ. Dei*, XV, 4: «non autem recte dicuntur ea bona non esse quae concupiscit haec civitas»: la paix, la victoire d'une juste cause: «haec bona sunt, et sine dubio Dei dona sunt» . . . Ou encore, au livre XIX, dans les admirables chapitres consacrés à la *pax temporalis*: saint Augustin n'a pas de peine à souligner le caractère positif, la bonté intrinsèque de tous ces biens essentiels, ces *prima naturae* dont lui parlait Varron, à l'école d'Antiochus d'Ascalon (XIX, 1, 2, etc.): c'est Dieu, ce Créateur Sage et Bon qui a donné aux hommes ces *quaedam bona huic vitae congrua* qui définissent la *pax temporalis* (XIX, 13, 2) et lorsque la cité terrestre poursuit cette paix, cette paix ne doit être réprouvée, *pacem non improbandam* (XIX, 26). Et il n'ôte jamais rien à ces éloges, même si les nécessités de la polémique, — car tout ce livre est alimenté par une polémique contre l'humanisme hellénistique dont le *de philosophia* de Varron lui fournissait une expression synthétique —, l'amènent surtout à insister sur le caractère relatif, limité, insuffisant de ces «nourritures terrestres», sur le fait que cette *pax temporalis* n'est pas la *pax finalis* (au double sens, comme déjà *fines* chez Cicéron, d'extrême, suprême et de final, eschatologique), que comparé à celle-ci le bonheur terrestre n'est que misère (XIX, 10; 20) . . . Le cas majeur de cette zone mineure des réalisations humaines étant bien entendu représenté par l'état romain avec ses magnifiques conquêtes dues à des vertus, relatives peut-être, réelles pourtant malgré toute leur insuffisance (c'est la valeur des derniers chapitres

du livre XIX, 21 sq. et surtout 24, reprenant la discussion du livre II, 21, sur le fait que tout de même l'état romain a été vraiment une *respublica* . . .).

Mais peut-on admettre que l'ensemble de ces réalisations humaines, groupées dans la notion de *pax temporalis* autour des *prima naturae*, constitue une « cité » d'un troisième ordre, une « cité de l'homme ». J'hésite en premier lieu à accepter cette désignation car trop souvent sous la plume d'Augustin « humain », a le sens de « trop humain » et *secundum hominem*, équivalent à *secundum carnem* (comparer les deux formules : *de civ. Dei* XV, 1 et XIV, 1; XV, 5), sert d'antithèse à *secundum Deum* ou *Spiritum*. Mais peut-on même parler de cité (cf. déjà les objections de Gilson, *Archives* . . ., 1953, p. 18, n. 2)? Il faudrait que la « spécificité » reconnue à ces « fins intermédiaires, infra-valentes » en « rapport immédiat au bien humain temporel » (Journet, *L'Eglise* . . ., II, p. 28) soit telle qu'on puisse les saisir de façon autonome, les distinguer, autrement que de façon formelle, si bien que leur domaine apparaisse comme distinct de l'une et de l'autre des deux « cités » proprement augustinienes.

Or il n'en est rien. Il faut ici souligner le caractère très profondément humaniste (au sens où le mot peut s'opposer à une vision cosmique) de la pensée augustinienne. Il ne définit pas dans l'abstrait un monde de « valeurs » ; ces valeurs, ces biens terrestres, il les saisit impliqués dans des actions humaines, dans des destinées concrètes, des vies d'hommes. Dans la mesure où ces biens sont réels, — ces biens relatifs à la paix du corps (XIX, 13, 1), à la paix de l'âme irrationnelle puis de l'âme rationnelle (XIX, 14), etc., — il est trop évident qu'ils relèvent comme tout ce qui est bon de la cité de Dieu : qui niera que celle-ci absorbe les efforts, les réalisations que sur le plan politique par exemple les hommes dépensent ou obtiennent en matière de paix ou de justice ? Si temporels que soient ces biens, ils sont directement relatifs à l'amour du prochain.

Mais, et c'est là l'essentiel, ces biens terrestres ne sont tout à fait revêtus de leur valeur positive, ne sont des biens qu'à la condition d'être associés, de la part des hommes, à un bon usage : la doctrine augustinienne de la paix est inséparable de

celle de l'*ordinata dilectio*, la paix c'est *tranquillitas ordinis* (XIX, 13, 1) et l'ordre est celui de la hiérarchie des êtres, qui entraîne la hiérarchie des amours, des appétitions, des usages (XIX, 14; 17). Les biens ne sont pas définis comme biens en dehors de l'usage que les hommes en feront. L'homme d'autre part est un: c'est le même homme qui use de l'air, de l'eau, de tout ce qui est adapté à la nourriture, à la protection et au soin de son corps (XIX, 13, 2) et qui est d'autre part l'objet d'une vocation surnaturelle au bonheur éternel ou à la damnation; et c'est l'usage qu'il aura fait de ces mêmes biens terrestres qui déterminera sa récompense ou sa condamnation (*ibid.*).

Il suffit d'oublier ces perspectives, d'oublier ces biens supérieurs, de rechercher trop ou trop uniquement ces biens terrestres pour que ceux-ci, quelle que soit leur bonté abstraitement intrinsèque deviennent des maux (cf. XV, 4): il suffit *quiescere*, de s'arrêter sur eux (XV, 17). Il me semble que le propre de saint Augustin est de se refuser l'abstraction, il veut toujours considérer les choses de l'homme non pas *in se* mais *in ordine exercitii*: un verre d'eau n'est pas en soi un bien pour l'homme; d'abord c'est un bien très différent bu en automne à Oxford ou en été en plein Sahara; donné à un assoiffé par le bon Samaritain c'est un très grand bien; dans certain cas il peut, mieux que le plus subtil cocktail, être l'instrument d'une concupiscence effrénée... Ou pour prendre un exemple plus complexe; la fission de l'atome n'est pas un *Kulturgut* d'une bonté intrinsèque; oui, dira-t-on, en tant que connaissance, que vérité; mais on ne peut isoler la science dans l'esprit du savant: celui-ci reste toujours un homme et en lui tout dépend de l'*usus*: il y a l'atome d'Hiroshima et celui de Genève, — et même en tant que science pure, il y a l'action de grâce qu'elle fera naître dans l'âme croyante et l'*hybris* luciférienne du savant athée...

Il faut méditer sur cette notion d'*usus*; ce n'est qu'en apparence que croyant et incroyant, disons de façon plus conforme au mystère, le Bon et le Mauvais useront du même bien: *communis est usus, sed finis utendi cuique suus proprius, multumque diversus* (XIX, 17): c'est en ce sens que la cité de Dieu, comme il dit, doit nécessairement user elle aussi de la paix terrestre (XIX, 17),



de la paix de Babylone (XIX, 26); mais mêlés les uns aux autres, les citoyens des deux cités idéales se serviront du même bien les uns comme d'une fin et ce sera pour leur perdition, tandis que les autres le mettent en rapport, et un rapport qui n'est pas extrinsèque, avec la paix éternelle, *eamque terrenam pacem refert ad coelestem pacem* (XIX, 17). Il n'y a rien qui soit neutre : ou cela est rapporté à Dieu, et ce bien si humble soit-il relève de la cité de Dieu, ou on en fait un mauvais usage, et si noble soit-il ce *Kulturgut* est prostitué au service de la cité du mal.

Je ne vois donc pas la possibilité d'admettre, dans la perspective augustinienne, l'autonomie d'une troisième cité de l'homme. N'y a-t-il donc pas de *tertium quid*? Oui, il y a quelque chose d'autre, bien entendu d'un ordre tout différent, c'est ce que je proposais d'appeler «le donné empirique de l'histoire», ce donné mystérieux où bien et mal, cité de Dieu et cité du diable sont inextricablement mêlés. Si l'on veut un terme augustinien pour le désigner, je proposerai celui de *saeculum*, — un des sens que le mot *saeculum*, traduisant un des sens du grec *αἰών* dans le N. T. revêt sous la plume d'Augustin. On sera sans doute tenté de traduire *saeculum* en pareil cas par le «temps de l'histoire», ainsi *de civ. Dei*, XV, 1: «hoc enim universum tempus, sive *saeculum*, in quo cedunt morientes, succeduntque nascentes, istarum duarum civitatum . . . excursus est». Mais on le sait, saint Augustin répugne à la notion abstraite: je ne crois pas qu'on puisse séparer chez lui le temps de l'histoire, comme un cadre vide, un milieu neutre, de son contenu, de cette histoire même: voyez *de Gen. ad litt.* XI, 15 (20), PL 34, 437: «quarum etiam (il s'agit déjà des *duarum civitatum*) quadam temporali conjunctione peragitur *saeculum*».

Ce *saeculum*, ce donné empirique de l'histoire, est bien un *tertium quid* (et de l'avoir reconnu aurait empêché bien des lecteurs pressés d'assimiler trop tôt chez saint Augustin cité de Dieu et «die empirische katholische Kirche», ou cité terrestre et l'état politique, soit romain soit moderne); en effet ce qui caractérise ce donné, c'est le caractère provisoirement inextricable du mélange des deux éléments idéels: «perplexae quippe sunt istae duae civitates, invicemque permixtae» (*de civ. Dei*,

I, 35; le mot *permixtae*, la notion de *commixtio* reviennent sans cesse: *ib.* XIX, 26 et déjà *de cat. rud.* 19 (31), *de Gen. ad litt.*, passage cité, comme dans les *Enarr.* contemporaines de la rédaction de la *Cité de Dieu*: *in Ps.* 61, 8; 64, 2; 136, 1 . . .). Et cela va très loin: nul ici n'a mieux aperçu l'intuition centrale d'Augustin que Mgr. Journet lui-même, ainsi (*L'Eglise*, t. II, p. 26): «l'Eglise s'oppose ici-bas à la cité du mal non pas comme le camp des bons au camp des méchants mais—par une disjonction plus subtile, plus acérée, toujours vivante et séparant l'âme de l'esprit, — . . . comme le camp de ce qui est bon (dans les bons et les méchants) au camp de ce qui est mal (dans les méchants et les bons). Ses frontières partagent en deux l'être de ses enfants, . . . prenant en deçà la partie pure, laissant au delà la partie impure; et même elles s'efforcent de partager en deux l'être de ceux qui ne se disent pas ses enfants, cherchant en eux la part du ciel pour l'inclure à l'intérieur d'elles-mêmes».

Je crois que cette analyse est fidèle à ce qu'il y a de plus profond dans la pensée augustinienne; sans doute l'idée n'est pas toujours très nettement apparente, mais il ne faut pas se laisser prendre aux procédés en quelque sorte classificatoires qu'utilise Augustin (les bons, les mauvais, — les provisoirement bons et en réalité ultimement mauvais ou réciproquement, les Judas-apôtres et les Saul-persécuteurs), ni se laisser obséder par le seul principe ultime de la prédestination individuelle. Saint Augustin était mal équipé par l'héritage de la philosophie antique, par cette philosophie de l'être, pour exprimer des notions comme celles de progrès, de développement, de donné inchoatif; encore que, plus ou moins maladroitement se fasse jour l'idée que ce qui est empiriquement donné, même chez un prédestiné, ce n'est pas une perfection déjà réalisée mais quelque chose qui se cherche, qui devient, qui croît, ou du moins doit croître, étant perpétuellement menacée de se flétrir en bouton; je pourrais multiplier les textes qui donnent à penser en ce sens: ainsi dans les *Enarrationes*, *in Ps.* 136, 1, où nous voyons «*particulam civitatis Jerusalem captivam teneri in Babylonia pro peccato incipere autem inde exire*», et cela dans le temps de l'histoire, puisqu'on marque bien que l'achèvement du pro-

cessus doit attendre la fin du *saeculum* et le jugement ou la résurrection; ou encore *in Ps.* 64, 2 (un des grands textes parallèles à la *Cité de Dieu*, «*duas civitates faciunt duo amores...*») où au contraire on voit des «*cives sanctae matris Jerusalem cupiditatibus Babyloniae corrupti*» et cela au point de «*tanquam cives inde facti erant*»; mais d'eux aussi, on pouvait dire avec le psalmiste qu'«*inciperent exire*». Mais le texte le plus net qui mérite d'être relu se trouve dans le *de civ. Dei*, XV, 5, où il s'agit des luttes qui déchirent l'humanité depuis Caïn et Abel: «*Pugnant inter se mali et mali* (St. Augustin s'est souvent expliqué sur ces divisions intérieures à la cité du mal); *item pugnans inter se boni et mali. Boni vero et boni, si perfecti sunt, inter se pugnare non possunt; proficientes nondumque perfecti ita possunt, ut bonus quisque ex ea parte pugnet contra alterum qua etiam contra semetipsum. Et in uno quippe homine* (comme dit saint Paul) *caro concupiscit adversus spiritum et spiritus adversus carnem...*»

Et c'est là le dernier mot de la doctrine augustinienne, qui fonde ce que nous pouvons appeler le mystère de l'histoire: aussi longtemps que le *saeculum* n'a pas clos son *ordo temporum*, aussi longtemps que nous contemplons l'histoire d'ici-bas avec nos yeux de chair, elle apparaît comme ce mélange inextricable de bon grain et d'ivraie, — et comme aime à le dire Mgr. Journet, la frontière entre la cité du bien et la cité du mal passe, pour chacun d'entre nous, à l'intérieur de son propre cœur.

## Les ordres d'enseignement chez Clément d'Alexandrie et Sénèque

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Je me propose ici de rectifier une erreur<sup>1</sup> qu'on se transmet pieusement d'auteur en auteur et qui me paraît n'être pas sans importance car elle touche à deux questions disputées. La première est celle du rapport entre la philosophie et le christianisme chez Clément d'Alexandrie; je n'ai pas besoin d'insister là-dessus. La seconde, celle des ordres d'enseignement dans l'Eglise anténicénienne, a été moins souvent traitée pour elle-même; qu'il suffise de dire qu'elle est liée à la distinction du gnostique et du simple fidèle, et au problème de la doctrine secrète. Je montrerai d'abord en quoi consiste l'erreur et quel est le vrai sens des textes en question, puis j'indiquerai quelques conséquences qu'on peut tirer de cette rectification.

Comme beaucoup d'autres, l'erreur vient d'une source dont on peut dire, telles les langues d'Esope, beaucoup de bien et beaucoup de mal: je veux dire l'autorité du «Corpus de Berlin» et particulièrement de l'édition Stählin des œuvres de Clément. Cette édition nous rend tous les jours trop de services pour que nous ayons le droit d'en dire trop de mal; mais elle est l'origine d'un nombre trop considérable d'erreurs et de contresens pour qu'on ne mette pas en garde ceux qui s'en servent sans vérification.

Le début du *Pédagogue*, est un texte célèbre. Clément y montre le Logos, dans son amour pour les hommes, prenant successivement trois formes selon le degré auquel ils sont arrivés; il con-

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<sup>1</sup> Depuis que cette communication a été donnée, je me suis aperçu que cette erreur avait déjà été rectifiée par E. Bickel dans un article, sur Martin de Braga, du *Rheinisches Museum* LX (1905) p. 545, cf. les *Nachträge und Berichtigungen* de Stählin au Tome IV de son édition p. XXV.

vertit le païen : c'est le Logos Protreptique ; il éduque le néophyte et guérit les passions ; c'est le Logos Pédagogue ; enfin il instruit et donne la gnose : c'est le Logos Didascale. Mais avant d'en arriver à cette formule finale, Clément développe longuement son idée en usant de mots divers et synonymes qui commentent surtout le rôle pédagogique du Logos. Entre autres, le Logos est appelé *ὑποθετικός*, que je traduirais par « conseiller », et *παραμυθητικός* que nous pouvons traduire « apaisant », plutôt que « consolateur ». C'est ici que se place une note de Stählin où nous trouvons une référence, combien précieuse, nous le montrerons, à la lettre 95 de Sénèque. Mais de cette lettre, deux lignes nous sont citées et c'est ici que l'erreur est commise. Voici les deux lignes : *Posidonius, non tantum praeceptionem, sed etiam suasionem et consolationem et exhortationem necessariam indicat.*

Stählin nous indique charitablement les concordances entre le grec et le latin<sup>1</sup>. Il rapproche avec beaucoup de vraisemblance *consolatio* et *παραμυθητικός*. Pour *suasio* identifié au *λόγος ὑποθετικός* et *exhortatio* à *προτρεπτικός*, on pourrait discuter. Mais ceci n'a qu'une importance secondaire. Ce qui l'est moins, c'est d'identifier *praeceptio* avec le *λόγος διδάσκαλος* de Clément. Car presque tous ceux qui ont étudié Clément ont admis, comme par exemple Völker<sup>2</sup> (p. 100, note 6), que « la division tripartite de Paed. I, 11, ss. vient de Posidonius (cf. O. Stählin dans l'apparat). Clément utilise ce schème et le place à la base de son travail d'écrivain ». C'est une erreur et assez lourde de conséquences.

Replaçons en effet, selon les bonnes méthodes, le texte de Sénèque dans son contexte. Dans la lettre 95, le philosophe latin traite d'une manière tout-à-fait scolaire, comme il lui arrive, cette question : « *an haec pars philosophiae quam Graeci παρασκευη vocant, nos praeceptivam dicimus, satis sit ad consummandam sapientiam* » : « Si cette partie de la philosophie

<sup>1</sup> Ces indications sont la reproduction de celles de Wendland dans ses *Quaestiones Musonianae*.

<sup>2</sup> Der wahre Gnostiker nach Clemens Alexandrinus, TU 57 (1952).

que les Grecs appellent *parénétique* et les Romains philosophie des préceptes suffit à réaliser pleinement la sagesse.

L'équivalence est ici clairement établie. Si *praeceptiva* est le latin de *παρανετική*, *praeceptio* que nous trouvons plus loin a bien des chances d'être *παρανετικὸς λόγος*, ou quelque chose d'équivalent. Mais certainement pas *διδασκαλικός*. La suite des idées et la marche même de la pensée le confirment. Car toute la lettre repose sur l'opposition entre la philosophie des préceptes moraux portant sur les détails de l'existence et l'enseignement dogmatique et général dont Lucilius contestait la nécessité et dont Sénèque prend la défense. Pour désigner cet enseignement, il a des mots sans équivoque: *decreta*, *scita*, *placita*, qui traduisent, il nous le dit, le grec *δόγματα*. C'est le fait de la science (*scientia*) et des savants (*docti*) de les connaître, c'est par une formation minutieuse (*institutio subtilis*), un long enseignement (*longum magisterium*), la fidélité à une école (*secta*), qu'ils s'acquièrent. A quoi s'opposent constamment les simples *praecepta*. Finalement il proclame nécessaires les uns et les autres, mais les uns, les dogmes, sont les arcanes de la philosophie, réservés, tels les mystères, aux initiés; les autres, les préceptes, sont connus aussi des profanes: «*In philosophia arcana illa admissis receptisque in sacra ostenduntur et praecepta et alia ejusmodi profanis quoque nota sunt.*» C'est ici que se place notre texte: «*Posidonius non solum praeceptionem, sed etiam suasionem et consolationem et exhortationem necessariam judicat.*» Dans un pareil contexte, le sens de *praeceptio* n'est donc pas douteux, ce n'est point *διδασκαλία*, qui conviendrait mieux à l'enseignement dogmatique, mais *παραίνεσις* ou *παρανετική* ou quelque mot de la même racine.

Loin donc que Posidonius dans ce texte donne une division de la philosophie qui corresponde à la division tripartite de Clément, il indique simplement l'existence d'une certaine diversité dans la littérature d'exhortation morale et de conseils pratiques. D'autant qu'il y ajoutait encore, la suite de la lettre le montre, la recherche des causes des passions, *αἰτιολογία* et la description des hommes vertueux *ἠθολογία* (en grec dans le texte). Ce tableau de la littérature d'exhortation morale doit être rattaché

au problème des divisions de la morale, problème posé depuis Chrysippe (Arnim. S. V. F. III, p. 3) et repris entre autres par Philon de Larisa et Eudore d'Alexandrie (Stobée. Eclogues II, 7). Selon les auteurs, on voit apparaître, tantôt à une place, tantôt à une autre les mêmes genres: *προτρεπτικός*, *ὑποθετικός*, *παραμυθητικός*, *παραναιτικός*. Le texte de Sénèque ne permet pas de décider avec certitude dans quel ordre le rangeait Posidonius.

Rien donc n'oblige à croire qu'il soit plutôt qu'un autre la source du début du Pédagogue. Ce début a certes un rapport avec la littérature philosophique. Mais ce rapport est moins simple qu'on ne le disait. Il nous faut le montrer maintenant.

Revenons à la lettre de Sénèque. Elle distingue, nous l'avons vu, la littérature d'exhortation, parénétique ou autre, destinée aux profanes et la sagesse assurée par la possession des «dogmes» philosophiques. C'est là une distinction fondamentale. A vrai dire, elle n'est pas propre à Sénèque, encore moins à Posidonius: c'est un article essentiel du stoïcisme ancien que la distinction entre la sagesse, parfaite par définition, stable et inébranlable parce que fondée en doctrine, et la morale des profanes, formée de préceptes de détail, *officia*, *καθήκοντα* et qui convient encore aux hommes en progrès vers la sagesse.

C'est elle que nous retrouvons hors du stoïcisme chez Philon de Larisa, chez Philon d'Alexandrie; enfin chez Clément, dans le passage que nous expliquons, elle prend la forme de la distinction entre la pédagogie et la didascalie et correspond à celle bien connue de la gnose et de la foi.

Quels sont en effet les termes dans lesquels Clément décrit la «pédagogie» d'une part, la «didascalie» de l'autre? La première concerne à la fois les actions et la guérison des passions, elle arrache à la coutume, elle donne des préceptes (*παραναι*), elle relève du genre parénétique (*παραναιτικὸν εἶδος*), elle donne des conseils (*ὑποθήκαι*) et des apaisements (*παραμυθίαι*), elle est éducatrice (*προακτινός*), elle exhorte à l'exécution des devoirs. Ce sont toutes les marques attribuées par Sénèque à la *pars praeceptiva philosophiae*. Elle procède par des *images*,

des *exemples* qu'elle propose à l' *imitation* du disciple; c'est affaire à ce que Sénèque, après Posidonius, appelle *ἡθολογία*.

Le Pédagogue est *πρακτικός* ou *προακτικός* (la leçon est incertaine) et le Didascale est «méthodique». L'un améliore les âmes, l'autre les enseigne, l'un mène à la vie tempérante, l'autre à la vie savante (*ἐπιστημονικός*), l'un fortifie les âmes faibles, l'autre donne une connaissance complète de la Vérité. Chacune de ces expressions trouve son équivalent dans la lettre de Sénèque. Enfin, nous trouvons, un peu dissimulé dans une formule complexe, mais bien présent tout de même chez Clément le mot-clé de *δόγμα*: le Didascale expose et révèle les choses relevant des dogmes: *ἐν τοῖς δογματικοῖς δηλωτικῶς καὶ ἀποκαλυπτικῶς*.

Il serait trop long de montrer dans l'œuvre de Clément, et particulièrement dans la doctrine de la gnose, le prolongement de cette distinction et de pousser plus loin la recherche d'un bien commun à Sénèque et à Clément. Qu'il suffise d'avoir montré sur ce point la concordance entre l'écrivain païen et l'écrivain chrétien.

Cette concordance donne d'autant plus de poids à leur divergence. Si, comme je le pense, l'*exhortatio*, ou peut-être la *suasio*, de Sénèque-Posidonius correspondent au Protreptique de Clément, elle n'est pour eux qu'une forme parmi d'autres de la littérature d'exhortation morale. Au contraire chez Clément d'Alexandrie, le genre Protreptique est quelque chose d'entièrement distinct, aussi différent de la pédagogie que la pédagogie peut l'être de la didascalie. Dans toute la philosophie antérieure, et même dans la philosophie païenne postérieure, je ne vois nulle part un pareil sort fait à ce genre modeste et confondu avec d'autres<sup>1</sup>.

Je ne crois pas qu'on puisse expliquer par la philosophie antique ce passage d'une division en deux termes à une division en trois termes. Mais elle s'explique parfaitement si on se

<sup>1</sup> Ceci concerne la dignité du genre et sa place dans le programme de l'éducation philosophique, non sa diffusion, qui fut considérable, comme l'ont montré, après les travaux de Hartlich (1889), ceux de l'école italienne qui, à la suite de Bignone, a inventorié la postérité du Protreptique d'Aristote.



rappelle que le Logos Protreptique, comme le dit notre passage, est celui qui édifie la foi: *εἰς οἰκοδομὴν πίστεως*. Qu'il en soit ou non l'auteur, Clément, par l'importance donnée au *Protreptique* manifeste avec évidence qu'il a dans la pensée, non les formes de la philosophie antique, mais la structure de l'Eglise chrétienne. Pour la philosophie antique, la grande coupure se plaçait à l'acquisition de la sagesse, ou plutôt pour employer une formule célèbre, et qui nous a été transmise par Clément, à la transformation de l'homme en sagesse et en raison pure, *μεταβολὴ εἰς σοφίαν*. Le choix d'une secte ou d'un genre de vie n'avait de sens que s'il menait à ce terme; il n'apparaît chez aucun philosophe revêtu d'autant de gravité qu'en a pour Clément le choix de la vie selon le Christ. La *προαίρεσις* d'Epictète même est tout autre chose que l'*αἵρεσις* à laquelle Clément ne cesse de nous renvoyer. C'est que pour le chrétien, l'acte décisif est le choix qu'il a fait un jour de la Vérité et de la Vie. La grande transformation, la véritable *métabolè* n'est pas au terme de la route, mais à son début, à l'entrée dans la Voie. Entre l'audition du Protreptique et celle du Pédagogue se place un événement décisif pour l'auditeur, la réception de la foi et du baptême. Le chapitre VI du *Pédagogue* est sur ce point formel: la gnose et la perfection sont données dès le baptême, et les élèves du Pédagogue les possèdent déjà. Il n'y a donc entre le gnostique et le débutant aucune séparation radicale, au lieu qu'il y en a une entre le croyant et l'incroyant.

Ainsi la note de Stählin, après nous avoir induits en erreur nous met-elle sur la voie d'une recherche très fructueuse. Non pas sans doute en ce qui concerne Posidonius et son influence. La seule conclusion que nous pouvons tirer sur ce point est qu'il ne faut pas majorer l'influence de Posidonius dans l'histoire des idées et le mouvement des esprits comme on a eu tendance à le faire à certains moments et en certains lieux. Trop souvent, quand on pousse la recherche avec quelque rigueur, on constate, comme ici, que l'apport de Posidonius est faible ou douteux.

Ceci posé, nous pouvons nous acheminer vers des conclusions plus positives. La première conclusion concerne le problème litté-

raire de la trilogie et du sens des *Stromates*. Le *Protreptique* et le *Pédagogue*, avons-nous dit, appartiennent tous deux à la partie «parénétique» de la morale; et le *Didascale* donne un enseignement «dogmatique» de la religion considérée comme philosophie et comme éthique. Du point de vue philosophique et littéraire, il est donc en opposition avec les deux autres degrés pour le contenu et la nature de l'enseignement. Dès lors tombe l'un des arguments opposés à l'interprétation classique de la trilogie *Protreptique-Pédagogue-Stromates*; la différence de genre littéraire entre les *Stromates* et les deux autres ouvrages s'explique par leur appartenance à deux domaines différents de la littérature philosophique. La question n'est plus que de savoir quel est le but des *Stromates*. S'il est, comme nous le pensons, un exposé des «dogmes» chrétiens, il est très probable que Clément fait allusion à ce troisième ouvrage projeté en parlant du «*Didascale*».

Enfin si la distinction des trois ordres d'enseignement ne vient pas de Posidonius, mais d'un effort pour adapter les catégories philosophiques aux réalités de la vie chrétienne, il faudra en tenir le plus grand compte pour définir la structure de l'enseignement ecclésiastique au II<sup>e</sup> siècle. On remarquera avec surprise que le catéchuménat n'en constitue pas une phase particulière. Par contre la distinction des néophytes, soumis à la pédagogie, et des chrétiens plus avancés qu'on initie à la doctrine proprement dite devra être considérée avec plus d'attention qu'elle ne l'a été jusqu'ici. Pour ma part, je pense que l'origine de cette distinction est un usage courant dans l'Eglise, bien avant le temps de Clément, et qu'elle remonte beaucoup plus haut qu'on ne le dit généralement; mais il ne saurait être question d'en apporter la preuve dans le cadre de cette brève communication. Qu'il suffise d'avoir montré que le problème se pose.

## Les traductions et les commentaires aristotéliens de Boèce

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Vers 510 Boèce avait promis de traduire et de commenter en latin tous les ouvrages d'Aristote qui lui seraient accessibles. En 1951 la *Clavis Patrum* énumérait seulement deux ouvrages directement aristotéliens de Boèce: le commentaire aux *Catégories* et le double commentaire au *De interpretatione*. Quel rapport y a-t-il entre la promesse apparemment grandiose et le mince trésor qui semble nous rester après ces quatorze cent et quarante ans?

La *Clavis Patrum* s'éloigne de la tradition suivie dans la *Patrologie Latine*, tradition qui remontait à l'édition préparée par Henry Lorit (Glareanus) et publiée à Bâle en 1546, tout en se rattachant à la tradition presque unanime des manuscrits médiévaux, de la première édition complète de Boèce (Venise 1491 ss.), et de l'édition des ouvrages logiques et théologiques préparée par Martien Rota (Venise 1543). Lorit avait ajouté aux textes boéciens de l'édition de Rota une traduction latine des *Analytiques Premiers* et *Deuxièmes*, des *Topiques* et des *Réfutations Sophistiques*, sans indiquer d'où il l'avait prise et sur quelle autorité il l'attribuait à Boèce. Cette attribution fut quand même acceptée, à ce qu'il semble, universellement jusqu'en 1862. Dès lors plusieurs médiévistes et le classiciste Rose se demandèrent s'il ne faudrait pas attribuer cette traduction à un certain Jacques de Venise du douzième siècle; une cinquantaine d'années plus tard on se persuada même que le texte publié par Lorit ne correspondait pas exactement aux textes latins — fusset-ils dûs à Boèce ou à Jacques — que l'on avait employés au Moyen Age. La question n'était pas encore tranchée en 1937, lorsque le Père Cappuyns publiait son excellent article «Boèce» dans le *Dictionnaire d'Histoire et de Géo-*

*graphie Ecclésiastiques*, dans lequel il affirmait qu'il faut «réso-lument retrancher du bagage littéraire de Boèce . . . la traduction des *Analytica priora et posteriora*, des *Topica*, et des *Sophistici Elenchi*». C'est bien sur l'article du Père Cappuyns que se sont basés, si je ne me trompe pas, les auteurs de la *Clavis Patrum* pour limiter aux commentaires sur les *Catégories* et sur le *De interpretatione* les ouvrages aristotéliens de Boèce.

D'autre part tous les éditeurs et les historiens de l'œuvre boécien ont accepté, comme représentant la seule forme authentique des traductions et des commentaires des *Catégories* et du *De interpretatione*, les textes tels qu'ils paraissent dans l'édition de Lorit; et quelques historiens, en particulier le Père Cappuyns, ont pensé que Boèce aurait connu directement d'autres ouvrages d'Aristote, comme la *Poétique*, la *Métaphysique*, la *Physique* etc., et que les traductions les plus anciennes du *De anima*, du *De generatione et corruptione*, d'une partie de la *Métaphysique* et d'une partie de l'*Ethique à Nicomaque* pourraient, peut-être, remonter à Boèce. Mais tous sont d'accord qu'aucun commentaire, à l'exception de ceux déjà indiqués, n'est arrivé jusqu'à nous.

Des recherches récentes ont modifié la situation sur presque tous ces points. J'essairai ici de contribuer, tant soit peu, à répondre aux questions suivantes: 1° quels ouvrages d'Aristote étaient accessibles à Boèce? 2° quels ouvrages peut-on affirmer qu'il ait traduits et commentés? 3° lesquels parmi ces traductions et commentaires sont parvenus jusqu'à nous? 4° que faut-il penser de l'édition de Lorit reproduite dans la *Patrologie Latine*? Pour répondre à la première question je me baserai surtout sur une recherche minutieuse par M. James Shiel qui m'autorise à donner ici quelques prémices d'un travail qu'il espère pouvoir publier sous peu; pour les autres questions je me baserai sur un examen d'environ cent cinquante manuscrits et éditions anciennes des traductions et des commentaires aristotéliens latins et sur une étude des méthodes et du langage des traducteurs latins d'Aristote et de Platon antérieurs à l'an 1300.

1° On a imaginé que Boèce aurait eu accès, à Alexandrie ou à Athènes, à beaucoup d'ouvrages d'Aristote, même à tout

le corpus conservé jusqu'aujourd'hui. Mais les théories du séjour de Boèce dans l'une ou l'autre des deux villes n'ont pas de fondement historique. Et même si Boèce y avait été, il faudrait se demander combien d'ouvrages d'Aristote lui auraient été facilement accessibles. Presque certainement on n'y possédait pas, par exemple, la *Politique*, la *Poétique*, la *Rhétorique*; et il est difficile d'admettre que Boèce aurait traduit et commenté, sans l'appui de l'enseignement et des commentaires grecs, d'autres ouvrages comme les *Ethiques*, même s'ils étaient accessibles dans les bibliothèques. Est-ce qu'on en faisait des copies? Est-ce qu'on savait même ce qu'il y avait? Une analyse des ouvrages de Boèce montre qu'il renvoie aux ouvrages suivants: le *De Anima*, la *Physique*, le *De generatione et corruptione*, la *Métaphysique*, la *Poétique*. Mais dans la plupart des cas il ne fait que répéter ce que l'on trouve dans des textes parallèles des commentaires grecs conservés. Les analyses détaillées de M. Shiel donnent des preuves assez persuasives que tout ce que l'on trouve dans les commentaires aux *Catégories* et au *De interpretatione* aussi bien que dans les commentaires à l'*Isagogé* de Porphyre, dans les trois *Traitéés sur les Syllogismes*, et dans la partie thémistienne du *De differentiis topicis* se réduit à des traductions, adaptations, amplifications de ce qu'on trouverait tout naturellement dans le texte et dans les marges d'un volume scolaire de l'*Organon* de provenance athénienne (de l'entourage de Proclus). C'est en effet là le seul livre aristotélicien que l'on puisse être sûr de trouver sur les rayons de la bibliothèque privée de Boèce: c'est l'«*Aristoteles logicus*» que Boèce donna aux latins, après avoir pénétré «*Atheniensium scholas longe positus*», selon les deux expressions cassiodoriennes.

2° C'est donc les ouvrages logiques que Boèce a traduits et commentés. Il n'y a aucun doute que cela est vrai pour les *Catégories* et le *De interpretatione*: la tradition manuscrite et Cassiodore en donnent des preuves suffisantes. Et Boèce lui-même nous renvoie, dans ses traités de logique, aux traductions et aux commentaires des *Analytiques Premiers* et *Deuxièmes* et des *Topiques*: il ne renvoie quand-même pas à une traduction ou à un commentaire des *Réfutations Sophistiques*; Boèce est

donné comme le traducteur des *Réfutations* pour la première fois dans un commentaire anonyme de la deuxième moitié du douzième siècle. Ni Boèce, ni Cassiodore, ni aucun auteur ancien ou historien sérieux du moyen âge ou moderne ne parle de traductions ou de commentaires boéciens d'autres ouvrages d'Aristote. Il faudra donc conclure que, au moins que l'on ne trouve des nouveaux témoignages très valides, on ne peut affirmer que Boèce ait rien traduit et commenté à l'exception de l'*Organon*, à part — peut-être — les *Réfutations Sophistiques*: nous donnerons de suite des raisons pour admettre que Boèce ait traduit ce dernier ouvrage.

3° Comme je l'ai déjà dit, la tradition manuscrite et les indications de Cassiodore nous garantissent que le *Commentaire aux Catégories* et le double *Commentaire au De interpretatione* qui sont attribués à Boèce dans des manuscrits du dixième siècle et des siècles suivants sont authentiques. Mais il y a des complications pour ce qui touche aux textes aristotéliens lui-même des deux traités. Le texte des *Catégories* se trouve morcelé en lemmes dans le *Commentaire*, lemmes qui sont très souvent incomplets (les premiers mots étant suivis de 'usque' et des derniers mots d'un passage aristotélien plus ou moins long): mais on le trouve, déjà dans le neuvième siècle, dans une forme complète, continue, indépendamment du commentaire. Le texte continu se présente dans deux rédactions, très différentes l'une de l'autre dans beaucoup de morceaux répandus un peu partout dans le cours du texte, spécialement dans la deuxième moitié de l'ouvrage, et en particulier dans les places où les lemmes du commentaire sont le plus incomplets. Un examen du langage des deux rédactions a donné ces résultats: les morceaux dans lesquels les deux rédactions coïncident sont identiques ou presque identiques aux lemmes, ou ils sont dans le langage des lemmes et des citations internes du commentaire; dans les autres morceaux, le langage de la version la plus rare correspond au langage des lemmes et du commentaire, et à celui des morceaux communs aux deux rédactions. On a pu ainsi identifier, dans la rédaction la plus rare, le texte certainement boécien, celui qu'il a employé dans le commentaire. Mais

une comparaison des deux rédactions a aussi montré que l'une — celle employée dans le commentaire — est une rédaction corrigée, définitive, et que l'autre, dans les morceaux différents, est la rédaction primitive, préliminaire. On conserve donc la rédaction définitive toute entière, et un texte contaminé, formé de morceaux de la rédaction primitive et de morceaux (peut-être tirés des lemmes du commentaire) de la rédaction définitive. Il faut aussi observer que Boèce semble avoir encore modifié dans quelques petits détails sa rédaction complète, définitive, lorsqu'il en transcrivait des morceaux comme lemmes ou comme citations dans son commentaire. — Je n'ai pas étudié la tradition du texte latin du *De interpretatione*, mais de ce que l'on décèle des préfaces par Meiser à son édition des commentaires, on peut soupçonner qu'il y a là une situation semblable à celle des *Catégories*.

Quant aux *Analytiques*, aux *Topiques* et aux *Réfutations Sophistiques*, Cassiodore ne nous dit rien (s'il mentionne la traduction boécienne des *Topiques*, c'est, il me semble, en citant un morceau de Boèce lui-même dans le commentaire aux *Topiques* de Cicéron); et, avec une seule exception importante, les presque trois cent manuscrits et éditions anciennes ne donnent pas de nom de traducteur à ces textes. L'exception est importante, puisqu'il s'agit du manuscrit le plus ancien et peut-être le meilleur des *Topiques*, antérieur à 1150; et vers 1170—1180 le texte commun des *Réfutations Sophistiques* est attribué à Boèce dans un commentaire. Mais cela n'est pas suffisant pour assigner à Boèce les traductions en question. Nous avons alors étudié les méthodes et le langage de toutes les traductions latines d'Aristote et de Platon antérieures à l'an 1300, et cela nous a permis de classer ces traductions avec une remarquable exactitude en groupes correspondants aux traducteurs différents. Le résultat peut-être le plus intéressant a été le suivant: le langage de la traduction commune des *Analytiques Deuxièmes* est constamment différent de celui de la traduction commune des *Analytiques Premiers*, des *Topiques* et des *Réfutations Sophistiques*; d'autre part le langage de ces trois derniers ouvrages correspond à celui des *Catégories* et

du *De interpretatione* boécien, tandis que le langage des *Analytiques Deuxièmes* correspond exactement à celui des traductions anciennes de la *Métaphysique*, de la *Physique*, du *De anima* et d'une partie des *Parva Naturalia*. Les différences entre les deux groupes sont telles et tellement constantes, qu'il n'y a pas de doute que l'on a à faire d'un côté à des traductions boéciennes (l'*Organon* entier à l'exception des *Analytiques Deuxièmes*) et de l'autre côté à des traductions dues à un autre traducteur que nous avons identifié comme Jacques de Venise. Cette étude linguistique nous a aussi montré que la traduction la plus ancienne de l'*Éthique à Nicomaque* et celle du *De generatione et corruptione* appartiennent à un autre traducteur, inconnu.

Comme dans le cas des *Catégories* on possède deux rédactions substantiellement différentes l'une de l'autre aussi pour les *Analytiques Premiers*: la rédaction définitive nous est parvenue complète, la rédaction primitive, peut-être, seulement incomplète; la grande majorité des cent vingt manuscrits que j'ai examinés donnent un texte contaminé. Dans le cas des *Réutations Sophistiques* et — dans une mesure beaucoup plus petite — des *Topiques* on a aussi dans les manuscrits le témoignage d'une double rédaction; mais je n'ai pas encore pu conclure avec une assurance complète s'il s'agit de deux rédactions boéciennes ou d'une rédaction boécienne et d'une rédaction anonyme.

Passons maintenant des traductions aux commentaires. Dans le manuscrit le meilleur que nous connaissons (et le deuxième en ancienneté) des *Analytiques Premiers* il y a un commentaire incomplet sous forme de scholies, qui semble remonter à Boèce. Il s'agit de plusieurs centaines de scholies de toute mesure — quelques unes d'entre elles longues de deux ou trois cent mots —, partiellement traduites ou adaptées du grec. Dans le deuxième livre l'original grec est très souvent reconnaissable: il s'agit du commentaire pseudo-philoponien publié dans les *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca* XIII. 1. Pour le premier livre on peut bien penser que l'original ait été le même; mais le premier livre pseudo-philoponien est perdu. L'origine grecque des scholies du premier livre est tout de même assurée par la correspondance



exacte de beaucoup d'entre elles avec le contenu des commentaires d'Alexandre d'Aphrodisias, de Philopon et d'Ammonius. Le langage des scholies latines correspond, autant qu'on peut en juger, au langage de Boèce. La forme extérieure de la page — texte, et scholies à l'alentour avec des signes de renvoi — correspond exactement à la forme traditionnelle des manuscrits grecs les plus anciens de l'*Organon* et de ceux qui en sont dérivés (syriaques et arméniens). Les recherches de M. Shiel, conduites avant la découverte de ce commentaire, avaient suggéré que Boèce aurait employé un manuscrit grec de l'*Organon* de cette forme; et que Boèce aurait écrit ses commentaires en élargissant les riches scholies marginales. Je voudrais proposer l'hypothèse que, dans le cas des *Analytiques Premiers*, nous avons une partie du commentaire boécien dans son premier état, où Boèce aurait traduit et légèrement adapté en latin tout ce qu'il trouvait d'intéressant dans son manuscrit grec; une amplification et la forme littéraire latine aurait suivi plus tard.

Je n'ai trouvé aucun élément qui puisse nous faire penser qu'un commentaire aux *Analytiques Deuxièmes*, aux *Topiques*, et aux *Réfutations Sophistiques* soit arrivé jusqu'à nous; au moins que l'on ne veuille penser que certains morceaux en latin du commentaire perdu d'Alexandre d'Aphrodisias qui se sont conservés dans des manuscrits du douzième et du treizième siècle dérivent d'un commentaire boécien: c'est plus probable qu'il existait une traduction du commentaire d'Alexandre faite au douzième siècle.

4° Lorit a reproduit dans l'édition de 1546 le texte de Marcien Rota (1543) pour les *Commentaires aux Catégories* et au *De interpretatione*, et le texte de Jacques Lefèvre d'Étaples (1503) pour les *Analytiques Premiers* et *Deuxièmes*, pour les *Topiques* et pour les *Réfutations Sophistiques* (c'est une curieuse particularité typographique de l'*Organon* édité par Lefèvre qui a fait attribuer à Boèce ces traductions). Le texte des *Catégories*, complet mais morcelé en lemmes, de l'édition de Rota est, en général, le texte commun contaminé des deux rédactions boéciennes; celui du *De interpretatione* correspond de très près à celui publié par Meiser; celui des *Analytiques Premiers*

est le texte boécien commun (contamination des deux rédactions) revu avec l'emploi de textes grecs par Jacques Lefèvre; celui des *Analytiques Deuxièmes* est le texte de Jacques de Venise également revu par Lefèvre; celui des *Topiques* et des *Réfutations Sophistiques* est encore le texte commun boécien, revu et en partie complètement refait par Lefèvre. C'est encore à Lefèvre que remontent les titres des chapitres des quatre derniers ouvrages.

Conclusion. — Une édition nouvelle des ouvrages de Boèce devra contenir entre autre: 1. texte des *Catégories*, deux rédactions; 2. commentaire aux *Catégories* avec lemmes incomplets; 3. texte du *De interpretatione*, une ou deux rédactions; 4. deux commentaires au *De interpretatione* avec lemmes incomplets; 5. texte des *Analytiques Premiers*, deux rédactions; 6. commentaire aux *Analytiques Premiers*; 7. texte des *Topiques*, une ou deux rédactions; 8. texte des *Réfutations Sophistiques*, une ou deux rédactions. Une édition de ces textes devra être basée sur les manuscrits et non pas sur les éditions imprimées; seuls les commentaires au *De interpretatione* (mais non pas le texte continu et les lemmes) pourront être reproduits de l'édition de Meiser, avec peu de retouches.

## Святой Иустин Философ и Мученик как Апологет

А. К. Сборовский, Москва

Каждая эпоха имеет такие свои характерные черты, которые сразу-же возникают в нашем представлении при напоминании о ней. У каждого времени есть свои герои. Раннее Христианство (II—III вв.) напоминает нам мучеников и апологетов: они утверждали Христианство; первые, смертью доказывали непоколебимость своей веры; вторые, своими писаниями способствовали распространению Христианства.

На воздвигнутое на нее гонение Церковь ответила мучениками и апологетами. Казни Христиан не достигли цели. Уже Тертуллиан предостерегал правителей: «При казни Христиан вы напрасно торжествуете. Ваши пытки и казни способствуют распространению нашей веры, и кровь Христиан есть семя. Мы умножаемся по мере того, как вы нас пожинаете.»

Христианские апологеты выдержали другую, тоже тяжелую, борьбу: Вся наука языческого мира была мобилизована против Христианства, и Христианство, для одержания победы, должно было стать выше культуры языческого мира и удовлетворить все запросы ума. В этой борьбе Христианские апологеты IIго и IIIго вв. проявили двоякое отношение к языческой философии: одни из них ценили ее, находили в ней (особенно в нео-платонизме) истину и хорошие доказательства истины; другие, объявляли ее ложью, считали совсем ненужной для Христиан и ее уничтожающе критиковали: «Что общего у философа и у Христианина? спрашивал Тертуллиан: У ученика Греции с учеником Неба? Между Афинами и Иерусалимом? Между Академией и Церковью? Нам после Христа не нужно никакого учителя, после Евангелия, не нужно никакого исследования.»

Во главе тех Апологетов, которые излагали Христианство как единственную истинную философию, возвышенную по содержанию

и божественную по происхождению, стоит Св. Иустин Философ. Раскрывая Христианское вероучение для образованных Римлян, он обращался к учению греческих философов о Логосе и к библейскому приложению этого учения у Филона. Усвоить эту идею для Апологетов было тем естественнее, что они, по своему историческому положению, в отношении к Христианству занимали ту-же позицию, какую занял Филон по отношению к иудейству: Филон стремился соединить Ветхозаветное откровение аллегорическим истолкованием священных еврейских Писаний с лучшими идеями греческой мысли. Христианские Апологеты ставили своей целью изложить Христианское учение не только как согласное с наиболее ценными выводами греческой философии, но как превосходящее ее по своему содержанию и происхождению. За Иустином осталось в истории название философа: это название является самой проникновенной его характеристикой. Он был мудрец по своим природным способностям; Бог одарил его склонностью размышлять, способностью познавать Истину, стремлением отстаивать Правду. Он не создал своей философской системы, да это ему и не надо было делать: человек своего времени, времени религиозных исканий, он основывался на Христианстве как на завершении исторического пути, пройденного человечеством и стал его Апологетом. Он не встал во враждебное отношение к языческой философии, как, например, Тертуллиан: в этом его бесспорная заслуга если принять во внимание время во котором он жил. Он сохранил стиль мудреца, сумевшего философски размышлять спокойно мыслить во время шумевшей бури. Он не был воинственным человеком: он знал, что мирной беседой, идущей из глубин убежденного сердца, можно достичь не меньших, но больших результатов, чем воинственным пылом. Он был обвеян духом Христианской кротости, проникнут общим миролюбием, и сохранил их в раскаленной атмосфере ненависти, звериной жестокости Рима, и кончил мучеником свою жизнь философа.

## Boethius and the Claims of Philosophy

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Interpretations of Boethius' 'Consolatio', while testifying to the understandable and justifiable craving to do justice to the philosophical theses from Book II onwards, have often passed too quickly over certain items in Book I. Thus, while the figure of Philosophy, otherworldly healer and physician, has long been fully appreciated and seen in relation with the larger context of the whole work, the physical condition of her patient has not yet received due attention. M. L. Gothein<sup>1</sup> is quite right when she says, "It is in her capacity as a physician that Philosophy comes to her patient so gravely ill; it is with the dignity of a physician that she chases the effeminate muses from his bedside; the imagery she uses is borrowed from medicine . . .". But this insight does not seem to have had any major effect on E. Gothein's translation into German which she attended to. The diagnosis of Philosophy, the physician, states that her patient suffers from lethargy: *lethargum patitur*, as the text says explicitly (1, pr. 2, 5).

If I am right, Boethius' scholarship has so far overlooked that in ancient nosology lethargy played an important part. Here, contrary to present day medicine, lethargy stands for a clearly outlined pattern of symptoms. This continued to be true throughout the Middle Ages, and even in Shakespeare we find traces of this. So in Part II of Henry IV, Falstaff gives the Lord Chief Justice a fairly detailed report of an illness described as 'a kind of lethargy' which the king is said to have contracted during a campaign. In this connection, Falstaff

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. the introduction to E. Gothein, Boethius' *Trost der Philosophie*, Zürich 1949, p. 27; E. T. Silk touches on the matter briefly, *Harvard Theol. Rev.* 32, 1939, p. 26, note 23.

does not fail to refer to Galenus' aetiology of this illness. Apparently, hitherto scholars have been content to make do with a general, more or less vague notion of the typical elements of lethargy. Hardly ever has the need been felt to compare the description of the patient in Book I with the doctrine of symptoms which was current among physicians of the time. It will be well to try and make up for this gap and so discover a new side to our subject. Obviously, all we can do here is to give a summary of the arguments developed in the original lecture which is published in full under the title *Philosophisches und Medizinisches in der Consolatio des Boethius* in the *Festschrift Bruno Snell* (Munich 1956), 113/144.

#### a) *Descriptive Detail in the 'Consolatio'*

The 'Consolatio' stresses in its presentation that the lethargy stricken patient, at least for a while, is completely divorced from his environment. Only by the time we reach 1, pr. 3, 1, does he recognize the physician sitting on his bed (*ad cognoscendam medicantis faciem mentem recepi*). And in fact we find it sometimes emphasized that a *lethargicus* is unable to recognize his physician (so *Lucr.* 3, 467ff.; cf. Heinze's commentary; *Augustine, sermo* 87, 14, PL 38, 538). For Boethius, the medical setting lends substance and force to a standard motif: the failure on the part of the addressee of a revelation to recognize the revelation medium at first glance<sup>1</sup>. Still more important, so it seems, is the reference to ἀφῶντα, ἀνασθησὶς and ἀνιμῶντα which occurs in the passage: *quid taces, pudore aut stupore siluisti? Mallem pudore, sed te, ut video, stupor oppressit* (1, pr. 2, 4). The insensitivity conveyed by ἀνασθησὶς is reflected in the glance of the patient's *lumen effetum* (1, m. 2 24; cf. 1, m. 3, 2 *luminibus . . . rediit vigor*), whereas Philosophy is characterized by eyes of great brightness (1, pr. 1, 1). Also, Philosophy is credited with *inexhaustus vigor* (1, pr. 1, 1) to produce a real

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. Klingner, *De Boethii Consolatione philosophiae*, Berlin 1921, p. 116.

antithesis to the *lethargicus* and his lack of *robur*. We also find an antithesis in a point of detail such as the colour of the skin: the *color vividus* of Philosophy is no surprise if we bear in mind the medical treatises and their catalogues of disease symptoms where lethargics are described as *δόχρωτες*, a particularly common symptom (cf. e. g. *Hippocr. Coac.* 136: Littré 5, 610). Other symptoms which Boethius took from the standard disease patterns are *oblivio* (1, pr. 6, 10; cf. also 1, pr. 2, 6) and *tumor* (1, pr. 5, 12; cf. e. g. *Cael. Aurel. morb. acut.* 2, 9, 40). As for the latter, it is clear that beside the obvious philosophical connotation there is reference to a medical context. Finally, *hausi caelum et . . . mentem recepi* lets us think of the *κατάκλις ἐν φωτὶ καὶ πρὸς αὐγὴν* which the patient is once more able to sustain and which is one of the important therapeutic measures (cf. e. g. *Aretaeus* 5, 2 p. 98, 8 Hude). The echo from Virgil (*Aen.* 10, 899) — which, incidentally, has so far been overlooked — very well permits us to interpret *hausi caelum* (sc. *oculis*) in terms of *lucis aspectus* (cf. *Servius* on *Aen.* 1, 738 and 10, 781 *lucis aspectu*; for 10, 899 *Servius* has a diverging interpretation) rather than in terms of a revitalizing *suspirium* (as Büchner has it).

#### b) *The Symbolic Significance of Lethargy in Boethius*

There may be two reasons why Boethius in his 'Consolatio' chose lethargy to describe his sufferings: I. There is the idea that Philosophy rouses us from sleep — and lethargy precisely means a pathological urge to sleep. It is true, this urge to sleep is not among the disease symptoms mentioned in Book I of the 'Consolatio', but no doubt everybody took *sopor* or drowsiness to be one of the intrinsic features. Therefore, if we wish to bring out the symbolic content of lethargy, we may very well have regard to this element of *sopor*<sup>1</sup>. II. No less momentous than the relationships just discussed is the fact

<sup>1</sup> For the history of the awakening topos in religion and philosophy (Platonism, the Stoic interpretation of Heraclitus, Seneca, Poimandres, the New Testament, Augustine), see chap. 2 of the above-mentioned article in the 'Festschrift Bruno Snell'.

that a *lethargicus* and his cure can be more easily linked with the illumination metaphysic and its wealth of motifs which is so important to Platonism in general and to Boethius in particular. This aspect is so obvious from the material of the 'Consolatio' and can be seen in so many instances that we cannot deal with it in adequate detail. For the medical scholars, lethargy was the typical disease of the dark (*Aretaeus* loc. cit. ζόφος . . . ἡ νοσος; cf. also *Lucr.* 3, 829 *nigrae lethargi . . . undae*). He who suffers from it shies away from the light, an aversion which needs overcoming. His glance is 'dull' and not equal to such brightness. Supposing that the author of the 'Consolatio' wanted to use a disease pattern of ancient nosology to represent someone who, "freed from the darkness of deceitful passions . . . is to discern the splendour of the true light" (1, pr. 6, 21 *dimotis fallacium affectionum tenebris splendorem verae lucis . . . agnoscere*) — there was much to commend the choice of lethargy.

At this juncture, we may ask ourselves: Is Boethius the only one who makes symbolic use of lethargy, or are there indications that others before him applied this type of illness to a spiritual predicament? In fact the latter is the case. To demonstrate this is to lay on the keystone to our construction. Precedents such as we look for can be found in some of Augustine's sermons<sup>1</sup>, so e. g. in *sermo* 87, 14 f. (PL 38, 538). Here, Augustine mentions the old antithesis '*phreneticus* v. *lethargicus*': *si necdum medicum agnoscimus, non in eum tamquam phrenetici saeviamus, non ab eo tamquam lethargici avertamur*, and the cor-

<sup>1</sup> Already the 'Index generalis' of the Maurine edition of Augustine, Antwerp 1702, vol. 11<sup>2</sup>, has this correct entry under 'lethargicus': 'Lethargicus dormire volens symbolum peccatoris perire volentis'. Recently, Auerbach, in *Typol. Motive in der mittelalterlichen Lit.* (Schriften des Petrarca-Instituts Köln, 1953), p. 30, has called attention to this and similar passages. The material from the Maurine Index reproduced in Auerbach's remarks may be enlarged further: beside *De util. credendi* 18, 36, we have in *epist.* 93 ad Vicentium a complete section on the spiritual meaning of 'phreneticus' and its opposite 'lethargicus', using very poignant language. And above all, there is *Confess.* 8, 5, 12, where the word 'lethargicus' is not used but its meaning is no doubt in the author's mind.



relation is interpreted in the sense that all who rage against the heavenly physician appear as *phrenetici*, while those who turn away from Christian truth in indifference and live in apathy and indecision are characterized as *lethargici*<sup>1</sup>: *ipsis* (sc. *lethargicis*) *similes sunt, qui non saeviunt in Christum . . . ; sed tantum differendo languescunt verbis somnolentis, in lucem oculis extendere pigrescunt, et qui eos excitare volunt, molesti sunt*<sup>2</sup>. In *sermo* 40, 6 (PL 38, 246), Augustine speaks of those who postpone the *conversio* from day to day and weaves into this the realistic account of an ailment where survival depends on an *excitatio* of the patient. He continues, *Dominus tibi clamat: noli dormire, ne in aeternum dormias; evigila, ut mecum vivas*. In such passages, the lethargy symbolism is purely theological. In the 'Consolatio' we have Boethius the philosopher and not Boethius the theologian, so the symbolism has a purely philosophical import. One might wonder if Boethius knew Augustine's sermons. I do not dare to affirm this but would like to use the above passages simply to show that the lethargy symbolism had little of the unusual about it. Once introduced into Christian oratory<sup>3</sup>, it could easily continue its influence and also undergo modification in the course of this process. As it is certain that Boethius knew such writings of Augustine as *Contra Academicos*,

<sup>1</sup> Cf. a context with reflections of a similar sort in *sermo* 359, 8 (PL 39, 1596) concluding with these words: *quamvis molesti sumus utrique generi, et lethargicum excitando et freneticum ligando, ambos tamen amamus*; cf. also *enarr.* in *psalm.* 34, *sermo* 2, 13 (PL 36, 340).

<sup>2</sup> The lethargy passages from the sermons should be placed side by side with Augustine's description of his spiritual sleep in *Confess.* 8, 5, 12: *ita sarcina saeculi, velut somno assolet, dulciter premebar eqs.* Here we find expressions like *soporis altitudo*, *gravis torpor in membris*, *somnum excutere*, and the *verba somnolenta* of him who keeps postponing his conversion and again and again falls back into a *dulcis morbus* (cf. also *dulciter*). The inclusion of the passage from the *Confessions* is not upset by the absence of the word 'lethargus': perhaps Augustine meant to avoid within his poetic language a word reminiscent of technical literature; but no doubt *somnus* is intended as *somnus lethargicus* in the religious interpretation of *epist.* 93.

<sup>3</sup> I do not suppose that the theological turn of the lethargy symbol originates with Augustine. There is evidence of elements from earlier Christian oratory and Bible exegesis (e. g. in connection with *Rom.* 8, 11 or *Eph.* 5, 14) to support this, even if we did not have Hilarius of Poitiers

*De beata vita* and *De ordine*<sup>1</sup>, we may assume that he was familiar with Augustine's protreptic exhortation to Romanianus (*Ac.* 1, 3): *illud ipsum . . . , quod in te divinum nescio quo vitae huius somno veternoque sopitum est, variis . . . iactationibus secreta providentia excitare decrevit. Evigila, evigila oro te . . . Ipsa (philosophia) me nunc in otio, quod vehementer optavimus, nutrit<sup>2</sup> ac fovet: ipsa me penitus ab illa superstitione (sc. Manichaeorum), in quam te mecum praecipitem dederam, liberavit. Ipsa enim docet, et vere docet nihil omnino colendum esse, totumque contempti oportere, quidquid mortalibus oculis cernitur, quidquid ullus sensus attingit*<sup>3</sup>. If we imagine this passage from *Contra Academicos* to have formed the nucleus of Boethius' 'Consolatio'—a thesis which I myself would not go so far as to advance—the shift in the complex of motifs from *somnus et veternus* to an accurate account of lethargy could be taken as emerging from the wider possibilities afforded by the established medical pattern of that illness and the author's wish to expand the motif within the total framework of the 'Consolatio'.

After this exposition of Augustinian traces in Boethius' notion of lethargy, it may be worth our while to go on to some

to fall back on. He says *Mat.* 14, 9 *mentes et corpora infidelitatis veterno ad intelligentiam novae praedicationis emundat* (sc. Dominus; cf. supra: *languorem infirmitatemque curat*); cf. the characteristic statement *ibid.* 9, 10 *civitates omnes et castella omnia . . . ingressu Christi illuminantur et omnem infirmitatem veteri languoris evadunt*. It is likely, however, that Augustine broadened the symbol, especially through bringing in detail from contemporary medical theories. His predilection for the opposites 'phreneticus-lethargicus' should be seen in this light.

<sup>1</sup> This was first seen by Boissier. Some years ago, E. T. Silk wrote an outstanding essay (*Harvard Theol. Rev.* 32, 1939, p. 19ff.) which remains the best statement on this issue. Cf. also Fortescue's commentary p. XXXI; R. Carton, *Le Christianisme et l'Augustinisme de Boèce*, *Mélanges August.* (Paris 1931) p. 327ff.; Klingner, *Röm. Geisteswelt* (1943) p. 419 = 3rd edition (1956) p. 548; P. de Labriolle, *L'hist. litt. chrét.* (3rd edition Paris 1945) p. 785; Büchner, *Forschungsbericht* (1951) p. 176, note 1 with a pertinent formulation; cf. a remark in the author's review of Büchner in *Rom. Forschungen* 63, 1951/52, 401.

<sup>2</sup> Similar Boeth. *Consol.* 1, pr. 3, 2; 2, pr. 4, 1 (*Philosophia nutrix*).

<sup>3</sup> The lethargy symbol is furthermore reflected in a string of words at the beginning of Book II of *C. Acad.* 2, 1: *sive ingeniorum quodam stupore, vel socordia vel tarditate torpentium, sive desperatione interveniendi*.

of the medical detail inherent in it. There is e. g. the distinction of *remedium lenius* and *remedium acrius*<sup>1</sup> which is important inasmuch as medicine with its step by step therapy matches the *gradatim* procedure of philosophical initiation. It is a general rule of medical therapy that the use of a *δραστικὸν φάρμακον* should be preceded by an *ἀσθενέστερον* (cf. e. g. *Galenus, compos. medic.* 2 p. 590 Kühn; *therap. meth.* 5, 94 p. 376 Kühn). If we look for an application of this general injunction to the specific conditions of lethargy and its *tumores*, Caelius Aurelianus, who is obviously quite free from Galenus' influence, commands our interest (*morb. acut.* 2, 7. 8. 9). We read there inter alia that *acutissimae potiones* are dangerous (2, 7, 33); particularly in the case of *tumores* not yet in process of receding, strong drugs should be avoided (e. g. 2, 9, 40 *omnis . . . acrimonia tumoribus incongrua*). As far as I can see, only Caelius Aurelianus has both the principle of a gradual therapy and its application to tumors such as occur in lethargy. This striking instance is seconded by other observations<sup>2</sup> which go to support the thesis that Boethius' conception of lethargy is particularly close to Caelius Aurelianus, in meaning and expression. In this connection, let us recall a contemporary of Boethius, Cassiodorus, who testifies to the high reputation of Caelius Aurelianus as a faithful mediator of Greek science in the sixth century<sup>3</sup>.

Let us leave the special problem of Boethius' indebtedness to Caelius Aurelianus and return to a general appraisal of his symbolic conception. We will be right in concluding that the symbolism of the 'Philosophia medicans' as adopted by Boethius has a certain affinity to the 'Christus medicus' long familiar

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Consol.* 1, pr. 5, 11 et passim.

<sup>2</sup> Details are given in the article of the 'Festschrift Bruno Snell' (v. supra p. 369). The relationship between Boethius and Caelius Aurelianus is treated in a special appendix (Beilage 1: „Weitere Erwägungen zur Bestimmung des medizinischen Anteils der boethianischen Lethargiekonzeption“).

<sup>3</sup> Cf. K. Vietmeier, *Beobachtungen über Caelius Aurelianus als Übersetzer*, Diss. Münster 1937, p. 9.

to theology<sup>1</sup>. Evidently it would be a mistake to collapse the two into one. Boethius stayed well within the scope of the ancient philosophy with its *logos therapeutikos* and *paramythetikos*, applying the therapy of medicine towards a philosophical *θεραπεία τῶν παθῶν*. But he attempted to infuse it with the expressive power formerly reserved to theological symbolism such as the 'Christus medicus' figure.

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<sup>1</sup> It may suffice to refer the reader to a passage in Augustine (*sermo* 299, 6: PL 38, 1372): *medicus magnus, hoc est Jesus, medicus magnus ad regionem veniens languidorum*. It should be borne in mind that languor is often mentioned as a typical characteristic of a lethargicus.



## **XI. MONASTICA**

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## A Note on the Chronology of the Pachomian Foundations

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I have argued elsewhere<sup>1</sup> for the priority of the Greek *Vita Prima* of Pachomius (G<sup>1</sup>), and the Letter of Ammon, over all surviving Coptic sources, and I shall not repeat the argument here, but shall assume the self-consistent Greek (G<sup>1</sup> c. 116) dating, which would place the death of Pachomius on 9th May, 346, and his arraignment before a council of bishops at Latopolis (G<sup>1</sup> c. 112) probably in the previous autumn (345), as that seems to have been the season at which the community's boat usually paid its visit to Alexandria, and Zacchaeus and Theodore were absent on that voyage during the Synod (G<sup>1</sup> c. 113). Theodore's disgrace took place two years before this (G<sup>1</sup> c. 107) — therefore in 343, or at latest 344. And as he had then been head at Tabennesis for seven years (G<sup>1</sup> c. 106), his appointment there must fall in 336—337. Greek and Coptic sources agree that he was then aged about thirty<sup>2</sup>. And the *Vita Prima* (cc. 26 & 33), here supported by Amelineau's Arabic (A<sup>m</sup> p. 392.19), says that he had come to the Community at about the age of 14 — therefore in 320—321. The Letter of Ammon (c. 9), which says he was then thirteen, is sufficiently close corroboration of this against the Bohairic statement that he was twenty.

The Letter of Ammon (c. 12) tells us that Alexander (313—328) was already Bishop of Alexandria when Pachomius went to join Palamon shortly after his baptism. We are driven to believe (though his biographer would wish to slur over the fact) that the army into which Pachomius had been conscripted at the age of twenty (G<sup>1</sup> c. 4: B<sup>0</sup> etc. c. 7) was that of Maximin Daia preparing for war against Licinius, and that his early release

<sup>1</sup> *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* V 1, pp. 38—77.

<sup>2</sup> G<sup>1</sup> c. 78: S<sup>4</sup> c. 69. B<sup>0</sup> c. 69 says 33, but this is probably due to a dittography. The evidence of G<sup>2</sup>, based on Paralipomena, can be discounted.



followed on the defeat and death of Maximin in 313. This allows at most eight years, for the whole time from Pachomius' baptism to the arrival of Theodore at Tabennesis, "a few days" after the second group of recruits, but before the Community was a hundred strong (G<sup>1</sup> c. 26). The time seems extremely short, but in any case is about as much as we can allow when we consider that it only leaves 26 or 27 years for the history of the Community from its foundation to Pachomius' death. Certainly there is not room for the minimum of 15 years required by the Coptic and Arabic Lives (B<sup>0</sup> etc. cc. 10, 17: A<sup>m</sup> pp. 346.3, 393.1).

At the Latopolis Council, Pachomius speaks (G<sup>1</sup> 112) of his Community as comprising nine monasteries. And this corresponds exactly with the number of foundations already recorded in the *Vita Prima*. Apart from Tabennesis itself, they fall into two groups. The creation of the first group is described concisely in G<sup>1</sup> 54, and at greater length in cc. 49—51 of the Coptic Life. Pabau, which was destined to become the headquarters of the Community, was founded in a deserted village some two miles down river from Tabennesis when numbers there grew too large, and the preexistent monasteries of Chenoboscia (Sheneset) and Mouchonsis (Tmoushons) were aggregated to the Community shortly afterwards. This appears to have taken place a considerable time before Pachomius, having transferred his headquarters to Pabau, appointed Theodore to Tabennesis, in 336—337. We have the impression that the Greek House over which Theodore the Alexandrian was set as housemaster 13 years before Pachomius' death (G<sup>1</sup> c. 95), therefore in 333, was already at Pabau. Moreover, the Letter of Ammon (cc. 10—11) describes events of which the second at least (seven days after the first) is stated to have occurred at Pabau, while Pachomius was visiting the other monasteries. And as it is stated that Theodore was aged twenty-two at the time, this would take the first group of monasteries back at least to 329 A. D. The event of c. 10 has too easily been assumed to be identical with the Fearful Vision of G<sup>1</sup> 88 (B<sup>0</sup> etc. c. 73). This would involve a manifest contradiction between the chronology of the two docu-

ments. But in fact, the differences between the two narratives seem too great for such an identification. And Ammon's dating is confirmed by the connexion of these chapters with Pachomius' championship, in cc. 12 & 13, of the young Athanasius at the beginning of his episcopate.

We are reminded of Pachomius' testimony to Athanasius, in the *Vita Prima*, c. 30, when the young Pope visited the Thebaid about this time, in 329 (see the Index to the Festal Epistles), and are tempted to see a connexion between the extension of the Community and the Bishop of Tentyra's unsuccessful effort to have Pachomius ordained: while Tabennesis was in the diocese of Tentyra, Pabau (Ep. Amm. c. 2) and the other monasteries of the first group were in that of Diospolis Parva.

The foundations of the second group are described or recorded in G<sup>1</sup> 80—83, almost immediately after the account of the appointment of Theodore to Tabennesis in c. 78 (= c. 70 of the Coptic). The account does not keep to the chronological order, but is careful to give clear indications of that order, which would seem to have been given some significance in the administration of the Community. The Greek describes first the coming of Petronius and his family, and the foundation of the monastery of Tebeu (c. 80). In cc. 81—82 we have the story of the foundation of a monastery near the city of Panopolis at the request of a Bishop called Arius. This is specially stated to have taken place before the establishment of Tebeu (*πρὸ ταύτης τῆς μονῆς — τάξιν γὰρ ἔχουσιν*). C. 83 sums up these two and the remaining three foundations, making clear the order of their establishment -- *καὶ πρὸ τούτου (sc. τῆς Πανοπόλεως) τὸ λεγόμενον Τασῆ, καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ τῆς Πανός, καὶ Τηβεῦ καὶ Τισμηναί, καὶ μετὰ χρόνον τὸ ἄλλο τὸ λεγόμενον Πιχνουμ, ἔνω περὶ Λατῶν . . .*

It will be well at this point to notice two definite evidences for dating. a) Pichnoum must have been founded before the Council of Latopolis, that is to say, before the autumn of 345. b) Athanasius speaks in Ep. Fest. XIX of the appointment of Bp. Arius as coadjutor to Bp. Artemidorus of Panopolis, at the latter's request owing to his great age and infirmity. The bishops named in this letter, for A. D. 347 — the first written after

Athanasius' return from exile — appear to be all those appointed since the beginning of his exile in February, 339. The names of several of them, including that of Arius himself, appear among the signatories at Sardica in 343. But his appointment cannot have been earlier than 339. We may assume that his invitation to Pachomius was one of his first acts as bishop: the account in G<sup>1</sup> of the difficulties over the building of the monastery fully confirms the implication that the diocese had got out of hand. The *ἐπίσκοπος τις* of G<sup>1</sup> — hardly the way to speak of the Bishop of Panopolis — appears in a new light when we find that Arius was in fact only a coadjutor bishop.

In the Coptic Life, the account of these foundations is transferred to an earlier position (cc. 52—58), so as to follow immediately on that of the earlier group. But we have already seen that the Greek separation of the two groups is fully corroborated on chronological grounds. The Coptic also arranges the accounts in chronological order. But all the evidence for such an arrangement is available in the Greek.

More important, the Coptic adds a considerable amount of interesting material, most of which has every appearance of being historical. Several points are relevant to our present discussion:

a) The monastery of Tse (Tase), the earliest of the group, is said to be in the region of Shmin = Panopolis. The name of its head is given as Pessô. He is not mentioned elsewhere.

b) Petronius' home is stated (c. 56) to have been at Djodj in the diocese of Diospolis Parva. This topographical link with the earlier group no doubt explains why Tebeu is described first in the Greek, though admitted to be later in foundation. Tebeu (Thbeou) is stated to have been on the family estate. A number of other small additions or differences in the account need not concern us here.

c) In c. 57 we are told that Pachomius went with the brethren northward to the district of Shmin (Panopolis) and built another monastery there (ΝΚΕ ΜΟΝΗ) which was in fact called Tsmine. He then took Petronius from Thbeou, where he was replaced by Apollonius, and made him head of Tsmine, giving him charge also of the other two monasteries near by. Though the Greek

is silent at this point as to Petronius' transference to Tismene, and as to the position of Tismene (as also of Tase), we are told in G<sup>1</sup> 114, when Petronius is appointed to succeed Pachomius, that he also was sick *ἐν τῇ μονῇ αὐτοῦ Τομην* (sc. *Τισμην*) *λεγομένη, περὶ τὴν Πανός*.

d) At the end of c. 51, after the account of Tmoushons, S<sup>5</sup> (B<sup>0</sup> does not survive, but Amelineau's text confirms S<sup>5</sup>) adds mention of the annexation of a small monastery — Psampesterposen or Psampesarapis — at the place where, according to the Coptic lives (B<sup>0</sup> cc. 8—10: A<sup>m</sup> pp. 344—346), Pachomius had spent three years after his baptism before joining Palamon. This fragmentary MS, where it survives, gives numbers in the margin to the different foundations, and this monastery is accordingly numbered as 5th in the series, with Tase as 6th. Lefort argues (*Vies Coptes de saint Pachôme*, p. 247) that, if we are to keep the number nine, Tase and the Panopolis monastery of cc. 54—55 (G<sup>1</sup> 81—82) must be identical. As Samuel is named in Greek and Coptic as head of the latter, he supposes that Pessô, named as head of Tase, must have disappeared very early. He supposes that G<sup>1</sup>, ignorant of Psampesterposen, treated one monastery as two in order to get the right number of nine. But he has overlooked two pieces of evidence. — a) S<sup>5</sup> is shown in Lefort's own publication of the text to give a number to both these monasteries — Tsê is given as 6th (ζ), the Panopolis monastery as 7th (ζ̄). Lefort mentions the numbering of Tsê in a footnote to his French translation also, but omits there to mention the separate numbering of the second monastery in the Coptic MS. b) In B<sup>0</sup> 57, the Coptic clearly states that Petronius, appointed to Tismene, was given charge also of the other two monasteries near by (Ⲛⲧⲕⲉϥⲛⲟⲩⲧⲙⲙⲟⲛⲏ ⲉⲧⲏⲧⲉⲣⲟⲩ). Lefort in his Latin and French translations ("*Commisit autem ei curam duorum in propinquo monasteriorum*"; "*Il lui confia en outre le soin des deux monastères qui étaient à sa portée*") neglects this significant ⲕⲉ = other. It is true it is absent from the Sahidic. But even without it, the most natural interpretation remains that the "two monasteries near by" were not meant to include Tismene itself.

The distinction of the two monasteries seems clear, and there is no need to suppose that Pessô died or disappeared to make way for Samuel. It is unfortunate that S<sup>5</sup> does not survive in cc. 56—58 to show us how the remaining monasteries were numbered — whether the total admitted was in fact altered to ten. But if nine is the correct historical number (and B<sup>0</sup> c. 58 confirms it) our suspicion is strengthened that the whole story of the temple of Sarapis is a later addition, an attempt to give historic lustre to some parvenu foundation.

But if in fact Petronius, when sent as head to Tismene, was given supervision not of one but of two other monasteries, there are highly important implications. The first four monasteries of the Community, in the diocese of Tentyra and Diospolis Parva, were within easy reach of each other — and Tebeu also, as we have seen, would fall naturally into that group. But Panopolis was something like sixty miles down river from Pabau. And when Petronius was sent thither to have the oversight of a group of three monasteries at such a distance from the headquarters of the Community, he would find himself in a position comparable, within that group, to that of Pachomius himself in the earlier group, a position which was already pointing him out as the probable successor to Pachomius — which, of course, is what he actually became. When he did so, one Coptic MS, S<sup>6</sup> (Lefort, *Vies Coptes* pp. 322—323) shows Theodore urging as a reason for obedience to him that he had in fact, under Pachomius, occupied just such a position in relation to the monasteries of his neighbourhood.

And Petronius was, as we have seen, very much of a new-comer to the Community — coming not earlier than 339—340. The story of Theodore's disgrace appears in a new light. In G<sup>1</sup> 106 we read that when Pachomius was ill *ἀρχαῖοι πατέρες καὶ κεφαλὰὶ τῶν μονῶν* appealed to Theodore to promise to accept the succession, since “*οὐδεὶς ἡμῶν ἐπίσταται πᾶσαν τὴν ἀναστροφὴν αὐτοῦ ὥς σὺ*”. The clear indication is that the “Early brethren” are jealous of the new-comer — even as they had been, not so many years before, of the young Theodore himself (G<sup>1</sup> c. 77). This is further borne out by the fact that, when Pachomius on

hearing of what had been happening assembled πάντας τοὺς ἡγουμένους τῶν μοναστηρίων, there is no mention of Petronius or of Orsisius (who was also a new-comer, as we know from G<sup>1</sup> 119 that he was still a "neophyte" when appointed to Chenoboscia). Only "Early Brethren" are named — Sourous, Psenthaesis, Paphnutius, Cornelius, and Theodore himself.

And when, some seven years later, Orsisius recognized his failure to hold the Community together, and called in Theodore, the latter, whose constant loyalty, first to Pachomius and then to Orsisius, is stressed throughout, opened his rallying call (G<sup>1</sup> c. 131) with the words, "Ποῦ εἰσὶν οἱ ἀρχαῖοι;".

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## Des moines euchites à Carthage en 400—401

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Saint Augustin consacre le 57<sup>ème</sup> chapitre de son *De haeresibus* aux messaliens ou euchites : « La dernière hérésie dont Epiphane fasse mention est celle des messaliens, nom syrien que les Grecs rendent par celui d'euchites, *εὐχῖται*, à cause de leur manière de prier. Ils prient tant, en effet, que cela paraît incroyable à ceux qui en entendent parler. Le Seigneur avait dit : il faut prier toujours et ne jamais se lasser. L'Apôtre avait dit aussi : Priez sans cesse. Ce qui signifie évidemment qu'il ne faut passer aucun jour sans consacrer à la prière quelques moments. Les messaliens ont tellement pris à la lettre cette recommandation, qu'on a cru devoir, pour cela, les ranger parmi les hérétiques. Néanmoins, si l'on ajoute foi au dire de certains auteurs, ils racontaient, sur la purification des âmes, je ne sais quelle fable fantastique et ridicule : ainsi, par exemple, quand un homme est purifié, on lui voit sortir de la bouche une laie avec ses petits, et, aussitôt après, un globe de feu entre visiblement en lui, et ne le consume pas. Epiphane leur assimile et comprend dans la même secte les euphémites, les martyriens, les sataniens. Les euchites prétendent que les moines ne peuvent et ne doivent rien faire, même pour subvenir aux nécessités de la vie, et qu'on ne se montre véritablement moine qu'en s'abstenant de tout travail. »<sup>1</sup>

Lorsque en 428, l'Evêque d'Hippone, insère dans son catalogue des hérésies cette notice concernant la secte des messaliens ou euchites, ceux-ci ont déjà plus d'un demi-siècle d'existence. C'est vers le milieu du IV<sup>e</sup> siècle, dans les environs

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<sup>1</sup> PL 42, 40—51.

d'Edesse, qu'ils apparaissent<sup>1</sup>. Leur histoire est très difficile à faire dans l'état actuel des documents. Jusqu'aux travaux de Dom Villecourt<sup>2</sup>, du Dr. M. Kmosko<sup>3</sup>, on estimait que les écrits proprement messaliens étaient à jamais perdus. Si leurs recherches ont abouti à établir l'authenticité messalienne d'un certain nombre d'ouvrages, il reste encore beaucoup à faire en ce domaine. On reconnaît aujourd'hui comme textes issus de la secte, les *Homélies spirituelles* attribuées à Macaire<sup>4</sup> dont MM. Dörries et Klostermann préparent l'édition critique, les sept opuscules ascétiques qui font suite aux homélies spirituelles dans la Patrologie grecque<sup>5</sup>, la «longue lettre grecque»<sup>6</sup>, et le *Liber graduum*<sup>7</sup>. Tous ces documents seraient de la deuxième partie du IV<sup>e</sup> s. Pour le moment les origines de la secte nous sont surtout connues par les notices que les hérésiologues ou les historiographes lui ont consacrées. Outre le témoignage d'Augustin déjà cité nous avons celui d'Epiphane, hérésie 80 de son *Panarion*<sup>8</sup> écrit dans les années 374—377, où est signalée pour la première fois l'existence des messaliens ou euchites; voir aussi: Théodoret de Cyr dans son *Historia ecclesiastica*<sup>9</sup>, vers 445, et dans son *Haereticarum fabularum liber primus*<sup>10</sup>, vers 453; Timothé de Constantinople, VII<sup>e</sup> s., dans son *De*

<sup>1</sup> Pour la bibliographie concernant les messaliens ou euchites, voir les articles du D. T. C.: Messaliens, et Euchites. — Pour connaître l'état actuel des textes et de la bibliographie, que l'on se reporte à Patrologia syriaca t. 3, Praefatio à l'édition du Liber graduum, par Dr. Michael Kmosko, Paris 1926; et J. Darrouzès: Notes sur les homélies du pseudo-macaire, dans Le Muséon, t. 67, 1954, p. 297—309.

<sup>2</sup> Résumé des travaux de Dom Villecourt et de Dom Wilmart dans le D. T. C., à l'article: Messaliens.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. supra note 1.

<sup>4</sup> En attendant l'édition critique, on trouvera les homélies I—L dans la Patrologie grecque, t. 34, col. 449—822; et les homélies LI—LVII dans G. L. Marriott, Macarii Anecdota. Seven unpublished Homilies of Macarius, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1918.

<sup>5</sup> PG 34, 821—968.

<sup>6</sup> Ibidem col. 409—442.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. supra note 1.

<sup>8</sup> Edition Karl Holl, Leipzig, 1933, p. 484sq.

<sup>9</sup> PG 82, 1144—1145.

<sup>10</sup> PG 83, 429—432.



*receptione haereticorum*<sup>1</sup>; Damascène, VIII<sup>e</sup> s., dans son *De haeresibus*<sup>2</sup>; et Photius, au IX<sup>e</sup> s. dans sa *Bibliotheca*, cod. 52<sup>3</sup>.

A l'aide de ces diverses sources, nous pouvons suivre l'hérésie messalienne jusqu'au VIII<sup>e</sup>—IX<sup>e</sup> s.; passée cette date, son histoire devient des plus compliquées avec ses proliférations nombreuses comme les encratites, les bohémiles, les fondaïtes, etc.<sup>4</sup> Originaires de Mésopotamie, les messaliens gagnent très tôt la Pamphylie, où ils sont condamnés pour la première fois au synode de Sidé, vers 390, par Amphilocius d'Iconium<sup>5</sup>. A la même date nous les trouvons en Syrie, où Flavien d'Antioche, ayant eu connaissance de l'acte d'Amphilocius, les condamne de son côté<sup>6</sup>. Cependant rien n'arrête leur développement, et rapidement ils gagnent les diverses provinces d'Asie mineure. Saint Jérôme dénonce ces hérétiques dans son *Dialogue contre les Pélagiens*, daté généralement de 415: «*et totius pene Syriae haereticos quos sermone gentili διασπαμμένως Messalianos, Graece εὐχίτας vocant*»<sup>7</sup>. A Constantinople, dans les années 420—426, les patriarches Atticus et Sisinnius<sup>8</sup>, ce dernier de concert avec le patriarche d'Antioche et d'autres évêques, écrivirent des lettres contre eux. Le fameux Nestorius, successeur de Sisinnius, obtint de l'empereur une loi sévère, celle

<sup>1</sup> PG 86, 45—51.

<sup>2</sup> PG 94, 729—744.

<sup>3</sup> PG 103, 88—92.

<sup>4</sup> Dès leur origine les messaliens ou euchites se présentaient sous des formes diverses d'où les appellations multiples qui ont servi à les désigner. Augustin leur assimile, en se couvrant par erreur de l'autorité d'Epiphane, les Euphémites, les martyriens et les sataniens. Le Concile d'Ephèse condamne les messaliens appelés encore euchites et enthousiastes (cf. Mansi, t. 4, col. 1477: «... *de messalianistis hoc est euchetis vel enthusiastis qui in Pamphylia versantur*). On retrouve ces mêmes appellations chez Théodoret de Cyr dans son *Historia ecclesiastica*, lib. 4, 10, PG 82, 1143. Au début du VII<sup>e</sup> s., Timothée de Constantinople nous dit que ces hérétiques ont des noms très divers: marcianistes, messaliens, euchites, choreutes, lampétiens, adelphiens, eustathiens (*De receptione haereticorum*, PG 86, 45—47).

<sup>5</sup> Histoire de l'Eglise, coll. Fliche-Martin, t. 3, p. 444, note 6.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid. p. 452.

<sup>7</sup> PL 23, 496.

<sup>8</sup> Les registres des actes du patriarcat de Constantinople, vol. I, par V. Grumel, nos 46, 47, 49.

du 30 mai 428, *Cod. Theod.*, L. XIV, tit. V, leg. 65, par laquelle interdiction est faite aux messaliens, euchites, enthousiastes, de tenir des réunions, de faire des prières publiques. En 431, le concile d'Ephèse ne fera que confirmer ces condamnations<sup>1</sup>. Avec ces témoignages des années 428—430, nous voici ramenés au *De haeresibus* d'Augustin. Le problème qui se pose est de savoir comment l'Evêque d'Hippone a connu cette secte.

Ce problème revient en somme à déterminer les sources dont s'est servi Augustin pour rédiger ce chapitre 57 de son *De haeresibus*, car nulle part ailleurs il ne fait allusion à l'hérésie messalienne. Ces sources étaient certainement multiples; il y a ceux qui trouvent incroyable ce qu'ils entendent dire des euchites (*eis qui hoc de illis audiunt incredibile videatur*); il y a ceux qui ont cru devoir ranger les messaliens parmi les hérétiques (*ut hinc judicarentur inter haereticos nominandi*); il y a ceux qui racontent à leur sujet une fable ridicule sur le mode de purification des âmes (*nonnulli eos dicant . . .*); il y a ceux qui rapportent comment les euchites conçoivent le monachisme (*dicuntur euchtiae opinari . . .*). Sources orales peut-être; et très probablement d'origine messalienne pour quelques unes. Mais il y a aussi la source: Epiphane; Augustin le laisse entendre clairement dans ce 57<sup>ème</sup> chapitre, après les quelques lignes consacrées aux messaliens: «L'Evêque de Chypre . . . termine ici son ouvrage sur les hérésies . . . Dans la nomenclature des hérétiques et l'exposé de leurs erreurs, j'ai suivi l'ordre adopté par lui, mais non sa méthode, etc.» Surgit alors un nouveau problème, sur lequel plusieurs auteurs se sont déjà penchés, est-ce le *Panarion* ou seulement le résumé apocryphe de ce grand ouvrage, l'*Anacephalaeosis* qu'aurait utilisé l'Evêque d'Hippone<sup>2</sup>? Mon enquête personnelle se limitant à l'examen

<sup>1</sup> Le texte de la condamnation du Concile d'Ephèse nous est parvenu en latin (Mansi, t. 4, col. 1477), et une partie, le début, en langue grecque (Miklosich-Muller, *Acta patriarchatus constantinopolitani MCCCXV—MCCCCII*, t. I, 1860, p. 298—299).

<sup>2</sup> Pour certains auteurs, le *Panarion* serait la source directe (voir: P. de Labriolle, *Les sources de l'histoire du montanisme*, Paris, 1913, p. CIX—CXIII; I. Chevalier, *Saint Augustin et la pensée grecque*, Fribourg, 1940, p. 104; S. Jannaccone, *La dottrina eresiologicala di s.*

de ce 57<sup>me</sup> chapitre, m'amène à penser qu'Augustin n'a eu en mains que le résumé apocryphe du pseudo-Epiphane<sup>1</sup>, lequel ne consacre aux messaliens que quatre lignes qui correspondent, à quelque chose près, au titre de la notice du *Panarion*: «Contre les messaliens auxquels sont assimilés les martyriens, les euphémites et les sataniens d'origine païenne»<sup>2</sup>. Si Augustin avait utilisé la notice du *Panarion* concernant les euchites ou messaliens, il n'aurait pas confondu ces hérétiques avec les autres sectes: martyriens, euphémites, sataniens; Epiphane a soin de distinguer ces deux groupes et précise que les messaliens sont chrétiens alors que les autres appartiennent à des sectes païennes<sup>3</sup>. De plus cette notice du *Panarion* fournissait à l'Evêque d'Hippone une foule de renseignements qu'il n'aurait pas omis de citer s'il les avait trouvés dans l'ouvrage de l'Evêque de Chypre qu'il détenait.

De fait, la simple lecture de l'Hérésie 80 du grand catalogue d'Epiphane, ramène immédiatement à l'esprit le souvenir de ces moines oisifs de Carthage que fustige Augustin en 400 dans son *De opere monachorum*<sup>4</sup>. De part et d'autre on refuse tout travail manuel sous prétexte de s'adonner à la prière, on en appelle au même texte de l'Apôtre pour se justifier, on fait obligation aux fidèles de donner le nécessaire, on porte les cheveux à la manière des femmes, enfin on ne tient aucun compte des avertissements reçus. Le parallèle est trop frappant. Augustin n'aurait pas omis de faire les rapprochements s'il

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Agostino, Catania, 1952, p. 23—26); — pour d'autres, sous le nom d'Epiphane, l'Evêque d'Hippone ne citerait jamais que le résumé apocryphe de son grand ouvrage, l'*Anacephalaeosis* (voir: les Mauristes, PL 42, col. 32, note sur l'hérésie 41; Bardenhewer, *Geschichte der altkirchlichen Literatur*, t. IV, Fribourg, 1924, p. 463—464; G. Bardy, Le «de haeresibus» et ses sources, dans *Miscellanea agostiniana*, t. 2, 1930, p. 397—416; B. Altaner, *Augustinus und Epiphanius von Salamis. Eine quellenkritische Studie*, dans *Mélanges Joseph de Ghellinck*, tome I, 1951, p. 265—275); — M. Courcelle songe plutôt à «un court résumé du *Panarion*», voir: *Les lettres grecques en occident*, Paris, 1948, p. 193.

<sup>1</sup> PG 42, 873.

<sup>2</sup> Ed. Holl, p. 484, 22—23.

<sup>3</sup> Ed. Holl, p. 487, 5—6.

<sup>4</sup> Toutes les références au *De opere monachorum* seront faites d'après l'édition de Zycha, dans le CSEL, vol. 41, p. 429—596.

les avait connus. Cette constatation nous amène d'une part à conclure que l'Evêque d'Hippone n'a connu les euchites ou messaliens sous leur vrai nom qu'aux alentours de 428, mais elle suggère d'autre part une nouvelle question qu'il faut nous poser maintenant: Augustin n'aurait-il pas eu affaire à eux sans les connaître dès 399—400? Lorsqu' à la fin de sa notice sur l'erreur messalienne il écrit: «On rapporte comme une opinion des euchites que les moines ne peuvent et ne doivent rien faire, même pour subvenir aux nécessités de la vie, et qu'on ne se montre véritablement moine qu'en s'abstenant de tout travail»<sup>1</sup>, l'Evêque d'Hippone ne faisait-il pas une allusion directe à la situation des moines de Carthage qu'il reprenait si fermement vingt huit ans plus tôt? Voyons ce que nous révèle l'examen des textes.

Une remarque préliminaire: on peut s'étonner de voir des monastères gagnés à l'hérésie euchite alors que celle-ci paraît avoir pris naissance dans les milieux laïques. Au dire d'Epiphane les premiers messaliens n'étaient que des hommes et des femmes vivant ensemble, dans une promiscuité dangereuse à certains moments, dans le renoncement à tous les biens du monde, sans souci de leur nourriture, attendant tout de la charité, ne voulant s'adonner à aucun travail manuel afin de se consacrer plus totalement à la prière<sup>2</sup>. Mais ils se trouvent bien vite des adeptes parmi les clercs et les moines. Flavien d'Antioche écrit à un évêque d'Arménie qui s'était laissé prendre<sup>3</sup>. Et dans la condamnation des messaliens par le concile d'Ephèse, 431, des dispositions diverses sont prises selon qu'il s'agit de clercs ou de moines<sup>4</sup>. Déjà du temps d'Epiphane, la secte se trouvait des adhérents dans les monastères, l'Evêque de Chypre signale, dans le *Panarion*, des moines de Mésopotamie gagnés à l'hérésie<sup>5</sup>. Vers la fin du IV<sup>e</sup> s., Letoius, évêque de Mélitène, fait incendier

<sup>1</sup> PL 42, 41: Dicuntur euchitæ opinari monachis non licere sustentandæ vitæ suæ causa aliquid operari atque ita se ipsos monachos profiteri ut omnino ab operibus vacent.

<sup>2</sup> Ed. Holl, p. 487, 7—488, 10.

<sup>3</sup> Photius, Bibliotheca, L, cod. 52, PG 103, 89.

<sup>4</sup> Mansi, 4, 1477.

<sup>5</sup> Ed. Holl, p. 491, 20.

plusieurs monastères, «ou plutôt ces cavernes de brigands», comme il les appelle, dans lesquels avait pénétré cette peste<sup>1</sup>. Cyrille d'Alexandrie qui fut au dire de Timothée un de leurs adversaires<sup>2</sup>, semble viser ces fameux moines dans sa lettre à Calosyrius qui sert de préface au traité contre les anthropomorphistes<sup>3</sup>. Mais les «Homélies spirituelles» du pseudomacaire, comme le *Liber graduum*, sont encore les pièces principales pour l'histoire du messalianisme en milieu monastique. Il n'est donc pas impossible que l'hérésie messalienne, au début du IV<sup>e</sup> siècle, ait gagné quelques monastères africains.

L'occasion du conflit carthaginois, à en croire Augustin, a été le refus catégorique de certains moines de s'adonner au travail manuel<sup>4</sup>. Ce n'était pas là affaire secrète d'un monastère, puisqu'on en vint aux querelles et aux disputes entre laïques<sup>5</sup>; il s'agissait bel et bien d'un scandale public au cœur même de l'église de Carthage. Se référant à l'Evangile: «*Ideo dico vobis ne solliciti sitis animae vestrae quid manducetis . . . Respicite volatilia caeli . . .* (Mt. VI, 25—34), voilà, disent-ils, où le Seigneur nous ordonne d'être sans inquiétude pour notre nourriture et pour notre habit. Comment donc l'Apôtre pourrait-il être d'un avis contraire à celui du Seigneur, et nous prescrire de nous préoccuper de notre nourriture, de notre boisson, de notre vêtement au point de nous imposer le fardeau des soucis, des travaux, des métiers de l'ouvrier»<sup>6</sup>. Ces moines prétendaient que toute leur vie devait se passer uniquement à prier, à lire les écritures et à endoctriner leurs adeptes<sup>7</sup>. A qui leur reprocherait leur paresse, ils sont prêts à répondre que s'ils ont quitté le monde, ce n'est pas pour y vivre comme s'ils y restaient<sup>8</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Theodoret, *Historia ecclesiastica*, 4, 10, PG 82, 1144.

<sup>2</sup> PG 86, 47.

<sup>3</sup> PG 76, 1076—1077.

<sup>4</sup> *Retractationes*, 2, 47, ed. Knöll, p. 156, 1; *De opere monachorum*, 1, 2, p. 531, 16, et passim.

<sup>5</sup> *Retractationes*, 2, 47, ed. Knöll, p. 156, 4.

<sup>6</sup> *De op. mon.*, 1, 2, p. 533, 4—9.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.* 1, 2, p. 534, 2—7.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, 25, 32, p. 577, 20—23.

Refus de tout travail manuel, fausse conception de la prière continue, nous retrouvons là certains principes de l'hérésie messalienne. Le messalianisme repose sur une compréhension erronée de la nature du péché originel et des conséquences de ce péché. Le démon a comme établi sa demeure en l'homme pécheur et rien d'extérieur à l'homme même ne peut l'en chasser, pas même le baptême. C'est là qu'intervient le rôle unique de la prière et de l'apatheia, où l'homme parvient à chasser le démon et à se sentir uni au Saint-Esprit. On retrouve les différents traits de cette doctrine à travers les notices que nous ont laissées Epiphane, Theodoret, Timothée, Jean Damascène<sup>1</sup>. A s'en tenir au *De opere monachorum*, nos moines de Carthage ne connaissaient du messalianisme que les pratiques; il se pourrait que nous n'ayons affaire qu'à un type déterminé de messaliens. Il faut plutôt, à mon avis, considérer l'ouvrage d'Augustin comme un livre de circonstance et ne pas chercher à interpréter ses silences.

L'Evêque d'Hippone note d'autre part, que ces moines «voulaient vivre des offrandes des personnes pieuses sans rien faire pour produire ou pour acheter le nécessaire<sup>2</sup>, aux fidèles revenait le souci de leur fournir nourriture et vêtements<sup>3</sup>. Or Epiphane disait déjà des messaliens: «Ils mendient comme des gens sans ressources<sup>4</sup>, et à croire Timothée et Jean Damascène, ces hérétiques faisaient une obligation aux fidèles de donner à eux seuls leurs aumônes<sup>5</sup>. Autres rapprochements: ces moines africains, portant la chevelure à la nazaréenne<sup>6</sup>, «hypocrites qui circulent par les provinces, sans aucune mission,

<sup>1</sup> Je ne signale que les références concernant les fausses conceptions de la prière et du travail: Epiphane, *Panarion*, 80, 1, ed. Holl, p. 485, 5; p. 487, 7 sq. à 489, 5; Theodoret, *Historia ecclesiastica*, 4, 10, PG 82, 1144: *Οἱ δὲ τελείαν τὴν νόσον εἰσδεγμένοι, ἀποστρέφονται μὲν τὴν τῶν χειρῶν ἐργασίαν ὡς πονηράν*; Timothée, *De receptione haereticorum*, PG 86, 48—49, capitula 3 et 13; Damascène, *De haeresibus*, PG 94, 732—738.

<sup>2</sup> *Retractationes*, 2, 47, ed. Knöll, p. 155, 20.

<sup>3</sup> *De op. mon.*, 3, 4, p. 535, 24, et passim.

<sup>4</sup> *Panarion*, 80, 3, ed. Holl, p. 487, 15.

<sup>5</sup> Timothée, *De receptione haereticorum*, PG 86, 51, capitulum 15; Damascène, *De haeresibus*, PG 94, 732.

<sup>6</sup> *De op. mon.*, 31, 39, p. 590, 4 sq.; *Retractationes*, 2, 47, Knöll, p. 156, 7.

sans domicile, sans aucun point d'attache ni résidence<sup>1</sup>, avaient eu leurs semblables. En 377, Epiphane trouvait déjà de tels mœurs chez des moines messaliens de Mésopotamie et en appelait aux textes de saint Paul pour les condamner<sup>2</sup>.

Une telle manière de vivre comportait des conséquences morales graves et il n'est guère de défauts que l'on ne trouve chez nos moines de Carthage. Augustine démasque violemment leur «fausse sainteté»<sup>3</sup>, leur paresse<sup>4</sup>, leur orgueil<sup>5</sup>, il les traite d'arrogants<sup>6</sup>, de bavards<sup>7</sup>, de désobéissants<sup>8</sup>, d'hypocrites<sup>9</sup>, de vaniteux<sup>10</sup>, il fustige leur déshonnêteté<sup>11</sup>, leur témérité<sup>12</sup>, leur ignorance<sup>13</sup>. Le tableau est bien chargé; comment pouvait-on se montrer tendre pour ces gens qui n'ont que du mépris pour les bons<sup>14</sup>, «vrais oiseaux du ciel par l'orgueil qui les exalte si fort, mais herbe des champs par leur sentiments charnels»<sup>15</sup>, «affranchis de tout, ils agissent à leur guise»<sup>16</sup>. Voilà pour leur vie morale, mais leur attitude intellectuelle n'est pas moins répréhensible. Ces moines de Carthage ne se sont égarés par

<sup>1</sup> De op. mon., 28, 36, p. 585, 15.

<sup>2</sup> Panarion, 80, 6, ed. Holl, p. 491, 19 sq. — Epiphane dénonce les moines gyrovagues: *Ἀκόλῳτοι δὲ εἰσι*, dans son Panarion, 80, 3, ed. Holl, p. 487, 15.

<sup>3</sup> De op. mon., 19, 22, p. 568, 11—12; 30, 38, p. 589, 13: *Ceterum quis ferat homines contumaces saluberrimis apostoli monitis resistentes, non sicut infirmiores tolerari, sed sicut sanctiores etiam praedicari ut monasteria doctrina saniore fundata gemina inlecebra corrumpantur, et dissoluta licentia vacationis et falso nomine sanctitatis?*; 31, 39, p. 591, 2.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., 3, 4, p. 536, 2; 13, 15, p. 556, 12; 16, 17, p. 561, 20; 19, 22, p. 568, 13; 22, 26, p. 572, 3 et 20; 23, 27, p. 572, 23; 25, 33, p. 579, 21; 30, 38, p. 589, 11.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., 13, 14, p. 555, 10; 22, 25, p. 571, 18.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., 3, 4, p. 536, 3.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., 22, 26, p. 572, 3.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid., 1, 1, p. 531, 8; 17, 20, p. 564, 20; 19, 22, p. 568, 8; 30, 38, p. 589, 11.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid., 28, 36, p. 585, 15; 31, 39, p. 591, 1.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., 31, 39, p. 590, 21.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., 13, 14, p. 555, 11.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., 21, 24, p. 569, 24.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., 19, 22, p. 568, 13.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., 22, 26, p. 572, 12.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., 22, 25, p. 571, 17.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid., 20, 23, p. 569, 14.

méprise, c'est sciemment qu'ils ont choisi l'erreur<sup>1</sup> et qu'ils cherchent à entraîner d'autres avec eux<sup>2</sup>. Hommes mauvais<sup>3</sup>, ils enseignent le faux et l'erreur<sup>4</sup>, ils s'efforcent de s'entourer de ténèbres eux et leurs partisans, dans l'intention de se soustraire aux utiles avertissements de cette charité (celle de s. Paul), et même dans le parti-pris de ne pas les comprendre ou de ne pas les laisser comprendre aux autres: ils ne redoutent pas cette parole de l'Ecriture: «Il n'a pas voulu comprendre pour faire le bien (Ps. 35, 4)»<sup>5</sup>. Ainsi leur perversité intellectuelle<sup>6</sup> est manifeste, et Augustin ne se fait aucune illusion sur l'utilité de ses propres recommandations: «En effet, dit-il, ceux qui ne saisissent pas ces paroles de l'Ecriture, ou font semblant de ne pas les comprendre, comprendront encore moins, ou avoueront encore moins comprendre les miennes; ou peut-être comprendront-ils les miennes plus vite parcequ'il leur est loisible de s'en moquer, même les ayant comprises: ils n'oseraient en faire autant des paroles de l'Apôtre. C'est pourquoi, lorsqu'ils ne peuvent l'interpréter conformément à leur opinion, ils le taxent d'obscurité et d'incertitude là-même où il est clair et limpide, parce qu'ils n'osent l'incriminer ouvertement<sup>7</sup>.»

Le comportement des moines de Carthage tel que nous l'a décrit Augustin n'est pas exempt de tout reproche, tant s'en faut! Il ne suffirait pas cependant pas pour condamner ces derniers comme hérétiques. L'oisiveté, la paresse, l'orgueil, et d'autres défauts leur sont reprochés mais non en désespoir de cause. Malheureusement il y a plus chez nos moines, toute leur attitude morale repose sur le refus de la vérité, sur un mépris formel de l'Ecriture.

Epiphane remarquait déjà que l'erreur messalienne avait pour point de départ une fausse interprétation de l'Ecriture par

<sup>1</sup> Ibid., 19, 22, p. 568, 24.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., 32, 40, p. 593, 1 sq.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., 22, 26, p. 572, 1.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., 22, 26, p. 572, 9.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., 2, 3, p. 535, 16 sq.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid. 23, 30, p. 576, 9: ...isti qui ex evangelio perverso intellectu tam manifesta apostolica praecepta pervertere moluntur...

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., 9, 10, p. 546, 18 sq.



des esprits incultes. Se targuant d'être dans le vrai, ces ignorants ne comprenaient ni les préceptes du Christ concernant le renoncement à soi-même, au monde, aux richesses, ni les exhortations et les exemples de l'Apôtre touchant ces obligations et tout particulièrement le travail des mains. Ils se servaient même de la parole de s. Paul: «*Qui non operatur non manducet*», pour se justifier, l'appliquant aux œuvres spirituelles<sup>1</sup>. De son côté, Augustin reconnaît que le comportement des moines de Carthage repose sur une compréhension erronée de l'Écriture: *ita se ipsi arbitrantur . . .*<sup>2</sup>. C'est plus particulièrement à leur fausse compréhension du même verset paulinien: «*Qui non operatur non manducet*» que l'Evêque d'Hippone s'en prend dans le *De opere monachorum*<sup>3</sup>. Toute la première partie du *De opere monachorum*, soit les divisions I, 1 à XXII, 26, sera consacrée au commentaire de ce verset. Il est surprenant que l'Evêque d'Hippone ne revienne jamais sur ce verset, dans aucun autre de ses écrits. — Voici donc un nouveau rapprochement entre ces hérétiques que dénonce Epiphane et ces moines que combat Augustin; une même exégèse d'un même verset scripturaire fonde un comportement identique. Ce rapprochement et ceux que j'ai déjà signalés ont d'autant plus de valeur que saint Augustin ne paraît pas avoir conscience de lutter à son tour contre une erreur déjà ancienne. Notons aussi que c'est à d'autres textes scripturaire qu'il en appellera dans son *De haeresibus* pour exposer l'hérésie messalienne<sup>4</sup>.

Le grief fondamental qu'Augustin fait à ces moines est donc leur attitude vis à vis de l'Écriture, la «perversité intellectuelle»

<sup>1</sup> Panarion 80, 4, ed. Holl, p. 488, 11 à 489, 7.

<sup>2</sup> De op. mon., 1, 2, p. 534, 10.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., 1, 2, p. 531, 15 sq.

<sup>4</sup> Dans la notice, la 57ème, consacrée à l'hérésie messalienne, Augustin cite les versets de Lc. 18, 1: *Oportet semper orare et non deficere*, et de I Thess., 5, 17: *Sine intermissione orate*, comme point de départ de l'hérésie. Or Epiphane dans son Panarion ne fait aucune allusion à ces versets, mais en cite d'autres dont II Thess., 3, 10 que nous retrouvons utilisés par Augustin dans le *De opere mon.* Nous avons là une preuve de plus pour affirmer que le Panarion n'a pas servi à l'Evêque d'Hippone dans la rédaction de son *De haeresibus*.

qu'ils mettent à ne pas la comprendre<sup>1</sup>. N'osant se moquer des paroles saintes comme ils peuvent le faire de celles de saint Augustin, et hésitant parfois à les interpréter conformément à leur opinion, ils les qualifient d'obscur et d'incertaines, là-même où elles sont claires et limpides<sup>2</sup>. Ceux qui ne les suivent pas sont taxés de traîtres<sup>3</sup>. Leur méthode exégétique se ramène d'une part à interpréter allégoriquement l'Écriture<sup>4</sup>, et l'on n'est pas peu surpris de voir s. Augustin le leur reprocher, et d'autre part à opposer pour les confondre l'Évangile et saint Paul. Au verset paulinien: «*Qui non operatur non manducet*», ils opposent celui de Matthieu: «*Conspicite volatilia caeli . . .*» (VI, 26); aussi toute la dialectique du *De opere monachorum* consistera à dénoncer le jeu de ces faussaires et à montrer qu'il n'y a pas opposition de doctrine entre Paul (II Thess. 3, 10) et les paroles du Seigneur (Mtth. 6, 25—34)<sup>5</sup>. — Les *Retractationes* résument bien cette dialectique augustinienne: contre le précepte de l'Apôtre, nos moines, en refusant de travailler, «prétendent orgueilleusement remplir beaucoup mieux les commandements évangéliques et la parole du Seigneur»<sup>6</sup>. Ajoutons que nos moines ne sont pas tendre à l'égard de saint Paul<sup>7</sup>, ils ne cherchent qu'à rabaisser ses préceptes<sup>8</sup> et se refusent à lui obéir<sup>9</sup>. En définitive, c'est avec des mots durs et sévères qu'Augustin

<sup>1</sup> De op. mon., 23, 30, p. 576, 9; cf. p. 395 note 6.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., 9, 10, p. 546, 22 sq.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., 30, 38, p. 589, 11: *praevaricatores evangelii*.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., 19, 22, p. 567, 21: *Hoc si conati fuerint allegorice interpretari, ostendunt quomodo proficiant in ecclesiasticis litteris quibus se vacare glorianantur*.

<sup>5</sup> A lire le chapitre des *Retractationes* consacré au *De opere monachorum* (*Retract.* 2, 47, Knöll, p. 155—156), il semblerait que l'attitude des moines carthaginois repose seulement sur la fausse interprétation du verset: *Respicite volatilia caeli . . .* Or, Augustin, dans le *De opere monachorum* porte l'essentiel de son argumentation sur le verset paulinien: *Qui non operatur non manducet*, à l'exégèse duquel il consacre les 22 premiers chapitres, et il n'aborde l'interprétation du verset de Matthieu qu'à partir du chapitre 23 jusqu'au chapitre 30.

<sup>6</sup> *Retractationes*, 2, 47, Knöll, p. 156, 2.

<sup>7</sup> De opere mon., 22, 26, p. 572, 2.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid., 7, 8, p. 543, 11; 13, 14, p. 555, 1.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid., 1, 1, p. 531, 8; 17, 20, p. 565, 9.

juge un tel comportement; à ses yeux, les moines de Carthage ne sont que des «*contradicentes*»<sup>1</sup>, des «*contumaces*»<sup>2</sup>, des pervers<sup>3</sup>. Et comment douter que l'Evêque d'Hippone ne s'en prenne pas à des hérétiques lorsqu'il les condamne en ces termes : «*Singulière démente ! . . . A coup sûr, celui qui tient de tels propos (contre l'Apôtre et l'Evangile), se protège contre les oracles les plus clairs de l'Ecriture, en prenant conseil de la malice et de l'impiété; il marche par des voies tortueuses et c'est une doctrine empestée qu'il s'efforce de répandre !*»<sup>4</sup> Augustin ne se fait aucune illusion sur le succès de son intervention, et en écrivant son *De opere monachorum*, son «*principal souci a été d'empêcher que ceux des frères qui sont bons et obéissants aux principes de l'Apôtre, ne soient traités de traîtres à l'Evangile par les paresseux et les désobéissants; puis d'obliger ceux qui ne travaillent pas à reconnaître sans détour la supériorité de ceux qui travaillent*»<sup>5</sup>. L'Evêque a donc bien conscience d'avoir affaire à des réfractaires, à des endurcis, à des pervers. Il s'adresse à eux sans grand espoir, et c'est sur une phrase plutôt pessimiste qu'il termine son traité : «*Si, après cet avis ou plutôt cette prière instante, ils avaient le dessein de persévérer, il ne nous resterait qu'à le regretter et à en gémir. Qu'ils le sachent, cela suffit; si ce sont des serviteurs de Dieu, ils ont pitié de nous; s'ils n'ont pas pitié, je ne veux rien dire de plus sévère*»<sup>6</sup>.

Que conclure de cet examen du *De opere monachorum*, de tous ces rapprochements établis entre le comportement des moines de Carthage au dire d'Augustin et les mœurs des messaliens à en croire tout particulièrement Epiphane? Ce qui apparaît comme certain, c'est l'existence à Carthage de monastères gagnés à l'hérésie messalienne. Je dirai plus. Ces moines pourraient être des moines orientaux par leur origine, venus peut-être de Syrie directement, après les mesures prises contre eux par Flavien d'Antioche. En tout cas il ne peut s'agir de moines

<sup>1</sup> *De opere mon.*, 13, 14, p. 555, 3.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, 30, 38, p. 589, 14.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, 7, 8, p. 543, 13; 17, 20, p. 565, 9.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, 32, 40, p. 592, 3 sq.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, 30, 38, p. 589, 10 sq.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, 33, 41, p. 595, 16.

d'obédience augustinienne, directement ou indirectement, car dans cette hypothèse, ces monastères de Carthage n'auraient en 400 qu'une douzaine d'années au plus, temps trop court à mon sens pour qu'un monastère se soit organisé d'abord dans une bonne voie sous la direction d'Augustin ou d'Aurèle et qu'il ait opté finalement pour une manière de vivre en tout opposée à l'impulsion première. Notons aussi qu'Augustin indique clairement dans les *Retractationes* que c'est dès leur fondation à Carthage que ces monastères affichent des mœurs étranges: *cum apud Carthaginem monasteria esse coepissent, alii se suis manibus transigebant optemperantes Apostolo, alii vero ita ex oblationibus religiosorum vivere volebant ut nihil operantes unde necessaria vel haberent vel supplerent, eo potius implere praeceptum evangelicum existimarent atque iactarent ubi Dominus ait: Respicite volatilia coeli et lilia agri*<sup>1</sup>.

On avait toujours accordé à Augustin la paternité du monachisme en Afrique<sup>2</sup>, je crois que ma démonstration infirme quelque peu cette théorie. Me réservant de fournir d'autres arguments, il me semble possible de dire dès aujourd'hui qu'à côté d'un monachisme d'origine augustinienne, il a existé simultanément en Afrique un monachisme qui se serait inspiré probablement du monachisme oriental.

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<sup>1</sup> *Retractationes*, 2, 47, Knöll, p. 155, 18 sq.

<sup>2</sup> Je ne nommerai que les deux grands historiens du monachisme africain: Dom Besse, dans son étude: *Les moines de l'Afrique romaine*, (Bloud, 1903), et P. Monceaux, dans sa contribution au *Miscellanea agostinia*, vol. 2, p. 61—89: Saint Augustin et saint Antoine.

## Le Monachisme au IV<sup>e</sup> s. en Asie Mineure : de Gangres au Messalianisme

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Aux origines du monachisme en Asie Mineure, Sozomène place Eustathe de Sébaste<sup>1</sup>, dont la doctrine ascétique peut être atteinte, à travers les condamnations du Concile de Gangres, à une date antérieure à presque toute la littérature monastique. Il y a là une source dont on peut tirer un bon parti, à condition de l'éclairer par son contexte vivant, et de l'interpréter en faisant appel aux autres textes issus du même milieu.

Ce Concile de Gangres, à la vérité, se présente à l'historien comme une énigme. Aucun contemporain n'en fait mention, et seuls les Actes officiels nous le font connaître<sup>2</sup>; or, sauf dans un manuscrit syriaque, ils ne comportent pas d'indication

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<sup>1</sup> Histoire ecclésiastique, 3, 14, 31. Eustathe évidemment n'a pas créé *ex nihilo*, il faut comprendre que son influence a profondément marqué sa génération.

<sup>2</sup> Le texte grec peut être trouvé dans toutes les collections conciliaires, qui ne font que réimprimer l'édition princeps de Paul V, Rome 1608; J. B. Pitra, *Iuris ecclesiastici Graecorum Historia et Monumenta*, Rome 1864, pp. 487—492, donne des variantes de quelques mss. V. N. Benešević, *Syntagma XIV Titulorum* I 2, Saint-Petersbourg 1906 (en russe), donne une édition critique d'une des recensions du Concile, mais son texte critique est évidemment choisi en vue de s'harmoniser avec le texte de la vieille version slave qui est en regard, et qui constitue l'élément essentiel du volume; c'est donc dans l'apparat, sous le sigle P (= Patmos 172, début du IX<sup>e</sup> s.), qu'il faut chercher les vraies leçons du *Syntagma* grec. Il faut donc s'aider des anciennes versions, surtout la syriaque A et la *Prisca*; cf. F. Schultheß, *Die syrischen Kanones der Synoden von Nicaea bis Chalcedon* (Abh. der kön. Ges. der Wiss. zu Göttingen, N. F. X 2), Berlin 1908, pp. 51—63; C. H. Turner, *Ecclesiae occidentalis Monumenta, iuris antiquissima*, II 2, Oxford 1913; F. Macler, Une recension arménienne des canons du Concile de Gangres, *Revue des Etudes arméniennes* IX (1929) pp. 73—95; L. Guerrier-S. Grébaud, Les canons du Concile de Gangres (en éthiopien), *Revue de l'Orient Chrétien* XXIII (1922—1923) pp. 303—313. Traduction française avec notes dans C. Hefele—H. Leclercq, *Histoire des Conciles*, I 2, Paris 1907, pp. 1029—1045.

chronologique, et la liste des membres ne précise aucun des sièges épiscopaux. Dès Socrate et Sozomène, les dates proposées diffèrent de vingt ans, et les historiens ne se trouvent d'accord que depuis peu de temps pour rapprocher l'assemblée du Concile de Sardique, et la fixer aux alentours de 341<sup>1</sup>.

Les Actes comprennent une lettre synodale des évêques du Pont, mettant en garde leurs collègues d'Arménie contre l'ascète Eustathe et ses disciples; une liste de 20 canons, reprenant en détail les griefs de la lettre; enfin un épilogue, qui s'efforce de conjurer la mauvaise impression que pouvait laisser cette condamnation de l'ascétisme, en affirmant le respect des Pères pour la virginité, l'anachorèse des affaires mondaines, les offices de dévotion et la libéralité envers les pauvres, à condition que tout ceci s'exerce dans l'humilité, la dignité, la déférence envers l'Eglise et ses traditions.

<sup>1</sup> De la plus ancienne traduction syriaque (A), il ne subsiste malheureusement, au moment voulu, qu'un ms. très récent, copié sans intelligence sur un témoin brouillé et peu lisible. Au texte du Concile, ce ms. ajoute une note avec la date du consulat de Placidus et Romulus (= 343) et l'année 390 de l'ère d'Antioche (= 1 oct. 341—342), cf. Schultheß, l. c., p. 63; pour accorder ces données, l'éditeur propose de lire 391 ou 392 de l'ère d'Antioche. Socrate reportait le Concile après 360, mais Sozomène le place avant 341, et les auteurs ont longtemps hésité, voir Hefele—Leclercq, o. c., p. 1029 n. 1; pour ce qui concerne Eustathe, Sozomène dispose d'informations particulières de réelle valeur. H. M. Gwatkin, *Studies of Arianism*, Cambridge 1882, avait déjà montré que la liste épiscopale s'explique au mieux aux alentours de 340; dans ce cas, pour une assemblée tenue à Gangres, le président est certainement Eusèbe de Nicomédie, lequel disparaît dès la fin de 341. La comparaison avec la littérature basilienne me paraît imposer aussi une date longtemps antérieure à 358, et donc aux alentours de 340; mais il est difficile de concilier exactement toutes les données. E. Schwartz, *Die Kanonesammlungen der alten Kirche*, Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte, Kanonistische Abteilung, XXV (1936) p. 31, admet comme président Eusèbe de Nicomédie; p. 18, il montre que la datation syriaque vient d'un modèle grec, et il estime qu'il faut lui faire confiance, en particulier quant à l'année consulaire; je ne comprends pas comment il peut admettre comme moyen terme « Spätsommer 342 », date qu'excluent l'une et l'autre source. Je tiens pour assurée la présidence d'Eusèbe de Nicomédie, car tous les documents (sauf le slave, et le grec édité de Benešević, mais cf. son apparat) marquent la présidence d'Eusèbe; sauf meilleur avis, je considère la datation syriaque comme un effort (grec) très ancien, et basé sur une bonne tradition, pour préciser indûment et par conjecture.

Ces Actes nous sont parvenus joints à ceux d'Ancyre, de Néocésarée, d'Antioche et de Laodicée, en une petite collection qui a servi de noyau aux premiers recueils canoniques. Cette collection, E. Schwartz a découvert qu'elle fut compilée à Antioche, avant 379, et dans un milieu anti-nicéen<sup>1</sup>. Voilà qui explique le silence des sources catholiques contemporaines ! Dans un tel contexte, il est permis de ne plus guère hésiter à identifier quelques-uns des membres, et notamment le président de l'assemblée, Eusèbe de Nicomédie, le type achevé du prélat de cour impérial.

Aux yeux de ces prélats, les ascètes bouleversent l'ordre public. Sous prétexte d'anachorèse et de chasteté, ils abandonnent conjoint, parents, enfants en bas âge ; les esclaves se soustraient au service de leurs maîtres. Dans le même ordre d'idées, des lois impériales interdiront plus tard aux curiales d'échapper à leurs responsabilités en se retirant dans les monastères<sup>2</sup>. De tout temps, l'abandon des devoirs séculiers sera imputé à crime à la vocation religieuse ; les cas dénoncés ici seraient pourtant particulièrement graves, surtout ce mépris affiché à l'égard du mariage que stigmatisent les Pères.

Le réquisitoire se poursuit par des griefs d'un autre ordre, qui se ramènent à celui d'esprit schismatique. Ceci est plus exceptionnel ; on trouverait pourtant des mouvements analogues, par exemple à la fin du moyen âge, dans le mouvement « spirituel » franciscain, ou plus tard dans les origines de certaines sectes. C'est qu'au milieu du IV<sup>e</sup> s. l'ascétisme n'a pas encore trouvé sa place particulière dans l'Eglise, en élaborant une doctrine du conseil évangélique qui sauvegarde pleinement la situation des séculiers, clercs ou laïcs. Plus ou moins explicitement, le mouvement réformiste prétend s'imposer à tous, et condamne ces accommodements avec le monde que semblait tolérer l'Eglise impériale. Ce n'est pas un hasard que ce soit

<sup>1</sup> E. Schwartz, art. cité dans la note précédente, pp. 33—36. Le même auteur, dans *Über die pseudo-apostolischen Kirchenordnungen*, Strasbourg 1910, pp. 20—27, reconstitue avec beaucoup d'ingéniosité le milieu spirituel des Pères de Gangres.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. notamment l'édit de Valens du 1 janv. 370 (ou 373), *Cod. Theod.* XII, 1, 63.

Eusèbe de Nicomédie qui vienne reprocher à Eustathe de marquer les distances vis à vis du clergé marié, de tenir des conventicules à l'écart, et notamment de fuir ces synaxes des martyrs si chères à la foule; de jeûner selon son caprice, même le dimanche, tout en se moquant des dates prescrites. Certains de ses disciples vont jusqu'à usurper un des droits du clergé, en recueillant les prémices . . .

Quel parti l'historien peut-il tirer de ce dossier?

Il est toujours scabreux de reconstruire une doctrine à partir des censures qui lui sont opposées, surtout lorsque les anathèmes ne portent pas sur des formules rédigées par les condamnés. D'autre part, il est impossible de dire jusqu'où ont pu aller certains ascètes forcenés, qui auraient justement attiré les foudres du Concile. Mais celui-ci, les contemporains eux-mêmes l'ont-ils pris au sérieux? En dépit de tous les avertissements, Eustathe, persévérant dans sa propagande ascétique et resté suspect à beaucoup de bien pensants, sera élu évêque de Sébaste en Arménie; mieux, on verra Basile, homme d'Eglise s'il en fut, se mettre à son école, sans jamais d'effrayer des anathèmes de Gangres.

Pour critiquer les textes conciliaires, il faut les rapprocher de ce que par ailleurs on sait d'Eustathe et de ses disciples. Epiphane par exemple raconte<sup>1</sup> qu'une fois élu évêque, il fonda à Sébaste un hospice, à la tête duquel il plaça son disciple Aère. Ceci est important, car nous y trouvons la preuve qu'avant toute intervention de Basile, l'ascétisme tendait déjà à se régler dans les formes que celui-ci devait encourager. Ces formes pourtant n'étaient pas du goût des extrémistes, et après quelques années de difficultés, à une date que nous ne pouvons préciser, mais qui doit coïncider avec la période d'élaboration de la doctrine basilienne, le chef même de cet hospice, Aère, opta pour une anachorèse plus radicale; il rompit avec Eustathe, que son hospice empêchait de renoncer à tout sur terre, et que son siège épiscopal gonflait d'orgueil. Sur ces deux griefs, où nous retrouvons les tendances condamnées à Gangres, Aère

<sup>1</sup> Epiphane, Panarion Haer. 75 (ed. K. Holl, III, Leipzig 1933, pp. 333—340).



fit schisme et entraîna à sa suite une troupe d'hommes et de femmes loin des habitations, dans les forêts et les neiges.

Un recueil anonyme de 30 homélies syriaques, le *Liber Graduum*<sup>1</sup>, rappelle étrangement Eustathe et Aère. Son but essentiel est de définir, sans entrer en conflit avec l'Eglise terrestre, une moralité ascétique supérieure. C'est le même problème qu'à Gangres; l'auteur le résoud en distinguant plusieurs degrés de vie chrétienne, notamment les deux classes (*gradus*) des justes et des parfaits. Chose grave, les parfaits n'ont pas à observer les commandements donnés aux justes. Ces derniers doivent nourrir les affamés, vêtir ceux qui sont nus; les parfaits doivent renoncer à tous leurs biens (y compris les hospices, *Hom.* 3, §§ 6 et 7; *Hom.* 8; *Hom.* 25, § 5), et sacrifier, comme les Apôtres, le service des tables pour se consacrer au ministère spirituel. La vraie charité, le grand don du Paraclet, est réservée aux parfaits. Aux justes est concédé le royaume, mais non la vision de Dieu: il y a différentes demeures dans la maison du Père. L'auteur fait son possible pour éviter le schisme, il est aussi tolérant que possible pour l'Eglise terrestre, qui est l'image de celle d'en-haut. Malgré tous ces efforts, il est visiblement suspect aux «justes», qui ont l'habitude de persécuter les parfaits.

De tous les disciples d'Eustathe, celui dont nous connaissons le mieux la pensée, c'est évidemment saint Basile; si personnel qu'il puisse être devenu, il n'a jamais nié une dépendance<sup>2</sup> dont les traces apparaissent à qui sait lire.

Relevons quelques cas concrets. Les ascètes sont accusés à Gangres de séparer les époux et de condamner le mariage. Cette critique du mariage, sous quelle forme se présentait-elle? Le Concile n'en dit rien, et les termes vagues qu'il emploie

<sup>1</sup> Ed. M. Kmosko, *Patrologia Syriaca* III, Paris 1926; notre résumé reprend les idées essentielles des homélies, de multiples références seraient nécessaires, mais constitueraient un travail indépendant; renvoyons simplement à l'analyse de Kmosko, §§ 36—37, pp. CVII—CIX.

<sup>2</sup> L'influence d'Eustathe sur Basile a été solidement établie par D. Amand de Mendieta, *L'Ascèse monastique de saint Basile. Essai historique*, Maredsous 1948, pp. 52—61 (notamment p. 54); les influences familiales, attestées par Grégoire de Nysse, n'y font pas difficulté; elles ont servi d'intermédiaire, et, en partie, de filtre.

peuvent très bien forcer la note. Mais quant aux familles divisées, si rien ne s'était passé, l'ire des évêques serait-elle explicable? Lisons maintenant Basile<sup>1</sup>. Sans mettre en question la légitimité du mariage, il accepte qu'un époux aspire à «ce genre de vie». Selon l'Épître aux Corinthiens, il demande le consentement du conjoint (sans remarquer pourtant que saint Paul ne recommandait qu'une séparation temporaire); mais que ce conjoint ose refuser, on le juge peu soucieux de plaire à Dieu, et «c'est le moment de se souvenir de ce qui est écrit (à propos d'un conjoint païen, endurci et intraitable), que Dieu nous a appelés à la paix». Si d'ailleurs on ne hait son père, sa mère, sa femme, on n'est pas digne du Seigneur, car «il ne faut rien préférer à l'obéissance à Dieu». Souvent et dans de nombreux cas, conclut Basile, montrant par là que cette discussion est loin d'être purement académique, nous avons vu une prière incessante et un jeûne prolongé obtenir qu'au conjoint récalcitrant, Dieu envoie jusqu'à une maladie, pour mater sa désobéissance et faire triompher la décision droite. En quoi ce disciple d'Eustathe s'est-il corrigé depuis Gangres?

Voici maintenant un postulant esclave<sup>2</sup>. En principe il faut le renvoyer à son maître, comme Onésime à Philémon; au cas pourtant où le maître ordonnerait le péché, il y aurait deux solutions: décider l'esclave à supporter les mauvais traitements avec fidélité et patience, ou accepter sa pétition, en se résignant à en subir soi-même les conséquences. La solution est plus nuancée que l'émancipation blâmée à Gangres, mais le droit du maître n'est plus tenu pour absolu.

Que faire si un ascète est poursuivi par l'impôt?<sup>3</sup> Avant d'entrer, qu'il rende à César ce qui est à César; mais ensuite, s'il a laissé ses biens aux siens, «il n'a pas à tergiverser, pas plus que ceux qui l'ont accepté»: formule volontairement imprécise, qui pouvait ne pas plaire au percepteur! D'ailleurs Basile admire Matthieu<sup>4</sup> qui n'a pas hésité à suivre le Seigneur, au

<sup>1</sup> Je cite les 55 GR (Grandes Règles) et 313 PR (Petites Règles) des éditions; je traduis ici la GR 12.

<sup>2</sup> GR 11.

<sup>3</sup> PR 94.

<sup>4</sup> GR 8, PG 31, 936 C.

risque de perdre son gain, et surtout de courir, lui et ses parents, les peines de ceux qui abandonnent leur poste. Ce n'est pas là jeu gratuit d'imagination; des cas analogues devaient se présenter, où le respect de la loi n'avait pas le dernier mot.

En tout ceci, les principes sont saufs, en ce sens qu'on n'a pas lieu de soupçonner la moindre spéculation gnostique sur l'impureté foncière de la création. Parlant d'abstinence<sup>1</sup>, Basile prend bien soin de se distinguer «des ennemis de Dieu, qui refusent d'admettre que tout a été créé à l'usage des fidèles»; et c'est dit sur un ton qui laisse supposer un auditoire en plein accord. A la vérité, lorsqu'il est question de la meilleure façon de disposer des richesses<sup>2</sup>, il faut insister à plusieurs reprises pour faire admettre l'idée qu'il faut les consacrer à Dieu, non les rejeter avec indifférence ou mépris, et nous devinons la résistance d'un parti plus radical dans son renoncement; mais pour qu'on puisse parler de consécration à Dieu des biens terrestres, il faut que soit absente toute idée de dualisme. Il est fort probable qu'à Gangres déjà, l'ascétisme eustathien n'impliquait aucune hérésie doctrinale, mais prenait simplement très au sérieux, comme devait le faire Basile, l'abnégation imposée par le Christ.

Passons au grief d'esprit schismatique, plus caractéristique encore des anathèmes de Gangres. La lettre synodale déplore une anachorèse qui va jusqu'à abandonner les «maisons de Dieu», qui méprise l'Eglise et «ce qui s'y exerce», qui tient à part ses synaxes privées et ses didascalies. Les canons 5 et 6 y reviennent; voici ce dernier: Si quelqu'un rassemble en particulier sa petite église en dehors de l'Eglise, et, méprisant l'Eglise, veut accomplir les choses de l'Eglise, sans la présence du prêtre agréé par l'évêque, qu'il soit anathème. Or que lisons-nous chez Basile? Les frères lui demandent<sup>3</sup> s'il est permis de faire l'offrande dans une maison particulière, et il le permet

<sup>1</sup> GR 18; intéressantes variantes sur ce texte, dans mon Histoire du texte des Ascétiques de saint Basile (Bibliothèque du Muséon, 32), Louvain 1953, p. 229.

<sup>2</sup> GR 9, cf. PR 92, 93, 143 et 144 et Règles Morales 39; sur l'évolution de Basile à cet égard, cf. mon Histoire du texte ..., p. 246.

<sup>3</sup> PR 310.

en cas de nécessité. Les frères demandent encore<sup>1</sup> : Est-ce au seul prêtre qu'il est dit : Si tu portes ton don à l'autel, et que tu te souviennes etc., ou bien est-ce dit à tous ? Et comment chacun de nous porte-t-il son don à l'autel ? La réponse explique que faire l'offrande, c'est *ἐξαργύτως* et *πρωτοτύπως* l'affaire des prêtres, quoique en un sens tous doivent offrir leur corps en hostie vivante et sainte.

Les Pères de Gangres s'étaient particulièrement scandalisés de voir les Eustathiens s'abstenir des synaxes des martyrs. Ces synaxes, Basile est loin de les mépriser ; à leur occasion il réunira ses collègues dans l'épiscopat, il prononcera des homélies ; mais aux ascètes il recommande une grande réserve<sup>2</sup>, par respect justement pour les martyrs, et parce que d'un lieu de prière la foule fait un centre d'affaires et de plaisirs.

En somme, si les conflits avec le clergé ont perdu beaucoup de leur acuité, parce que l'évêque Basile et ses collaborateurs sont favorables à la propagande ascétique, l'écho des problèmes de Gangres n'est pas totalement éteint.

Ces observations de détail nous autorisent à chercher dans la même perspective l'explication des grandes lignes de l'activité réformatrice de Basile. Lorsqu'à son retour d'Athènes, vers 356, celui-ci se décida à renoncer à une carrière de rhéteur, à rejoindre sa famille dans la propriété de campagne où elle vivait retirée, et à adopter son style de vie ascétique, il eut une conscience si vive des problèmes qui divisaient les esprits, et se trouva un moment si désorienté, qu'il crut devoir entreprendre un long voyage d'étude à travers la Syrie et l'Égypte monastiques, et prendre conseil de l'expérience d'autrui. Peu satisfait de cette enquête, il se tourna vers le Nouveau Testament, y releva plus de 1500 versets et les classa dans ses *Règles Morales*, ouvrage à première vue impersonnel et objectif, mais que l'on peut utiliser, je le montrerai jeudi<sup>3</sup>, pour faire le point de l'ascèse eustathienne et de sa problématique vers 360.

<sup>1</sup> PR 265.

<sup>2</sup> GR 40.

<sup>3</sup> Voir plus bas, pp. 416—426 : Les Règles Morales de saint Basile et le Nouveau Testament.

Passons donc aussitôt à la grande œuvre de Basile, que nos éditions appellent *Grandes et Petites Règles*, mais à qui il conviendrait de réserver le titre authentique d'Ascéticon<sup>1</sup>, car pour son auteur la seule Règle autorisée est la Parole de Dieu, le Nouveau Testament, ou le traité des *Règles Morales* qui en résume les prescriptions. Cet Ascéticon, il serait imprudent de l'interpréter uniquement par lui-même, comme on pourrait le faire pour les Règles de Pachôme ou de Benoît; car Basile n'a pas vécu abbé d'un monastère, il n'a pas élaboré à l'usage de ses religieux une doctrine ou un code complet en lui-même; il suppose connues bien des choses, il s'abstient même soigneusement d'insister sur un certain idéal de virginité ou de pauvreté, qui lui tient fort à cœur et qu'il recommanderait à des profanes, mais qui serait ici susceptible de déclencher un enthousiasme excessif, et d'augmenter la tension avec la communauté ecclésiastique.

Nous ne manquons pas de détails pour nous représenter le *Sitz im Leben* de l'Ascéticon<sup>2</sup>. Basile est un maître respecté, déjà évêque sans doute; il circule dans les villages, et pendant la journée il a catéchisé l'ensemble de la population. A la fin de la prière nocturne, il reprend la parole devant un groupe choisi; tout est sombre encore, l'heure est propice à un entretien où chacun interroge en toute simplicité. On commente l'Écriture, on résoud au jour le jour des doutes et des difficultés d'organisation, et une réforme se propage discrètement parmi ces ascètes, qui jusqu'alors avaient subi surtout l'influence d'Eustathe. Plus de 300 «Petites Règles» rapportent au naturel ces dialogues improvisés, tandis que les premières pages de la collection, correspondant à peu près à nos «Grandes Règles», se présentent refondues par l'auteur, et constituent un exposé systématique des principes fondamentaux de l'ascèse chrétienne. On ne s'étonnera pas si les questions posées, mieux encore que les réponses, rappellent de temps en temps les perspectives condamnées à Gangres.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. mon Histoire du texte (supra, p. 406, n. 1), pp. 292—293.

<sup>2</sup> Voir surtout la forme la plus ancienne du Prologue, dans mon Histoire du texte, p. 240; autres sources ibid., pp. 255—256.

Basile a donné plusieurs éditions successives de cet Ascéticon. La plus ancienne, qui a survécu en latin et en syriaque, est de moitié plus courte que le texte définitif. La comparaison de ces éléments primitifs et des remaniement ultérieurs permet d'établir une chronologie relative des idées et des institutions, et de reconnaître une évolution dans le sens d'une organisation de plus en plus ferme et distincte<sup>1</sup>. Jamais pourtant, dans cet écrit qui ne s'adresse qu'aux ascètes, Basile ne les désigne du nom de moines, ne les considère comme un groupe distinct dans l'Eglise, caractérisé notamment par un engagement à la chasteté. Ce phénomène monastique, Basile ne l'ignore pas, il doit bien l'accepter lorsque dans sa correspondance il parle en évêque et s'adresse à des étrangers<sup>2</sup>. Mais dans l'Ascéticon, il ne veut considérer ses interlocuteurs qu'en tant que chrétiens, qui veulent vivre selon l'Evangile<sup>3</sup>. Il estime sans doute que c'est la meilleure tactique pour leur mettre en tête une notion équilibrée de leurs devoirs, ne pas les laisser s'attacher avec complaisance à tel ou tel renoncement, en négligeant des devoirs obscurs et mortifiants : l'obéissance, le travail persévérant au service de la communauté et des pauvres, le sacrifice des libres pérégrinations, la prudence dans les rapports avec les sœurs.

Mais c'est plus qu'une manœuvre tactique pour apaiser les conflits ; ce comportement de Basile répond à une conviction intime : la bonne nouvelle du Christianisme, le don de soi-même dans la charité, sont des valeurs autrement décisives qu'aucune pratique austère, si exaltante qu'elle puisse paraître. Ce n'est peut-être que malgré lui et sans vouloir trop tôt se l'avouer que Basile en vint à constituer des maisons religieuses, au lieu d'Eglises saintes et fidèles. Rien d'étonnant dès lors si l'horizon de l'Ascéticon se limite autant que possible à la communauté,

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<sup>1</sup> Dans mon Histoire du texte, le chapitre XIX, pp. 237—254, donne une description du Petit Ascéticon et le compare rapidement à l'évolution ultérieure.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. ep. 199, can. 19.

<sup>3</sup> Voir mon Histoire du texte, pp. 187, 307.

conçue comme l'Eglise locale<sup>1</sup>, dont il n'y a pas lieu de définir les relations avec une plus large paroisse séculière. Et du fait qu'il est lui-même évêque, Basile n'a pas à parler d'une hiérarchie extérieure. S'il fait allusion au sacerdoce, c'est à propos des devoirs et des droits de ces membres «responsables de la parole de Dieu»<sup>2</sup>. Le meilleur moyen de réduire le schisme était évidemment soit d'enrôler les prêtres parmi les ascètes, soit de recruter le clergé parmi ces derniers. De cette façon, l'attachement indiscuté à l'Eglise a corrigé une tendance à ce que l'on pourrait appeler du Congrégationnalisme.

Il ne faut naturellement pas insister exagérément sur cet aspect «sectaire» de l'ascétisme d'Eustathe et de Basile. Peut-être, dans le but de me faire comprendre, ai-je déjà été trop loin; la théorie chez eux n'est pas élaborée, ni poussée jusqu'à l'absurde de ses extrêmes conséquences. Ce qu'on peut affirmer, c'est que Basile a délibérément écarté la doctrine de deux degrés de vie chrétienne, telle que la conçoit le *Liber Graduum*: il n'est pas question chez lui d'une masse de justes, dispensés de l'obligation à la charité parfaite et au renoncement total, et d'une élite de parfaits, libres de discerner les commandements qui leur importent. Réagissant en face d'une telle doctrine, il va jusqu'à soutenir l'égalité des fautes et l'inclusion de tous les commandements dans celui de la charité; on peut blâmer ici une terminologie stoïcienne, mais ce rigorisme doit se comprendre dans son contexte historique.

Dans quelle mesure Basile concède-t-il que le christianisme est possible en dehors des fraternités? Averti du problème, et

<sup>1</sup> Partout la fraternité est conçue comme le corps du Christ, par ex. GR 7 § 2, GR 24 sqq. Une des formules les plus fortes se trouve PR 85: Posséder quelque chose en propre est contraire au texte des Actes qui dit des croyants: Aucun ne jugeait sien ce qui lui appartenait. Celui donc qui dit sien quelque chose se rend étranger à l'Eglise de Dieu... C'est cette conception qui explique pourquoi Basile réproche tout abandon de la communauté par un individu, GR 36, et refuse d'admettre plusieurs communautés au même endroit, GR 35.

<sup>2</sup> Les textes sont cités et commentés par W. K. L. Clarke, *The Ascetic Works of Saint Basil*, Londres 1925, pp. 39—52; il n'est ni certain ni même probable que dans tous les cas Basile songe à des prêtres, et il insiste sur le charisme bien plus que sur l'ordination, mais il n'est pas dit qu'il n'ait pas supposé quelque lien entre ces deux grâces.

soucieux d'une terminologie correcte, il proclame sans hésiter, à la suite du Seigneur, qu'il est impossible, *ἀδύνατον*, d'arriver au Royaume céleste, si on ne renonce à l'argent, à la gloire, à tout ce que les hommes recherchent avidement; qu'il est impossible que, distrait par des soucis disparates, l'esprit parvienne à son but, et serve deux maîtres à la fois<sup>1</sup>. Basile va plus loin: il est pour lui impossible d'accomplir le précepte de la charité, si les pensées divaguent sans contrôle<sup>2</sup>, impossible de régler sa conduite, sans s'appliquer continuellement à connaître et à suivre la volonté de Dieu<sup>3</sup>. Mais quand on passe aux modalités pratiques qui découlent de ces prémisses, et qui concernent la vie retirée et la solitude, la formule change<sup>4</sup>: une telle condition n'est plus indispensable, mais utile, *συντελεῖ*; car oublier ses habitudes relâchées et renoncer à ses volontés tout en vivant dans un milieu indifférent, c'est «très difficile, pour ne pas dire impossible», *δυσκολώτατον, ἵνα μὴ λέγω ὅτι παντελῶς ἀνεπίδεκτον*<sup>5</sup>: restriction propre au texte, très calculé, de la Grande Règle 6. Une telle prudence est exceptionnelle; un peu plus haut, dans le même contexte, un remaniement plus tardif, peut-être fait rapidement, y va plus franchement: vouloir atteindre à la méditation et à la prière au milieu des distractions et des affaires du monde, c'est impraticable, *ἀμύχανον*<sup>6</sup>; de même la Petite Règle 263 répond à l'improvisiste et presque brutalement qu'il est impossible de plaire à Dieu dans un état qui continuellement distrait l'âme. Ainsi, lorsqu'il est sur ses gardes, Basile sait distinguer les rigoureuses exigences de la charité et du renoncement prescrit par l'Evangile, et les modalités moins absolues de réalisation concrète. Soulignons-le d'ailleurs: jamais il n'est porté à mépriser ni à condamner les chrétiens qui n'adhèrent pas aux fraternités; et c'est bien là le point délicat où son ascétisme aurait couru le risque de s'opposer à l'Evangile.

<sup>1</sup> GR 8, PG 31, 940 A 1 et A 7.

<sup>2</sup> GR 5, début.

<sup>3</sup> GR 5 § 3.

<sup>4</sup> GR 6 début, 925 A 4.

<sup>5</sup> GR 6, 925 C 9.

<sup>6</sup> GR 6, 925 C 2.



Le temps manque pour descendre dans tous les détails; voyons du moins quelle est sa pensée, dans la première rédaction de l'Ascéticon, au sujet de trois points où l'Eglise par la suite verra des conseils, et dont elle fera les vœux caractéristiques de l'état religieux.

J'ai étudié longuement ailleurs sa conception de l'obéissance<sup>1</sup>. Celle-ci n'est aucunement conçue comme un engagement facultatif et méritoire, par lequel on soumet sa volonté aux libres décisions d'un supérieur religieux. Il s'agit essentiellement d'une obéissance totale aux commandements de Dieu, connus par l'Ecriture, déterminée dans le détail par le service inconditionné des frères; cette obéissance s'impose à tout chrétien. La pauvreté consiste à consacrer ses biens aux œuvres pies, y compris, et en premier lieu, l'entretien modeste de la communauté; elle n'implique pas un moment de renonciation juridique, soit au domaine, soit à l'administration de ces biens<sup>2</sup>, de sorte que la situation de l'ascète ne se distingue pas de celle du chrétien, pour qui les Homélies de Basile se montrent extrêmement exigeantes au point de vue de l'usage communautaire de la propriété. Reste la chasteté: Basile sait que la virginité est un grand bien, non obligatoire cependant<sup>3</sup>; son auditoire en est d'ailleurs si convaincu, qu'il suffit dans l'Ascéticon de supposer acquis le célibat, sans insister sur ce point délicat, où il n'eût guère été possible de se dissimuler la constitution d'un groupe d'élite, distinct de l'ensemble de l'Eglise. Encore est-il qu'avec les monastères doubles, des époux renonçant au mariage ne devaient pas affronter un changement aussi radical que celui qui les attendrait aujourd'hui; il suffit de se rappeler la retraite de Basile lui-même, dans sa propriété d'Annessi, en face de la maison où sa mère et sa sœur menaient la vie

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<sup>1</sup> J. Gribomont, *Obéissance et Evangile selon saint Basile le Grand*, dans: *La Vie spirituelle*. Supplément 21, 1952, pp. 192—215.

<sup>2</sup> GR 9, dans sa forme primitive; voir plus haut, p. 406, note 2.

<sup>3</sup> Règles Morales 70 § 8, où le sujet est abordé très indirectement, à propos des cas où les responsables de la parole de Dieu doivent exhorter, sans donner d'ordres. Quant à l'Ascéticon, il ne touche même pas le sujet.

d'ascèse avec leur domesticité : cela n'apparaissait pas si différent d'une simple vie dévote.

A cette époque, en somme, les ascètes ne sont guère plus distincts de la communauté ecclésiastique que ne le sont aujourd'hui, dans la paroisse, les membres de l'Action Catholique ; la coupure d'avec les chrétiens ordinaires est réelle plus que juridique, ce qui veut dire qu'elle est susceptible de bien des nuances, ainsi que nous le constatons à propos de chaque personnalité mieux connue, Grégoire de Nazianze, Grégoire de Nysse, Amphiloque d'Iconium. Avec le temps, et dès la dernière édition de l'Ascéticon, les institutions se précisent, la matière des vœux se dégage au contact de l'expérience<sup>1</sup>, sans que change pourtant le point de vue doctrinal de Basile. Dans la première édition de l'Ascéticon, bien rares sont encore les traits qui distinguent les auditeurs : ils ont la possibilité d'interroger en privé sur la Parole de Dieu<sup>2</sup> ; ils ne sont plus des enfants dans l'ordre spirituel, il n'est donc plus nécessaire d'insister sur la crainte de Dieu<sup>3</sup> ; ils montrent un zèle particulier, *σπουδή*<sup>4</sup>. C'est à peu près tout.

Avec de légères réserves, nous pouvons donc maintenir notre conclusion : Basile rejette tout vocabulaire proprement monastique, parce qu'il ne veut considérer ses frères en ascétisme que comme des chrétiens logiques avec eux-mêmes, et n'est pas capable d'introduire dans son système, ou du moins d'y généraliser, l'idée de conseil évangélique. Ceci s'explique comme une réaction, historiquement saine et bienfaisante, en face d'une tendance ascétique sectaire ; ce n'est encore qu'un équilibre instable, qui n'ose pas prendre une conscience nette de sa propre originalité ; mais tel quel, ce dynamisme s'impose comme un grand moment de la tradition ascétique chrétienne. Il fut une source d'inspiration pour le monachisme byzantin, une contribution capitale à l'élaboration de la synthèse bénédictine ;

<sup>1</sup> Voir mon Histoire du texte, pp. 236—254.

<sup>2</sup> Prologue de la première édition = PG 31, 1080 A.

<sup>3</sup> GR 4.

<sup>4</sup> Souvent, par ex. GR 2 (908 C 11), GR 5 § 3 (921 C 10, C 22), GR 7 § 1 (929 B 9), GR 9 (944 B 13) ...

il reste un idéal évangélique auquel chrétiens d'Orient et d'Occident se mesureront encore avantageusement dans l'avenir.

Pour finir, touchons un mot de l'état des choses à la mort de Basile. Tant qu'il fut présent, l'évêque de Césarée maintint dans l'orbite de l'Eglise le mouvement ascétique soumis à son influence; les remaniements apportés à l'Ascéticon ne trahissent pas une situation particulièrement tendue. Pourtant, dès 375, à son disciple Amphiloque d'Iconium, il indique les mesures à prendre contre les sectes ascétiques dissidentes, Encratites, Saccophores, Hydroparastates<sup>1</sup>; et après sa disparition, c'est ce même Amphiloque qui prend aussitôt la tête du combat contre ces sectes, alors en regain de vitalité: en 382, il obtient de Théodose leur condamnation<sup>2</sup>. Peu après, c'est lui encore<sup>3</sup> qui rassemble à Side un concile qui démasque et condamne les Messaliens, groupe si important dans l'histoire de la spiritualité orientale.

C'est sur ces Messaliens que je voudrais conclure, en les présentant comme des héritiers d'Eustathe. A vrai dire, on les voit condamner d'abord au Sud et à l'Est de Césarée, ce qui ne semble pas les relier aux ascètes dont nous parlions jusqu'ici; mais le fait peut s'expliquer par l'influence modératrice du grand évêque qui a retardé la crise en Cappadoce. Le prêtre Timothée de Constantinople, notre meilleur témoin des Actes de Side, leur donne entre autres le nom d'Eustathiens<sup>4</sup>, titre vite oublié dans la suite, à mesure que le souvenir d'Eustathe

<sup>1</sup> Ep. 199, can. 47.

<sup>2</sup> Cod. Theodos. XVI, 5, 7. Le rapport de cet édit avec la lettre de Basile et l'activité d'Amphiloque a été signalé par K. Holl, *Amphilochius von Ikonium in seinem Verhältnis zu den großen Kappadoziern*, Tübingen 1904, pp. 35—38; ces pages ont déjà noté les liens de ces mouvements ascétiques et du messalianisme.

<sup>3</sup> Il est vrai que l'ép. 82 de Cyrille d'Alexandrie (PG 77, 376) adresse à un Amphiloque de Side des avertissements au sujet des Messaliens; mais les Actes du Synode de Side, décrits par Photius, utilisés par Théodoret et Timothée de Constantinople, nomment explicitement comme président de l'assemblée Amphiloque d'Iconium, cf. les textes rassemblés par M. Kmosko dans sa préface à l'édition du *Liber Graduum*, *Patrologia Syriaca* III, Paris 1926, p. CCLIII, n° XXI § 1; p. CXCI, lignes 28—29; p. CCI, ligne 13; p. CCXXII, ligne 9.

<sup>4</sup> Voir Kmosko, o. c., p. CCXXI, n° XIV, ligne 3.

pâlit devant celui des chefs contemporains. Jean Damascène rapproche la doctrine messalienne de celle des Ariens, ou, selon une heureuse conjecture de Le Quien, des Aériens, ces disciples extrémistes d'Eustathe<sup>1</sup>. Ailleurs le même auteur utilise contre eux des traits repris au Concile de Gangres<sup>2</sup>. Un des leaders de la secte, Lampetius, est connu pour être d'origine cappadocienne<sup>3</sup>. A ces témoignages externes s'ajoutent des indices non équivoques de relations entre Messaliens et disciples de Basile. Un manuscrit de l'Ascéticon, qui au V<sup>e</sup> s. se trouvait dans les monastères du Pont, contient, interpolée, une des homélies du Pseudo-Macaire<sup>4</sup>. Il y a des similitudes de genre littéraire et de problématique, voire des citations de Basile dans l'Ascéticon messalien<sup>5</sup>, sans parler du *Liber Graduum* cité plus haut, dont la parenté avec le Messalianisme a depuis longtemps été établie.

Dès que l'édition critique de Syméon de Mésopotamie, promise par Klostermann et Dörries, aura paru, il y aura lieu de suivre de plus près toutes ces pistes. Elles aideront à comprendre davantage encore dans son contexte historique l'œuvre basilienne, et montreront sans doute que les courants spirituels basilien et messalien, si importants par eux-mêmes et dans leur avenir, ont beaucoup en commun, explicitement et implicitement, même, s'ils se trouvent sur certains points en opposition directe<sup>6</sup>; et c'est là une perspective assez nouvelle dans l'histoire de la spiritualité orientale.

<sup>1</sup> Voir Kmosko, o. c., p. CCXLII, ligne 6.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. CCXXXVIII, §§ 11—13.

<sup>3</sup> Notice de Photius, dans Kmosko, o. c., p. CCLVIII, § 5.

<sup>4</sup> Voir mon Histoire du texte, pp. 159 et 299.

<sup>5</sup> H. Dörries, Symeon von Mesopotamien. Die Überlieferung der messalianischen „Makarios“-Schriften (Texte und Untersuchungen, LV, 1), Leipzig 1941, p. 289, n. 1, pp. 451—454, etc., a attiré l'attention sur ces parentés entre l'Ascéticon de Basile et les Homélies messaliennes, et sur l'utilisation du premier par les secondes.

<sup>6</sup> Le Messalianisme a été rapproché des Eustathiens condamnés à Gangres par E. Peterson, Die Häretiker der Philippus-Akten, Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft XXI (1932) pp. 97—111, et Zum Messalianismus der Philippus-Akten, Oriens Christianus XXIX (1932) pp. 172—179.

## Les Règles Morales de saint Basile et le Nouveau Testament

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Le premier ouvrage de Basile, les *Règles Morales*<sup>1</sup>, composé vers 360 dans les débuts de sa retraite aux bords de l'Iris, se borne à enchaîner des textes scripturaires; en dehors du Prologue, la main de l'auteur ne se manifeste qu'en de brèves rubri-

<sup>1</sup> Note Critique. Un bon nombre de mss. des œuvres ascétiques de Basile ont laissé tomber les Règles Morales, trop archaïques et élémentaires pour intéresser beaucoup un monachisme évolué. En fait, les Morales ne sont connues que dans deux formes du Corpus ascétique, la Vulgate (V) et la Studite (S); cf. mon Histoire du texte des Ascétiques de saint Basile (Bibliothèque du Muséon, 32), Louvain 1953. Or dans l'ancienne version arménienne, qui représente l'ancêtre Césaréen du Corpus studite, on ne trouve que l'Ascéticon et ses prologues, sans les Morales; et l'on constate que, dans la mesure où il est actuellement possible d'en juger, le texte S des Morales et de leurs prologues est très inférieur au texte V, et ne présente pas du tout la même qualité que le texte S de l'Ascéticon: j'estime qu'il est puisé à une source différente (dès avant le IX<sup>e</sup> s.) qui pourrait fort bien être une tradition V contaminée.

Quant à cette tradition V, elle ne dérive pas directement du texte des Morales édité par Basile vers 360, mais d'une copie que Basile lui-même joignit, vers la fin de sa vie, à l'Ascéticon (mon Histoire du texte, p. 301); il avait alors remanié le prologue des Morales, y introduisant les §§ 1—5 de notre De fide (mon Histoire, p. 288) et ajoutant en tête une nouvelle Introduction générale (mon Histoire, pp. 278—287); avait-il retouché les Morales elles-mêmes? Jusqu'ici, je n'ai rien remarqué qui le suggère.

La tradition S, qui connaît le De fide et l'Introduction générale, dépend certainement de cette réédition tardive, et non du texte de 360, qui est perdu.

Le texte imprimé des Morales représente malheureusement la recension S. En note, les Mauristes ont donné les variantes d'un ms. de Messine et du Regius III (= Messine Bibl. Univ. 24 et Paris B. N. grec 964), deux témoins V des XII<sup>e</sup> et XI<sup>e</sup> s. Les meilleurs témoins sont à mon avis les Vatican gr. 428 et 413, que j'ai étudiés de près; j'ai comparé aussi un certain nombre de mss.: Vatican gr. 425 et 431, Paris gr. 504, Paris Coislin 46, Venise Marc. 65 et 63, Leyde gr. 1, Vatopédi 61 (ce ms. dépend ici de la famille S); ces mss. sont décrits dans mon Histoire du texte.

ques qui résument et classent les citations. Cette apparence impersonnelle rebute les historiens, qui ne prennent guère la peine d'interroger ce fichier. Lorsque pourtant, après s'être familiarisé avec les œuvres de la maturité de Basile, on s'attarde à feuilleter ses *Morales*, on y découvre en germe toute la substance de son message: le choix des citations, leur ordonnance, leur interprétation, vus dans leur rapport avec la situation concrète et l'évolution ultérieure, sont singulièrement révélateurs des problèmes qui dès sa conversion agitaient le jeune solitaire. Il est déjà l'homme d'Eglise, soucieux d'apaiser les tensions, mais dans une exigeante fidélité à l'Evangile; il corrige les outrances et les passions du radicalisme ascétique aussi bien que les affadissements et l'esprit du monde; déjà aussi il est l'homme des grands principes, casuiste médiocre, trop peu attentif aux contingences de temps et de personnes.

Pour commencer, il faut répondre à la seule question que les auteurs posent au sujet des *Morales*: l'ouvrage s'adresse-t-il aux moines, ou à tous les chrétiens? D'une part, l'accent est mis sur l'ascèse et les exigences du renoncement; mais de l'autre, l'auteur se borne à résumer la morale évangélique. Répondons que l'alternative est mal posée: comme je l'ai plus longuement exposé dans un rapport mardi dernier<sup>1</sup>, les ascètes auxquels s'est rallié Basile ne se présentent pas comme un ordre religieux qui ne demande que sa petite place dans l'Eglise, mais comme un mouvement de réforme qui prétend imposer ses vues, plus ou moins totalement, à l'ensemble des chrétiens; s'ils ne condamnent pas formellement le mariage ou la richesse, ils proclament du moins sur un tel ton la continence et l'apotaxis, que l'ordre familial et civil est ébranlé, tandis que le clergé réfractaire à leur enthousiasme se sent méprisé et réagit par des Conciles et des censures. En se ralliant aux austères disciples d'Eustathe, le jeune Basile n'ignorait pas qu'il encourait l'hostilité militante de myriades de bien pensants<sup>2</sup>, y compris un bon

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<sup>1</sup> Voir plus haut, pp. 400—415: Le Monachisme au IV<sup>e</sup>s. en Asie Mineure: de Gangres au Messalianisme. Les preuves et les nuances qui manquent au présent résumé ont été apportées là.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Basile, ep. 244 § 1.

nombre d'évêques; bien pis, parmi ses frères en ascétisme eux-mêmes il trouvait la plus complète confusion: une aile radicale et intransigeante était prête à condamner la modération du vieux maître Eustathe, à passer à la dissidence et l'excentricité. Plus tard un autre parti engendrera la secte messalienne. C'est dans ces conditions qu'après un voyage d'information à travers la Syrie et l'Egypte monastiques, le jeune novice, décidé à s'appuyer coûte que coûte sur les bases infaillibles de la Révélation, à vaincre les craintes des communautés chrétiennes et à assurer l'équilibre intérieur du mouvement ascétique, entreprit cette large enquête scripturaire qui remplit aujourd'hui 220 colonnes de la Patrologie, alignant 1542 versets du Nouveau Testament<sup>1</sup>. Si donc il met au clair les devoirs du chrétien, sans plus, il n'en a pas moins directement en vue ses frères en ascétisme et la crise où ils se débattent; du reste ses ouvrages postérieurs ne prendront pas un point de vue plus spécifiquement monastique, c'est toujours en tant que chrétiens qu'il tient à aborder ses auditeurs<sup>2</sup>.

Cette interprétation est confirmée par l'endroit qu'on allègue le plus volontiers en sens contraire: l'avant-dernière section des *Morales* (*Reg.* 70—79) détaille les devoirs propres aux divers états de vie: ministres de la parole, époux, parents, esclaves, soldats, magistrats. Quel intérêt, dit-on, tout ceci pouvait-il avoir pour des moines? Un intérêt majeur! Au concile de Gangres, ce qu'on leur avait le plus amèrement reproché, c'était de mépriser le clergé, de diviser les familles, d'émanciper les enfants, de soustraire les parents à leurs responsabilités, d'entraîner

<sup>1</sup> La tradition V du texte des *Morales*, et elle seule, connaît des additions données en note par les Mauristes, et que je tiens provisoirement pour authentiques. J'en ai tenu compte dans mes statistiques. En voici la liste: Mtt. 3, 10; 4, 5—11; 5, 20 et 46; 6, 10—12; 7, 24—27; 9, 6 et 16—17; 11, 26; 12, 1, 11—12 et 41—42; 16, 27; 24, 26; 25, 18—28. Mc. 7, 21; 13, 21—22. Lc. 9, 61—62; 12, 20—22, 40 et 45—47; 14, 26—27; 15, 5—7 et 32; 18, 3—8. Jo. 3, 5; 6, 53; 10, 2—4; 12, 50; 13, 15; 14, 15; 16, 4. Act. 13, 40—41 et 44—45. Rm. 1, 30—32; 3, 5 et 10; 6, 8; 12, 7—8. I Cor. 9, 7—8; 10, 13 et 33; 12, 14—30; 15, 57. II Cor. 1, 9; 5, 15. Gal. 5, 6. Eph. 5, 2, 20, 27 et 29—30. I Thess. 2, 10—12; 5, 3—5. I Tim. 3, 3—6; 6, 5. II Tim. 2, 5 et 25; 3, 9—13. Tit. 1, 7—9. En tout 135 versets.

<sup>2</sup> Voir mon *Histoire du texte*, pp. 187, 307.

toutes les classes sociales, curiales, soldats, esclaves, à désertier leurs devoirs, le tout sous prétexte de vie parfaite. Tous les jours la contagion d'une vigoureuse propagande ascétique créait là des problèmes, les solutions s'affrontaient, les esprits se divisaient. C'est bien le lieu où'il importait de dégager les directives apostoliques, même et surtout lorsque la Bible ne venait pas confirmer certain radicalisme. Il ne faut d'ailleurs pas croire que les *Règles Morales* soient une thèse préconçue; l'effort pour rechercher les normes du Nouveau Testament y est sincère et consciencieux, même si parfois la préoccupation des problèmes de l'heure conduit l'auteur à interpréter tel texte en un sens inattendu.

Le plan du recueil n'est pas toujours facile à dégager. En tête (*Reg.* 1—2) vient l'appel à la pénitence et au changement de vie, ce qui tout à la fois donne un début logique et permet de commencer comme l'Evangile, par la prédication de Jean Baptiste. Une analyse de la charité et de la foi (*Reg.* 3—9) tourne à l'éloge de l'obéissance intégrale aux commandements, que suit (*Reg.* 10—14) une esquisse de l'eschatologie biblique, de ce jugement de Dieu en face duquel chaque responsabilité est tellement personnelle (*Reg.* 15—19). Cette introduction générale, qui utilise quelque 360 versets, se termine par une mention des sacrements, et de l'état nouveau et souverainement exigeant qu'ils créent en nous (*Reg.* 20—21), thème que j'estime important, en face de la tendance messalienne à exagérer le rôle subjectif de l'expérience de la prière, et à dissocier de son cadre ecclésial la vie spirituelle.

Dans le corps de l'ouvrage, je me borne à signaler quelques points significatifs: l'appel aux critères qui jugent des doctrines (*Reg.* 26—29); l'insistance à tenir le chrétien pour responsable de l'observation par autrui des commandements de Dieu (*Reg.* 33—35 et 50—54), car il ne suffit pas à l'ascète de veiller sur lui-même, ni de se consacrer au service matériel de ses frères, il ne peut se soustraire au devoir de la correction fraternelle. On sent ensuite une mise en garde contre l'instabilité (*Reg.* 39—41) et l'inconstance, dans l'impérieuse prescription du travail (*Reg.* 48 § 7), si odieux à certains messaliens, et dans la défense de



distribuer aux pauvres sans discernement; et ici les nécessités d'une vive controverse vont jusqu'à faire citer le texte de la Syrophénicienne, sur le pain à réserver aux enfants, c'est à dire à la fraternité consacrée au Seigneur, en ne partageant au dehors que les miettes (*Reg.* 31). On sent aussi une mise en garde contre un antinomisme menaçant, grâce à de longues explications sur la Loi nouvelle, qui perfectionne l'ancienne par plus d'intensité et d'intériorité (*Reg.* 42—46). Particulièrement caractéristique de Basile est le foyer d'intérêt pour la doctrine des charismes, au sujet de laquelle on cite jusqu'à 103 versets (*Reg.* 57—61): le chrétien doit chercher l'épanouissement désintéressé de sa vocation personnelle dans le service du corps du Christ, et non dans une tendance à l'érémisme. Sur tous ces points, le temps me manque malheureusement pour citer les témoignages en sens divers d'autres courants monastiques.

La conclusion finale (*Reg.* 80) est admirablement christocentrique: 73 versets, répartis sous 22 rubriques, peignent le chrétien comme le disciple du Christ, modelé sur cela seul qu'il voit dans son maître; la brebis du Christ, docile à la voix du seul pasteur; le rameau du Christ, portant en lui son fruit; le membre du Christ, l'épouse et le temple du Christ, l'hostie sainte, le fils de Dieu . . .

Pour mesurer l'influence des divers livres du Nouveau Testament, il faut tenir compte, non seulement des chiffres absolus des citations, mais d'un pourcentage relatif à la longueur de chaque source. En chiffres absolus, les Evangiles fournissent plus de la moitié, soit 791 versets sur 1542; et Matthieu à lui seul surpasse la somme des trois autres. Proportionnellement parlant, sur 18 livres cités, Matthieu n'obtient que le 7<sup>e</sup> rang, Luc, Jean et Marc sont 13<sup>e</sup>, 14<sup>e</sup> et 17<sup>e</sup>; saint Paul est donc beaucoup plus favorisé. En tête vient la I<sup>re</sup> aux Thessaloniens, puis les trois Epîtres Pastorales, et le regroupement de ces trois témoins prouve que leur prééminence n'a rien de fortuit: de telles préférences manifestant un souci urgent d'insister sur la stabilité, l'ordre, la discipline. Les Epîtres aux Philippiciens et aux Corinthiens sont, de tout le Nouveau Testament, les

moments les plus favorables à l'ascèse, et plus tard elles prendront la tête dans les préférences de Basile; mais dans les *Morales*, elles ne paraissent, proportionnellement parlant, qu'en 5<sup>e</sup>, 8<sup>e</sup> et 10<sup>e</sup> lieu. Mais entrons dans le détail des chapitres. Chez Matthieu, le Sermon sur la Montagne et le Discours de mission sont très largement représentés, moins pourtant que le chapitre 25 et ses avertissements à la vigilance; les exemples tirés de la Vie du Seigneur, par contre, sont rares, et les Paraboles sont peu utilisées: Basile s'intéresse moins à la doctrine du Fils de l'Homme ou du Royaume qu'aux conditions exigées des disciples. Prenons l'Épître aux Romains: la parénèse est largement utilisée, et, seul de tout le Nouveau Testament, le chapitre 12 est intégralement cité; mais on ne tire quasi rien des chapitres 5 à 8, dont l'exposé sur la rédemption offrait pourtant quantité de textes splendides. Chez saint Jean, si le nombre des versets choisis est relativement restreint, plusieurs d'entre eux reviennent continuellement, à la façon d'un refrain favori; ils chantent une charité qui consiste en observation des commandements et en service fraternel. Malgré cette indifférence envers le dogme, l'intérêt s'éveille soudain pour les chapitres 3 ou 6 de Jean, le chapitre 6 de Romains, c'est à dire lorsqu'il s'agit de baptême et d'eucharistie: nouvel indice de l'importance attachée aux sacrements, par réaction sans doute contre une ascèse trop peu ecclésiale. — Ni l'Apocalypse ni les Épîtres Catholiques ne sont citées; Hébreux ne paraît qu'une seule fois.

Je me suis amusé à dresser ainsi, chapitre par chapitre, la statistique des citations. Si l'on veut déduire une règle générale, ce sera celle d'une préférence pour les parties les plus hellénisées du Nouveau Testament, ces exhortations de saint Paul qui s'inspirent volontiers du stoïcisme populaire. L'analyse du recueil, telle que nous l'avons esquissée plus haut, permet pourtant d'affirmer que Basile est resté fort attaché à quantité d'éléments très caractéristiques de la Bible, aux idées de péché, de jugement, de justice dans le Christ et à son image . . .

La préface des *Morales* annonce que les références au Nouveau Testament seront indiquées par un système de renvois chiffrés,

de façon que chacun puisse les retrouver. En fait, une bonne partie de ces chiffres se retrouvent dans les marges de nos manuscrits<sup>1</sup>, et ils permettent de reconstituer, tant pour les Evangiles que pour l'Apôtre, une antique division en chapitres inconnue par ailleurs.

Pour finir, tirons parti des *Règles Morales* pour mieux apprécier la personnalité de Basile. Celui-ci, avant son baptême, avait accompli brillamment le cycle de la formation hellénistique, et, dans certaines de ses œuvres ascétiques, il se place délibérément au point de vue de la philosophie: telle la lettre 2 à Grégoire de Nazianze, ou ce fameux Discours aux jeunes gens sur la lecture des auteurs classiques, qu'en réalité on peut définir un plaidoyer pour l'ascèse sur la base des exemples et des doctrines des Grecs. Ce sont ces œuvres naturellement qui, depuis la Renaissance, ont surtout retenu l'attention des humanistes. A force d'insister en ce sens, on a été amené à penser que le problème historique essentiel de l'ascétisme basilien, c'est le problème du discernement des influences réciproques de l'hellénisme et de la Bible. Mais lorsqu'on prend l'ensemble des écrits ascétiques, pour les comparer successivement à nos *Règles Morales*, puis aux deux petites pièces nommées à l'instant, on ne peut que constater<sup>2</sup> combien ces dernières constituent un hors d'œuvre, étranger d'ailleurs dans les manuscrits à la tradition directe du Corpus ascétique. Très joliment, David Amand désigne du nom de bluettes<sup>3</sup> ces petites pièces de littérature raffinée, ciselées en guise d'apologie à l'égard d'un public délicat, sur le terrain duquel il fallait descendre. Il y aurait une

<sup>1</sup> La meilleure tradition est la branche Va de la famille V: Vatic. gr. 413 et Venise Marcienne 63. Les mss. S donnent les mêmes chiffres, mais dans un état très corrompu. La branche Vb (et V-Séquence) a gardé les chiffres authentiques pour les références aux Actes et à saint Paul; mais pour les Evangiles, elle a voulu remédier au caractère lacuneux de notre information en remplaçant soigneusement les chiffres basiliens par les canons d'Eusèbe.

<sup>2</sup> Voyez plus bas les chiffres des statistiques, et les remarques faites à la suite du second tableau comparatif.

<sup>3</sup> D. Amand de Mendieta, *L'Ascèse monastique de saint Basile. Essai historique*. Maredsous 1948, p. 25.

réelle faute de méthode à y chercher le naturel de Basile. Pour retrouver le milieu vivant et la problématique dans lesquels les textes ascétiques livreront la plénitude de leur témoignage, c'est bien plutôt au sein de la crise prémessalienne qu'il faut les replacer, non pas dans la littérature, mais au point de rencontre et de conflit de l'enthousiasme eustathien avec la tradition de l'Eglise.

## TABLES STATISTIQUES

Les statistiques ne prétendent pas dispenser de l'étude individuelle de chaque texte, mais la faciliter en la replaçant dans son cadre. Elles pourront servir aussi à la critique d'œuvres d'authenticité douteuse, ou à la comparaison avec d'autres Pères.

Les statistiques comparent déjà les *Règles Morales* (Mor.) avec l'Ascéticon, c'est à dire ce qu'on appelle habituellement les Règles de Basile; cet Ascéticon est envisagé dans ses deux états, Asc. I signifiant la première édition, Asc. II signifiant la seconde édition basilienne, celle que donnent les textes grecs manuscrits et imprimés. Mor., Asc. I et Asc. II représentent donc trois étapes successives de la pensée de Basile.

Comme un même verset peut être cité à plusieurs reprises, il faut distinguer du nombre brut des citations, le nombre net, c'est à dire le nombre de versets différents. Il a semblé utile de calculer à part la proportion des versets répétés ainsi à plusieurs reprises; le pourcentage des doublets a été calculé en soustrayant le nombre net du nombre brut, puis en divisant le nombre ainsi obtenu par le nombre net. Ainsi, pour Matthieu, les Morales citent 406 versets, ou plus exactement 310 versets différents, plus 96 versets déjà utilisés. Le pourcentage de doublets est obtenu en divisant 96 par 310.

Pour permettre de mieux apprécier la signification des chiffres absolus, nets ou bruts, je leur adjoins un pourcentage, obtenu en les divisant par le nombre total de versets du livre biblique correspondant. L'Evangile de Matthieu, par exemple, compte 1168 versets; Basile cite 310 versets différents, c'est à dire 26,5%.

Les relevés ont été faits, pour l'Ascéticon, sur un dépouillement nouveau; j'y tiens compte des allusions.

Pour les *Morales*, à côté de fiches personnelles, j'ai dû recourir à l'excellent index de W. K. L. Clarke, *The Ascetic Works of Saint Basil*, Londres 1925, complété naturellement par les textes mentionnés plus haut, p. 3, n. 1; les quelques différences qui subsistaient par rapport à mes notes ne modifient pas la physionomie de l'ensemble.

Les Prologues des *Morales* appartenaient à un genre différent du corps de l'ouvrage, et je n'ai pas tenu compte des citations qu'on y trouve; ceux de l'Ascéticon au contraire ont été utilisés.

## I. Chiffres absolus

Sources	Morales		Asc. I		Asc. II		Classement					
	Brut	Net	Brut	Net	Brut	Net						
Mtt.	406:310		117:89		257:143		1	1	1	1	1	1
Lc.	206:184		57:48		100: 72		2	2	4	2	4	3
Jo.	155:106		60:45		106: 64		3	5	3	3	3	4
I Cor.	124:120		64:44		148: 77		4	3	2	4	2	2
Act.	115:107		14:10		37: 21		5	4	10	11	9	10
Rm.	101: 88		28:25		81: 57		6	6	6	6	5	5
I Tim.	61: 50		13:12		30: 22		7	8	11	10	10	8
II Cor.	61: 48		32:25		73: 44		8	9	5	5	6	6
I Thess.	56: 44		7: 7		23: 13		9	10	14	14	12	14
Eph.	56: 53		20:14		47: 21		10	7	7	7	7	9
Phil.	44: 32		19:14		38: 25		11	11	8	8	8	7
II Tim.	38: 30		9: 8		18: 12		12	12	13	13	13	15
Mc.	30: 30		10: 9		17: 14		13	13	12	12	15	13
Gal.	28: 24		14:13		29: 18		14	14	9	9	11	11
Tit.	27: 19		1: 1		5: 5		15	16	18	18	18	18
Col.	25: 24		5: 5		18: 14		16	15	16	16	14	12
II Thess.	7: 7		5: 5		13: 8		17	17	15	15	16	16
Hebr.	5: 5		5: 5		6: 6		18	18	17	17	17	17
Philm.	0: 0		0: 0		3: 3		19	19	19	19	19	19
Somme	1542:1281		480:379		1049:639							

Les six colonnes du classement suivent l'ordre des colonnes de chiffres qui les précèdent, et permettent de contrôler d'un simple coup d'oeil l'évolution des préférences de Basile: les chiffres en s'abaissant montrent que celui-ci utilise de plus en plus un livre donné, les Evangiles par exemple et les Epîtres Pastorales perdent de l'importance au profit de saint Paul.

Un nombre brut beaucoup supérieur au nombre net (traduit, dans le classement, par une meilleure place dans la colonne «brut») signifie que de nombreux versets sont répétés, c'est à dire que le livre exerce une influence intensive plus qu'extensive —et peut-être aussi que Basile ne retient que quelques aspects de la doctrine de l'auteur!

## II. Pourcentages des citations

Les livres du Nouveau Testament sont d'étendue très diverse, et un texte court peut être proportionnellement beaucoup cité, tout en ne présentant qu'un chiffre absolu peu important. Il importe donc de corriger le tableau précédent par une statistique proportionnelle, qui indique

le nombre de versets de chaque livre, puis le pourcentage des citations basiliennes. Nous ajouterons le pourcentage des doublets, calculé, comme il a été dit, par rapport au nombre net des citations, non par rapport à la longueur du livre biblique.

Comme l'Ascéticon contient nécessairement beaucoup moins de citations que le recueil des *Morales*, les chiffres proportionnels y sont beaucoup plus bas; on obtiendrait des nombres comparables à ceux des *Morales* en multipliant Asc. I brut par 3, 2; Asc. I net par 3, 3; Asc. II brut par 1, 4; Asc. II net par 2, c'est à dire en multipliant chaque colonne par la moyenne de la somme de ses citations par rapport à la colonne correspondante des *Morales*.

Sources		Morales		Asc. I		Asc. II		Doublets		
		Brut	Net	Brut	Net	Brut	Net	Mor.	Asc. I	Asc. II
I Thess.	89	62,8 : 48,3		7,8 : 7,8		25,8 : 14,4		27,2	0,0	76,9
I Tim.	113	53,9 : 44,2		11,5 : 10,6		26,5 : 19,4		22,0	8,3	36,3
Tit.	46	50,8 : 41,3		2,1 : 2,1		10,8 : 10,8		42,1	0,0	0,0
II Tim.	83	45,7 : 36,1		10,8 : 9,6		21,6 : 14,4		26,6	12,5	50,0
Phil.	104	43,8 : 31,7		18,1 : 13,4		36,5 : 24,0		37,5	35,7	52,0
Eph.	155	36,2 : 34,2		12,6 : 9,0		30,3 : 13,5		5,6	42,8	123,8
Mtt.	1168	34,7 : 26,5		10,0 : 7,6		22,0 : 12,2		30,9	40,4	79,7
I Cor.	437	27,5 : 27,4		14,6 : 10,0		33,8 : 17,6		3,0	45,4	92,2
Col.	95	26,3 : 25,2		5,2 : 5,2		18,9 : 14,7		4,1	0,0	28,5
II Cor.	256	23,8 : 18,3		12,5 : 9,7		28,5 : 17,0		27,0	28,0	65,9
Rm.	453	22,2 : 19,4		6,3 : 5,5		17,8 : 10,3		14,6	12,0	45,6
Gal.	149	18,7 : 16,1		9,3 : 8,7		19,4 : 12,0		16,6	7,0	61,1
Lc.	1151	17,8 : 15,9		4,9 : 4,1		8,7 : 6,2		11,9	18,7	38,8
Jo.	889	17,4 : 11,9		6,7 : 5,0		11,9 : 7,1		46,2	33,3	67,5
II Thess.	47	14,8 : 14,8		10,6 : 10,6		27,6 : 17,0		0,0	0,0	62,5
Act.	1016	11,3 : 10,5		1,3 : 0,9		2,6 : 2,0		7,4	40,0	76,1
Mc.	678	4,4 : 4,4		1,4 : 1,3		2,5 : 2,0		0,0	11,1	21,4
Hebr.	303	1,6 : 1,6		1,6 : 1,6		1,9 : 1,9		0,0	0,0	0,0
Phlm.	25	0,0 : 0,0		0,0 : 0,0		12,0 : 12,0		0,0	0,0	0,0
Somme	7257	21,2 : 17,6		6,6 : 5,2		14,4 : 8,8				

Ce tableau dégage un ordre plus objectif que le tableau précédent; la preuve en est que l'on voit se regrouper ici des ensembles cohérents, les Pastorales, les Epîtres de la Captivité (Colossiens est un peu en retard), les Corinthiens, Romains-Galates, Luc-Jean; et dans ces groupes l'écrit le plus important vient généralement en tête.

Le pourcentage net des citations des *Morales* n'impose pas un classement fort différent de la première colonne, que nous

avons prise pour guide dans la disposition du tableau: Eph. précéderait Phil., I Cor. passerait avant Mtt., Rm. avant II Cor. . . . L'Ascéticon en revanche opère une révolution. Voici l'ordre de ses préférences: Phil., I Cor., Eph., II Cor., I et II Tim., II Thess., Mtt., Gal., I Thess., Jo., Rm., Col., Lc., Tit., Hebr., Mc., Act. Les chiffres nets ou ceux du second Ascéticon ne changent guère ce classement. Il est clair qu'avec le temps, et dans un ouvrage où il est plus lui-même, Basile se limite de moins en moins à ce que nous avons appelé la « morale hellénisée » du Nouveau Testament, et réduit l'importance des Pastorales au profit des exigences radicales et du feu d'idéal chrétien des plus enthousiastes parmi les épîtres de Paul. Ces chiffres prouvent à eux seuls combien secondaire sera sur l'Ascéticon l'influence de l'ascèse philosophique.

Quant à la seconde rédaction de l'Ascéticon, le phénomène le plus caractéristique est sans doute la proportion extraordinaire des doublets. Alors que dans Asc. I ils se trouvaient parfois bien plus rares que dans les *Morales*, dans la colonne Asc. II on peut dire que tous les chiffres sont très sensiblement plus élevés que dans les deux colonnes précédentes. Cela signifie que la pensée de Basile va se nourrissant surtout d'un certain nombre de textes choisis.

## The Observance of the 'Two Weeks' in Shenoute's Writings

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Several occurrences of the phrase ΠCABBATON CNAΥ or CNAΥ ṢCABBATON in the writings of Shenoute have suggested to me that it refers to a specific two weeks in the ecclesiastical year, which were observed in the White Monastery of which Shenoute was abbot from about A. D. 385. The phrase does not, I think, simply mean 'a fortnight', or 'two Saturdays', though CABBATON, which can mean 'week', or 'Saturday', is ambiguous.

The following will be examined:

- 1) A passage from Paris 130<sup>3</sup>, 22—29.<sup>1</sup>
- 2) Passages from Paris 130<sup>1</sup>, 14—16.<sup>2</sup>
- 3) An unedited passage from Paris 130<sup>3</sup>, 3v.<sup>3</sup>

I make, of course, no claim to have collected all the uses of the phrase in the edited and unedited writings of Shenoute, but I should perhaps add that I have not come across the phrase with this connotation elsewhere in Coptic literature.

The analysis of the passages may be divided into two parts: How were the 'Two Weeks' observed? and, When were the 'Two Weeks' observed?

How were the 'Two Weeks' observed?

a) First, there is a special recommendation of leisure and more time for religious observances in the 'Two Weeks'. The

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<sup>1</sup> Edited in J. Leipoldt, *Sinuthii Archimandritae Vita et Opera Omnia*, CSCO, 73, p. 156.

<sup>2</sup> Edited in P. van Cauwenbergh, *Étude sur les moines d'Égypte*, Paris, 1914, pp. 176ff. I have collated his text with the original. It must be noted, however, that P. van Cauwenbergh attributes the text to Besa. I have no doubt that it should be assigned to Shenoute, cf. 'Besa's Letters and Sermons', *Le Muséon*, LXVI, pp. 231 and 241.

<sup>3</sup> This passage is also extant in part in Cambridge, Or. 1699—1700, one of the manuscripts originally belonging to Sir Herbert Thompson.



time is to be used, it seems, for contemplation on, and perhaps prayer for the ills of the world. This is expressed in Paris 130<sup>1</sup>, 15v—16r, as follows:

ΕΥΨΑΝΧΟΟΥ ΔΕ Ν̄ΖΕΝΡΩΜΕ Ν̄ΟΥΘΕΙΩ ΝΙΜ CΝΑΥ CΝΑΥ  
ΕΝΕΖΒΗΥΕ ΕΤΟΥΝΑΧΟΟΥCΟΥ ΕΡΟΟΥ. ΑΥΩ Μ̄Ν̄CΑ-  
ΤΡΕΥCΟΟΥ<sup>2</sup> Ε<sup>2</sup>[ΟΥΝ] Ν̄ΟΥΘΕΙΩ ΝΙΜ Ε<sup>4</sup>ΟΝ<sup>2</sup> Ε<sup>4</sup>ΕΙΡΕ Ν̄ΑΠΑ-  
ΤΟΟΤ<sup>4</sup> ΕΤΟΡΠ̄Ν. Η ΕΤΟΚΜ̄Ν ΕΒΟΛ Ζ̄ΝΤΕΙΜ̄ΝΤΑΤCΡ<sup>4</sup>Ε ΕΤΕ-  
ΜΕCCEΙ. ΕΤΡΕΝCΡ<sup>4</sup>Ε. Η ΕΤΡΕΝCΡΑ<sup>2</sup>Τ̄ Ν̄ΖΟΥΟ Ζ̄Μ̄ΠCΑΒ-  
ΒΑΤΟΝ CΝΑΥ ΕΤ̄ΜΜΑΥ ΠΑΡΑΘΕ ΕΤ̄ΝCΡΟ<sup>4</sup>Τ̄ Μ̄ΜΗΝΕ. ΑΥΩ  
ΕΝΤΑ<sup>4</sup>Ρ̄ΠΑΙ ΟΝ Ν̄CΙΠΕΝΕΙΩΤ ΕΤΒΕ̄Ν<sup>2</sup>ΙCΕ ΕΤΩΩΠΕ Ζ̄Μ̄ΠΚΟC-  
ΜΟC ΚΑΤΑΟΥΘΕΙΩ. ΕΙΤΕ Ν̄ΖΕΒΩΩΝ. ΕΙΤΕ Ν̄Ρ̄Μ̄ΠΩCΕΡΕ-  
ΕΙΤΕ ΙCΕ [Ν]ΙΜ.

‘And if men are at any time sent two by two on assignments on which they shall be sent, and after they are gathered together every time, he (i. e. our father), while alive, endeavours to seize and draw us away from this lack of leisure which does not satisfy, that we may have leisure and rest in those two “sabbaton” more than we are at leisure daily. Moreover our father did this because of the sufferings which take place in the world periodically, whether famines or bad seasons or any suffering . . .’

The desirability of leisure is mentioned again in Paris 130<sup>1</sup>, 14r. Unfortunately the text is fragmentary at this point so that it is impossible to gauge its full significance.

b) The demand for extra leisure is emphasised by specific precepts regarding work in the ‘Two Weeks’. Work must not interfere with the observance of the ‘Two Weeks’. Only particularly light tasks, or those which are strictly necessary should be performed. Two passages illustrate this: Paris 130<sup>3</sup>, 3v,

ΠΩΟΡ̄Π̄ Ν̄CΑΒΒΑΤΟΝ Μ̄ΠΕΖΜΕ Ν̄ΖΟΥΥ ΑΥΩ ΠΝΟC Μ̄ΠΑCΧΑ  
ΕΤΟΥ<sup>1</sup>Α,Β Μ̄Ν̄ΠΚΕCΝΑΥ Ν̄CΑΒΒΑΤΟΝ Ν̄ΝΕΥΘΑΙΒΕ Ν̄ΡΩΜΕ  
Ε†ΙCΕ ΝΑΥ Ζ̄Ν̄ΖΕΝΖΒΗΥΕ ΕΥΜΟΚ<sup>2</sup> ΟΥΤΕ Ν̄ΝΕΥ†ΖΤΟΡ  
ΕΡΟΟΥ ΕΡ<sup>2</sup>ΩΒ ΕΙΜΗΤΙ ΕΝΕΤΕΖΕΝΕΛΛΑΧΙCΤΟΝΝΕ ΕΥΜΟΤ̄Ν  
ΕΛΛΥ Η Ν̄ΤΟ<sup>4</sup> ΖΕΝΖΒΗΥΕ ΕΤΑΝΑΓΚΗΠΕ ΑΛΥ ΩΑ<sup>2</sup>ΡΑΙ  
ΕΝΕ(Τ)Ω<sup>1</sup>ΑΥ<sup>1</sup>ΩΩΠΕ Μ̄ΠΜΑ Μ̄ΠΡΟ

‘(During) the first “sabbaton” of the Forty Days and the Great Holy Passover and also the two “sabbaton”, they shall not con-

strain people by troubling them with difficult tasks nor shall they compel them to work except with regard to the very small things which are easy to do, or tasks which it is necessary to do, including those who are at the gate'.

And Paris 130<sup>1</sup>, 14r,

ΝΗΕΛΛΑΥ ΝΡΩΜΕ ΧΠΕΖΩΒ ΝΛΥ ΖΡΑΪ ΝΖΗΤΝ̄ ΕΥΝΑΚΑΤΕΧΕ  
ΕΤΒΗΗΤΟΥ ΕΤΜ̄CΩΟΥ? ΕΖΟΥΝ. ΟΥΤΕ ΝΝΕΥΧΝΟΥΟΥ  
ΕΖΩΒ. ΟΥΤΕ ΝΝΕΥΝΟΥΧΕ ΕΧΩΟΥ. ΕΙΜΙΤΕΙ ΠΕΤΕΡΕΠΟΥΛ  
ΠΟΥΛ ΟΥΩΩ ΕΛΛΥ ΖΜΠΕΥΖΤΟΡ ΜΑΥΛΛΥ. ΕΤΒΕΟΥΜΝΤΑΤ-  
CΟΜ. ΧΕCΕΖΟCΕ ΝΖΗΤΟΥ ΖΝΟΥΖΤΟΡ.

'Let not any man acquire work among us because of which he shall be detained from assembling, nor shall work be demanded of them, nor shall they be imposed upon, except what each one wishes to do of his own accord because of weakness for they are necessarily wearied in them . . .' (The reference is almost certainly to the 'Two Weeks'.)

c) One particular precept regarding work should perhaps be included in this review, although it is doubtful whether it is relevant to my theme, for the 'Two Weeks' are not mentioned explicitly, though, I think, a reference to them is implied, and because the precept seems to have a universal application and is not confined to any one period of the year. The passage from Paris 130<sup>1</sup>, 14v, may be quoted,

ΕΩΩΠΕ ΔΕ ΕΡΩΑΝΟΥΡΩΜΕ ΖΡΑΪ ΝΖΗΤΝ̄ ΡΟΥΖΩΒ ΝΒΡΡΕ  
ΠΑΡΑΠΟΥΕΖCΑΖΝΕ ΜΠΕΙΩΤ ΝΤCΥΝΑΓΩΓΗ ΖΝ̄CΑΒΒΑΤΟΝ  
ΕΤΜ̄ΜΑΥ. Η ΖΜΠΕΛΖΜ,Ε ΝΖΟΥΥ. [Η Ζ]Ν̄CΕΛΛΑΥ [NC]Λ,ΒΒΑ-  
ΤΟΝ [ΕΠΤ]ΗΡῘ. [Η] ΛΛΑΥ ΝΖΟΥΥ ΕΧΝ̄ΤΡΕΥΧΟΟC ΝΛΥ.  
ΕΥΝΑΡΩΚΖ ΑΝ ΜΠΖΩΒ ΕΝΤΑΥΛΛΥ ΧΙΝΜΠΟΥΥ ΕΖΡΑΪ. Η  
ΕΒΟΛ ΚΑΤΑΘΕ ΕΝΤΑΥΛΛC. ΛΛΛ ΕΥΝΑΧΟΟC ΧΕΤΑΪΤΕ ΘΕ  
ΕΤΟΥΝΑΡΩΚΖ ΝΝΕΖΒΗΥΕ ΝΝΕΤΜ̄ΜΑΥ ΕΤΒΕΤΕΥΜΝΤ-  
ΑΤCΩΤΜ̄. ΕΤΜ̄ΤΡΕΥ†ΖΗΥ ΕΛΛΑΥ ΝΖΩΒ ΜΠΕΤΝΑΝΟΥΥ  
ΕΤΟΥΕΙΡΕ ΜΜΟΥ.

'And if anyone among us does a new work against the command of the father of the community in those "sabbaton" (The reference is probably to the two) or in the Forty Days [or] in any other "sabbaton" at all [or] any day without him telling them,

the work made shall not be burned from to-day on or henceforth according as it was done, but it shall be said, "Thus shall the works of those be burned because of their disobedience so that no one profits by anything of the good things which are made".

d) There are also references to the practice of fasting in the 'Two Weeks'. The 'Two Weeks' were, it appears, called Weeks of Fasting. I quote from a fragmentary passage in Paris 130<sup>1</sup>, 16r,  $\bar{\text{N}}\bar{\text{N}}[\epsilon\gamma\chi\omega] \epsilon\pi\iota\varsigma\alpha\beta[\beta\alpha\tau\omicron\text{N}] \text{C}\bar{\text{N}}\lambda\gamma \epsilon\tau\bar{\text{M}}[\text{M}\lambda\gamma] \text{2}\rho\alpha\bar{\text{I}} \bar{\text{N}}\text{2HT}\epsilon \chi\epsilon\pi\alpha\chi\alpha. \omicron\gamma\tau\epsilon \bar{\text{N}}\text{N}\epsilon\gamma\mu\omicron\gamma\tau\epsilon \epsilon\rho\omicron\omicron\gamma \chi\epsilon\pi\alpha\chi\alpha. \epsilon\tau\beta\epsilon\text{N}\epsilon\tau\omicron\gamma\omega\psi \epsilon\tau\epsilon\delta\text{2}\epsilon[\text{N}]\lambda\omicron\bar{\text{I}}\delta\epsilon \bar{\text{N}}\text{2}\lambda\iota\text{P}[\epsilon]\text{TIKOC. } \iota\text{N}\text{2J. one line } \chi\text{.....}\chi\text{J. } \iota\epsilon\text{JY}[\text{O}]\chi\text{. } \lambda\lambda\lambda\text{J}[\lambda] \epsilon\gamma\text{N}\alpha\mu\omicron\gamma\tau\epsilon \epsilon\rho\omicron\omicron\gamma \chi[\epsilon]\bar{\text{N}}\text{C}\alpha\beta\beta\alpha\tau\omicron[\text{N}] \bar{\text{N}}\text{NHCTEI}[\lambda]$

'[Do not let them speak] of those two "sab[baton]" among you (you f. sg. perhaps  $\text{C}\gamma\text{N}\alpha\Gamma\omega\Gamma\text{H}$ ) as Passover nor let them call them Passover because of those who wish to plant heretical causes . . . 4 lines . . . but they shall call them "sabbaton" of fasting . . .' A particularly severe fast is implied in Paris 130<sup>1</sup>, 14r. The resulting weakness excuses the monk even from his religious duty of reading and reciting, probably from the scriptures, at the evening service. I quote,

$\epsilon\psi\omega\pi\epsilon \text{ON } \epsilon\rho\psi\alpha\text{N2O}\bar{\text{I}}\text{NE } \bar{\rho}\alpha\text{T}\delta\text{OM } \bar{\text{N}}\text{CET}\bar{\text{M}}\delta\bar{\text{N}}\theta\epsilon \bar{\text{N}}\omega\psi. \bar{\text{H}} \epsilon\text{M}\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\tau\alpha \bar{\text{M}}\pi\text{N}\lambda\gamma \bar{\text{N}}\rho\omicron\gamma\text{2}\epsilon \bar{\text{M}}\pi\text{M}\epsilon\text{22O}\omicron\gamma \text{C}\bar{\text{N}}\lambda\gamma \epsilon\tau\epsilon\text{M}\pi\omicron\gamma\text{OY}\omega\text{M } \bar{\text{N}}\text{2HTOY } \text{2}\bar{\text{M}}\pi\text{C}\alpha\beta\beta\alpha\text{TON } \text{C}_{\text{I}}\text{N}_{\text{J}}[\lambda\gamma] \epsilon\tau\bar{\text{M}}[\lambda\gamma] \lambda\gamma\omega \text{O}_{\text{I}}\text{N}_{\text{J}} [\text{2M}]\pi\epsilon\text{2M}[\epsilon \text{N2O}\omicron\gamma]$

'Moreover if some are weak and do not find the means to read or recite in the evening of the second day in which they did not eat in those [two] "sabbaton" and also [in] the Forty [Days] . . .' Fasting in the 'Two Weeks' is also referred to in a passage from Paris 130<sup>3</sup>, 22—29,

$\epsilon\gamma\psi\alpha\text{N6NOY}\rho\omega\text{M}\epsilon \text{H } \omicron\gamma\text{C2IME } \text{2}\rho\alpha\text{I } \text{N2HTEN } \text{NOY}\omicron\epsilon\text{I}\omega \text{NIM } \epsilon\gamma\alpha\text{M}\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\text{I } \epsilon\tau\alpha\text{2O}\omicron\gamma \epsilon\rho\alpha\text{TOY } \lambda\gamma\omega \text{NC}\epsilon\psi\pi\epsilon \lambda\text{N } \text{2HTOY } \text{NNEC}\text{NH}\gamma \text{NGK}\rho\alpha\text{THC } \text{N}\alpha\text{ME } \lambda\gamma\omega \epsilon\tau\text{2OC}\epsilon, \text{MNNC}\alpha\text{TPEY-}\dagger\text{CBW } \text{N}\lambda\gamma, \lambda\gamma\omega \text{NCETM}\text{C}\omega\text{TM } \epsilon\rho\text{N}\epsilon\gamma\text{C}\omega\text{M}\alpha \text{N}\lambda\gamma \text{N2M2}\lambda\lambda, \chi\epsilon\text{NNE}\gamma\mu\omicron\gamma, \omicron\gamma \text{MONON } \chi\epsilon\text{2M}\pi\text{C}\alpha\beta\beta\alpha\text{TON } \text{C}\bar{\text{N}}\lambda\gamma \epsilon\tau\epsilon\psi\alpha\text{N}\lambda\lambda\gamma \epsilon\text{NCO}\omicron\gamma\text{2 } \epsilon\text{2OY}\text{N } \text{N2HTOY}, \lambda\lambda\lambda\lambda \text{NOY}\omicron\epsilon\text{I}\omega \text{NIM}$

ΑΥΩ Ν200Υ ΝΙΜ, ΕΥΝΑΚΩΛΥ ΜΜΟΟΥ ΖΙΤΕΝΝΕΙΟΤΕ  
ΝΝΕΙCΥΝΑΓΩΓΗ ΕΤΜΒΩΚ ΕΟΥΩΜ,

'If a man or woman is found among us at any time who is negligent to establish himself and does not revere the truly temperate and toiling brethren after having been taught and does not listen so as to subject his body lest he die, not only in the two "sabbaton" which we are wont to observe being then gathered together, but at any time and on any day, he shall be prevented by the fathers of these communities from going to eat...'

e) It is difficult to decide whether any other ascetic practices in addition to fasting were prescribed for the 'Two Weeks'. From the passage in Paris 130<sup>3</sup>, 22—29, it might be inferred that the subjection of the body which is there urged was particularly stringent in the 'Two Weeks'. But it is impossible to say whether the subjection of the body included anything in addition to fasting.

f) Three times in the texts under consideration reference is made to the monks being gathered together. In the passage from Paris 130<sup>3</sup>, 22—29, the monks observe the 'Two Weeks', 'being gathered together'; in Paris 130<sup>1</sup>, 14r, they are warned not to undertake work which might prevent them from assembling; and in Paris 130<sup>1</sup>, 15v—16r, the exhortation to leisure is said to be given after the return of monks from some mission to the outside world, 'after they are gathered together'. Does this terminology suggest that special meetings with a religious purpose were held in the 'Two Weeks'? Attention has already been drawn to the ambiguity of the term **CABBATON** with its two meanings 'Saturday', and 'week'. It may be added here that in Shenoute's time there was an assembling of the monks for a General Chapter which was held four times a year on four Saturdays<sup>1</sup>. But though there is some similarity in terminology, the context is, I feel sure, entirely different.

<sup>1</sup> E. g. J. Leipoldt, *Sinuthii Archimandritae Vita et Opera Omnia*, CSCO, 73, p. 91, p. 120; cf. also J. Leipoldt, *Schenute von Atripe*, TU, N. F. X, 1, p. 97.

This leads to the question, when were the 'Two Weeks' observed? J. Leipoldt<sup>1</sup>, when referring to the passage in Paris 130<sup>2</sup>, 3v, states that the two weeks after Easter are intended; P. van Cauwenberg<sup>2</sup>, on the other hand, dealing with Paris 130<sup>1</sup>, 14—17, draws attention to 'le jeûne des "deux semaines"' without attempting to assign to it a place in the ecclesiastical year.

Two of our selected passages make it likely, I think, that the 'Two Weeks' were observed at some time in the Easter season. I quote from Paris 130<sup>2</sup>, 3v,

ΠΩΟΡΠ̄ ΝCΑΒΒΑΤΟΝ ΜΠΕΞΜΕ Ν2ΟΟΥ ΑΥΩ ΠΝΟΘ ΜΠΑCΧΑ  
ΕΤΟΥΔ,Δ,Β ΜΝΠΚΓCΝΑΥ ΝCΑΒΒΑΤΟΝ

'(During) the first "sabbaton" of the Forty Days and the Great Holy Passover and also the two "sabbaton"' ... and from Paris 130<sup>1</sup>, 16v,

ΠΩΟΡΠ̄ ΝCΑΒΒΑΤΟΝ ΜΠΕΞΜΕ Ν2ΟΟΥ· ΑΥΩ ΠΝΟΘ ΜΠΑCΧΑ·  
[ΔΥ]Ω ΠCΑΒΒΑΤΟΝ CΝΑΥ

'The first "sabbaton" of the Forty Days and the Great Passover [and] the two "sabbaton"' ...

But an attempt may be made to place the 'Two Weeks' more precisely in the ecclesiastical year.

That the 'Two Weeks' immediately precede Easter is unlikely, though both the fasting practice and the enforced leisure for religious purposes could fit such a theory. The order in the two passages mentioned — first 'sabbaton' of the Forty Days, Passover, two 'sabbaton' — seems to contradict it. Also the way in which Athanasius fixed the date of Easter in his Festal Letters, many of which are extant in Coptic<sup>3</sup>, by specifying the forty days' fast, Holy Week, and the feast of Easter, seems to me to make it unlikely that in Shenoute's day the two weeks before Easter were specially observed. By so doing Athanasius' scheme would have been disturbed and there is every reason

<sup>1</sup> Shenute von Atripe, p. 128.

<sup>2</sup> Étude sur les moines d'Égypte, p. 149.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. L. Th. Lefort, S. Athanase, Lettres Festales et Pastorales, CSCO, 150—151.

to believe that his pronouncements were binding for the whole of Egypt.

The order in the two passages mentioned — first 'sabbaton' of the Forty Days, Passover, two 'sabbaton' — suggests that the 'Two Weeks' immediately followed Easter, and this, as we have seen, is supported by Leipoldt. However both the special fast and the recommendation of leisure for two weeks at this time of the ecclesiastical year seem somewhat surprising.

At this point I want to draw attention to a passage from the *Canones Ecclesiastici*, which has suggested to me an alternative solution to the problem; more precisely, the part extant in Coptic which contains an extract of the 8th book the Apostolic Constitutions. The relevant passage occurs in chapter 75, section 25<sup>1</sup>.

ⲙⲡⲣ̅ⲧⲣⲉϥ̅ⲣ̅ⲱⲃ ⲁⲉ ⲟⲛ ⲛ̅ⲧⲛⲟⲉ ⲛ̅ⲁⲉⲃⲁⲱⲙⲁⲥ ⲙ̅ⲛⲛⲟⲉ ⲙ̅ⲡⲁ-  
ⲥⲕⲁ ⲙ̅ⲛ̅ⲧⲉⲧⲛⲛⲩ ⲙ̅ⲛ̅ⲛ̅ⲥⲱⲥ, ⲉ̅ⲧⲉⲧⲁⲛ̅ⲱⲁⲧⲉ. ⲧⲟϥⲉⲓ ⲙⲉⲛ  
ⲭⲉⲛⲧⲁϥ̅ⲧⲁϥⲣⲟϥ ⲙ̅ⲡ̅ⲭⲟⲉⲓⲥ ⲛ̅ⲁⲛ̅ⲧ̅. ⲧⲕⲉⲧ ⲁⲉ ⲭⲉⲛⲧⲁϥ-  
ⲧⲱⲟϥⲛ ⲉ̅ⲃⲟⲕ ⲁ̅ⲛ̅ⲛⲉⲧⲙⲟⲟϥ̅ⲧ ⲛ̅ⲁⲛ̅ⲧ̅. ⲁϥ̅ⲱ ⲧⲉϥ̅ⲣ̅ⲁⲧⲉ  
ⲛ̅ⲧ̅ⲛ̅ⲉⲓⲙⲉ ⲁ̅ⲧ̅ⲛ̅ⲧⲉⲥⲃⲱ ⲭⲉⲛ̅ⲓⲙ ⲡⲉⲛⲧⲁϥ̅ⲧⲱⲟϥⲛ ⲉ̅ⲃⲟⲕ  
ⲁ̅ⲛ̅ⲛⲉⲧⲙⲟⲟϥ̅ⲧ.

'And also do not let them (i. e. ⲁ̅ⲧ̅ⲛ̅ⲧⲉⲥⲃⲱ the servants or slaves) work in the great week (*ἐβδομάς*) of the Great Passover and the one that comes after it, which is the one of the feast: the one because the Lord was crucified in it, and the other because he rose from the dead in it. And it is necessary that we understand by means of teaching who rose from the dead.'

It must be noted at once that there is little similarity of terminology between the passages from Shenoute and the above quotation. I should, however, like to suggest, though very tentatively, that the 'Two Weeks' referred to in Shenoute's writings were observed in Holy Week and Easter Week. The order in the two passages from Shenoute neither confirms nor contradicts this hypothesis. Special fasting and extra leisure are

<sup>1</sup> I quote from the Paris text 130<sup>3</sup>, 51r, edited by J. Leipoldt, *Saïdische Auszüge aus dem 8. Buche der apostolischen Konstitutionen*, TU, N. F. XI, 1b; but P. de Lagarde's text, published in *Aegyptiaca*, Göttingen, 1883, p. 283, has no variants of any importance.

essential features of Holy Week, and extra leisure for religious observances in the celebration of Easter Week is wholly credible. But it must be admitted that a fast in Easter Week is unlikely, though the monastic context in which Shenoute wrote should be remembered. Fasting was an integral part of the monastic life all the year round and, in the White Monastery, there was only one meal a day<sup>1</sup>. The theological reason advanced in the Apostolic Constitutions for not working would, I think, have commended itself to Shenoute also. It is, of course, not part of the hypothesis to try and determine the sphere of influence of the Apostolic Constitutions, the original of which is generally said to have come into existence in Syria or Constantinople in about A. D. 380<sup>2</sup>. In any case the introduction of observances and their codification need not, of course, be contemporaneous.

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. J. Leipoldt, *Schenute von Atripe*, p. 118.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. B. Altaner, *Patrologie*, Freiburg, 1951, p. 44.

## Prayer-time in Egyptian Monasticism (320—450)

A. VAN DER MENSBRUGGHE, Paris

§ 1. *The Pre-Pakhomian uses (S. Anthony and the abbot Palamon): Continuous prayer by day; Four alternatives of half-night vigils.*

a) The constant prayer by day. — The Septennary cycle or cycle of seven Hours, (two public synaxes of Matins (= Lauds) and Vespers; three day-time prayers of Terce, Sext and None, two night-prayers, at bed-time and at midnight or at dawn), represents in the 4th century an already old tradition, that goes back to Jewish and early Christian worship. It represents also a universal tradition followed by the whole of the Church: Palestine, Syria, urban Egypt, Rome, Africa. This antique and universal tradition might be defined the tradition of “discreet” prayer, in the latin meaning of the word: a prayer fixed and limited to certain moments of the continual flux of time.

There are nevertheless certain saints and certain milieux which boggle at this conception of “discreet” prayer, of prayer limited to certain moments. Such was Epiphanius; such were the monastic circles of East Syria and Egypt. Egyptian monasticism defends stubbornly the principle of “continuous”, non-discreet prayer. Cassian defines this ideal of the monks of Scete and Thebais<sup>1</sup> in these terms: “With them these offices which we (in Palestine and Gaul) try to fulfil to the Lord through distinct hours and intervals, to the warning of a ringer, they celebrate them constantly throughout the day’s duration, spontaneously, joining labour to them. For they apply themselves incessantly to manual labour in their cells, in such a way that

<sup>1</sup> Cassian visited Scete only, but he is positive that the customs he saw there are the same everywhere in Egypt: *Necessarium reor antiquissimam Patrum proferre in medium Constitutionem, quae nunc usque per totum Aegyptum a Dei famulis custoditur* (Inst. Coen., l. 2, c. 2).



it be never devoid of the meditation of the psalms and of the other Scriptures; and as they mix their work from time to time with prayers and orisons, they take the whole day's time for those services which we celebrate at given times<sup>1</sup>."

Egyptian monasticism was echoing the voice of Epiphanius. It answered also the conception of East-Syrian hermits. S. Julian, the hermit of Adiabene (c. 350) taught his monks "to go out two by two after dawn into the solitude of the desert, and there, whilst the one would bend knees to offer to God the worship that is due to Him, the other, standing, would recite fifteen psalms of David; and this having been done, they would change roles: that one would get up to sing; this one throwing himself on the ground would worship. And having gone out from the early morning-crepuscule, they did this assiduously till the evening" (Theodoret., Hist. relig., c. 2; PG 82. 1309). Abbot Isaiah in the fifth century was still spreading the prayers of the day over the whole period from sunrise to sunset (Precepts 11 and 17; PG 103. 429).

b) The half-night vigil. — The Egyptian ascetics before Pakhomius know sometimes a total "*agrypnia*" or "*pannykhid*" vigil, as their Palestinian and Syrian brothers know it on Sundays and Feasts. Yet, sleep has its rights, even on the ascetics of the desert; the exercise of the constant prayer all through the night is hardly possible every night. Normally one keeps watch only half the night through. S. Palamon warns his postulant Pakhomius from the very start: "I keep watch, as I have been taught: always one half of the night, in prayer and meditation on God's words, and often the whole night<sup>2</sup>."

<sup>1</sup> *Apud illos etiam haec officia, quae Domino solvere par distinctiones horarum et temporis intervalla cum admonitione compulsoris adigimur, per totum diei spatium iugiter cum operis adjectione spontaneae celebrantur. Ita namque ab eis incessanter operatio manuum privatim per cellulas exercetur, ut psalmorum quoque vel ceterarum scripturarum meditatio numquam penitus omittatur, cui preces et orationes per singula momenta miscentes in his officiis, quae nos statuto tempore celebramus, totum diei tempus absumunt* (Inst. Coen., l. 3, c. 2).

<sup>2</sup> Ἀγρυπνῶ, ὡς ἐδιδάχθην, ἀεὶ μὲν τὸ ἥμισον τῆς νυκτὸς εἰς εὐχὴν καὶ μελέτην λόγων Θεοῦ, καὶ πολλάκις ὅλην τὴν νύκτα (Vit. graec. I § 60, ed. Halkin, p. 60; = Vit. gr. III § 78, p. 274. 5; = Vit. boh. 10, tr. Lefort, p. 6).

In practising this half-night watch, there are four uses: S. Anthony liked better to divide the night in three parts, reserving the first and last parts to prayer, the middle part to sleep: *Ut psallerent ante et post somnum* (Vit. Antonii, c. 35; PG 26. 922)<sup>1</sup>. Abbot Palamon, the master of S. Pakhomius knows three alternatives in the observance of the night-watch; they are the three alternatives which Pakhomius offered one night to the choice of his two travelling companions: "I learnt from our holy father Palamon three modes of prayer: either that we pray till midnight and that we rest the remainder (of the night) till morning<sup>2</sup>; or that we sleep till midnight and pray till morning; or again, that we do alternately a time of prayer and a time of sleep from evening till morning (Vit. gr. I, § 60)<sup>3</sup>.

In the four alternatives, there is an even amount of sleep and watch, whether the watch was in one stretch from sunset

<sup>1</sup> This was still the custom of S. Barsanuphius well in the VIth century (+ 543): "About the nightly sleep: pray for two hours from the evening, reckoning them from sunset, and having given glory, sleep for six hours and rise up for the vigils and make the other four hours; and in the summer likewise, only with conciseness and a few psalms because of the shortness of the nights" (Answer to question 75).

<sup>2</sup> This also was still the use of Abbot Isaiah at Scete in the fifth century: *Mediam noctem ad vigilandum orationi decerne; alteram vero medietatem requiei corporis tui* (Precept. 55; PG 103. 432; = ed. Brockie, I. 8; and cf. Prec. 32; PG 103. 340).

<sup>3</sup> Following for this third alternative the text of the ms of Athens. The standard ms of Florence has here a lacuna: "or that from the start (of the night) we rest a little and <...> till morning." To fill in the gap we follow the text of the Vita I in the Athenian ms, and not the inferior text of the Vita III as Fr. Halkin has done. The text of the Vita III gives to understand, not an alternation of rest and watch, repeating itself several times, but a single session of prayer framed between two periods of rest; "or that from the start we sleep a little and so we may rise up and pray, and again that we sleep till morning". This version does not allow easily to understand the rest of the story: "They chose to do alternately a time of sleep ("hinim"; not "prayer" as Lefort mis-gardedly translates) and a time of watch" (Bohairic version). Pakhomius is then said to have remained awake to apportion (*ισδιζων*) judiciously the hours of sleep and prayer.

It is interesting to notice that the third (and oldest) of the Palamonian alternatives, the several periods of watch sandwiched with periods of sleep (Vit. I, § 60; = Vit. III, § 78; = Vit. Boh. § 59) vanishes as too archaic in the Vitae II (§ 50) and VI (§ 66), which come to mention only *Δύο τέλους προσευχῆς*.

to midnight, or from midnight to sunrise, or in two stretches of two hours at the beginning and four hours at the end of the night, or in twelve slices of half an hour sandwiched with slices of sleep.

Finally we may surmise that with the standard of a quasi continual prayer during the day and of six hours of prayer at night the reckoning of an output of some 50 psalms for the half-night and some 60 psalms during the day, given by the Bohairic Life (§ 10) should not be far out<sup>1</sup>.

§ 2. *The original Pakhomian Typikon (320—380):*

*Frequent prayers during the day; Full synaxis and domestic synaxis in the evening; Full synaxis at dawn.*

The authoritative documents, reflecting faithfully the state of things during the lives of S. Pakhomius (+ 346) and S. Theodore (+ 368) are the following: the *Vita Pachomii graeca* I, written before the death of Theodore (368), and its parallel the Bohairic Life; the Rule of Pakhomius in three books (Precepts, Precepts and Institutions, Precepts and Laws), either in the greek and coptic fragments which remain, or in the latin translation made by Jerome in 404 and which has come to us complete; the Epistle of Ammun to Theophilus the bishop of Alexandria, c. 390, and the Paralipomena, between 370 and 400.

a) The constant prayer during the day. — According to the first Pakhomian documents the constant vocal prayer is certainly no longer practised “à la lettre”. To go for the whole day in the desert to recite uninterrupted series of psalms from sunrise to sunset is perhaps possible for hermits who feed on wild roots and consequently enjoy abundant leisure. It is scarcely possible in a cenobitic community such as that of Akhmin for instance, which counts teams of masons, carpenters, bakers, tanners, fullers, tailors, smiths, reed cutters, basquet-weavers, gardeners for the kitchen-gardens, wheat and olive growers, boatmen to convey to town the produce of the

<sup>1</sup> Cmp. Cassian, telling us that, before Pachomius' time, Egyptian monks were discussing whether 50 or 60 psalms ought to be said at night (Inst. Coen., l. 2, c. 5).

monastery. In the face of such an economic development constant vocal prayer from morning to evening must needs disappear.

And yet, even if the daily prayers are already cut up, "discreet", yet is the ideal of the constant prayer saved by a faithful endeavour to rise from work as often as the work will allow it, or to have one monk reading psalms to a team of monks working together indoors. Pakhomius being ill "was getting up at intervals and was moved to pray by the fervour of his heart and of his love of God" (Vita gr. I, § 51—52; = Bo § 47): "One day — it was in the twelfth year<sup>1</sup> — Theodore was sitting in his cell, weaving ropes and reciting passages which he had learnt by heart in the holy Scriptures; each time his heart prompted him to do so, he got up and prayed" (Bo § 34).

b) The full synaxis in the evening, supper and the full conference. — Daily work in the Pakhomian monasteries stopped at the 10th hour (= 4 pm) according to the older documents. Beginning the narrative of the famous Apocalyptic Vision, the Paralipomena tell that Pakhomius rejoined the brethren at the tenth hour<sup>2</sup> at the synaxis<sup>3</sup> and makes the prayers with them<sup>4</sup>. So does the Vita I relate the criticism made to Pakhomius that he only tolerated foreign monks at the synaxis before supper and his talk<sup>5</sup>. So does the Epistle of Ammun tell us that with the evening the brethren rested from work and that Theodore gave a talk to the brethren assembled after the common prayer<sup>6</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> A. D. 321 according to the chronology of the Greek Lives; A. D. 323 according to that of the Coptic sources.

<sup>2</sup> At the 9th hour (= 3 pm) according to the later documents: Vita gr. II, § 63; Vita gr. III, § 105; Vita gr. VI, § 22.

<sup>3</sup> "Synaxis" in the Vitae means either (here both) the services of Common prayer (Vespers and the Vigils) or the building in which these services are held.

<sup>4</sup> *Καὶ εἰσελθόντων τῶν ἀδελφῶν εἰς τὰς εὐχάς, συναχθεὶς καὶ αὐτὸς μετ' αὐτῶν ἐπλήρωσεν τὰς εὐχάς. Καὶ ἐξελθόντων ἐπὶ τὸ γενύσασθαι . . . κτλ.* (Paral., § 17).

<sup>5</sup> *τῇ μὲν ὥρᾳ τῆς συνάξεως συνέρχεσθαι μεθ' ὑμῶν, μετὰ δὲ τὴν εὐχὴν εἰς πρέποντα καὶ ἡσυχον τόπον ὄντας ἐσθλὴν καὶ ἀναπαύεσθαι.* (Vit. gr. I § 40; = Boh. § 40).

<sup>6</sup> *τὸ ἐσπέρινον καταπαύσασιν τοῦ ἔργου καὶ εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ <ν> ἡθροισμένοι ἐπὶ τὰς συνήθεις εὐχὰς προτρέπων ἐφη· κτλ.* (Ep. Amm., § 22).

While the Greek *Vitae* call the Common Prayer offices “*Synaxes*”, the Latin text of the Rule calls them “*Collectae*”: The general or full evening *Synaxis* or *Collecta* consist of six psalms with a prayer after each psalm. This will be shown further on, when speaking of the later evening house-synaxis.

The general evening *Synaxis* is followed by supper, the only meal of the day. The foreign monks are led to supper straight from Vespers<sup>1</sup>. In the episode of the Apocalyptic Vision, the brethren go to the refectory after the *synaxis* to taste food (τὸ γεύσασθαι), while Pakhomius goes and shuts himself in the oratory from 4 pm to the time of the night-service, that is 2 am<sup>2</sup>.

After supper, on certain days, the Superior General of the Congregation gives a spiritual talk or conference (*collation*). Like Vespers this spiritual conference is a full session of all the monks of the village-monastery, gathered from their several houses in the central meeting-house. This exercise is a new feature of Pakhomian monasticism. It was yet unknown of Anthony. Monks contemporary of Pakhomius at Latopolis have the Conference, but it is still there, after the original meaning of the word, a mere colloquy between brethren, from equal to equal, to tell each other of their spiritual experiences<sup>3</sup>. The Pakhomian Collation or Conference will also entail such sharing of experience, as well as avowal of faults, but it presents itself first and foremost as an instruction to cenobites, eager to receive teaching from an experienced and recognised master. Evening falling, Pakhomius was wont after supper to sit and to speak the word of God to the brethren<sup>4</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Vit. gr. I, § 40 = Boh. § 40.

<sup>2</sup> Par., § 17.

<sup>3</sup> Vit. gr. I, § 34: καθημέτων δέ ποτε τῶν μοναχῶν ἐσπέρας ὡς ἔθος λαλεῖν τὸν λόγον τοῦ Θεοῦ; = Boh., § 29: nam in omni tempore, postquam panem suum comederant, in unum convenire solebant, et quod quisque a sanctis scripturis didicerat recitabat.

<sup>4</sup> Boh. § 29: Cum vesper intervenisset . . . ut panem edendi finem fecerunt, pater noster Pakhomius sedit, locutus est verbum divinum fratribus et exposuit interpretationes Scripturarum (tr. Lefort, p. 20, 1. 20 ss).

Par., § 1: ἔθος ἦν τοῖς ἀδελφοῖς τοῦ θεωφιλεστάτου καὶ ἀγίου πατρὸς ἡμῶν Παχουμίου καθ' ἐσπέρας εἰς ὠρισμένον τόπον τῆς μονῆς συνέρχεσθαι ἐπὶ τὸ ἀκοῦσαι τῆς διδασκαλίας αὐτοῦ. Συναχθέντων οὖν ἐν μίᾳ κατὰ τὸ ἔθος ἐπὶ τὸ ἀκοῦσαι τοῦ μεγάλου . . . κτλ.

Once, taking the young Theodore unawares, Pakhomius orders him to leave his table-service to someone else and to prepare himself to give the spiritual talk in the oratory a few minutes later<sup>1</sup>.

While Pakhomius was at Pabau, Theodore went there every evening after work from Tabennisi to hear Pakhomius read the Scriptures, which he was also accustomed to explain to the brethren before their retiring to bed<sup>2</sup>. Later on Theodore himself, being now second-in-charge of the whole community, "while the brethren had finished their meal, they went into the hut after their wont to listen to the words which Theodore would tell them"<sup>3</sup>.

This general conference is not held every day. In the story already quoted of the Apocalyptic Vision, Pakhomius withdraws to the oratory after Vespers, and without going to supper shuts himself in for the night. In another story, that of the Terrifying Vision, Pakhomius again retires to the oratory immediately after Vespers, although this time it must have been a day fixed for a conference for Theodore is coming from afar to attend it. The criticism levelled at Pakhomius on the way he receives foreign monks speaks of their being let in Church for Vespers then to a guest room for supper and then straight to bed<sup>4</sup>.

It is the Vita I itself which explicitly tells us that the Economos, that is the Superior General of the whole Congregation, must give three catecheses a week, one on Saturday (presumably after Vespers) and two on Sunday (presumably after the Vigils and after Vespers)<sup>5</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Vit. gr. I, § 77 = Bo § 69: *ὅτε ἐξέρχονται οἱ ἀδελφοὶ ὀψέ, παράδος τὴν διακονίαν ἄλλω, καὶ δεῦρο, ὅπου συναρόμεθα εἰς κατήχησιν κατὰ τὴν κυριακὴν . . . καὶ μετὰ τὴν κατήχησιν καὶ εὐχὴν ἐκαθέσθῃ ὡς ἔθος αὐτῷ καὶ ἤρξατο λαλεῖν ταῦτα Παχόμιος . . . . κτλ.*

<sup>2</sup> Vit. gr. I, § 88 = Bo § 73: *καὶ εἶχεν Θεόδωρος τοιαύτην συνήθειαν ἐλθεῖν καθ' ἡμέρας τὰ πρὸς ὀψέ εἰς Παβαῦ μετὰ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ ἐν Ταβεννήσει, ὅπως ἀκούσας τὰ λεγόμενα λόγια τῶν γραφῶν παρὰ τοῦ ἀββᾶ Παχουμίου, ἀνακάμψει διηγῆσασθαι τοῖς ἀδελφοῖς πρὶν κοιμηθῶσιν.*

<sup>3</sup> Vit. boh. § 87: *Lorsque les frères eurent fini de manger, ils se rendirent dans la cabane selon leur habitude pour entendre les paroles de Dieu <que Théodore leur> disait.*

<sup>4</sup> Vit. gr. I, § 40 = Bo § 40.

<sup>5</sup> Vit. gr. I, § 28: *Κατήχησεις δὲ τρεῖς ἵνα ὁ οικονόμος τῆς μονῆς ποιῇ, κατὰ σάββατον μίαν καὶ τῇ κυριακῇ δύο.*

c) The domestic synaxis of "the six prayers" at the domestic conference. — A passage from the Vita I informs us concerning a second synaxis and a second conference in the evening, both distinct from the fuller synaxis and conference prescribed by Pakhomius or Theodore. "When, his speech finished, says that passage, Pakhomius rose up, everyone went in his own house . . . and after having said the six prayers they began to discuss the questions put to them."<sup>1</sup>

This passage is unique in the Vitae and would make us wonder, if it was not corroborated by no less than ten passages in the Pakhomian Rule. For this Rule clearly distinguishes two evening synaxes, a general one held in the central church and presided by the Ekonomos (Superior General) and a smaller one held in each house of the monastery and presided by the house-masters (*oikuxoi*). The first is the "Collecta" or "*Collecta maior*" or "*Collecta omnium fratrum*" or "*Collecta meridiana*"; it is celebrated at 4 pm. The second is called "*Collecta vespertina sex orationum*", "*Collecta domus*" (or *domorum*, or *per domos*), but more often simply "the six evening prayers", *sex orationes vespere*<sup>2</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Vit. gr. I § 58: *Καὶ οὕτως μετὰ τούτους τοὺς λόγους ἀναστὰς ὁ πατὴρ ἡμῶν Παχοῦμιος . . . καὶ οὕτως ἀναχώρησεν ἕκαστος εἰς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ οἰκίαν . . . καὶ μετὰ τὸ ποιῆσαι αὐτοὺς τὰς ἑξ ἐυχὰς . . . ἐκάθητο συνλαλεῖν . . . τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν εἰρημένων.*

<sup>2</sup> Praecepta, 23: *ad collectam meridianam vel (= et) ad vespertinam sex orationum.*

Praec., 49: *in collecta omnium fratrum.*

Praec., 121: *qui una oratione de sex orationibus vespertinis tardius venerit*; = Copt.: *ad unam sex orationibus vespere* (p. 165, ll. 21—23).

Praec., 125: *Vespere in sex orationibus*; = Copt.: *per sex orationes.*

Praec., 126: *Post sex orationes quando ad dormiendum omnes separantur.*

Praec., 135: *Omnis correptio . . . fiet . . . in maiori collecta et in vescentibus.*

Praec. et Inst., 14: *Per domos singulas vespere sex orationes psalmosque complebunt iuxta ordinem maioris collectae quae a cunctis fratribus in commune celebratur*; = Copt.: *Congregati autem in domo sua orationem sexies facient vespere iuxta regulas collectae.* (Cmp. Praec. et Leg., 10, *infra*).

Praec. et Leg., Tit.: *De sex orationibus vespertinis et de collecta quae per singulas domus fit sex orationum.*

Praec. et Leg., 5: *vel in collecta domus, sive in collecta maiore, hoc est omnium fratrum.*

Praec. et Leg., 10: *Sex orationes facere vespertinas, iuxta exemplum maioris collectae, in qua omnes fratres pariter congregantur.*

In practice nevertheless these house-prayers are of same length as the general synaxis; as both offices consist of six psalms with a psalmic prayer at the end of each psalm. For it is twice emphasised that the second or house-synax is built on the pattern of the first: "*iuxta ordinem maioris collectae*", (= Copt.: *iuxta regulas collectae*), "*iuxta exemplum maioris collectae*" (Praec. et Inst., 14; Praec. et Leg., 10).

Finally, as the full synaxis was followed on Saturdays and Sundays by a spiritual conference given by the Economos, so is the domestic Synaxis in its turn followed twice a week, on Wednesdays and Fridays, by a Conference or spiritual talk, given this time by the house-masters<sup>1</sup>. The monks have thus five instructions a week without counting the eventual homily at the Sunday Eucharist.

Having thus made out the double evening synaxis of six psalms each, we can now turn to a passage of the Epistle of Ammun where the single evening synaxis mentioned is given a total of twelve psalms. In fact there is no contradiction with what we have met in the Vita I and the Regula. The case of the Vespers mentioned in Ammun's Epistle happens not in the monastery but during a wood-cutting expedition: work has lasted longer than usual and the monks will not return to their houses in the monastery; they will camp on the spot. Nothing

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<sup>1</sup> Vit. gr. I, § 28: Κατηχήσεις δὲ τρεῖς ἅς ὁ οἰκονόμος τῆς μονῆς ποιῇ καὶ σάββατον μίαν καὶ τῇ κυριακῇ δύο· καὶ οἱ οἰκιστοὶ τὰς δύο ἡμέρας.

Praec. ac Inst., 15: *Per singulas hebdomadas binas disputationes, i. e. catecheses a praepositis complebuntur*; = Copt.: *Catechesis autem verbi bis per sabbatum fiet necessario* (p. 167). The Coptic "*sabbatum*" is of course synonymous of "*hebdomada*"; it means the week, not the day. The Economos is giving the Conference on Saturdays.

Praec., 20: speaks of three weekly conferences: *Disputatio per singulas hebdomadas a praepositis domorum tertio fit*. But a) the joint authority of Vit. gr. I, Praec. ac Inst. lat. and Praec. ac Inst. copt., b) the special authority of Praec. ac Inst. as the formal handbook of the house-masters, c) the explicitations of Vit. gr. I mentioning why they are two, viz. on account of the two fasts in the week, d) the universality of the double fasting stations in the week, point all to "*binæ*" as the exact reading.



more natural then for the two series of six psalms to be said together at one stretch<sup>1</sup>.

d) The full Synaxis in the night. — It is clear that the Pakhomian monasteries have no office between the "six evening prayers" with their eventual conference and the night-vigil. The three alternatives taught by Palamon to Pakhomius never entered the Pakhomian Typikon. That Pakhomius once proposed them to his travel-companions remains an isolated and exceptional fact.

Vitae and Paralipomena are explicit: there is no watch from sunset to midnight (1st alternative of Palamon), but all go to bed in great silence immediately after the six evening prayers and the possible conference. Neither does one watch from midnight to sunrise, nor does one cut the whole night in alternative slices of sleep and watch (2nd and 3rd alternatives of Palamon). Indeed Pakhomius retires to the oratory from supper time (4 pm) till the beginning of the Vigils (8th hour of the night or 2 am) (Vit. I § 88, Episode of the Terrifying Vision). Again another time he receives a vision round midnight which lasts till the Vigils (Par. § 19, Episode of the Apocalyptic Vision). There are thus no offices from 9 pm to 2 am.

The full Night-Synaxis or Vigils begins round 2 am. The most ancient documents then, Vita gr. I and Paralipomena, in the passages just mentioned, call it rightly the *νυκτερινή σύναξις*<sup>2</sup>. The Night-Synaxis finishes *πρωτ*, before sunrise, at early morning (Vit. I. § 88; = Bo § 73; = Vitae gr. III § 138, Episode of the Terrifying vision). This explains why the *σύναξις νυκτερινή* (Par. § 19; Vita II § 71; Vita III § 119; Vita VI § 53) is called sometimes a *σύναξις ἑωθινή* (Vit. II § 58, Vita VI § 52). But their official name will always remain *vigiliae nocturnae*,

<sup>1</sup> Ep. Ammon., § 22: τὸ ἑσπερινὸν καταπαύσασιν τοῦ ἔργου καὶ εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ <ν> ἡθροισμένοις ἐπὶ τὰς συνήθεις εὐχὰς προτρέπων ἔφη· Ἐν τῇ δωδεκάτῃ προσεὐχῇ, θέντων ἡμῶν τὰ γόνατα ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν, τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον ἐδήλωσέν μοι δι· ... κτλ.

<sup>2</sup> And cmp. Vit. gr. I § 70 (Episode of the temptation of the postulant elder): καὶ ταραχθεὶς ἐνυπνίῳ νυκτὸς ἦλθεν ἐν μέσῳ τῶν ἀδελφῶν ἐν τῇ συνάξει.

νυκτεριναὶ παννύχαις, and link them with the night-office, not with Matins (Lauds).

§ 3. *The Pakhomian Typikon after 380 (the Rule of the Angel):*

*Twelve day-prayers in private, Synaxis of twelve evening-prayers, Synaxis of twelve night-prayers, Prayers at None, Table psalms.*

The fifth century documents which deal with Pakhomian uses after 380 are Palladius' Lausiac History (written 419/420), Cassian's *Instituta Coenobiorum* (written c. 425), Sozomen's notice on Pakhomius in his *Ecclesiastical History* (l. III, c. 14), (a notice dependent on Palladius), the *Vita Pachomii* translated by Dionysius Exiguus in the first years of the VIth century, but whose original greek text must go back to 450/500, and finally the second set of Greek Lives of Pakhomius: *Vita* III, VI and IV. These latter lives make a group to themselves as they are much related to each other.

There is no great interest to take these works in their chronological order, first because they are pretty well contemporary. The three first are all of the first half of the century. Still more: if Cassian wrote some five years later than Palladius, their actual experience of Egyptian monasticism dates from exactly the same years, viz. the last decade of the 4th century. There is thus no interest in taking them in chronological order.

But all these documents quote in a more or less developed way a set of directions which by the end of the fourth century was believed to have been delivered by an angel either to the Pakhomian community as a whole or directly and personally to Pakhomius himself. This set of directions on monastic ways of life is called the *Regula Angeli*, the Rule of the Angel. Now one should not confuse the legendary character given to the origin of the Rule with the historicity of its contents c. 390, and to reject the latter because one rejects the first. The elaboration of an angelic and visionary setting to the origins of the Rule of the Angel between 346 and 390 may indeed be the creation of a legend; for Cassian and Palladius

to relate that such a Rule was followed, and that such belief on its origins was in fact held by the Pakhomian monks in 390 is no longer legend but history. As for the contents of the Rule, they offer nothing abnormal or even excessive, neither on the chapter of dress or of demeanour or of prayer. As to the last item, it may be noted incidentally that the "three times twelve psalms" formula of the Rule is quantitatively smaller than the actual norm in the Byzantine Office, equal to that of the actual Roman and Benedictine Offices.

Nor can one argue from the resemblance of formulae in Cassian and Palladius that they were copying from a common literary source, and that this source should be Evagrius because both happen to be Evagrians. First, the supposed common literary source is a pure supposition of which there is no trace, certainly not in Evagrius' writings. Secondly the presupposed source cannot be Evagrius: Both Palladius and Cassian were in Egypt at the same time as Evagrius. Having seen what they wanted to see the three of them separated far enough of each other to write their memoirs independently; also they wrote concomitantly enough to prevent the probability of a literary borrowing. Why search "midi à quatorze heures" and not admit simply that the resemblance of their formulae comes from having eye-witnessed a same practice and heard of an already stereotyped and recognised formula in the visited monasteries? The fact that Cassian and Palladius only visited Northern Egypt is no objection. Cassian explicitly states that by his time monastic uses were already standardized between Scete and Thebais; Palladius explicitly states that the Rule of the Angel is that of the Pakhomian monasteries and that he actually visited one of them.

Finally, there is not only resemblance between Cassian's and Palladius' formulas of the Rule. If they agree on evening- and dawn-prayers, they do not agree on the day-prayers, Cassian still speaks of a constant prayer during the day (*incessanter*); Palladius reduces them to twelve, bringing them so in alignment with the evening and night quotas. This is enough to discard a servile dependence of the one on the other, or of

both on an hypothetical common source. The explanation again is simpler: the discrepancy states the eye-witnessing of two stages in the development of practice. Cassian reflects the state of things prevailing at the time of his visit, that of last decade of the 4th century. Palladius, although he had visited Egypt at the same time, had another chance to revisit Egypt later. It is between these two stays that the free and frequent day-prayers became reduced to twelve, and it is the latter use that is enshrined in Palladius' formula of the Rule of the Angel.

The whole Rule covers perhaps at most a couple of pages; the passage concerning the divine Office amounts to just one sentence. And yet, as we have said, that same sentence does not present the same wording in our documents. These can be classified in four groups representing each a stage of development in the text of the Rule of the Angel. It is this order of gradual complexity and development which we shall follow.

1. Cassian, *Instituta Coenobiorum*, l. 2, cc. 2, 5 and 6. — The date of redaction of the Institutes is c. 425, but the experience of Cassian in Egypt goes back to c. 385 to c. 398/400. Cassian gives the most sober and most primitive story and text of the Rule of the Angel; undoubtedly more sober and primitive than the one given by Palladius his contemporary. The apparition of the Angel does not yet take here the form of a personal vision granted to Pakhomius. Following long and unconclusive discussions by the Seniors on the number of psalms to be read at the synaxes, an unknown reader one day appears in the synaxis and begins to read eleven psalms '*in directum*', that is 'straight through', without giving time to the congregation to answer an antiphon or refrain. At the twelfth psalm though, the reader suggests the antiphon '*alleluia*' in answer to his reading. After which the reader disappears and the community deduces that an angel has come to give them the divine answer to their interminable and insoluble discussions.

The Rule of the Angel is formulated by Cassian as follows:

- a) *per totum diei spatium incessanter;*
- b) *duodenarius numerus tam in vespertinis*
- c) *quam in nocturnis vigiliis.*

The main features of this first version of the Rule of the Angel, when compared with the older typikon before 380, are these; a) the constant or continuous prayer during daytime is still asserted; b) the double series of six psalms, one before supper in general synaxis the other after supper in the domestic synaxis are now fused into one single series of twelve psalms.

2. The *Vita Pachomii latina* is in reality a latin translation of an earlier Greek life, distinct from the *Vitae Graecae I—V* published by Halkin and the *Vita VI* published by Nau. The Life was translated into Latin in the beginning of the 6th century by Dionysius Exiguus and we possess only this translation. But the text shows rather primitive features, even though the Life may have borrowed here and there from Palladius' *Lausiac History*. As far as the Rule of the Angel is concerned, the *Vita Pachomii Latina* presents a version as sober and almost as primitive as that of Cassian:

- a) *ut diurnae orationes XII fierent;*
- b) *et vespertinae XII,*
- c) *et nocturnae XII.*

The continuous prayer in the daytime has gone and a set of twelve prayers has taken its place. But apart from this the rest of the Rule is just as in Cassian: twelve prayers at the evening and twelve at night.

3—7. The third recension of the Rule of the Angel is represented by the *Lausiac History* of Palladius and by the notice of Sozomen on Pakhomius (*Hist. Eccl.*, l. 3, c. 14) which depends on the *Lausiac History*. The latter was written in 419/420 but on memories going back to Palladius' sojourn in Egypt c. 390.

The main characteristics of this group as compared to the two first ones is the addition of three prayers at None and of two psalms at meal.

Here we find ourselves before a great puzzle: the Lausiac History has come to us in two recensions: G, dating from AD. 400—450; B, dating from AD. 450—500. The older of the two recensions, viz. G, is accepted by all scholars as giving a better text than B. And yet when we look at it from the angle of our particular interest in the *Regula Angeli*, the text of this *Regula* is undoubtedly better in B than in G. Although a later recension, B has here the more conservative text, while G has made a mess of it.

Recension B simply adds the new items to the older ones:

- a) διὰ πάσης τῆς ἡμέρας ποιεῖν αὐτοὺς εὐχὰς δώδεκα,
- b) καὶ ἐν τῷ λυχνικῷ δώδεκα,
- c) καὶ ἐν παννυχίῳ δώδεκα,
- d) καὶ ἐνάτην ὥραν τρεῖς.
- e) "Ὅτε δὲ δοκεῖ τὸ πληθὺς ἐσθλεῖν καθ' ἐκάστην εὐχὴν ψαλμὸν.

As long as the sentence spoke only of the prayers of the day, of the evening and of the night, these three items followed each other in perfect chronological order. As soon as you start to add the three prayers at None and the Table-psalms, tacking them on at the end of the first series you get the new series:

Day | Evening | Night | None | Table.

But this upsets the chronological sequence of Offices. By trying to remedy the situation, Recension G muddles the text beyond repair. Of the three best mss of Recension G, two, ms 30 (Paris) and ms 31 (Turin), understand the prayers of None as really a doublet of the prayers of evening. Consequently, the Paris ms takes the evening prayers from their old place (2nd column) and transfers them at None (4th column), writing down here καὶ ἐν τῷ λυχνικῷ δώδεκα and omitting καὶ ἐνάτην ὥραν τρεῖς altogether. The Turin ms, aiming at eliminating the supposed doublet, takes the None prayers from their accepted place in Recension B (4th column) and transfers them at Vespers (2nd column) writing down here καὶ ἐνάτην ὥραν τρεῖς and omitting καὶ ἐν τῷ λυχνικῷ δώδεκα altogether. The Oxford Laudian ms (ms 31) finds another solution still

## The Four Redaction-Stages of the "Rule of the Angel":

	Day-Prayers	Evening Synaxis
1. Cassian, Inst. Coen., l. 2, cc. 2, 5 and 6 (a° c. 425)	1. <i>Per totum diei spatium incessanter . . .</i>	1. <i>Duodenarius numerus . . . tam in vespertinis</i>
2. Vita Pachomii, lat. tr. a Dionysio, 22 (a° 450/500)	2. <i>ut diurnae orationes XII fierent,</i>	2. <i>et vespertinae XII</i>
Palladius, Hist. laus., Butl. c. 32; = PG c. 38 (a° 419/420)		
3. Recension B:	3. }	3. <i>καὶ ἐν τῷ λυχνικῷ δώδεκα,</i>
Recension G:		
4. ms 30, Paris	4. <i>διὰ πάσης τῆς ἡμέρας ποιεῖν αὐτοὺς εὐχὰς</i>	4. —
5. ms 31, Turin ms 32, Oxford Land.	5. <i>δώδεκα,</i>	5. <i>καὶ ἐννάτην ὥραν τρεῖς,</i>
6. Sozomen, H.Ecc., III, 14	6. }	6. —
	7. <i>διὰ πάσης τῆς ἡμέρας δωδεκάτον (= δωδεκάκις) εἶχεσθαι,</i>	7. <i>καὶ πρὸς ἑσπέραν ὁμολως,</i>
Vitae Pachomii graecae ultiores (a° 450/500)		
8. Vita gr. III, § 22	8. <i>διὰ πάσης τῆς ἡμέρας ποιεῖν αὐτοὺς εὐχὰς</i>	8. —
9. Vita gr. VI, § 5	9. <i>δώδεκα + ὡς ἄπαντον εἶναι εὐχὴν</i>	9. —
10. Vita gr. IV, § 31	10. <i>(11. + ὡς εἰπεῖν)</i>	10. —

Night-Synaxis	Prayer at None	Eventual Prayers at the meal	Evening Synaxis
1. <i>quam in nocturnis conventiculis</i> (= vigiliis)			
2. <i>et nocturnae XII</i>			
3. } 4. } <i>καὶ ἐν παννυχί- σιν δώδεκα,</i> 5. }	3. καὶ ἐννάτην ὥραν τρεις. 4. καὶ ἐν τῷ λυ- χνικῷ ιβ. 5. —	3. "Ὅτε δὲ δοκεῖ τὸ πλῆθος ἐσθλεῖν καθ' ἐκάστην εὐ- χὴν ψαλμόν. 4. "Ὅτε δὲ μέλλει τὸ πλῆθος ἐσθλεῖν. 5. Καὶ ὅτε δοκεῖ τὸ πλῆθος ἐσθλεῖν. 6. "Ὅτε δὲ τὸ πλῆθος ἐσθλεῖ 4—6 ἐκάστῃ εὐχῇ ψαλμόν. 7. Ἦνθα δὲ μέλλοιεν ἐσ- θλεῖν ἐκάστης εὐχῆς προάδειν ψαλμόν.	
6. καὶ ἐν ταῖς νυκτε- ριναῖς παννυχίσιν δώδεκα, 7. τοσαυτάκις δὲ καὶ νύκτωρ,	6. καὶ ἐν τῷ ὀρθρῷ τρεις. 7. ἐννάτῃ δὲ ὥρᾳ τρίτον.		
8. } 9. } <i>καὶ ἐν παννυχί- σιν δώδεκα.</i> 10. }	8. } Καὶ ἐννάτην ὥραν τρεις εὐ- 9. } χὰς, 10. Καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἐννάτην ὥραν τρεις εὐχὰς,	8. } ὅτε δοκεῖ τὸ πλῆθος 9. } μεταλαμβάνειν. 10. ὅτε δὲ πλῆθος μετα- λαμβάνει τροφῆς.	8. — 9. } καὶ ἐν τῷ λυ- 10. } χνικῷ ἐξ.



more drastic: It omits to mention Vespers altogether, dropping *καὶ ἐν τῷ λυχνικῷ δώδεκα* in the second column. Then, interpreting the Prayers at None as a ninth hour of night, it changes the *καὶ ἐννάτην ὥραν τρεῖς* in the 4th column by *καὶ ἐν τῷ δρθρῳ τρεῖς!*

8—10. Finally the fourth and last version of the *Regula Angeli* is represented by the later *Vitae Graecae* III (§ 2), VI (§ 5) and IV (§ 31).

The characteristics of this group are: a) that it accepts the new prayers at None, without trying to get rid of them as did the G recension of group III. But whereas the third group still links the Prayers at None (or what they make of them) with the preceeding items of the sentence, beginning only a new sentence for the Table-psalms (*Ὅτε δὲ . . . ; Καὶ ὅτε . . .*), the 4th group detaches the Prayers of None from what precedes and links them with the following Table-psalms. Starting the new sentence already at the 4th column: *Καὶ ἐννάτην ὥραν τρεῖς εὐχὰς*, it then changes the full dot into a comma, and links the Prayers at None to *ὅτε δοκεῖ*. Thus the 4th group now says in fact: "Three prayers at None, when there is a meal".

b) The second characteristic of this text-group is that it also notices the upsetting of chronology in the order of enumeration, and wants to remedy it. But instead of interfering with the new None-prayers as Recension G of the III group, it simply transfers the evening prayers to the end, that is, transfers the 2nd column after the fifth (None). This does not solve the problem perfectly, as the Day-prayers remain out of their chronological order, but at least there is no tampering with the Prayers of None, nor confusing them with those of the evening. One must nevertheless mention two points: 1. *Vita gr* III (§ 2) intending to transfer Vespers at the end of the series, begins by omitting them in column II but then finally forgets to insert them as a new column VI. 2. *Vitae Graecae* VI (§ 5) and *Vitae gr* IV (§ 3) make the transfer of Evening prayers at the end (column VI); but the twelve prayers have become now six: *καὶ ἐν τῷ λυχνικῷ ἕξ*.

c) A last characteristic of this group reminds also of an archaic feature: mentioning the prayers of the day at the head of the list, the formula of this group adds a few words that remind us of the primitive care about constant prayer to which Cassian's formula still referred. Cassian said: *Per totum diei spatium incessanter*. The fourth redaction in these later *Vitae* uses the classical form: *διὰ πάσης τῆς ἡμέρας ποιεῖν αὐτοὺς εὐχὰς δώδεκα* used in all other groups as well, but it adds the words *ὥς ἀπαιροῦν εἶναι εὐχὴν*, "that the prayer may be continuous". Vita IV, though, feels the need of qualifying this by adding still a cautious little *ὥς εἰπεῖν*, "so to speak", "as one might say".

It remains to gather the results of this analysis of the Egyptian sources: What spirit presided over the birth and development of prayer-time in Egyptian monasticism? Which form did the hour-cycle of the Egyptian Office take? What is the nature or the internal structure of these Egyptian Hours?

Egyptian monastic prayer was born of a categorical refusal to accept the Septennary-cycle already traditional elsewhere in Christendom: the new fourth century public offices of Matins (Lauds) and Vespers because they were either unknown yet in the desert of Egypt or because they were judged too essentially ecclesiastical; the three little day-prayers of Terce, Sext and None and the three night-prayers of Bed-time (*Apodeipnon*), Midnight (*Mesonyktikon*) and Rising-up (*Orthros*) because they were "discreet". While Palestinian, West Syrian, and Cappadocian monasticism had aligned itself to the ecclesiastical tradition, itself inherited from the ancient Jewish ritual, Egyptian monasticism stood fiercely for the principle of the constant or continuous prayer, and the principle is voiced by Epiphanius and by Cassian.

Yet the constant prayer, if it has to be vocal as the Egyptians understood it, is built on too precarious circumstances: it is rarely practicable and then only in private. Thus it asks to be completed by a common-prayer or office. At night, constant prayer becomes impossible as a daily norm and Palamon must offer instead three alternatives of clustered prayers, which is

already a first step to "discreetness". With Pakhomius the constant prayer during the day becomes a free and frequent turning to God from the manual task; it is discreet nevertheless. And there are three synaxes: the first full or general after work in the late afternoon; the second, domestic, after supper at bed-time; the third, general again, at dawn.

With the second Pakhomian generation the two evening synaxes of six psalms each have fused; the three first recensions of the *Regula Angeli* concord in speaking of "twelve (prayers) at evening". Evening and morning synaxes are thus brought in alignment and balance each other. And daily prayers, though remaining private and discreet, are now officially reduced to twelve, to bring them also in alignment with the rest, in a formula of "three times twelve prayers", or thirty six psalms a day.

This second Pakhomian generation introduces also the commonprayers of three psalms at None. With the synaxes of evening and dawn, this third common-prayer in the afternoon might remind one of the verse of the Psalm: "At evening morning and afternoon . . ." (Ps. 54. 17). But the rapprochement is fallacious: The three-hour cycle of the later Pakhomians has nothing to do with the sacrificial associations lying behind the quoted psalm-verse. It has nothing to do with the sacrificial meaning of Matins (Lauds) and Vespers elsewhere. Egyptian "Vespers" may well be held at the same time as the ecclesiastical Vespers in the rest of Christendom, they do not show a trace of the hour-kathism as all ecclesiastical Vespers do: psalms chosen especially for the evening; nor do they entail the old candle-lucernarium traceable in ecclesiastical Vespers. Again their Night-Vigils may be held at dawn as the Orthros elsewhere, they ignore the hour-kathisma of the Rising-psalms (Hexapsalm), the morning eucharist for the light and the expectation theme of the Second Advent traceable in Syria and elsewhere. The Egyptian monastic "Vespers" and Nocturns are long seances of reading through the Psalter "*per ordinem*". As the primitive constant prayer of Julian's hermits, they have no other meaning than that of a punctual acquittal of the "*servitutis pensum*", the integral recitation of the Psalter once a week.

## **XII. ASCETICA**

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## Influence of Patristic Studies on Russian modern Mystics

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Russian contemplatives have as their patriarch, St. Anthony of Kiev (983—1073). The latter learnt how to lead a contemplative life in the Monastic Republic of Mount Athos in the Byzantine Empire, where he was professed by the Abbot of the Esphigmenu Monastery. Returning home he brought with him Athonite spirituality and customs. All Russian monks and contemplatives are descended in the last resort from this saint. By the XIIth century the Russian monks had their own monastery on Mount Athos, Xylurgu, out of which the great Russian Monastery of St. Panteleimon ultimately developed<sup>1</sup>. Since an early time the Russians possessed a large collection of Slavonic translations of the patristic writings. Already before the Mongol invasion of 1236 the Russians read St. Athanasius the Great, St. Gregory Nazianzen, St. Gregory of Nyssa, St. Gregory the Great, St. Basil the Great, St. Ephrem the Syrian, St. John Climacus, St. John Chrysostom, St. John Damascene, St. Maximus, St. Hippolyte of Rome as well as several Palestinian and Egyptian mystics<sup>2</sup>.

The Mongol invasion followed by the long period of subjection to Mongol rulers as overlords delayed the development of patristic studies in Russia. As soon as this subjection whittled away the Fathers began once more to be studied in Russia. St. Joseph of Volokolamsk, who flourished in the XVth century and founded an ecclesiastical party known as Josephites, wrote a very able defence of Christianity against the heresy of the Judaizers. In

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<sup>1</sup> Soloviev, Prof. A., *Histoire du Monastère Russe au Mont Athos*, Belgrade, 1933.

<sup>2</sup> Golubinsky, Prof. E., *Istoriia Russkoi Tserkvi*, Moscow University Press 1900—1, Vol. I, 4th chapter.

the treatise "Prosvetitel" over forty Fathers are quoted<sup>1</sup>. St. Nilus of Sora, a contemporary of St. Joseph and, as the leader of the opposing party of the Nonpossessors his chief antagonist, was particularly learned in the Fathers. After his monastic profession St. Nilus went abroad and lived for a while in Constantinople, the Holy Land, Mount Sinai and Mount Athos. The latter had experienced in the preceding century the great hesychast movement and the controversies between St. Gregory Palamas (d. 1359) and Barlaam the Calabrian. St. Nilus learned much on Mount Athos.

St. Nilus of Sora may be considered the first Russian mystic of distinction. In his writings St. Nilus taught that mental prayer, particularly the hesychast prayer of Jesus, is superior to vocal prayer. Without inner perfection external works mean little or nothing. None can attain this perfection, unless he first masters himself, for inner perfection consists in mastering the imagination, emotions and thoughts and then subjecting them to the service of God<sup>2</sup>. There is no doubt that St. Nilus was familiar with the writings of St. Gregory of Sinai (d. 1346), St. Maximus Capsocalyvitis, St. Theoleptus, St. Gregory Palamas, etc. St. Nilus of Sora did not found a school. After his death the Josephites destroyed the Nonpossessors alleging that they harboured heretical tendencies. In this struggle St. Maximus the Greek (1480—1556), a monk of Vatopedi, Mt. Athos, who brought Greek learning to Russia, suffered much.

The Father of modern Russian contemplatives, Archimandrite Paisius Velichkovsky (1722—1794), like St. Anthony of Kiev and St. Nilus of Sora, was closely connected with Mount Athos. A Ukrainian and a graduate of Kiev Theological Academy, Paisius became a monk in his own country and then in 1746 went to Mount Athos where he founded the Skete of St. Elias which still exists. In 1763 Paisius migrated to the Rumanian Principality of Moldavia, where he was successively Abbot of Dragomirna, Sekul and Neamtu where at his death he left

<sup>1</sup> Prosvetitel, Kazan, 1857.

<sup>2</sup> Sorsky, St. Nil, Tvoreniya, St. Petersburg, 1863.

700 monks. The translation of "Philokalia" from Greek into Slavonic, made by Paisius and published in Moscow in 1793 at the request of the Metropolitan Gabriel Petrov, of St. Petersburg and Novgorod, mightily influenced contemplative life in Russia<sup>1</sup>.

The "Philokalia" is a collection of patristic and hesychast writings concerning pure prayer and the monastic life. This collection was prepared on Mount Athos by Macarius, Metropolitan of Corinth, (1731—1805) and St. Nicodemus the Haghiote (1748—1809) who has been recently canonized. It was printed in Venice in 1782 and has 1207 pages in folio. The "Philokalia" is divided into two parts. The first includes the writings of Anthony the Great, Isai, Evagrius, Cassian, Marc, Hesychius, John Damascene, Philemon, Theognost, Philotheus of Sinai, Elias and Theophanis. The second part contains treatises of Peter of Damascus, Simeon Metaphrast, Simeon the New Theologian, Nicetas Stephatos, Theoleptus, Nicephorus, Gregory of Sinai, Gregory Palamas, Callixtus and Ignatius Xanthopoulos, Callixtus the Patriarch, Callixtus Angelikudes, Callixtus Cataphygiotes, Simeon of Thessaloniki, Marc of Ephesus and Maximus Kapsokalyvitis. Paisius Velichkovsky translated only 25 treatises out of 36. He named his collection "Dobrotolyubie" or "Love of Good". Paisius also made some translation from Theodore Studit<sup>2</sup>.

The "Dobrotolyubie" of Paisius rapidly spread through Russia. The great Russian mystic of the XIX<sup>th</sup> century, canonized in 1904, St. Serafim of Sarov (1759—1833), knew it and recommended it to his disciples. St. Serafim's spirituality faithfully reflects that of the Philokalia, particularly that of Simeon the New Theologian. St. Serafim's mysticism is a mysticism of joy and light<sup>3</sup>. An even greater influence on the

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<sup>1</sup> Schiarchimandrite Paisii Velichkovsky, *Journal Moskovskoi Patriarkhii*, Oct. 1954, pp. 53—59.

<sup>2</sup> Un moine de l'Eglise d'Orient. La Prière de Jésus, *Irénikon*, 1947, 4<sup>me</sup> Trimestre, pp. 380—421. The article abounds in information, notes and bibliography on "Philokalia" and "Dobrotolyubie".

<sup>3</sup> Dobbie-Bateman, *Saint Seraphim of Sarov*, London, 1936.



development of Russian Orthodox spirituality in the XIX<sup>th</sup> century was exercised by the Staretz of the Monastery of Optino. This Monastery founded at the beginning of the XV<sup>th</sup> century was suppressed by Peter the Great in 1724. Then Bishop Philaret Amfiteatrov, of Kaluga, in 1821 invited some disciples of Paisius to restore it. The Monastery of Optino became renowned throughout Russia from its Staretz or spiritual directors, Fathers Leonid Nagolkin (1769—1841), Macarius Ivanov (1783—1860) and Ambrose Grenkov (1812—1891). Fr. Macarius published several of the Slavonic translations made by Paisius Velichkovsky. In this work he was assisted by a Russian philosopher Ivan Kyreevsky (1806—1856) and some monks. Altogether 16 titles were published. They include Barsanuthius the Great, John, St. Simeon the New Theologian, Theodore Studit, Maximus the Confessor, Isaak the Syrian, Thalassius, Dorotheus, Marc, Orsisius, Isaih. Most of these books were published in Slavonic, but some in Russian. The Monastery sent them free to the libraries of all Russian Theological Academies and Seminaries, to all Bishops and some clergy and to all Russian cenobitic Monasteries. All these books were published between 1846 and 1860<sup>1</sup>. The Staretz of Optino directed several eminent Russians like N. Gogol, S. Shevirev, M. Pogodin, L. Kavelin, A. Norov, A. Muraviev, T. Filipov, C. Leontiev, C. Zedergolm, etc. T. Dostoevsky, L. Tolstoy, V. Soloviev and V. Rozanov visited Staretz Ambrose. Dostoevsky tried to picture Staretz Ambrose as the Staretz Zosima in "Brothers Karamazov" and Vladimir Soloviev as the Staretz John in "Three Conversations". The Monastery of Optino was closed by the Soviet Government in 1923 and its last Staretz, Fr. Nectarius, died in 1928<sup>2</sup>.

Although "Dobrotolyubie" of Paisius was republished in 1853—1855 there was a great need to issue it in Russian. Another great Russian mystic, Bishop Theophan Govorov (1815—1894) better known as Theophan the Recluse performed this task. A

<sup>1</sup> Staretz Makarii Optinskii. Institut Sv. Vladimira, Harbin, 1940.

<sup>2</sup> Rymarenko, E. Vospominaniya ob Optinskom Startze ieromonakhe Nektarii, Pravoslavnaia Zhizn, Jordanville, USA, May—Sept., 1954.

graduate of Kiev Theological Academy since 1841, the monk Theophan was first professor or Rector of various Seminaries, then a missionary in the Holy Land and a chaplain in Constantinople, finally Rector of St. Petersburg Academy. Consecrated Bishop of Tambov in 1859, Theophan was translated to Vladimir in 1863. Three years later he resigned and became a recluse in the Monastery of Vysh. During his 28 years as a recluse, Theophan published several books on the spiritual life. He produced in 1877 the first Russian edition of "Dobrotolyubie" in five volumes. This edition was published by the Russian Monastery of St. Panteleimon on Mount Athos. There were three more editions of which the last appeared in 1913. Theophan greatly enlarged the collection devoting, for instance, an entire volume to the writings of St. Theodore Studit. He omitted certain hesychast treatises which he considered to be liable to create a misunderstanding. In 1892 Theophan published "The Ancient Monastic Rules of Pachomius the Great, Basil the Great, John Cassian and Benedict". The Bishop-Recluse's writings have all made a deep impression on those Russian monks, clergy and laity who were attracted to the contemplative life<sup>1</sup>. Another Bishop, Ignatius Brianchaninov (1807—1867), a nobleman and Army officer before he became a monk, left six volumes of ascetical and mystical writings equally well read by Russians in search of perfection. When Ignatius resigned his commission in 1827 and entered the Monastery of St. Alexander Svirsky there he met Fr. Leonid Nagolkin, the first Staretz of Optino, Ignatius was afterwards Abbot of Sergiev near St. Petersburg and then Bishop in Caucasus. The last six years of his life Ignatius lived in retirement in a Monastery in the diocese of Kostroma. The sources of Bishop Ignatius' spirituality are as patristic as those of Theophan. Paisius's "Dobrotolyubie" greatly influenced Russian popular piety as that devotional classic "The Story of a Russian Pilgrim" clearly shows. This

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<sup>1</sup> Shabatin, I. N. Prof. Episkop Feofan Zatvornik i Ego Dukhovnoe Nasledstvo, *Journal Moskovskoi Patriarkhii*, May 1948, pp. 43—45. Also Archimandrite Claudian, Preosvyashenii Feofan, Vyshensky Zatvornik, *Journal Moskovskoi Patriarkhii*, Jan. 1953, pp. 49—54.

little book appeared in Kazan in 1884. The author is unknown. The Abbot of St. Michael's Monastery in Kazan, Paisius (d. 1883), found the manuscript in the possession of a monk on Mount Athos. The treatise was subsequently translated into many languages. It should not be supposed that Russian contemplatives only knew those Fathers who were included in "Dobrotolyubie". Russian Theological Academies, some Monasteries as well as individual Bishops and priests, edited, translated and published a good number of the Fathers as well.

The Soviet Revolution of 1917 stopped the publication of all religious literature. Theological Academies and Seminaries and nearly all the Monasteries disappeared. Only since 1945 have new Theological Academies and Seminaries come into being. There are now also between 70 and 80 Monasteries and Convents in Russia, and some religious periodicals and books have appeared since 1944, but nothing is yet as it used to be. After the disappearance of Monasteries in the Soviet Union, Russian contemplative life still survived in some of the Monasteries abroad, principally in Valaam in Finland and on Mount Athos. The former, an ancient Russian Monastery, was much indebted for its greatness to the Metropolitan Gabriel Petrov of St. Petersburg, who arranged the publication of Paisius' "Dobrotolyubie". Monks from Optino introduced the Staretz method of spiritual direction into Valaam. In 1936 the Monastery published a "Collection of articles on the Prayer of Jesus" and in 1938 "Talks on the Prayer of Jesus". These books are based on "Dobrotolyubie" and the writings of Bishops Theophan the Recluse and Ignatius Brianchaninov, as well as some other authors. I visited Uusi Valamo, where the Community now resides, in the summer of 1954. During that visit I had the privilege of several talks with its great mystic, Fr. Michael the Recluse, who is the most profound contemplative I have ever met in my life although I have visited over 100 Monasteries of various nations, rites and rules. I have already published some articles about Fr. Michael and a book is to appear in due course. The spirituality of Fr. Michael is similar to that of

St. Serafim of Sarov and St. Simeon the New Theologian. It is a completely patristic spirituality<sup>1</sup>.

Besides Valaam the old tradition still survives in the Russian Monasteries on Mount Athos, which I also visited in 1954. Since 1914 the great St. Panteleimon's Monastery has ceased its publication of mystical, ascetical and devotional books. Cut off from their recruiting grounds in Russia, the Russian Monasteries on Mount Athos are in the process of dying out. There are still a few old monks of high spirituality. One Athonite monk, Archimandrite Sophronius Sakharov, has published in Paris in 1952 "Staretz Siluan", the life and teaching of his spiritual director on Mount Athos. The same Archimandrite also published in 1954 in Paris "Des Fondements de l'Ascèse Orthodoxe". The "Messenger" of the Exarchate of the Russian Patriarchate in Paris often publishes articles of the Archimandrite and other contemporary scholars. The Russian emigrés published in Harbin, in Manchuria in 1928, a small volume of extracts from "Dobrotolyubie" and in 1940 "Staretz Macarius of Optino". The Russian emigré Community in Jordanville Monastery in U.S.A. also publishes various periodicals and other literature where traditional Orthodox mysticism occupies the place of honour. People connected with St. Sergius' Theological Institute in Paris have also produced some patristic studies. In conclusion we can only state once again that all Russian modern mystics were brought up on the Fathers. They had no other source, either medieval Latin or modern Roman Catholic and Protestant, except in a very few and isolated cases<sup>2</sup>.

#### *Bibliography*

Literature on Russian mystics of the XVIII<sup>th</sup> and XIX<sup>th</sup> century, already considerable, continues to grow. For the background the best books will be Fr. G. Florovsky, "Puti Russkago Bogoslovija", Y. M. C. A. Press, Paris, 1937, and I. Smolitsch, „Leben und Lehre der Starzen“,

<sup>1</sup> Bolshakoff, S. Fr. Michael, Recluse of Uusi Valamo, Rus. Orth. Journal, New York, USA, Dez. 1955.

<sup>2</sup> The influence of J. Arndt and J. Hall on Tikhon Zadonsky is studied by N. Gorodetsky in "Saint Tikhon Zadonsky. Inspirer of Dostoevsky", S. P. C. K., London, 1951.

Vienna, 1936. "Russkie Podvizhniki XVIII; XIX-ago Vekov" in several volumes, published by St. Panteleimon's Monastery on Mt. Athos, is invaluable. A shortened translation of Theophan's "Dobrotolyubie" was published by Faber and Faber, London in 1952 under the title "Writings from the Philokalia on Prayer of the Heart". The same publishers translated "Unseen Warfare", Theophan's adaptation of "Spiritual Combat" by Lorenzo Scupoli (1529—1610), a Roman Catholic mystic of the Counter Reformation period. In "Unseen Warfare" Eastern and Western mysticism fuse. Archpriest Sergius Chetverikov described in his: "Moldavsky Staretz Skhiarkhimandrit Paisii Velichkovsky", Put zhisni, Petseri, Estonia, 1938, 2 vols, the life of the Staretz and the spread of his influence over 107 Monasteries. The influence of Fathers on Russian non-Orthodox mystics was studied by me in my book "Russian Nonconformity", Westminster Press, Philadelphia, USA, 1950. The same influence on Russian religious thinkers, particularly on Khomyakow, was studied by me in another book "The Doctrine of the Unity of the Church in the Works of Khomyakow and Moehler", S.P.C.K., London, 1946.

## Hagiographie grecque et Patrologie

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Beaucoup de Pères de l'Église ont écrit des Vies de saints<sup>1</sup>; beaucoup sont honorés eux-mêmes comme des saints et ont été pourvus comme tels de biographies édifiantes<sup>2</sup>. A ce double titre, la littérature hagiographique ne peut manquer de retenir l'attention des patrologues.

Cyrille d'Alexandrie — pour choisir un exemple peu connu et pourtant fort suggestif — est évidemment d'abord l'exégète, le théologien et l'adversaire victorieux de Nestorius. Mais on lui doit aussi l'instauration du culte des saints Cyr et Jean à Menouthis<sup>3</sup>, et sa propre fête est inscrite à trois dates — 18 janvier, 7 ou 9 juin et 27 juin — dans le calendrier byzantin<sup>4</sup>. Sous quels traits l'Église d'Orient a-t-elle présenté à la piété des fidèles ce «pharaon chrétien» dont le rôle politique répond si peu à notre concept de la sainteté épiscopale? Pour s'en rendre compte, il faudrait parcourir les différentes Vies de saint Cyrille qui, insérées dans les ménologes, étaient lues régulièrement chaque année soit à l'office liturgique, soit dans les monastères. Mais où les trouver? Ni les collections patristiques, ni les manuels de patrologie, ni les monographies récentes ne les signalent. Il nous en est cependant parvenu au moins cinq:

<sup>1</sup> Vie de S. Antoine par Athanase, panégyrique de S<sup>te</sup> Julitte par Basile, éloge funèbre de S<sup>te</sup> Macrine par son frère Grégoire de Nysse, discours de Grégoire de Nazianze sur S. Cyprien, etc.

<sup>2</sup> Il suffira de rappeler le Dialogue de Pallade sur Jean Chrysostome, l'éloge de S. Athanase par Grégoire de Nazianze, les discours des deux Grégoire sur S. Basile, etc.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. H. Delehaye, *Les origines du culte des martyrs*, 2<sup>e</sup> éd. (Bruxelles, 1933), p. 223—224.

<sup>4</sup> Voir le *Synaxarium Ecclesiae Constantinopolitanae*, ed. H. Delehaye (Bruxelles, 1902; cet in-folio forme le *Propylaeum Novembris* dans la série des *Acta Sanctorum*), col. 399, 736, 740 et 773.

deux ont été publiées, respectivement en 1912 et en 1922<sup>1</sup>; les trois autres sont encore inédites<sup>2</sup>. L'une d'elles a pour auteur l'historien Jean Zonaras (première moitié du XII<sup>e</sup> siècle) et est conservée dans plusieurs manuscrits<sup>3</sup>. Toutes les références nécessaires seront réunies dans la nouvelle édition de la *Bibliotheca hagiographica graeca*, que nous espérons achever l'an prochain.

Autre exemple, d'un genre tout différent. Lazare de Béthanie, le frère de Marthe et de Marie, dont la résurrection est commémorée la veille des Rameaux, a fourni à nombre de Pères de l'Église le sujet d'homélies qui intéressent à la fois l'exégète, le patrologue et l'hagiographe. Car Lazare est devenu un saint, non seulement dans l'Église latine, grâce aux légendes apostoliques de Provence, mais aussi en Orient, où ses reliques furent vénérées d'abord en Chypre, puis à Constantinople<sup>4</sup>. On voudrait pouvoir comparer entre eux tous ces discours consacrés à Lazare par des Pères grecs, depuis Titus de Bostra et Jean Chrysostome jusqu'à André de Crète et Aréthas de Césarée. Mais comment faire pour les repérer? Ceux qui ont trouvé un éditeur sont dispersés un peu partout, parfois dans des Mélanges où on ne songerait pas à aller les chercher<sup>5</sup>. Quant aux inédits, parmi lesquels on notera deux homélies d'Hésychius de Jérusa-

<sup>1</sup> B. Latyšev, *Menologii anonymi byzantini quae supersunt*, t. II (Saint-Petersbourg, 1912), p. 112—114; archim. Hippolytos, dans *Néa Σύν*, t. XVII, 1922, p. 593—599.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *Anal. Boll.*, t. LIII, 1935, p. 399; t. LVII, 1939, p. 235.

<sup>3</sup> Voir, par exemple, *Anal. Boll.*, t. XLIV, 1926, p. 52, n° 4.

<sup>4</sup> En dehors du «samedi de Lazare» les Byzantins avaient consacré trois jours au culte du *quatriduanus* (τετραήμερος): ils célébraient 1°) sa résurrection le 17 mars; 2°) la translation de ses restes le 17 (16) octobre et le 4 (5) mai; 3°) la dédicace de son église le 4 mai. *Synax. Eccl. CP.*, col. 544, 146 (144) et 658—660. Dans la *Byzant. Zeitschrift* de 1954, deux discours d'Aréthas sur le transfert des reliques de Lazare à Sainte-Sophie et sur la procession organisée à cette occasion par l'empereur Léon VI ont été publiés par MM. Jenkins, Laourdas et Mango (p. 20—25; voir l'introduction p. 5—11 et les remarques du P. Darrouzès, *ibid.*, 1955, p. 2).

<sup>5</sup> L'homélie de Basile de Séleucie sur Lazare, éditée par le P. Camelot dans les *Mélanges offerts à A.-M. Desrousseaux* (Paris, 1937), p. 38—41, risquerait fort d'échapper à l'attention, si elle n'avait été signalée par B. Altaner dans sa *Patrologie* (2<sup>e</sup> éd., 1950, p. 292).

lem<sup>1</sup>, il est encore moins facile de les découvrir. Des uns et des autres on trouvera une liste détaillée et documentée dans le répertoire déjà annoncé ci-dessus, la *Bibliotheca hagiographica graeca*.

Créé par le P. Delehaye en 1895 et remanié par lui en 1909, ce précieux instrument de travail sera très considérablement augmenté 1°) par la mention des nombreux textes parus tant en Occident qu'en Orient, voire en Amérique, au cours des 47 dernières années; 2°) par l'inclusion des inédits dont l'existence est connue avec assez de précision pour qu'on puisse les verser au dossier du saint qu'ils concernent. La masse du volume en sera peut-être doublée, mais nous avons confiance que son utilité n'en sera pas accrue dans une moindre proportion.

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. A. Ehrhard, *Überlieferung und Bestand der hagiographischen und homiletischen Literatur der griechischen Kirche*, t. II (1938), pp. 73 et 138.



## Genèse et signification de la prière, aux origines chrétiennes

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Les premières générations chrétiennes n'ont pas traité de la prière pour elle-même, en soi, séparée de la liturgie ou de la vie, séparé de la Bible. Nous la trouvons toujours liée à tout le contexte de la vie; elle affleure de l'existence chrétienne elle-même. Il est significatif que les premiers traités sur la prière aient été des commentaires du Pater, comme pour mieux montrer que toute prière chrétienne se référait à la présence invisible du Seigneur Jésus.

Partout et toujours, publique ou privée, originale ou paraphrase, la prière apparaît dans la spontanéité de son jaillissement. Il n'est pas jusqu'à la Prière du Seigneur elle-même qui ne se trouve en deux recensions différentes, dans les Evangiles, ce qui témoigne de la liberté avec laquelle les Evangélistes ont traité la plus vénérable de toutes les formules chrétiennes.

La prière des premiers chrétiens nous introduit donc dans un monde de pensée et de vie très différent du nôtre dont la *Weltanschauung* se distingue nettement de celle d'un chrétien du XX<sup>e</sup> siècle. Pour cette raison, par fidélité à la conception des origines chrétiennes, nous ne séparerons pas dans notre étude, prière et liturgie, l'une était l'autre, l'une prolonge et suppose l'autre.

### *I. Sources de la prière chrétienne*

Où trouvons-nous la prière des premières générations chrétiennes? Nous bornerons ici notre investigation aux trois premiers siècles de la foi, afin d'assister en quelque sorte à la naissance de la prière chrétienne. D'ailleurs la paix constantinienne marque une nette coupure, dans l'ancienne littérature chrétienne. La situation de vie comme les conditions littéraires

vont changer notablement, à partir de Nicée, et marqueront très fortement de leur empreinte la pensée et la littérature chrétiennes.

### Les Synoptiques.

La prière chrétienne occupe déjà une place caractéristique dans les textes néotestamentaires. La communauté apostolique conserve le souvenir du Christ, comme d'un Orant. Les Évangiles Synoptiques et plus spécialement saint Luc, en font foi, tout au cours de leur récit. Le III<sup>e</sup> Évangile s'ouvre et se ferme au Temple de Jérusalem. Les nombreuses indications sur la prière, disséminées à travers le récit évangélique, manifestent à quel point elle est liée, elle fait corps avec la mission et le message de Jésus. Par la prière le Christ demeure dans la communauté de vie et d'action avec son Père.

Si nous faisons abstraction du Pater, qui est notre prière plus que celle de Jésus, les Synoptiques ne nous rapportent que trois prières personnelles de Jésus: son action de grâces au retour des disciples (Matth. 11, 25—26; Luc. 10, 21), la supplication à Gethsémani (Matth. 26, 39, 42; Marc. 14, 35—36; 39; Luc. 22, 41) et sur la croix (Matth. 27, 46; Luc. 23, 34, 46). Un trait commun à toutes ces prières rapportées par les Synoptiques, comme à celles d'ailleurs fournies par Jean, est l'invocation de Dieu comme Père. Si le peuple d'Israël ne l'ignorait pas, depuis son élection, il considérerait plus fréquemment le rapport père-fils, dans une ligne descendante, que celui de fils-père, dans sa ligne ascendante. A cette paternité de Dieu, le Christ donne par son incarnation, toute la plénitude, insoupçonnée jusque là. Par là, il achève la révélation du nom de Dieu, au Sinaï.

Pour dégager les idées majeures de la prière de Jésus, il faut souligner ses racines juives. La piété de Jésus est solidaire de la prière juive qui a le Temple comme centre unique, la synagogue comme sanctuaire local. Comme les Israélites, le Christ récite le *Shema*, prière essentielle du pieux Juif. Même fidélité aux rites de la bénédiction, à la multiplication et surtout à la Cène où le Christ inscrit le rite nouveau dans le contexte de l'antique Pâque.

Le Psautier occupait une place privilégiée dans la piété juive. Les 18 Bénédictions en sont inspirées; le Magnificat et le Benedictus prouvent à quel point le judaïsme, au temps du Christ, en nourrit sa piété. Pour Jésus, le Psautier est le livre de sa religion comme de sa mission. Au Tentateur il réplique avec un verset du Psautier. Les psaumes 22 et 69 apparaissent en filigrane dans le récit de la crucifixion et de la mort. Ils rythment, en quelque sorte, la liturgie du drame pascal, en exprimant, sur les lèvres du Christ, le sacrifice du soir, qui fonde l'offrande de l'alliance nouvelle et définitive.

Les premières générations chrétiennes, pour cette raison, conservent la prière du Psautier. Consciente d'être l'Israël véritable, l'Eglise redit, avec les psaumes, la prière de son enfance, par fidélité au Maître.

Parmi les prières fournies par le Christ, le Pater occupe une place privilégiée. Il a été appelé «Prière du Seigneur», non pas au sens d'une prière à l'usage du Seigneur, mais enseignée aux hommes par Jésus lui-même, comme modèle de toute prière chrétienne. La tradition chrétienne y a vu un traité de la prière en acte. Tertullien dit même qu'elle était le *breviarium totius Evangelii*<sup>1</sup>. Aucun texte évangélique n'a été plus souvent commenté. De fait, le Pater récapitule, dans sa première partie, les révélations de l'Ancien Testament: transcendance de Dieu, royaume céleste instauré sur terre, charte de la Torah, qui commande les relations entre Yahweh et son peuple. La seconde partie, en quelque sorte parallèle à la première, suit une voie ascendante. Dieu prend soin du peuple auquel il se révèle. La péché est une dette à l'endroit de sa Seigneurie; celle-ci, seule, a puissance pour le remettre. Enfin, la tentation qui se ramène à une opposition entre la volonté de Dieu et de l'homme, situe le chrétien dans l'affrontement des deux puissances, celle du ciel et celle des enfers, qui sous-tendent l'histoire du monde, mais s'achèvent par la victoire définitive du Kyrios.

Les deux recensions du Pater attestent à la fois une double tradition — peut-être galiléenne et hiérosolymitaine — en même

<sup>1</sup> Tertullien, De Oratione liber I. Nous n'indiquons pas d'édition, puisque celles-ci sont multiples, dans les divers pays.

temps qu'une certaine liberté laissée aux communautés. L'une comme l'autre placent la communauté qui prie, dans une perspective eschatologique: en dégageant la prière chrétienne de toute coloration apocalyptique, dans l'attente et l'espérance de l'accomplissement, le Pater formule l'objet de la prière chrétienne en termes sobres, nets, d'une inépuisable densité, qui prélude à la liturgie romaine.

L'évangile de saint Luc a seul conservé deux cantiques, attribués, l'un à Marie (I, 46—56) l'autre à Zacharie (I, 68—80)<sup>1</sup>. Nous y trouvons l'empreinte du judaïsme préchrétien, porté par l'attente messianique. L'événement, de part et d'autre, est situé à l'intérieur de l'histoire du salut. Les auteurs sont imprégnés de la lecture biblique. L'action de grâces jaillit de la méditation des desseins divins. L'un et l'autre hymnes s'appuient sur la promesse faite à Abraham, l'ancêtre de l'Israël ancien et nouveau. Aussi l'action de grâces est-elle un élément fondamental de la prière chrétienne.

#### Actes des Apôtres.

Le livre des Actes continue l'Evangile de saint Luc avec lequel, à l'origine, il ne formait qu'un seul ouvrage<sup>2</sup>. Les prières proprement dites sont peu nombreuses. Nous n'en trouvons que trois: celle des apôtres, lors de l'élection de Matthias (Actes I, 24), celle des chrétiens, à la libération de Pierre (4, 24—30), celle d'Etienne, au moment de son martyre (7, 59—60).

Le livre des Actes permet d'assister à la naissance de la prière chrétienne, au sein de la communauté hiérosolymitaine, tributaire encore de la piété juive, consciente déjà de ce qui constitue sa nouveauté. Les formes de la prière juive se retrouvent dans la prière chrétienne: La confession de la foi, déjà en usage dans le Shemoné Esré, passe dans le culte et dans la piété chrétienne (Act. 4, 24; 14, 15; 18, 4). Moins développées

<sup>1</sup> Les discussions au sujet de l'authenticité et de l'origine de ces deux cantiques ne concernent pas l'objet de notre étude. Pour nous, il nous suffit d'ailleurs qu'ils appartiennent au patrimoine chrétien.

<sup>2</sup> La séparation entre Actes et le III<sup>e</sup> Evangile fut faite vers 150 seulement, au moment où les chrétiens voulurent posséder ensemble les quatre Evangiles.

encore que chez saint Paul, les doxologies bibliques apparaissent dans les Actes (3, 13; 4, 21; 13, 48; 21, 20). Prophètes et Psaumes éclairent la messianité du Christ, qui, par la souffrance et la résurrection, est devenu le Kyrios. Ils permettent de découvrir la merveilleuse progression de l'histoire du salut, où la persécution elle-même prouve que les chrétiens sont les héritiers des promesses.

La nouveauté de la prière chrétienne, par rapport au passé juif, réside dans la médiation du Christ. Toute prière s'appuie désormais sur lui pour monter vers le Père. Etienne voit le Kyrios dans la gloire de Dieu (Act. 7, 57). Il le prie, lui remet son âme, comme Jésus l'avait fait à l'égard du Père. Il y a plus: Etienne adresse au Christ, la prière réservée à Dieu. L'œuvre de Jésus n'est pas autre que celle de Dieu. Pour cette raison, la prière de la communauté comme de chacun de ses membres la situe dans le dessein du salut. Si les fidèles prient «au nom de Jésus», c'est que d'abord, ils se rassemblent en son nom. La prière chrétienne est un acte de foi à l'endroit de Jésus qui vit au cœur de la communauté. Elle est le signe et le fruit de son unité autour du même Seigneur, par l'action d'un même Esprit.

#### Saint Jacques.

Ce que les premiers chrétiens de Jérusalem vivent dans la foi, saint Paul va l'exposer doctrinalement. Mais déjà la Lettre de saint Jacques situe la vie spirituelle des fidèles dans le cadre de la vie liturgique et de la prière<sup>1</sup>. Pour paradoxale que puisse paraître pareille juxtaposition, il reste que le milieu incriminé semble trahir l'Evangile en séparant piété et action sociale. Les directives sur la prière (5, 13—18) rappellent la prédication de Jésus et connotent l'expérience d'une vie d'oraison. C'est la prière qui doit rythmer toute la vie chrétienne, dans les circonstances les plus diverses. Comme Luc, Jacques apporte l'exemple d'Elie pour montrer que par la prière le juste mobilise la puis-

<sup>1</sup> Nous suivons l'opinion des exégètes qui voient dans l'épître une composition archaïque, adressée à des judéo-chrétiens, aux environs de l'an 50.

sance de Dieu, ce qui lui garantit pouvoir et efficacité. (Jacques, 5, 17—18; Luc., 4, 25).

### Saint Paul.

Il est impossible dans le cadre de cette étude d'analyser la prière de saint Paul<sup>1</sup>. Qu'il suffise de marquer sa place et son importance dans la tradition de l'Eglise. L'Apôtre est nourri de la piété juive et biblique. Bénédictions et doxologies sont un héritage d'Israël. Dans les outres antiques, il infuse un vin nouveau, dont il soupèse tout le prix. Action de grâces et louange, dans la ligne de l'Eucharistie, sont inspirées par l'Ancien Testament, plus spécialement par les Psaumes et par le Deutéronome.

La vie comme la prière de Paul est marqué par son élection et sa vocation. Par là il est inséré dans le dessein de salut du Dieu et Père de notre Seigneur Jésus-Christ. L'objet ordinaire de sa demande est sa tâche apostolique, la persévérance de ses communautés, la patience dans les persécutions, la connaissance du mystère de Jésus, la progression de son œuvre missionnaire. Cette prière s'adresse au Père des miséricordes, qui a l'initiative de toute l'œuvre de salut.

Le Christ, dans la perspective paulinienne, est la voie pour atteindre le Père; il ouvre le chemin aux disciples. Les hymnes au Christ, qui apparaissent dans les Lettres et qui forgent la première hymnique chrétienne, reconnaissent le rang divin que le Kyrios occupe dans la gloire de son Père. Comme dans les Evangiles, l'action de grâces et la confession, chez saint Paul, sont deux notions très voisines et complémentaires. L'une et l'autre font du chrétien un témoin de la résurrection du Christ, à laquelle est suspendue toute l'œuvre du salut.

Biblique ou spontanée, la prière paulinienne n'est que foi contemplée. Elle affleure spontanément au début et au cours de ses épîtres. Ordinaire ou extatique, elle exprime une expérience de la foi (Rom. 8, 15, 26; Gal. 4, 6; I Cor. 14, 14—15).

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<sup>1</sup> Qu'il nous suffise de renvoyer à l'étude, dernière en date, de L. Cerfaux, L'Apôtre en présence de Dieu, dans *Recueil Lucien Cerfaux*, II, 469—481.

C'est toujours l'Esprit-Saint qui nous suggère comment prier Dieu et qui nous fait crier: *Abba, Pater* (Gal. 4, 6). Si certains textes font penser aux célébrations liturgiques, c'est que la prière s'alimente dans le culte chrétien, l'Eucharistie plus spécialement, où Paul retrouve, vivant, le Kyrios du chemin de Damas, qui lui a révélé le Père.

#### Littérature johannique.

Jean situe et illustre la prière chrétienne, à la fin de la première génération chrétienne. Dans le IV<sup>e</sup> Evangile, la prière permet de souligner l'humanité de Jésus, contrastant d'ailleurs avec sa sereine assurance de Fils de Dieu. C'est le cas, au moment de la résurrection de Lazare la première rapportée par saint Jean (11, 41). La seconde se situe à Jérusalem (12, 27), dans le cadre des dernières semaines de Jésus. A l'approche de «l'heure», l'âme de Jésus est aux prises avec l'angoisse de la mort. Le Maître ne peut la cacher à ses disciples. Le récit de Jean a des ressemblances nettement transparentes avec la Transfiguration et l'Agonie, sur lesquelles il garde le silence. Deux points redeviennent claires: la gloire du Père qui va se manifester dans l'offrande de la croix, la mission de Jésus qui réalise l'œuvre qui lui a été confiée par le Père.

La prière sacerdotale (Ch. 17) a des analogies avec le Pater. Le nom de Père, maintes fois répété (17, 1, 5, 11, 21, 24, 25) rappelle l'adresse de la Prière du Seigneur (Matth. 6, 9). La révélation du nom saint de Dieu se retrouve de part et d'autre. La demande: Préserve-les du mal rappelle le Délivre-nous du mal (Jean, 17, 15 et Matth. 6, 13).

Dans cette prière, où la méditation de l'apôtre pénètre à l'intérieur même de l'âme de Jésus, le Christ reprend les thèmes des discours eucharistiques: promesse de retour, assistance permanente, unité et charité parmi les disciples. Le leit-motiv demande au Père que son œuvre soit prolongée par les disciples, dans l'Eglise une et sainte, à l'image de l'unité trinitaire. La préoccupation centrale est l'unité des siens, qui demeure toujours à faire.

Les notes caractéristiques de la prière chez saint Jean rejoignent celles qui se dégageaient déjà des Synoptiques: Elle est faite de respect et de confiance, de simplicité filiale et de grandeur, d'adoration et d'action de grâces; calme dans les circonstances les plus angoissées, elle baigne dans le mystère de Dieu, par un échange où elle puise force et joie, plénitude et vie. Jésus est la prière incarnée.

S'il est vrai, comme l'a affirmé avec de solides arguments Cullmann dans *Les sacrements dans l'évangile johannique*, que le IV<sup>e</sup> Evangile est construit à partir des deux sacrements essentiels de la communauté chrétienne, baptême et eucharistie, l'enseignement de Jean sur la prière trouve un nouvel éclairage: C'est dans l'expérience spirituelle de la communauté liturgique que le chrétien situe sa prière, autant personnelle que collective; l'une et l'autre étant nécessairement complémentaire, s'alimentant à la même source<sup>1</sup>.

L'Apocalypse se déroule dans le cadre de la liturgie. Le voyant place ses visions au «jour du Seigneur» (Apoc. 1, 10), c'est-à-dire, au moment où la communauté se réunit. Le culte de l'Eglise est pour l'écrivain comme l'anticipation de la liturgie céleste: de l'une à l'autre il y a correspondance et continuité dans l'accomplissement.

Aussi, l'Apocalypse est-elle parsemée de réminiscences liturgiques, d'hymnes et de prières, depuis la doxologie de l'adresse (1, 6), jusqu'au *Marana tha*, qui ferme le livre (22, 20). Les cinq premiers chapitres semblent suivre le déroulement de la célébration liturgique. Doxologies et acclamations qui remplissent le livre montrent comment la prière chrétienne s'est coulée dans les formes préexistantes, sans pour autant édulcorer la nouveauté du message évangélique.

Pères apostoliques.

La soudure entre les écrits apostoliques et la première littérature extracanonique est faite par le pape Clément. Sa

<sup>1</sup> C. Cullmann, *Les sacrements dans l'Evangile johannique. La vie de Jésus et le culte de l'Eglise primitive*, Paris, 1951. La même thèse avait déjà été défendue par l'auteur dans *Urchristentum und Gottesdienst*, Bâle, 1944.



prière est vraisemblablement contemporaine de la littérature johannique<sup>1</sup>. Elle est encore proche des Dix-huit Bénédictions juives. Elle nous fournit un spécimen de ce que fut la prière improvisée, dans la célébration liturgique primitive.

C'est une prière litanique, qui embrasse les intentions universelles de l'Eglise, comme elle tient compte de la situation spéciale créée par la persécution. Clément prie même pour l'autorité romaine, dans un esprit de loyalisme, ce qui est d'autant plus remarquable que Domitien persécute les chrétiens. Grave et majestueuse, la prière du pape Clément prélude à la liturgie romaine: «biblique, traditionnelle, respectueuse et amoureuse du passé, et en même temps toute vibrante des joies et des espérances nouvelles<sup>2</sup>.»

La prière de Clément est adressée au Père, à qui elle donne les titres traditionnels de Maître souverain, de Seigneur, comme ceux de Roi des âges, d'Artisan de l'univers. Elle passe désormais par la médiation du «grand-prêtre et protecteur de nos âmes, Jésus-Christ», ce qui représente sa nouveauté par rapport au passé juif.

Les lettres de saint Ignace ne renferment pas de prières proprement dites, mais des aspirations, des «élévations» adressées au Père ou au Christ. Dieu n'est pas tant le Seigneur que le Père qu'il invoque par Jésus. Ses invocations sont le premier témoignage de la prière personnelle, spontanée, dans ce qu'elle a de vivant et d'intime. La prière est le lien de la communauté, autour de Jésus-Christ<sup>3</sup>.

L'*Adversus haereses* d'Irénée de Lyon présente, non pas des prières organisées, mais comme les lettres de saint Paul, des élévations spontanées vers Dieu. L'évêque écrit en la présence

<sup>1</sup> Clément, *Epître aux Corinthiens*, 59—61. *Patres apostolici*, éd. Funk, I, 175—181. L'authenticité de cette prière n'a jamais été sérieusement mise en doute.

<sup>2</sup> J. Lebreton, *Histoire du dogme de la Trinité*, II, 192. L'auteur consacre un chapitre à La prière et le culte dans l'Eglise anténicéenne. Nous reprendrons et développerons cette étude dans notre ouvrage sur la prière, des origines chrétiennes au concile de Nicée, qui est en préparation.

<sup>3</sup> A titre d'exemple on peut citer, l'épître aux Magnésiens, 6 et 7; l'épître aux Romains, 4, 5, 6, 7.

divine. D'instinct la prière affleure le texte. Tant il est vrai que la théologie d'Irénée n'est pas une spéculation de l'esprit, mais une méditation, en face de Dieu dont la lumière éclaire le drame de l'hérésie et cerne le visage des hérésiarques. Adressée à Dieu, elle exprime l'amour de l'évêque pour l'Eglise et pour les hommes même dévoyés<sup>1</sup>.

En la deuxième moitié du II<sup>e</sup> siècle apparaissent les nouveaux témoins de la prière chrétienne, dont la signification comme la portée est des plus importantes: les martyrs. Leurs actes, rédigés souvent pas des témoins oculaires, ont utilisé la minute des pièces officielles et nous ont conservé la fidélité de leur foi et de leur confession.

Petit-à-petit se forge une littérature martyrologique, fortement influencée par le récit du martyr d'Etienne, dans le livre des Actes, qui sert en quelque sorte de schème. Ici prière et confession se confondent. La confession du martyr est à la fois une profession de la foi reçue au baptême et une action de grâces, dans la fidélité.

Il en est ainsi de la prière de Polycarpe sur le bûcher<sup>2</sup>, de celle d'un Spératus et des autres martyrs scilitains, qui moururent en disant *Deo gratias*<sup>3</sup>, de celle du philosophe Apollonius, qui dit en recevant la sentence de mort: «Je rends grâces à mon Dieu, proconsul Pérennis, avec tous ceux qui ont confessé le Dieu tout-puissant, son Fils unique Jésus-Christ et le Saint-Esprit, pour la sentence qui m'apporte le salut<sup>4</sup>.»

### III<sup>e</sup> siècle.

Les prières des martyrs se multiplient au tournant du III<sup>e</sup> siècle, et jusqu'à la fin de la persécution romaine. Nous y retrouvons fréquemment des versets de psaumes, exprimant la con-

<sup>1</sup> Les principaux textes dans l'*Adversus haereses*, sont 3, 6; 3, 25.

<sup>2</sup> *Martyrium Polycarpi*, 14. PG 5, 1040. Quelle que soit l'authenticité de cette prière, elle reflète de toute façon la conception de la communauté où elle fut rédigée.

<sup>3</sup> Actes des martyrs scilitains, éd. Knopf-Krüger, Tübingen, 28—29. Les martyrs de Scili sont les premiers martyrs d'Afrique. Leurs actes sont la plus ancienne pièce de la littérature chrétienne latine.

<sup>4</sup> Actes d'Apollonius, éd. Knopf-Krüger, 30—35.

fiance en Dieu, des textes bibliques qui chantent leur joie et leur espérance en la résurrection. Souvent elles sont, comme dans le cas d'Etienne, directement adressées au Christ, «le premier et le seul vrai martyr», selon l'admirable mot du récit des martyrs de Lyon.

A côté des martyrs, les écrivains se multiplient au III<sup>e</sup> siècle. En cent ans, le ruisseau est devenu une rivière. Le Pédagogue de Clément d'Alexandrie se termine par une hymne célèbre au Christ<sup>1</sup> qui peut-être a été le chant de l'école d'Alexandrie<sup>2</sup>. C'est une hymne enthousiaste, inspirée de la Bible et de Platon, précédée d'une prière au Sauveur, qui associe au Fils le Père et le Saint-Esprit, dans une doxologie finale.

Chez Origène comme chez les premiers auteurs, la prière est à fleur de texte. Le didascale d'Alexandrie compose le premier «Traité de la prière», qui est un commentaire du Pater. Ses homélies s'ouvrent et se ferment par une prière d'une fraîcheur qui émeut<sup>3</sup>. Bien qu'il ait enseignée que toute prière chrétienne doive s'adresser au Père, Origène adresse fréquemment ses élévations à Jésus avec une note toute personnelle de piété affective et de dévotion au Christ, qui est nouvelle et qui annonce les effusions d'un Bernard de Clairvaux ou d'un François d'Assise<sup>4</sup>.

En Afrique, vers la même époque, apparaissent les traités *De la Prière*, de Tertullien à Cyprien, qui sont des commentaires, eux aussi, du Pater, tant il est vrai que la prière pour les Pères du III<sup>e</sup> siècle, n'était pas tant un problème abstrait, qu'une présence, qui oriente le fidèle vers le centre de sa foi, le Kyrios. Ces premiers commentaires permettent de discerner la grandeur des Pères mais aussi leurs limites. Ils sont plus parénétiques que théologiques, plus moraux que doctrinaux.

<sup>1</sup> Pédagogue, 3, 12, PG 8, 680—681.

<sup>2</sup> C'est l'opinion d'Altaner, *Patrologie*, 161.

<sup>3</sup> Les doxologies, à la fin des homélies, se rapportent le plus souvent au Christ, parfois au Père, rarement au Saint-Esprit, ou à la Trinité tout entière.

<sup>4</sup> A titre d'exemple, nous pouvons indiquer ici 5<sup>e</sup> homélie sur Isaïe, 2, PG 13, 235—236; 5<sup>e</sup> homélie sur Jérémie, 2, PG 13, 297—300; 2<sup>e</sup> homélie sur le Cantique des Cantiques, 2, 8, PG 13, 40—41; 139.

Les grands thèmes bibliques, comme le royaume, le pain, la tentation, ne ressortent pas suffisamment, à notre goût.

Déjà se manifeste la tendance surtout alexandrine d'allégorisme. Aucun Père ne s'arrête au pain matériel, le premier, le plus fondamental, celui dont l'autre, spirituel, tire toute sa signification. Il est facile de découvrir, à la lumière de cet exemple, à côté des valeurs permanentes, l'élément caduc dans la littérature patristique.

L'Eglise d'Afrique a joué un rôle prépondérant dans la création du style de la liturgie romaine. La prière qui jaillit spontanément, sous la plume de Cyprien, a déjà la densité et la sobriété de la liturgie latine. Hippolyte de Rome nous fournit davantage. Sa Tradition apostolique, nous apporte les schèmes de la liturgie romaine. Nous trouvons là la première anaphore latine, adressée au Père, qui d'étend sur les bienfaits de la création, mais se concentre, comme au baptême, sur les mystères du Christ. Elle appelle l'Esprit-Saint sur les oblates, l'Eglise et les communiant<sup>1</sup>.

Nous trouvons chez Hippolyte de précieux renseignements sur la piété personnelle et collective. Depuis le Didaché, qui avait rapporté l'usage de la Prière du Seigneur, trois fois par jour, nous ne savions que peu de choses sur ce sujet. Hippolyte nous renseigne sur l'usage du signe de la croix, sur les heures de la prière, à la troisième, à la sixième, à la neuvième heure, avant de se coucher. Il exhorte les gens mariés à prier ensemble : «Celui qui est marié n'est pas souillé pour autant<sup>2</sup>.» Origène précise que les chrétiens doivent avoir un sanctuaire ou un lieu réservé à la prière, orienté par le Levant, le lieu du paradis, d'où le Seigneur reviendra<sup>3</sup>.

Au moment où se forge le style de la prière liturgique, que le temps durcira quelque peu, les formules demeurent souples, soumises, à des variations, gardant la nouveauté de leur jaillisse-

<sup>1</sup> Tradition apostolique, 4.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. 35—36.

<sup>3</sup> De la Prière, 31, PG 552—553. Pour l'orientation, ibid. 32. Le même fait est attesté par Tertullien, *Adversus Valentinian*. 3, par Clément d'Alexandrie, *Stromates*, 7, 7, 43, et plus tôt par Justin, *Dialog*. 121, 2. Origène y revient ailleurs (*Hom. in Levit.* 9, 10).

ment. C'est le cas de la liturgie romaine comme de la liturgie orientale, s'il est vrai que l'Anaphore des apôtres nous en a conservé la forme la plus ancienne<sup>1</sup>.

Il serait du plus grand intérêt de pouvoir étudier, à côté des liturgistes et des théologiens, la prière du peuple chrétien, dont la foi elle aussi est un jalon de la tradition. Nous le trouvons déjà dans les Actes des martyrs, où le jardinier et l'esclave voisinent avec le philosophe et l'évêque. Nous le trouvons aussi et dès le II<sup>e</sup> siècle dans la littérature apocryphe, où s'exprime l'âme du peuple, amoureuse du merveilleux, spontanée jusqu'à la crédulité. Il en est ainsi des Actes de Jean<sup>2</sup> qui rapporte l'hymne chantée par le Christ, des Actes de Pierre<sup>3</sup> et de ceux d'André<sup>4</sup> et des invocations à la croix. Les Actes de Thomas<sup>5</sup> multiplient des textes d'hymnes. Les Livres sybillins citent une hymne au Christ dont le caractère hérétique ne semble nullement démontré<sup>6</sup>.

De nouvelles sources enrichissent le dossier: les papyri et les ostraka. Terrain riche et presque illimité, qui est loin d'avoir été exploré. Ici les difficultés grandissent. Il n'est pas aisé de cataloguer, de dater les textes ainsi découverts. Nous sommes souvent réduits à la seule critique interne. Certaines conjectures de dom Leclercq montrent la difficulté et l'écueil que le spécialiste rencontre sur ce terrain.

Papyri et ostraka nous apportent des formules liturgiques fort anciennes, comme les chants de communion, éditées par dom Borgia, sans doute antérieures à l'usage du Psaume 33<sup>7</sup>.

A côté de ces textes liturgiques et bibliques, griffonnés par une main chrétienne, au sortir peut-être d'une réunion liturgique,

<sup>1</sup> C'est une hypothèse émise par dom Botte, *L'anaphore chaldéenne des Apôtres*, dans *Orientalia christiana periodica*, XV, 259—276.

<sup>2</sup> Actes de Jean, 95. Les historiens datent ces Actes de la deuxième moitié du II<sup>e</sup> siècle. Mais l'hymne citée a pu être interpolée.

<sup>3</sup> Actus Vercellenses, 37. Ces Actes sont du début du III<sup>e</sup> siècle.

<sup>4</sup> Actes d'André, 19. La liturgie latine y a fait de larges emprunts.

<sup>5</sup> Actes de Thomas, 27; 50; 108—113.

<sup>6</sup> C'est du moins le jugement émis par E. Amann, *Apocryphes*, dans *Supplément au Dictionnaire de la Bible de Vigouroux*, 531.

<sup>7</sup> N. Borgia, *Frammenti eucaristici antichissimi*, Grottaferrata, 1932.

afin de se souvenir de quelque citation, nous renonçons dans mainte prière la foi personnelle, aux heures de la tentation, de la lutte, de l'angoisse :

O Dieu des croix  
qui nous surviennent,  
protège ton serviteur  
Apphounas.  
Amen<sup>1</sup>.

La confiance en Dieu y voisine avec l'invocation des saints, comme saint Phocas et saint Mercourios<sup>2</sup>. Certains textes bibliques comme les débuts des évangiles semblent aux fidèles avoir une vertu merveilleuse où le danger d'une pointe de superstition ne semble pas éloigné. Ces prières sont adressées soit au Père soit au Christ. L'élément personnel développe surtout la demande de pardon.

Un autre écho de la foi des premiers chrétiens a été conservé par la pierre. Inscriptions de maisons, de baptistères ou d'églises, épitaphes, surtout, qui gardent la mémoire des frères ou des martyrs. Les richesses de l'épigraphie nous apportent une expression spontanée, personnelle de la prière antique. «Les inscriptions, a dit Mommsen, appartiennent non à la littérature mais à la vie.» Toute la vie chrétienne s'y retrouve, éclairée par la lumière de la foi et de l'espérance.

Les prières que la pierre nous a conservées, expriment la foi en Dieu; la forme trinitaire est fréquente; elles s'adressent souvent au Christ, parfois à l'Esprit-Saint. Pour ceux qui s'en sont allés, qui «dorment», disent les chrétiens, on demande le pardon, la vie, le repos, la paix on demande qu'ils soient auprès de Dieu ou du Christ.

Que la foi recoure aux formules bibliques ou liturgiques, ou qu'elle exprime les sentiments de la tendresse maternelle, elle est toujours transfigurée par l'espérance. Telle l'épithèque de Magus :

Magus, enfant sans malice.

Tu es au milieu des petits innocents.

<sup>1</sup> Monumenta Ecclesiae liturgica, éd. Cabrol, CCVI.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. CXLIX.

Ta vie est heureuse, à l'abri des risques.  
 L'Eglise t'accueille à ton départ,  
 maternelle et dans l'allégresse.  
 O mon cœur cesse de gémir,  
 et mes yeux, cesses de pleurer<sup>1</sup>.

## II. Signification de l'antique prière chrétienne

La prière chrétienne des origines est porteur de la richesse doctrinale de la foi. Nous y retrouvons les valeurs et les notes caractéristiques de la Révélation : La Bible, le Christ, l'Eglise. Elle est née dans le berceau d'Israël. Elle ne rougit pas de ses origines, mais conserve avec dévotion le patrimoine de son passé. Comme le peuple élu, elle s'inscrit dans le tissu même de l'histoire. Elle est insertion de l'Eglise comme de chacun de ses membres dans le peuple de Dieu, dans l'histoire du salut.

Cette richesse doctrinale fait de la prière des origines véritablement un lieu théologique de la tradition. Sa valeur se situe, au delà de l'ascèse, dans la foi, professée au baptême, proclamée dans la célébration liturgique, par la vie chrétienne et jusqu'au martyre. Pour les premières générations chrétiennes si toute théologie est prière, toute prière est également théologique.

La prière exprime une confession de la foi, un *Credo*. Par elle le fidèle comme la communauté se situe dans l'histoire du salut. Il prend conscience des dimensions de la foi. Saint Cyprien l'exprime noblement dans son Commentaire du Pater.

*Notre prière est publique et communautaire, et quand nous prions, nous ne prions pas pour un seul mais pour tout le peuple, car avec tout le peuple nous sommes un. Le Dieu de la paix et le maître de la concorde, qui nous a enseigné l'unité, a voulu que chacun prie pour tous comme lui-même nous a portés tous en un. Car Dieu qui rassemble dans sa maison ceux qui ont un même cœur, n'admet dans ses demeures divines et éternelles que ceux qui prient en communion les uns avec les autres<sup>2</sup>.*

Si toute prière implique une confession de la foi, elle évoque naturellement l'unique baptême qui a enté tous les chrétiens

<sup>1</sup> Ibid. 2237—2238. .

<sup>2</sup> De oratione dominica, 8.

sur le Christ, le Prieur invisible de la communauté; l'Eucharistie, le centre vivant de l'Eglise, parce qu'elle est l'action de grâces du Kyrios, invisiblement présent au rassemblement des siens.

Rien mieux que le martyre n'exprime peut-être cette fusion de la foi et de la vie, l'affrontement de la cité de Dieu et de celle de l'Adversaire. C'est le procès ouvert, sous Ponce-Pilate (comme l'évoque l'ancienne confession de la foi) qui se continue<sup>1</sup>. Le chrétien, à son tour, à la barre du monde, affirme que Jésus est Kyrios, comme le rapporte le récit du martyre de Polycarpe<sup>2</sup>.

La passion des confesseurs de la foi est donc à la fois le prolongement et la réalisation du mystère chrétien, signifiée pour la communauté par le culte. «La bouche qui répond Amen au Trishagion n'a pas le droit, écrit Tertullien, à l'heure de martyre d'adorer et de confesser pour l'éternité aucun autre que Dieu et son Christ<sup>3</sup>.»

Le témoignage de la vie confesse ce que la liturgie avait exprimé dans la réunion du culte. Pour cette raison, beaucoup de confessions de foi sont hymniques, beaucoup d'hymnes sont des confession de la foi<sup>4</sup>. Ceci se trouve dès les écrits apostoliques (Col. 3, 16; Eph. 5, 19).

Nous trouvons cette conception du martyre comme d'une liturgie, d'une prière vivante, dans les écrits de saint Ignace: «Je suis le froment de Dieu, que je sois moulu par la dent des bêtes pour devenir le pain pur du Christ<sup>5</sup>.» Non seulement les martyrs reprennent comme d'instinct, devant les tribunaux les acclamations et les confessions de la foi et de la liturgie, mais leur confession publique du Christ est une affirmation publique et solennelle de l'Eglise, établie sur le mystère de la mort et

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<sup>1</sup> O. Cullmann, *Die ersten christlichen Glaubensbekenntnisse*, Zürich, 1949, 20—22.

<sup>2</sup> *Martyrium Polycarpi*, 8, 2.

<sup>3</sup> *De spectaculis*, 25.

<sup>4</sup> Pour toute cette question, voir E. Stauffer, *Die Theologie des neuen Testaments*, 212—216.

<sup>5</sup> *Epître aux Romains*, 4.



de la résurrection du Christ, que le martyre rend manifeste au monde<sup>1</sup>.

Si le martyre est un cas privilégié, il reste que toute vie chrétienne doit confesser ce que le culte exprime dans son mystère. Pour cette raison, liturgie et prière sont inextricablement unis. Même isolé, le chrétien est un membre. Et comme le souligne Cyprien, il prie au pluriel<sup>2</sup>. Toutes les fois qu'il nomme le Père, il évoque du même coup la fraternité universelle.

Pour cette raison, la Cène du Seigneur demeure le centre de la religion chrétienne comme de la vie de l'Eglise. Sacrement de la communion universelle, l'Eucharistie apprend aux chrétiens d'achever dans leur chair «ce qui manque aux souffrances du Christ» et à préparer dans l'action de grâces et l'attente la liturgie céleste. Aussi, le dernier mot de l'Apocalypse qui achève la Révélation est-il une prière, empruntée aux assemblées liturgiques où les premières générations chrétiennes, d'après la Didaché, ont discerné le sens de leur existence comme de toute l'histoire humaine: *Marana tha*.

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<sup>1</sup> La chose est manifeste dans le récit des martyrs de Lyon. Les païens racontent les Actes, jetèrent les restes des confesseurs dans le Rhône. «Ils croyaient ainsi triompher de Dieu et priver les martyrs de la résurrection. Il faut, disaient-ils, enlever à ces hommes jusqu'à l'espoir de la résurrection. A cause de cette croyance, ils introduisent chez nous une religion nouvelle et étrangère, méprisent les tortures et courent joyeusement à la mort. Voyons maintenant s'ils ressuscitent si leur Dieu est a même de les secourir et de les arracher à nos mains.» Martyrs de Lyon, Eus. Hist. Eccl. 5, I, 1.

<sup>2</sup> De oratione dominica, 8.

“Ο ἀνυπερήφανος Θεός”  
St. Symeon the New Theologian  
and early Christian popular piety

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I would like to speak about one rare and striking expression used by the great Byzantine mystic St. Symeon the New Theologian (949—1022 A. D.) in his two remarkable writings of highly autobiographical and mystical character known as the First and Second Thanksgiving<sup>1</sup>. St. Symeon calls in them Christ ‘the not-proud God’ (ὁ ἀνυπερήφανος Θεός) or even ‘the not-proud One’ (ὁ ἀνυπερήφανος). These are the relevant passages: In the First Thanksgiving (= Euch. 1) St. Symeon tells us that he had been granted many mystical revelations without, however, well understanding their nature, so that he still remained in ignorance of who was really appearing to him. And he explains his state: ‘I still did not know Thee, Master, that it was indeed Thou. I did not yet know that it was Thou Thyself, my not-proud God and Lord. I had not yet been vouchsafed to hear Thy voice, so that I might know Thee. And Thou hadst not yet mystically told me “It is I”<sup>2</sup>.’ Similarly in The Second Thanksgiving (= Euch 2)

<sup>1</sup> A general survey of the writings of St. Symeon the New Theologian may be found in my article ‘The Writings of St. Symeon the New Theologian’ in *Orientalia Christiana Periodica* 20 (1954) 298—328. On both Thanksgivings (*Εὐχαριστία* = Euch. 1 and 2) see *ibid.* pp. 209, 300 and 302. Many passages of Euch. 1 and 2 are quoted by me (in English translation) in my article ‘The Brother-Loving Poor Man: The Mystical Autobiography of St. Symeon the New Theologian’ in *The Christian East*, II, 7—8 (1953—1954) 216—227, and (in their original Greek text) in the Greek version of the same article “*Πτωχὸς φιλάδελφος*” in *Γρηγόριος Παλαμᾶς* 37 (1954) 156—164, 257—266.

<sup>2</sup> Οὐκ ᾔδειν σε, Δέσποτα, ὅτι ἦς σύ . . . Οὐκ ᾔδειν ὅτι σὺ ὑπῆρχες, ὁ ἀνυπερήφανος Θεός μου καὶ Κύριος. Οὐκ ᾔδειν γὰρ φωνῆς σου ἠξιώθην ἀκοῦσαι ἵνα γνωρίσω σε, οὐκ ᾔδειν ἥς εἰπὼν μοι μυστικῶς ὅτι: “Εγὼ εἰμι”. Euch. 1. 144—148. The Greek text (unpublished until now) is here given according to the manuscripts Vatic. gr. 1436 fol. 247 r, Coisl. 292 fol. 262 v and Bodl. Cromw. 8 p. 81.

St. Symeon describes in symbolic images his progress towards spiritual purity, and how it was Christ Himself who was cleansing him and opening his eyes. He says: 'Thereafter, while I was standing near the source, Thou, the not-proud One, didst not deem it unworthy of Thee to descend more often, but coming near holding first my head, Thou dippest it in the waters and madest me to see clearer the light of Thy face<sup>1</sup>.'

From these passages it appears that for St. Symeon the name "*ἀνυπερήφανος Θεός*" expresses the great condescension and mercy of the 'not proud God' who not only forgives our offences, but is ready to come Himself to cleanse our impurities by washing (symbolically) Himself our head. This condescension is even better expressed in the mystical union when the 'not proud God' reveals Himself to His creature by saying "It is I". However, the profoundest manifestation of the Divine humility is for St. Symeon the Incarnation itself, when the Creator does not consider it incompatible with His Divine majesty to become a man. The Incarnation is also the source and the foundation of our union with God and deification, as may be seen from the words which Christ says to St. Symeon in a mystical apparition in another passage of the same writings: 'I am God who for thy sake became a man. And because thou

<sup>1</sup> *Ἐκτοτε οὖν συγχροτέρως καὶ πρὸς αὐτῇ τῇ πηγῇ ἱσταμένου μου, ὁ ἀνυπερήφανος οὐκ ἀπηξίους κατέρχεσθαι, ἀλλὰ παραγινόμενος καὶ κρατῶν μου πρῶτον τὴν κεφαλὴν, ἐνέβαπτες αὐτὴν ἐν τοῖς ὕδασι καὶ καθαρώτερον ἐποίησες ὁρᾶν με τὸ φῶς τοῦ προσώπου σου.* Euch. 2. 128—132. Also unpublished in its original text and here given according to Vatic. gr. 1436 fol. 307 r, Monac. gr. 177 fol. 306 v, and Vatic. gr. 1782 fol. 232 r. A Latin translation of Euch. 2 by Pontanus is in PG 120. 595—602 (as Caput 40 of his Latin translation of the Hymns of St. Symeon). A Modern Greek translation of Euch. 1 and 2 was published by Dionysios Zagoraios in his edition of the writings of St. Symeon the New Theologian (as *Λόγος* 90 and 91), Venice, 1790; 2nd ed. Syros = Smyrna. 1886, pp. 513—523. Both the Euch. have been translated from the Modern Greek text of Zagoraios into Russian by Bishop Theophan (1st ed. Moscow, 1882; 2 ed. 1890, vol. 2 pp. 482—502). Bishop Theophan translates the word "*ἀνυπερήφανος*" (extant in the text of D. Zagoraios) by *«многоснисходительный»* (ibid. p. 487) or *«снисходительный»* (ibid. p. 495) which in no way renders the striking originality of the Greek text.

hast sought me with all thy soul, behold, from now on thou shalt be my brother, my fellow-heir and my friend<sup>1</sup>.

Was St. Symeon the New Theologian the first and the only one to apply to Christ the word "*ἀντιπερίφανος*"? Or had he any predecessors among the ancient Christian writers? An answer to this question would throw much light on the difficult problem of the sources of St. Symeon's writings and spirituality<sup>2</sup>. I succeeded to find the following instances of the use of

<sup>1</sup> *Ἐγώ . . . σὺ δὲ ὁ Θεός, ὁ διὰ σὲ γεγονώς ἄνθρωπος. Καὶ ὅτι με ἐξ ὅλης ψυχῆς ἐπεζήτησας, ἰδοὺ ὑπάρξεις ἀπὸ τοῦ νῦν ἀδελφός μου καὶ συγκληρονόμος μου καὶ φίλος μου.* Euch. 2. 214—217.

<sup>2</sup> It would be impossible to examine in these notes in any detail the complicated and practically unexplored question of the literary sources of the writings of St. Symeon the New Theologian.

Briefly speaking, they may be divided into two groups, those named by himself and those unnamed. Thus we can find in his writings references by name to and quotations from St. Gregory of Nazianz (the most frequently quoted of all the Fathers, with at least four quotations in the Catechetical Sermons) and St. John Chrysostom. Many quotations from ascetic Fathers, such as Marc the Monk (5th c.) and St. John Climacus (7th c.) are also to be found. Also references to the Sayings of the Desert Fathers (*Apophthegmata Patrum*) and especially to the Lives of the Saints, as e. g. St. Anthony (most frequently) and other monastic saints (Pachomius, Arsenius, Euthymius, Sabbas etc.), or St. Mary of Egypt whose Life seems to have produced a particularly deep impression on St. Symeon the New Theologian. References to other women saints are also to be found in the 5th Catech. Sermon. However, all these named quotations and references are comparatively rare, and it would be perhaps more important, although more difficult, to discover and to identify in his writings other passages where he seems to be influenced or inspired by some ancient writers without, however, exactly quoting or naming them. There are, for instance, some passages in St. Symeon's writings marked by a similarity of style or contents with analogous passages of St. Gregory of Nazianz (not named here), of Anastasius Sinaita (7th c.), and of St. Theodorus the Studite. These passages, however, generally concern certain particular questions or are confined to stylistic adaptations. More striking and deep seem to be the affinities (and at the same time the contrasts) between the so called Great Epistle attributed to Macarius (recently published by Dr. Werner Jaeger in his book: *Two Rediscovered Works of Ancient Christian Literature* — Gregory of Nyssa and Macarius. Leiden. 1954 pp. 281—301) and the 34th Catechetical Sermon of St. Symeon, or between the 8th Epistle of Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita (to Demophilus, PG 3. 1084 to 1100) and certain passages of St. Symeon. However, even these affinities are not very important and do not deprive St. Symeon the New Theologian of his originality as a writer.

*ἀνυπερήφανος* as applied to Christ in Christian literature before St. Symeon the New Theologian<sup>1</sup>.

The most ancient instances of such a use of the word "*ἀνυπερήφανος*" are to be found in the Acts of John, written probably in the second half of the second century A. D. in Asia Minor, and considered to be the most ancient of all the

<sup>1</sup> I was much helped in my present research on the use of the word "*ἀνυπερήφανος*" in ecclesiastical literature by the material collected for the Oxford Greek Patristic Lexicon. As is known, "*ἀνυπερήφανος*" is not found in classical or Biblical Greek which only know the positive form "*ὑπερήφανος*" used generally in a bad sense meaning arrogant, proud, more seldom in a good sense meaning magnificent, splendid. See Greek-English Lexicon by H. G. Liddell and R. Scott, 9th ed. The negative type "*ἀνυπερήφανος*", formed by the addition of an alpha privativum, must therefore be considered as a product of a later development of the Greek language under Christian influence. As applied to man, St. Basil the Great (+ 379 A. D.) uses the word "*ἀνυπερήφανος*" in his Ascetical Sermon on the Renunciation from the World in an enumeration of the qualities which should possess a spiritual father. 'Try to find', he writes, 'a man . . . who knows well how to guide those who are going towards God . . . one who is not distracted (*ἀπερίσπαστον*) . . . nor vainglorious (*ἀκενόδοξον*) nor proud (*ἀνυπερήφανον*), nor liable to flattery (*ἀκολάκευτον*) . . . who prefers nothing before God' — PG 31, 632 B. St. John of Damascus (+ c. 749 A. D.) in his treatise 'On the Virtues and Vices of Soul and Body' even uses the substantive form, "*τὸ ἀνυπερήφανον*", absence of, or freedom from, pride, in order to designate one of the virtues of the soul: 'The virtues of the soul . . . (are) faith, freedom from arrogance (*τὸ ἄνυπον*), absence of pride (*τὸ ἀνυπερήφανον*)' — PG 95, 85 C. We have in both cases a rather scholarly use of the word "*ἀνυπερήφανος*", elaborated in monastic circles for ascetic purposes. Quite different is the Life of St. John the Merciful, Patriarch of Alexandria, written by Leontius of Neapolis (+ c. 650 A. D.). It belongs to popular literature and is written in a peculiar and irregular colloquial Greek. Leontius tells us in this Life how the Patriarch John once decided to visit one of his deacons who was offended with him in order to reconcile himself with him. And he calls the Patriarch 'the really not-proud' (*ὁ ὄντως ἀνυπερήφανος*) — see Leontius' von Neapolis Leben des heil. Johannes des Barmherzigen . . . herausgegeben von Heinrich Gelzer. Freiburg i. Br.-Leipzig 1893, ch. 27, p. 58. 10. As in St. Basil where the word "*ἀνυπερήφανος*" characterizes the disposition of a spiritual father towards his disciple it here also indicates the condescension of a superior to his subordinate. All these instances, however, have no direct relation to the above mentioned passages of St. Symeon, because the word 'not proud' is applied in them to men in their attitude towards other men, and is not used about God.

apocryphal Acts<sup>1</sup>. In these Acts St. John is said to pray to Christ in such words: 'The only benefactor and not-proud, the only merciful and loving mankind<sup>2</sup>.' In another prayer when asking for the resurrection of a dead person St. John says: 'My Lord will not be weak to extend His kind pity and His not-proud mercy (exactly 'bosom', 'bowels', or *σπλάγχνα*) even unto thee'<sup>3</sup>: The same 'not proud bosom' ("*ἀνυπερήφανα σπλάγχνα*") are mentioned again in the following passage of the Acts: 'John had compassion on Cleopatra . . . and called down upon her the perfect and not proud mercy (bowels) saying: "Lord Jesus Christ"<sup>4</sup>.' The importance of the Acts of

<sup>1</sup> Greek text in R. A. Lipsius—M. Bonnet. *Acta Apostolorum Apocrypha*. Lipsiae 1891—1903, v. 2 p. 1, pp. 154—216. English translation by M. R. James. *The Apocryphal New Testament*. Oxford, 1953 (3rd ed.) pp. 282 to 270. On early Christian apocryphal literature see J. Quasten. *Patrology* vol. 1. Utrecht-Brussels. 1950. Ch. III. The beginning of christian romance, folk stories and legends, pp. 106—157 ('The Acts of John' *ibid.* pp. 135—137) and, the important article by E. Amann 'Apocryphes du Nouveau Testament' in *Dictionnaire de la Bible*, Supplément 1 (1928) 460—523 ('Les Actes de Jean', *ibid.* 491—494). On the spiritual importance of these early Christian writings see in particular G. Bardy. 'Apocryphes à tendance encratite' in *Dictionnaire de Spiritualité* 1 (1937) 752—765 ('Les Actes de Jean', 759—760). Also: Rosa Söder: *Die apocryphen Apostelgeschichten und die romanhaftes Literatur der Antike* (= *Würzburger Studien zur Altertumswissenschaft*, 3). Stuttgart. 1932; R. Helm *Der antike Roman* (= *Handbuch der griechischen und lateinischen Philologie* herausgegeben von B. Snell und H. Erbse). Berlin. 1948 (ch. 'Christliche Romane' pp. 53—61, and for the 'Acts of John', *ibid.* p. 53). Both authors are exclusively interested in the literary aspect of these writings without making any attempt to enter into their religious significance. The Acts of John should not be confused with another legendary narrative on St. John attributed to his disciple Prochorus. This is of much later date (5th c. or even later), and among Byzantine readers acquired an even greater popularity than the more ancient Acts. Edited by Th. Zahn. *Acta Ioannis* Erlangen. 1880.

<sup>2</sup> ὁ μόνος εὐεργέτης καὶ ἀνυπερήφανος, ὁ μόνος ἐλεήμων καὶ φιλόανθρωπος. *Acta Ioannis*, ch. 108 (p. 206. 11).

<sup>3</sup> Οὐκ ἀποτήσῃ μου ὁ Κύριος καὶ μέχρι σοῦ τὸ χρηστὸν ἔλεος καὶ τὰ ἀνυπερήφανα σπλάγχνα ἀπλῶσαι *ibid.* ch. 52 (p. 177. 1—3). James translates "ἀνυπερήφανα σπλάγχνα" 'condescending mercy' *op. cit.* p. 240.

<sup>4</sup> ἐκάλεσε τὰ τέλεια σπλάγχνα καὶ ἀνυπερήφανα, *ibid.* ch. 24 (p. 164. 12—15). Translated by James as 'perfect and condescending mercy', *op. cit.* p. 232. It is interesting to note that the expression "σπλάγχνα" is also used by St. Symeon the New Theologian in his Thanksgivings

John does not lie in the stories they tell us, which are entirely unreliable from an historical point of view, nor in the dogmatic ideas they express, which are sufficiently vague and sometimes even dyed with docetic, encratic and gnostic tendencies, although the idea of an heretical origin of these Acts is now rejected by most scholars<sup>1</sup>. They are rather a kind of ancient Christian didactic religious novel written in ecclesiastical circles for popular reading without great care for the exactitude of the ideas they express. Their great interest consists in the many prayers which they contain. They give a good idea of the manner in which the simple Christians of the second century used to pray to God. We could not learn this from literature of a more scholarly type<sup>2</sup>. The Acts also express the popular spirituality of this period with its strong faith in the Divinity of our Lord, its warm devotion to His Person, and a vivid consciousness of His mercy and condescension towards the human race in general and the sinners in particular. And this spiritual attitude of the early Christians towards Christ, who is always ready to listen our to prayers and perform great miracles, is strikingly expressed in the words 'the only not-proud and loving mankind.'

although not in immediate connexion with "*ἀνυπερήφανος*". For, instance, *διὰ σπλάγχνα ἐλέους σου* — 'for the bowels of Thy mercy' Euch. 2. 29—30.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. e. g. such statements: „L'écrit primitif ne semble pas l'œuvre d'un sectaire; mettons qu'il proviendrait d'un de ces catholiques, plus ou moins touchés par certaines doctrines gnostiques" Amann, op. cit. p. 493. Or: „Die... Akten sind schwerlich von außen in die Kirche hineingetragen, sondern in der Mitte von Gemeinden entstanden, die sich als treue Glieder der katholischen Kirche fühlten." Hans Lietzmann, *Geschichte der alten Kirche*. vol. 2. *Ecclesia catholica*, p. 81. Berlin-Leipzig. 1936.

<sup>2</sup> Most scholars neglect the Apocryphal Acts as a source for their studies on prayer of the first Christians. For instance Jules Lebreton. *La prière de l'Eglise primitive* (= *Recherches de Science Religieuse*, 14 (1924) 5—32, 97—133); Dom Fernand Cabrol. *La prière des premiers chrétiens*. Paris 1929. And recently E. G. Jay in his introduction to Origen's *Treatise on Prayer*. London. 1954. There are, however, some fortunate exceptions. Ed. von der Goltz has a chapter on the Apocryphal Acts („Gebete der apocryphen Apostelgeschichte") in his important book *Das Gebet in der ältesten Christenheit*. Leipzig. 1901, pp. 290—308. See also Bardy, op. cit.

Another ancient writing where the word "*ἀντιεργήφανος*" is also applied to Christ is the Life of the holy women Xanthippa Polyxene and Rebecca, more commonly known as the Acts of Xanthippa and Polyxena<sup>1</sup>. Written in the 3rd—5th c. A. D. and depending as for their contents from the apocryphal Acts of the Apostles<sup>2</sup>, the Acts of Xanthippa and Polyxena describe the adventures of these holy women who were converted to christianity by St. Paul in Spain. This is also a popular didactic novel, with the fanciful elements even more accentuated than in the apocryphal Acts of the Apostles<sup>3</sup>. Its principal interest is also in the many, often beautiful, prayers it includes and the spirituality it expresses.

<sup>1</sup> The Greek text of these Acts was edited by M. R. James in *Texts and Studies* vol. 2, part 3 ('*Apocrypha anecdota*') pp. 58—85. Cambridge 1893, from the manuscript Paris. gr. 1458, 11th c. There is, however, another manuscript of these Acts, Mosqu. 379, 11th c., ignored by James and partially published by A. N. Veselovsky in his study 'From the history of the novel.' P. I. Greek-Byzantine period. Ch. 1. Christian transformation of the Greek novel. 'The Life of Xanthippa, Polyxene and Rebecca' in the *Transactions of the Russian Academy. Section of Russian Language and Literature*, 40 (1886) pp. 29—64 (in Russian). See also: 'Introduction to the Acts of Xanthippa and Polyxena' by M. R. James, *op. cit.* pp. 43—54; Max Bonnet. 'Sur les Actes de Xanthippa et Polyxène' in the *Classical Review* 8 (1894) 336—341; R. Helm, *op. cit.* 57—59.

<sup>2</sup> The author of the Acts of Xanthippa and Polyxena seems to have known and utilized for their composition the Apocryphal Acts of Paul, Peter, Andrew, and perhaps Philip, as James shows in his 'Introduction' pp. 52—54. I would add that he might also know the Acts of John, as may be deduced from the similarity of their vocabulary (use of "*ἀντιεργήφανος*"). If, however, the dependence of the Acts of Xanthippa and Polyxena from the Acts of Philip could be considered as certain — and I am not sure that this is so, James' proposal (*op. cit.* pp. 53—54) to date them at the middle of the 3rd. c. could not be maintained, as the Acts of Philip themselves seem to have been written at the end of 4th or beginning of the 5th c., and not at the beginning of the 3rd century, as James supposed. The date given by James (3rd c.) is accepted by Helm (*op. cit.* p. 57), but contested by E. V. Bennet in his article on the edition of James in *The Classical Review* 8 (1894) 101—103, and by M. Bonnet (*op. cit.* p. 337). Both are partisans of a later date. The ancient character of the Acts of Xanthippa and Polyxena is, however, evident, as was pointed out by Veselovsky (*op. cit.* p. 61).

<sup>3</sup> See James. *Apocryphal New Testament* p. 475.



The passages here which especially interest us are: 1. When Xanthippa addresses Paul in these words: "Teacher, why did you leave me alone? Now at least make haste to give me the seal, so that if death reaches me, I shall go to that merciful and not-proud (i. e. Christ — ἀπέλθω πρὸς ἐκεῖνον τὸν εὖσπλαγχνον καὶ ἀνυπερήφανον<sup>1</sup>); 2. Xanthippa being in extasy feels as if somebody was burning and delighting her from inside or, as she puts it, 'is playing in me on the harp<sup>2</sup>.' And she says: 'Perhaps it is the one who is teaching through Paul, the not-proud one, who fills the heavens, who speaks from inside and receives from outside, who sits on the throne with the Father and is stretched by men on the tree?' 3. In the same Acts St. Andrew prays to God in these words: 'And what shall I say . . . about Thy mercy, O God? For Thou ever supportest . . . the humble and providest for those who are in ignorance, for Thou art not-proud and art rich in mercy (ἀνυπερήφανος καὶ πολυέλεος ὦν<sup>4</sup>. 4. This mercy and condescension of the 'not-proud God' extends itself even to wild beasts (a lioness in this instance), as we see from the following curious passage of the Acts where St. Andrew says: 'Behold the admirable and not-proud (nature) of God (ὄρα τὸ θαυμαστόν καὶ ἀνυπερήφανον τοῦ Θεοῦ), how he pours out His mercy even on speechless and untamable beasts<sup>5</sup>.' To summarize, I would say that the personal-mystical approach, to the 'not-proud' Christ who speaks from inside and 'is playing in' us as 'on a harp' is more stressed in the Acts of Xanthippa and Polyxena than in the more ancient Acts of John which accentuate more the miraculous element.

I have not been able to find any other instances in Patristic literature of the use of ἀνυπερήφανος as applied to Christ. It

<sup>1</sup> Acta Xanthippae et Polyxenae, ch. 13 (p. 67 1—4).

<sup>2</sup> ἔστιν τις κιννυρίζων ἐν ἐμοί, *ibid.* 14 (p. 68).

<sup>3</sup> μήπως ἐκεῖνος ὁ ἐν Παύλῳ διδάσκαλος, ὁ ἀνυπερήφανος, ὁ οὐρανοῦς πληρῶν, ὁ ἔσωθεν λαλῶν καὶ ἔξωθεν προσδεχόμενος, ὁ ἐν θρόνῳ σὺν Πατρὶ καθεζόμενος καὶ ἐπὶ ξύλον ὑπὸ ἀνθρώπων ἐφαπλούμενος, *ibid.* 14 (p. 68).

<sup>4</sup> *ibid.* 30 (p. 79. 27—30).

<sup>5</sup> *ibid.* 30 (p. 79. 25—26). As in St. John of Damascus "τὸ ἀνυπερήφανον" is used here as a substantive.

seems therefore that the only writings where this striking expression is to be met are the early Christian popular narratives (Acts of John, 2nd c., used three times; Acts of Xanthippa and Polyxene, 3rd—5th c., four times) on one side, and the writings of the 11th century Byzantine mystic, St. Symeon the New Theologian (twice in his Thanksgivings) on the other side. How to explain the revival of this ancient 'ante-Nicean' expression in the writings of a medieval Byzantine author? To say that it is a pure coincidence would be no explanation<sup>1</sup>. More probably, such a coincidence may be explained by a similarity of spiritual attitude towards Christ, by an affinity of devotional feeling. Early Christian popular writings and the mystical treatises of St. Symeon the New Theologian, with all their difference in style, phraseology, theological vocabulary and even dogmatic ideas<sup>2</sup>, are both marked by the same warm devotional and personal intimate relation to Christ, 'our not-proud God and Lord' which is sometimes lacking in some learned and philosophical writings. Similar spiritual feelings and attitudes naturally use the same or similar expressions. I would, however, hesitate to assert that St. Symeon the New Theologian himself found the expression "*ἀννερήφανος Θεός*" independently of the ancient writings where it is to be met. Such an expression is so especial and so rare to be created by different persons independently one from another. Most probably, St. Symeon met it while reading these ancient Acts, and was struck by its correspondence to his own feelings, and so later used it in writing his Thanksgivings,

<sup>1</sup> The mere fact that St. Symeon twice uses the expression "*ἀννερήφανος*" shows that for him it was not something fortuitous and irrelevant to his spirituality. The same can be said about its use in the Acts.

<sup>2</sup> The language of St. Symeon, although always simple and natural, cannot be considered as a popular one. Symeon is a great and skilful stylist and well knows how to use such literary devices as rhythmic prose etc. He is excellently trained in the ecclesiastical tradition with its elaborated ascetical and theological vocabulary, although he sometimes permits himself to use his own particular expressions (as "*αἰσθητῶς*", e. g. or "*ἀννερήφανος*", as in the present case. See 'The Writings of St. Symeon...' pp. 307—309). In any case, we cannot find in his writings any trace of Gnostic or Docetic ideas, so perceptible in the Acts of John.

perhaps even without well remembering its origin<sup>1</sup>. Such an 'unconscious' borrowing seems to me more probable in a writer of the originality of St. Symeon. However, it gives indications to us where to search for the sources of the spirituality of St. Symeon the New Theologian. Moreover at the same time it shows us how inexact is the current opinion that Byzantine christianity had no interest for early Christian religious life and was confined to its 'post-Nicean' expressions, both dogmatically and spiritually<sup>2</sup>. Medieval Byzantine mysticism, as represented by St. Symeon the New Theologian, seems to be in many ways a continuation and a revival of early Christian religious life and spirituality. Such, in any case, was the idea of St. Symeon himself. 'And because I say this', he writes in his 4th letter, . . . I am condemned by all as proud and blasphemous, for the devil is raising his kinsmen against us, and is fighting to stop us from repeating in words and accomplishing by deeds the sayings of the Gospel and of the apostles of Christ, and from zealously pursuing the renewal of the image of life according to the Gospel, as though it has become old and obscure<sup>3</sup>.'

<sup>1</sup> The Acts of John seems to have had a large circulation in Byzantine times, as may be guessed from the existence of a great number of their manuscripts (See critical apparatus in Lipsius-Bonnet). Their popularity and reputation do not seem to have suffered much from their condemnation by the Seventh Oecumenical Council, which occupied itself with these Acts because the iconoclasts were trying to base their ideas on an episod related in them (ch. 27—29). On this see Concilium Nicaenum II, actio V, Mansi, vol. 13. 168—176. Cf. G. B. Ladner. 'The concept of the image in the Greek fathers and the Byzantine iconoclastic controversy' in *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 7 (1953) 3—34. The orthodoxy of the Acts of John was also put in doubt by the Patriarch Photius in his *Myriobiblion*, 114 (PG 103. 389 AD.). The Acts of Xanthippa and Polyxena were less widespread, as may be concluded from the fact that only two of their manuscripts are extant, but they had the advantage to be included in ecclesiastical collections of Lives of Saints (*Μηταία*), under the date 1st December. In any case, St. Symeon with his comparatively vast knowledge of ancient writers and his particular interest in the Lives of Saints may quite easily have read them both and he influenced by them. And it is quite in his manner to make quotations from his readings, probably by memory- without naming his sources.

<sup>2</sup> Such is, for instance, the opinion of Rev. Archimandrite Cyprian Kern as expressed in his book *Anthropology of St. Gregory Palamas*. Paris 1950, p. 30 (in Russian).

<sup>3</sup> Coisl. 292 fol. 273v.

## La théologie spirituelle de Grégoire de Nysse

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### I

L'accouplement de ces deux mots «théologie spirituelle» aurait étonné les Pères. Du moins ceux d'un certain «type de religion» comme dirait Grégoire de Nysse<sup>1</sup>, les Alexandrins, les Cappadociens, voire les Byzantins. A leur époque les différentes disciplines théologiques ne s'étaient pas encore dissociées les unes des autres, le lien organique qui les unit entre elles et qui les unit à la vie, restait plus apparent que ce n'est le cas aujourd'hui et l'expression aurait sonné à leurs oreilles comme un pléonasme. Ce n'est qu'au XIII<sup>e</sup> siècle que par une démarche de l'esprit très légitime parce que finalement inévitable, la théologie se constitue en science de type abstrait, aristotélicien, que son vocable acquiert une signification proprement épistémologique<sup>2</sup>, qu'elle en vient à désigner davantage une discipline de l'esprit qu'une doctrine de vie. Si les tout grands scolastiques, un Albert le Grand, un Thomas d'Aquin, un Bonaventure, si le génie spéculatif d'un Ruusbroec incarnent pour un temps, somme toute assez bref, des moments de bel équilibre, de constante et féconde interaction entre la vie et la pensée, le nominalisme inaugurerà l'ère de la séparation, l'ère des spirituels qui ne seront plus théologiens et des théologiens qui ne seront plus des maîtres de prière. Que l'on songe à la défaveur dont témoigne envers la pensée théologique le petit livre qui a tant marqué la vie chrétienne de l'Occident, l'Imitation de Jésus-Christ, née au XV<sup>e</sup> siècle dans les milieux néerlandais de la Dévotion moderne. Il s'ouvre par cette remarque, vraie dans sa teneur

<sup>1</sup> *Τύπος εὐσεβείας*. L'expression est prise au *De Instituto Christiano*, Jaeger, p. 43, 6.

<sup>2</sup> Cfr. Y. Congar, art. Théologie, dans: *Dict. Théol. Cath. T. XV*, col. 345—346.

matérielle, fausse dans la tendance qui l'inspire: «A quoi te sert-il de disputer subtilement sur la Trinité, si tu manques d'humilité par quoi tu déplaïs à la Trinité?»<sup>1</sup> L'effort ascétique et moral s'appuie sans plus sur la vérité bonnement reçue et se détache de l'effort de penser et de contempler sa religion. La prière devient examen de conscience et demande de secours, elle est beaucoup moins qu'auparavant cette contemplation du contenu de notre foi qui transforme déjà l'âme par sa seule vertu. «Crois-tu, demandait Platon, qu'on puisse ne pas imiter ce qu'on regarde avec admiration?» «C'est impossible» répond Adimante<sup>2</sup>.

Les Pères, disciples de Platon, pensaient de même. La *theologia* des moines et des mystiques était aussi bien la contemplation amoureuse et unitive de Dieu que la connaissance précise du dogme trinitaire<sup>3</sup>. Si, de par le fait des controverses, il arrive que le mot soit assez intellectualisé au IV<sup>e</sup> siècle<sup>4</sup>, il reste que les grands évêques dogmaticiens de ce temps ont tous passé par le désert et lorsque Grégoire de Nysse écrit que «la théologie est une montagne rude et escarpée dont le grand nombre approche à peine le pied»<sup>5</sup>, il a en vue non les difficultés dialectiques d'une théologie raisonneuse mais l'effort de purification à la fois morale et psychologique qui doit conduire, à travers

<sup>1</sup> De Imitatione Christi, Lib. I cap. 1: «Quid prodest tibi alta de Trinitate disputare, si careas humilitate unde dipliceas Trinitati?»

<sup>2</sup> Platon, Rép. VI, 500 C: ... ἢ οἷσι τινα μηχανήν εἶναι, διῶ τις ὁμιλεῖ ἀγάμενος μὴ μιμεῖσθαι ἐκείνο; Ἀδύνατον, ἔφη. Cfr. Grégoire de Nysse, In Cant. Hom. IV, PG 44, 833 D: πρὸς δὲ γὰρ ἂν τις ἐνατενίσῃ τοῦτο δέχεται ἐν ἐναντίῳ τὸ ὁμολοῦμα. Hom. VIII, 920 c et De Perfectione, Jaeger, 183, 6—7.

<sup>3</sup> Grégoire de Nysse pose l'assentiment à la formule dogmatique orthodoxe comme fondement à la vie spirituelle: ὡς δὲ τῆς εὐσεβείας ἐν ὑμῖν κανὼν τῷ ὁρθῷ τῆς πίστεως πέπηγε δόγματι, De Instituto Christiano, Jaeger, 42, 6—7. Pour son contemporain Evagre «le sommet de la vie spirituelle ... c'est la *theologia*, connaissance ou contemplation de Dieu, connaissance ou contemplation de la Sainte Trinité»; M. Viller, Aux sources de la spiritualité de S. Maxime. Rev. Ascét. Myst. XI (1930) p. 247.

<sup>4</sup> Grégoire de Nazianze distingue *θεωρία*, contemplation, et *θεολογία*, théologie, mais il ne permet de *θεολογεῖν* qu'aux *διαβεβηκότες ἐν θεωρίᾳ*. Oratio Theologica I, 3—4.

<sup>5</sup> Vie de Moïse, PG 44, 373 A—376 A: ὁρος γὰρ ἐστὶν ἄναπτες ... καὶ δυσπρόσιτον ἡ θεολογία ἧς μόλις ὁ πολὺς λεῶς τὴν ὑπέρωριαν φθάνει.

précisément l'échec de la raison, à une connaissance expérimentale de Dieu, à l'expérience mystique du Rien divin et de l'Infini divin. H. von Balthasar, dans le titre de *«Présence et Pensée»*<sup>1</sup> qu'il a donné à son essai sur la philosophie religieuse de Grégoire de Nysse, a très bien exprimé cet aspect synthétique de la théologie des Pères: on ne peut être théologien sans vivre de la présence divine, présence dont l'ineffable obscurité s'illumine pour autant que faire se peut, aux efforts de la pensée — pensée par ailleurs toujours vivifiée, toujours fécondée par cette présence encore plus adorée que scrutée. Le grand reproche que les Pères adresseront aux Eunomiens, tout en ne leur cédant aucunement en vigueur dialectique, sera justement de n'être que des dialecticiens, de jouer éperdument avec les «mots», et de manquer, dans leur théologie, de cette référence à la «réalité» divine que donne seule la vie d'union à Dieu<sup>2</sup>. Grégoire de Nysse, se rattachant dans les deux cas à des traditions helléniques que Basile écarte plutôt, appelle aussi bien la vie parfaite *ὁ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν βίος* que *ὁ κατ' ἁρετὴν βίος*. Plus brièvement il la désigne d'un seul mot qui prend chez lui un relief étonnant: *θεογνωσία*<sup>3</sup>.

Mais s'il en est ainsi, peut-on encore parler de la «théologie spirituelle» d'un Père? Toute sa théologie n'est-elle pas «spirituelle»? Malgré ce qui vient d'être dit, il semble que non: chaque Père garde ses thèmes privilégiés. Il y a la théologie qui lui est imposée par les devoirs de sa charge pastorale, par les nécessités de la polémique: anti-eunomienne, anti-apollinariste, anti-macédonienne dans le cas de Grégoire de Nysse — et il y a la théologie dégagée de ces préoccupations qui trahit la pente de son âme contemplative et dont les thèmes fondent plus directe-

<sup>1</sup> Paris, 1942.

<sup>2</sup> Grégoire de Nazianze, *Oratio Theol. I, 2*: *καὶ κινδυνεύει τεχνόδριον εἶναι τὸ μέγα ἡμῶν μυστήριον* (Mason, p. 3, 12). Cfr. aussi *Oratio Theol. III, 11* et 21.

<sup>3</sup> Cfr. W. Jaeger, *Two rediscovered works of ancient christian literature: Gregory of Nyssa and Macarius*. Leiden, 1954, pp. 32 et 82. *θεογνωσία* et *θεολογία* sont équivalents comme il appert de la comparaison entre Vie de Moïse, PG 44, 372 D: *προσβῆναι τῷ τῆς θεογνωσίας ὄρει* cf. *ibid.* 373 D—376 A: *ὄρος . . . ἀναντες . . . ἡ θεολογία*.

ment, sous-tendent plus efficacement que d'autres, l'élan du chrétien vers son Dieu. Grégoire nous a légué, dit-on, la meilleure réfutation de l'apollinarisme de l'antiquité<sup>1</sup>. Cependant la réalité de l'intellect humain du Sauveur — très importante du point de vue dogmatique: «quod non est assumptum non est redemptum» — n'intervient guère dans sa doctrine de la sanctification de l'homme. Même, on en aurait dit autant de sa théologie du S. Esprit dont il établissait cependant la divinité à partir de son rôle de sanctificateur<sup>2</sup>, si la découverte par Jaeger du texte intégral du *De Instituto Christiano* ne nous avait mis en présence d'une œuvre «ascétique» toute pleine du rôle de l'Esprit. De plus, Grégoire a à son compte un certain nombre d'écrits rédigés à la demande expresse de moines — le plus important et le plus beau est le *De Instituto* que nous venons de nommer et dont le démarquage par le Ps. Macaire atteste l'influence<sup>3</sup> — et nous y voyons Grégoire lui-même établir un choix de thèmes doctrinaux qui seront à la base de leurs efforts. Tous les aspects de la pensée d'un Père n'entrent donc pas pour autant dans sa «théologie spirituelle», dans sa théologie de la vie chrétienne et de la perfection. Notons qu'il ne faut pas confondre «théologie spirituelle» et «ascèse», la vue doctrinale et les conseils pratiques. Chez Grégoire d'ailleurs il n'y a pas grand danger de le faire car, malgré le titre choisi par son éditeur d'Harvard, il n'a pas à proprement parler d'«opera ascetica»: tous ses écrits aux moines sont encore de la «théologie» puisqu'il se réserve explicitement «après que d'autres (il vise son frère Basile) ... avaient fort bien réglé le détail de l'action concrète», d'esquisser l'esprit qui doit animer cette pratique, les grands horizons de foi qui doivent lui donner sa divine profondeur<sup>4</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> O. Bardenhewer, *Geschichte der altkirchlichen Literatur*, III, 1923, p. 201.

<sup>2</sup> Cfr. *De Trinitate ad Eustathium*, Oehler I, 2, pp. 177—179.

<sup>3</sup> Cfr. Jaeger, *Two rediscovered works ...*, pp. 155—162. L'œuvre doit être une des dernières de Grégoire et dater d'environ 390: *ibid.* p. 132.

<sup>4</sup> Jaeger, *ibid.*, pp. 19 et 84. Cfr. *De Virginitate*, Cavarnos, 248, 18.

## II

Cette théologie spirituelle de Grégoire de Nysse s'édifie sur le thème de «l'homme à l'image de Dieu», thème courant dans la littérature patristique (il vient clore déjà, comme un sommet, l'œuvre d'Irénée) mais que Grégoire traite avec une grande originalité, une grande abondance aussi, et dont il fait le foyer où convergent toutes ses conceptions sur les rapports de l'homme avec Dieu. Le thème est extrait de la Bible, Genèse I, 26 où Dieu dit: «Faisons l'homme à notre image, selon notre ressemblance . . .» (trad. Crampon). L'auteur sémite explique illico ce qu'il entend par cette qualité d'image: «et qu'il domine sur les poissons de la mer, sur les oiseaux du ciel, sur les animaux domestiques et sur toute la terre et sur les reptiles qui rampent sur la terre» (Crampon). L'homme, selon le sens premier du texte, est sur terre le grand vizir de Dieu, appelé à gérer et à dominer en son nom toute la création visible. C'est une ressemblance surtout fonctionnelle que Théodoret circonscrit avec concision et justesse: *κατὰ μόνον τὸ ἀρχικόν*<sup>1</sup>. Cette donnée première est élargie et interprétée par nombre de Pères, surtout Alexandrins: Clément, Origène, Athanase et particulièrement notre Grégoire, en fonction d'une ontologie platonicienne de la participation qui en fera la première théologie de la grâce. Platon n'avait-il pas dit: «Participer n'est autre chose que d'être à l'image<sup>2</sup>»?

Créé à l'image de Dieu, participant donc de Dieu, l'homme, selon Grégoire, porte en lui tous les attributs divins (*ἐπιθεωρούμενα*). La différence réside uniquement dans le mode de subsistance: créé d'une part, incréé de l'autre<sup>3</sup>. On ne peut dire plus, on ne peut dire moins: véritablement, la créature est Dieu hors de Dieu, *ὡς ἄλλο ἐκεῖνο*<sup>4</sup>. C'est cette similitude qui nous permet de connaître Dieu: on voit dans l'image l'archétype, dans le miroir créé son auteur incréé. Car on ne

<sup>1</sup> Interpretatio Epistolae Iae ad Corinthios, PG 82, 312 C.

<sup>2</sup> Parm. 132 D: *καὶ ἡ μέθεξις . . . οὐκ ἄλλη τις ἢ εἰκασθῆναι*.

<sup>3</sup> De Hom. Opif. PG 44, 184 C—D: *ἐν τῷ τὸ μὲν ἀκτίστως εἶναι, τὸ δὲ διὰ κτίσεως ὑποστῆναι*.

<sup>4</sup> De Beat. Or. III, PG 44, 1225 D.



peut connaître, selon le principe qui a l'âge même de la philosophie grecque et qu'énonçait déjà Empédocle «le semblable que par le semblable»<sup>1</sup>. De même, on ne peut aimer que ce à quoi on est déjà apparenté<sup>2</sup>: fondement de la connaissance, l'image de Dieu l'est aussi de l'amour, de l'«eros» divin, pour user de la transposition la plus hardie qu'ait osée Grégoire<sup>3</sup>. Connaissance et amour se fondent d'ailleurs en un mouvement unique d'adhésion qui est proprement la vie de l'esprit: *ἡ δὲ γνώσις ἀγάπη γίνεται*<sup>4</sup>.

Malheureusement, à la différence qui, dans l'ordre des choses, «distingue» Dieu de la créature selon leur mode de subsistance, vient, dans l'histoire concrète, s'en substituer une autre: celle du désordre et du péché qui maintenant les «sépare». Elle supprime cette relation de connaissance et d'amour qui était la vraie vie de l'homme, elle supprime cette divine connaturalité, d'une façon plus brève et plus expressive: elle détruit l'image<sup>5</sup>, ou selon une métaphore plus précise: elle la recouvre d'une gangue qui la rend méconnaissable<sup>6</sup>, ou encore: elle transforme l'âme en une autre image, celle du serpent de mensonge<sup>7</sup>. Par la disparition ou l'obnubilation de l'image l'âme est aliénée de Dieu et d'elle-même. Elle est aliénée aussi des autres: car le péché fragmente cette unique image de l'humanité entière que le Créateur avait d'abord projetée. En effet, l'image ne caractérise pas seulement l'homme individuel: toute l'humanité prise dans son ensemble est une seule image de Dieu<sup>8</sup>. C'est même elle que Grégoire, sur les traces de Philon<sup>9</sup>, considère en premier lieu et qu'il voit exprimée dans le singulier du texte biblique: «Faisons l'homme à notre image, selon

<sup>1</sup> De infantibus qui praemature abripiuntur, PG 46, 173 B—176 C. Cfr. Diels, *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*. Empédocle fragm. 109.

<sup>2</sup> Cfr. *Oratio catech.*, Srawley, V, 4—6.

<sup>3</sup> In Cant. Hom. I, PG 44, 773 D.

<sup>4</sup> De anima et resurr., PG 46, 96 C.

<sup>5</sup> De virgin., PG 46, 372 B—C.

<sup>6</sup> De hom. opif., PG 44, 192 A—B, 193 C.

<sup>7</sup> In Cant. Hom. V, PG 44, 868 D.

<sup>8</sup> De anima et resurr., PG 46, 160 C.

<sup>9</sup> De opif. mundi, Cohn I, 46, 12—47, 11; *Legum allegor.*, Cohn I, 93, 10 sq.

notre ressemblance»<sup>1</sup>. Mais elle n'a eu d'existence que dans l'intention divine, si on peut ainsi parler, frustrée à l'avance de sa réalisation par la prévision du péché. Nous ne pouvons nous étendre ici sur les positions très particulières et très contestables que cette vue inspire à Grégoire, sur les traces cette fois d'Origène, quant à la création en deux temps, quant à l'origine du sexe et à celle de l'âme individuelle, quant à l'apocatastase. Mais que la seule mention en suffise pour montrer les dimensions universelles, ecclésiales, de sa pensée car c'est en l'Eglise, corps du Christ et nouvelle création, que se fait enfin l'unité de la nature humaine, que celle-ci devient l'image de Dieu unique et totale<sup>2</sup>.

Par le péché donc, par ce «flot de péchés»<sup>3</sup> que constitue bientôt l'histoire, l'image de Dieu disparaît: l'âme individuelle, comme l'humanité tout entière, se trouve séparée de son Dieu et livrée à la mort puisque, comme nous l'avons vu, la vraie vie est de connaître Dieu et de l'aimer.

La Rédemption hors de cette déchéance s'exprimera encore en termes d'image: elle sera le rétablissement, la reconquête progressive de l'image de Dieu oblitérée. L'âme par le baptême<sup>4</sup> et son effort vertueux<sup>5</sup> revêtira la sainteté que le Sauveur est venu apporter en ce monde, revêtira le Seigneur Jésus lui-même<sup>6</sup> «qui, afin de te rétablir à l'image de Dieu s'est fait lui-même, par philanthropie, image du Dieu invisible. La propre forme qu'il a prise à lui, il la coule en toi, et ainsi, par lui, tu

<sup>1</sup> De hom. opif., PG 44, 185 A—192 A, 204 A—209 A.

<sup>2</sup> Cfr. tout le traité *In illud Quando sibi subjecerit omnia* . . . PG 44, particulièrement 1320 B: *σῶμα δὲ αὐτοῦ (Χριστοῦ) πᾶσα ἀνθρωπίνη φύσις ἢ κατεμύχθη*. Cfr. aussi *In Cant. Hom. VIII*, PG 44, 949 A—B, *Hom. XIII*, 1049 B—1052 A, et R. Leys, *L'image de Dieu chez S. Grégoire de Nysse*, pp. 88—92 et 120—122.

<sup>3</sup> De virgin., PG 46, 372 B: *ἐκ μικρᾶς ἀφορμῆς εἰς ἀπειρον τῆς κακίας ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ χυθείσης*.

<sup>4</sup> *In Cant. Hom. XI*, PG 44, 1001 B: . . . *τὸ μέλαν τῆς ἀγνοίας ἀποκλυσσάμεν τῷ ὕδατι* . . .

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, 1009 B: *ἐκκαθαρθεῖσα δι' ἀρετῆς*.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, 1008 C: *ἀγιασμός δὲ ὁ Κύριος* et 1005 A: *Ἰησοῦν λέγει τὸ ἔνδυμα*.

redeviens participant de la beauté archétype.<sup>1</sup> Par cette conformité avec Jésus-Christ l'âme redevient donc à l'image<sup>2</sup> et recouvre la vraie vie. Un texte célèbre, le *VI<sup>e</sup> Discours sur les Béatitudes*, esquisse ce retour et donne au sujet de la connaissance de Dieu par son image en nous, des précisions qui permettent d'en voir la cohérence avec la doctrine de l'incognoscibilité divine, aussi importante chez Grégoire que chez nombre d'autres auteurs<sup>3</sup>, aussi fréquente chez lui que celle justement de la connaissance de Dieu par l'image. Grégoire y pose que le bonheur n'est pas tellement de connaître que de posséder: «On peut fort bien connaître les avantages de la santé et cependant se porter mal . . . Ainsi ce n'est pas de savoir quelque chose au sujet de Dieu que le Seigneur magnifie mais de le porter en soi: οὐ τὸ γινῶναι τι περὶ θεοῦ μακάριον ὁ Κύριος εἶναι φησιν ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ σχεῖν τὸν θεόν.»<sup>4</sup> Mais comment posséder Dieu? «Ce qu'il y a d'accessible à la connaissance de Dieu se trouve en toi. Celui qui t'a créé a uni un si grand bien à ta substance dès ta venue à l'être. Car des biens de sa propre nature Dieu a imprimé les images dans ta constitution comme dans une cire le dessin d'un cachet. Mais le mal qui est venu envelopper de toutes parts le divin caractère a rendu ce bien inutile pour toi, caché comme il est par des voiles honteux. Si tu éloignes par l'effet d'une vie vertueuse l'ordure qui a recouvert ton cœur, la beauté divine y brillera de nouveau . . . Ainsi donc celui qui se voit, voit en lui-même l'objet de ses désirs et ainsi se réalise la béatitude en celui qui est pur de cœur parce que, regardant sa propre pureté, il voit, dans l'image, l'archétype. Comme ceux qui contemplent le

<sup>1</sup> De perfectione, Jaeger, 194, 16—195, 5: ἵνα σε ποιήσῃ πάλιν εἰκόνα θεοῦ, καὶ αὐτὸς ἐπὶ φιλανθρωπίας ἐγένετο εἰκὼν τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ ἀοράτου, ὥστε τῇ ἰδίᾳ μορφῇ, ἣν ἀνέλαβεν, ἐν σοὶ μορφωθῆναι καὶ σὲ πάλιν δι' ἑαυτοῦ πρὸς τὸν χαρακτῆρα τοῦ ἀρχετύπου συσχηματισθῆναι κάλλους εἰς τὸ γενέσθαι ὅπερ ἡς ἐξ ἀρχῆς.

<sup>2</sup> De professione christiana, Jaeger, 136, 17: καὶ ἡ τοῦ χριστιανισμοῦ ἐπαγγελία ἐστὶ τὸ εἰς τὴν ἀρχαίαν εὐκληρίαν ἐπαναχθῆναι τὸν ἀνθρωπον.

<sup>3</sup> Philon, Origène, Grégoire de Nazianze, Chrysostome, Valentin, Proclus, Ps. Denys . . .

<sup>4</sup> PG 44, 1269 C.

soleil dans un miroir . . . ne le voient pas moins que ceux qui le fixent en lui-même. Ainsi, dit le Seigneur, vous aussi, quand bien même vous n'avez pas les forces nécessaires pour saisir la lumière, si vous revenez à la beauté qui d'emblée a été déposée en vous, vous trouverez en vous-mêmes ce que vous cherchez. Pureté, élévation au-dessus des passions, éloignement de tout mal: c'est Dieu tout cela. Si ces choses sont en toi, sûrement Dieu y est. Si tu te défais de toute méchanceté, si tu te libères des passions, si ton intention s'éloigne de toute souillure, bienheureux es-tu d'avoir la vue aussi pénétrante. Car ce qui est invisible aux yeux non purifiés, toi, purifié, tu le saisis, et une fois que la buée de la matière ne couvre plus tes yeux, tu contemples dans le ciel très pur de ton cœur la rayonnante et bienheureuse vision. Et qu'est-elle cette vision? Elle est pureté, sainteté, simplicité, tous ces rayons lumineux qui partent de la divine nature et par lesquels on voit Dieu.»<sup>1</sup>

A lire ce texte on ne peut pas ne pas évoquer l'*Ennéade* VI de Plotin, 9, 10 dont Bréhier disait qu'elle décrit «une vision qui est en même temps et du même coup une union»<sup>2</sup>. L'image dont parle Grégoire n'est pas celle toute statique d'un miroir, Dieu n'y est pas, selon ses propres termes «un objet opposé au regard»: οὐ γάρ μοι δοκεῖ ὡς ἀντιπρόσωπὸν τι θέαμα τὸν θεὸν προτιθέναι<sup>3</sup> mais bien une façon d'être, intérieure, dynamique et dont on dirait en termes modernes qu'on ne la connaît que par présence à soi, ou, selon la terminologie de S. Thomas, «par connaturalité»<sup>4</sup>. L'«habitus» de chasteté, est-il dit dans la Somme, confère de celle-ci une connaissance plus réelle que ne le fait sa seule définition. Pour connaître véritablement il faut devenir ce qu'on veut connaître. Pour connaître Dieu il faut comme devenir Dieu. Reprenons encore les paroles de Grégoire: «Il ne me semble pas, dit-il, que Dieu se livre au regard de qui s'est purifié comme un objet de vision opposé à son visage mais que cette splendide parole de la Béatitude

<sup>1</sup> PG 44, 1269 B—1272 C.

<sup>2</sup> Plotin, *Ennéades* VI, 2<sup>e</sup> partie, Paris 1938, p. 186 note 1.

<sup>3</sup> PG 44, 1269 C.

<sup>4</sup> *Summa Theologica* IIa IIae, q. 45, a. 2, c.

nous propose ce que l'Écriture énonce plus ouvertement ailleurs : c'est au-dedans de vous qu'est le Royaume de Dieu.»<sup>1</sup>

Ce VI<sup>e</sup> Discours sur les Béatitudes ne suggère pas moins Platon, surtout à partir du parallèle qu'on en trouve dans le *De Virginitate*, 296, 21—297, 8 en un contexte qui est l'ascension dialectique du *Banquet* à peine démarquée<sup>2</sup>. Un Platon corrigé cependant par l'introduction de la notion aristotélicienne de *cause* : au terme de l'ascension ce n'est plus comme dans le *Banquet* la vision subite (*ἐξαίρνης*) de la Beauté suprême mais la vision indirecte de la cause dans l'effet<sup>3</sup>. L'objet direct de la vision reste la perfection finie de l'âme — vision dont nous avons dit ci-dessus la modalité existentielle — mais sachant qu'elle est causée par l'Infini, on le pressent, lui, à travers elle — à travers le participant on voit le participé : *τολμῶ καὶ λέγω ὅτι ἐμφανὲς γίνεται τὸ μόνον φύσει καλόν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὸ παντός καλοῦ τε καὶ ἀγαθοῦ αἴτιον*<sup>4</sup>.

Faut-il redire encore, après l'œuvre de J. Daniélou, que la transposition littéraire par Grégoire, de Plotin et de Platon n'entache en rien son christianisme? Certes la transformation de l'âme qui l'habilite à la vision divine est le fruit de ses propres efforts, tant dans le choix initial — nous ne faisons que mentionner ici le thème fréquent de la liberté : l'homme à la croisée des chemins . . .<sup>5</sup> — que dans son progrès continu : «l'amour de Dieu n'est pas chose simple ni qui aille de soi mais il faut de grands efforts pour l'obtenir, et beaucoup de soin et l'assi-

<sup>1</sup> PG 44, 1296 C. Voir de plus amples développements dans notre L'image de Dieu chez S. Grégoire de Nysse (d'où nous avons repris ce qui concerne le VI<sup>e</sup> Discours sur les Béatitudes), pp. 41—46.

<sup>2</sup> Comparer *De Virgin.*, 296, 10—20 à *Banquet* 210 C, 211 C, et 210 E—211 B.

<sup>3</sup> Nous ne disons pas : «inférence de la cause à partir de l'effet».

<sup>4</sup> *De virgin.*, Jaeger, 296, 21—24. Noter que dans le passage calqué sur le *Banquet* le *ἐξαίρνης κατόψεται* (210 E) est remplacé par *πρὸς ἐκείνο μόνον ἐρωτικῶς τε καὶ ἐπιθυμητικῶς ἔξει* (296, 14). Grégoire tient dès sa première œuvre ce qu'il exprimera encore dans une des dernières, que «désirer» Dieu c'est là le «voir» (Vie de Moïse PG 44, 404 A). Cfr. infra.

<sup>5</sup> C. Eunom., Jaeger, I, n° 275 : *ἐν μεθοδίῳ*. Cfr. *De professione christiana*, Jaeger, 140, 5.

stance du Christ<sup>1</sup>. Mais elle l'est tout autant de la grâce, de la grâce baptismale (nous avons déjà vu que l'âme se purifie par le bain et «revêt» le Seigneur Jésus)<sup>2</sup>, comme aussi de l'assistance ultérieure du S. Esprit. Le rôle du S. Esprit, peu apparent dans les écrits antérieurs, devient très important dans la plus significative des œuvres «ascétiques» de Grégoire, le *De Instituto* qui date de la fin de sa vie et où il fait allusion à la part qu'il a eue dans la définition dogmatique de Constantinople<sup>3</sup>. La théologie de l'Esprit s'y exprime en deux mots: il habite l'homme et il l'assiste: *σύνεργον καὶ σύννοικον παραμένει*<sup>4</sup>. Certes cette «synergie» de l'Esprit, Grégoire la traduit souvent en formules qui devaient devenir classiques en Orient mais que l'évolution postérieure de la doctrine de foi aurait taxées de semi-pélagiennes: Jaeger, dans son étude de la théologie du traité, en aligne quatre pages<sup>5</sup> et signale, en corrigeant l'optique de Harnack, qu'elles n'ont pas été sans favoriser ultérieurement les positions semi-pélagiennes en Occident<sup>6</sup>. Mais il lui arrive aussi d'exprimer le rapport qui unit la part de l'homme et celle de Dieu dans l'œuvre de la sanctification, de façon particulièrement heureuse et en consonnance parfaite avec l'orthodoxie postérieure: ainsi lorsqu'il dit que dans l'effort vertueux Dieu se met de notre côté et «accomplit lui-même en nous les œuvres de la justice»: *συναντιλαμβάνοντος ἡμῶν αὐτοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ ... καὶ ἀποτελοῦντος δι' ἡμῶν τὰ τῆς δικαιοσύνης ἔργα*<sup>7</sup>. Peut-être Jaeger a-t-il insisté un peu unilatéralement sur les formules semi-pélagiennes qui, sans doute, l'emportent en nombre sur les autres mais semblent encore

<sup>1</sup> De instituto, Jaeger, 71, 23—72, 2. Cfr. ibid. 44, 27—45, 4.

<sup>2</sup> Cfr. l'heureuse formule du *De perfectione*, Jaeger, 212, 10—12: *μία γὰρ τῇ φύσει ἡ καθαρότης ἥ τε ἐν τῷ Χριστῷ καὶ ἡ ἐν τῷ μετέχοντι θεωρουμένη ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν πηγάζει, ὁ δὲ μετέχων ἀρύεται.*

<sup>3</sup> W. Jaeger, *Two rediscovered works...*, p. 42.

<sup>4</sup> De instituto, Jaeger, 44, 21—22.

<sup>5</sup> Jaeger, *Two rediscovered works...*, p. 93—96.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., p. 90.

<sup>7</sup> De instituto, Jaeger, 77, 12—13. Cfr. ibid. 47, 4—7: *συνελθοῦσαι δὲ εἰς ταῦτόν δικαιοσύνης ἔργον καὶ πνεύματος χάρις, εἰς ἣν συνῆλθον ψυχὴν, ταύτην ζωῆς μακαρίας μετ' ἀλλήλων ἐνέπλησαν· διαζυγεῖσαι δὲ ἀπ' ἀλλήλων οὐδὲν τῇ ψυχῇ κέρδος παρέχουσιν.*

démenties par l'admirable passage sur la prière, p. 78, 8—81, 22. Grégoire vient de souligner l'inutilité d'une classification des vertus et d'une méthode qui irait pédestrement de l'acquisition d'une vertu à celle d'une autre: les vertus se tiennent et il faut les exercer toutes à la fois<sup>1</sup>. Il y a cependant «un coryphée au chœur des vertus et c'est précisément la prière par laquelle nous demandons à Dieu les autres vertus»<sup>2</sup>. Il n'est pas très pélagien d'attendre de la prière l'acquisition des vertus. Je sais: ce texte aussi pourrait se comprendre de façon semi-pélagienne si cette prière vient de notre propre initiative, si elle n'est elle-même déjà don de Dieu. Mais Grégoire n'étant pas confronté avec le problème, n'avait pas à entrer en ces précisions et l'inspiration du morceau me semble bien plutôt «augustinienne» jusque dans l'émotion dont il se colore: l'homme dans cette disposition de prière «ayant reçu l'Esprit comme guide et comme allié» (*ὁδηγὸν καὶ σύμμαχον*) s'enflamme d'amour pour le Seigneur (*φλέγεται πρὸς τὴν τοῦ κυρίου ἀγάπην*) et les vocables grecs de l'ardeur s'accumulent, intraduisibles: *ζέει ... ἐκκαίόμενος ... ἄρδων*). Ne se lassant jamais de sa prière, il brûle d'un désir toujours nouveau et il réalise la parole que «ceux qui me mangent auront encore faim et ceux qui me boivent auront encore soif»<sup>3</sup>. L'Esprit de Dieu conduit alors l'âme par la prière et les vertus jusqu'à cet état surhumain<sup>4</sup> de la virginité qui n'est pas seulement la garde du corps mais une fidélité de l'âme en toutes choses<sup>5</sup>, fidélité qui lui confère la parfaite transparence de l'image<sup>6</sup>. Il n'est plus question ici de philosophie: les parallèles helléniques que Jaeger énumère<sup>7</sup>, disparaissent devant l'assertion, uniquement intelligible en climat chrétien, que par la virginité l'âme devient «épouse de

<sup>1</sup> Ibid., 77, 15—78, 9.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., 78, 9—11: *ὅλον γὰρ κορυφαῖός τις τοῦ χοροῦ τῶν ἀρετῶν αὕτη (ἡ εὐχή) τυγχάνει δι' ἧς καὶ τὰς λοιπὰς ἀρετὰς αἰτούμεθα παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ.*

<sup>3</sup> De instituto, Jaeger, 77, 14—19.

<sup>4</sup> De virginitate, Cavarnos, 304, 15—305, 2.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., 277—278, 309—311.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., 297, 3—6: *καὶ ἡ ἀληθινὴ παρθενία καὶ ἡ περὶ τὴν ἀφθαρσίαν σπουδὴ εἰς τοῦτον τὸν σκοπὸν καταλήγει, τὸ δι' αὐτῆς δυνήθῃαι τὸν θεὸν ἰδεῖν.*

<sup>7</sup> Jaeger, Two rediscovered works..., p. 25—27.

Dieu<sup>1</sup>. Et cette âme virginale l'Esprit la poussera encore au-delà, jusqu'au dernier achèvement que donne la conformité aux souffrances de Jésus-Christ et jusqu'à cet héroïsme surhumain de les trouver douces au-delà de toute douceur<sup>2</sup>.

Ce sont là les hauteurs où culmine la théologie de l'image, œuvre en nous du S. Esprit et de notre fidélité à son inspiration.

### III

Le fait que Dieu ne nous soit pas donné dans l'image comme un «objet» qu'on contemple, laisse intacte cette transcendance que Grégoire exalte en tant de ses pages, dans la *VII<sup>e</sup> Homélie sur l'Ecclésiaste*, dans la *XI<sup>e</sup> sur le Cantique*, dans la *Vie de Moïse*, dans le *Contre Eunome*. La nature divine, son caractère incréé, est proprement inaccessible au créé. Le créé ne comprendra jamais l'Incréé que, dans un vocabulaire proche de celui de Plotin, sans lui être cependant identique, Grégoire appelle *δόριστος*, *ἀπεράτωτος*<sup>3</sup>. Ne procédant que par morcellement conceptuel<sup>4</sup> notre esprit n'a aucune prise sur la simplicité infinie qui est en même temps la plénitude infinie, du principe de toutes choses. Il ne connaîtra Dieu ni dans sa nature (*φύσις*), ni dans sa puissance (*δύναμις*) mais seulement dans ses effets, ses énergies (*ἐνέργειαι*) qui descendent jusqu'à nous<sup>5</sup>. Effets visibles, tangibles de la création du monde, perceptibles aussi aux philosophes du dehors et aux pécheurs<sup>6</sup>, effets d'un ordre supérieur qui produisent en l'âme l'image de Dieu et l'unissent à Lui. On ne connaît Dieu qu'à la trace: on sent sa présence

<sup>1</sup> De virginitate, Cavarnos, 310, 2: ἡ γὰρ τῷ ἀληθινῷ νυμφίῳ προσκολληθεῖσα διὰ παρθενίας ψυχὴ . . .

<sup>2</sup> De instituto, Jaeger, 85, 24—86, 3: . . . τὸ πάντων μείζον, τὰ τοῦ σωτῆρος εἰς ἑαυτὴν ἀναδέχεται πάθη καὶ ἐντροπὰ τοῦτοις πλέον ἢ οἱ ἐρασταὶ τοῦ βίου τούτου ταῖς παρὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων τιμαῖς καὶ δόξαις καὶ δυναστείαις.

<sup>3</sup> Vie de Moïse, PG 44, 301 A—B, 404 B. Plotin se sert du terme *ἀνείδεος* pour désigner l'illimitation positive de l'Un (VI, 7, 32, 9 et 33, 7) tandis qu'il réserve *δόριστος* à l'indétermination de la matière (I, 8, 3, 15 et 4, 30; II, 4, 10, 28).

<sup>4</sup> Cfr. Vie de Moïse, PG 44, 300 D—301 B, In Eccles. Hom. VII, PG 44, 729 B—C.

<sup>5</sup> De Beat. Or. VII, PG 44, 1280 B.

<sup>6</sup> De Beat. Or. VI, PG 44, 1269 B.



dans le monde, oui, mais «comme aux parois du vase l'onguent qu'il a contenu»<sup>1</sup>. Même les vertus que nous communique l'image à partir de la présence de Dieu dans notre cœur, ne sont que «les rayons lumineux qui descendent de la nature divine»<sup>2</sup>. Ces rayons lumineux, cette «bonne odeur des vertus» sont dits nous tenir lieu de lui: *ἡ δὲ εὐωδία ἀπὸ ἐκείνου ἡμῶν γίγεται*<sup>3</sup>. C'est dire que la présence de Dieu ne nous est jamais donnée que médiatement et que sa connaissance nous reste toujours voilée. La nature divine, c. à. d. l'Incréé, l'ordre des Trois Personnes, nous reste cachée dans une transcendance impénétrable — et c'est la raison pour laquelle il n'y a pas chez Grégoire, d'image de la Trinité dans l'âme — seules les «énergies» de Dieu nous unissent à lui et nous le révèlent dans ce qui «entoure» pour ainsi dire sa nature<sup>4</sup>, dans ses attributs: les *ἐπιθεωρούμενα*<sup>5</sup>. A ce sujet nous faisons entièrement nôtre l'excellente remarque de von Balthasar: «Les coupures qu'on a coutume de faire entre connaissance par les créatures (argument cosmologique), par l'introspection de l'âme (connaissance par l'image) et par extase (connaissance mystique) sont certainement artificielles. Les deux premières sont deux façons de voir Dieu dans la créature (la première dans l'objet, la seconde dans le sujet), la troisième n'est qu'une transparence de Dieu toujours plus intense à travers ce voile»<sup>6</sup>.

La connaissance de Dieu par son image dans l'âme ne s'oppose donc nullement à son incompréhensibilité. L'image est un intermédiaire, un *μεταξύ* dirait Platon, dont on peut souligner selon la nécessité, ou le caractère de ressemblance ou celui de déficience par rapport à l'archétype. La transcendance divine par laquelle l'image reste toujours déficiente fonde en l'âme ce mouvement incessant vers Dieu, ce mouvement jamais terminé

<sup>1</sup> In Cant. Hom. II, PG 44, 781 D—784 A.

<sup>2</sup> De Beat. Or. VI, PG 44, 1272 C. Cfr. De professione christ., Jaeger, 138, 15—18, De perfectione, Jaeger, 184, 24—185, 2.

<sup>3</sup> In Cant. Hom. III, PG 44, 824 A—B.

<sup>4</sup> *Τὰ περὶ αὐτῆς (τῆς φύσεως)*: Quod non sunt tres dii, Paris, 1638, p. 19 A.

<sup>5</sup> De hom. opif., PG 44, 184 D.

<sup>6</sup> Présence et Pensée, p. 67 note 4. C'est nous qui soulignons.

en quoi consiste selon la *Vie de Moïse*, la perfection de la vie chrétienne. L'image, nous le disions déjà, n'est pas une réalité statique, un terme atteint, un objet à contempler : elle est bien plutôt l'effort même d'assimilation à Dieu par la connaissance et l'amour. Elle est cette aspiration, ce mouvement vers Dieu qui ne peut trouver d'achèvement, pas même dans l'éternité<sup>1</sup>, sous peine de faire coïncider le créé et l'Incréé, sous peine d'effacer la limite infranchissable qui sépare la créature du Créateur. Prié de définir la perfection, Grégoire refuse de la définir tout en la définissant comme «une ouverture continuelle à une perfection ultérieure»<sup>2</sup>. Elle est en effet participation à la sainteté même de Dieu laquelle est infinie : elle se trouve de ce chef en perpétuelle inchoation et sa formule a été donnée par S. Paul «oublieux de ce qui a déjà été atteint, tendu vers ce qui reste encore à atteindre»<sup>3</sup>. Lorsque Moïse au sommet des communications divines s'enhardit à demander au Seigneur la vision de sa face, celui-ci ne lui accorde que de voir sa Gloire de revers. La voix divine, commente Grégoire, lui accorde sa demande justement en la lui refusant. Car si quelque vision eût comblé son désir, elle n'aurait pu être de Dieu. Mieux on comprend Dieu et plus on perçoit d'au-delà à ce qu'on en a déjà saisi. De sorte que la vision authentique de Dieu sera le désir croissant d'un au-delà dont on perçoit toujours mieux qu'il est infini et inépuisable. La vision de Dieu n'est autre que le désir incessant de Dieu : *ὡς ἐν τούτῳ ὄντος τοῦ ἀληθῶς ἰδεῖν τὸν θεὸν ἐν τῷ μὴ λῆξαι ποτε τῆς ἐπιθυμίας τὸν πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀναβλέποντα*<sup>4</sup>. Formule plus heureuse, de par sa connotation du désir, que celle, analogue, qu'on peut lire sans la même *Vie de Moïse*, à l'occasion d'une théophanie antérieure : purifié des passions, purifié ensuite du raisonnement «l'esprit parvient à l'invisible et à l'insaisissable, et là il voit Dieu. C'est en cela que consiste la vraie connaissance de celui qu'on cherche, c'est

<sup>1</sup> In Cant. Hom. VII, PG 44, 941 B, Hom. XIII, PG 44, 1037 C.

<sup>2</sup> *Vie de Moïse*, PG 44, 301 C, De perfectione, Jaeger, 214, 4—6 : *αὕτη γὰρ ἐστὶν <ή> ὡς ἀληθῶς τελειότης τὸ μηδέποτε στήναι πρὸς τὸ κρεῖττον ἀξαναρόμενον μηδέ τινι πέρας τι περιορῆσαι τὴν τελειότητα*.

<sup>3</sup> Philipp. 3, 13 cité *Vie de Moïse*, PG 44, 300 D.

<sup>4</sup> *Vie de Moïse*, PG 44, 404 A.

en cela que consiste sa vraie vision, à ne pas voir: *ἐν τούτῳ τὸ ἰδεῖν, ἐν τῷ μὴ ἰδεῖν.*<sup>1</sup> Sur le plan moral cette attitude se traduira par une docilité inconditionnée au bon plaisir divin: Moïse voit Dieu de dos, comme on voit un guide, il le suit où qu'il aille, et cela encore s'appelle «voir Dieu»: *ὅτι τὸ ἀκολοῦθεῖν τῷ θεῷ καθ' ὅπερ ἂν καθηγῆται τοῦτο βλέπειν ἐστὶ τὸν θεόν*<sup>2</sup>.

Nous estimons, à l'encontre de G. Horn<sup>3</sup>, que connaître Dieu dans la clarté de l'image et connaître Dieu dans l'obscurité de la nuée, *οἷόν τιτι γνόφῳ . . . διειλημμένον*<sup>4</sup>, ne sont pas deux façons différentes de connaître Dieu mais qu'elles sont deux phases d'un même processus: lumineux lorsqu'il concerne les attributs de Dieu communiqués par l'image, il se mue en obscurité lorsque, à travers eux, il cherche à atteindre sa nature ineffable. Et même l'image qui livre les attributs, nous y revenons encore une fois, est moins un objet à contempler qu'une attitude à prendre, non réalité statique mais effort continuuel d'assimilation, aspiration sans fin suscitée dans l'âme par ce Dieu auquel elle participe et qui la dépassera toujours. On ne s'étonnera pas de cette antithèse à lire un auteur qui, plus que le Ps. Denys, semble parler à partir d'une expérience personnelle de la mystique: la même réalité est à la fois lumineuse et obscure, *λαμπρὸς γνόφος*<sup>5</sup>.

Nous avons voulu montrer, en cette communication à la fois trop touffue et trop sommaire, comment chez un des grands Pères de l'Eglise, toute la vie spirituelle, depuis ses plus humbles débuts de conversion jusqu'à l'adhésion mystique, est centrée sur la vision doctrinale de l'«homme à l'image de Dieu par la grâce». Toute l'histoire du salut s'y reflète: la création de l'image

<sup>1</sup> Vie de Moïse, PG 44, 377 A. Avec légère correction du texte, sinon incompréhensible, de Migne: [τὸ] *ἐν τούτῳ τὸ ἰδεῖν* ...

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., 409 A.

<sup>3</sup> Le miroir et la Nuée. Deux manières de voir Dieu d'après S. Grégoire de Nysse. Rev. Asc. Myst. VIII (1927) pp. 113—131. L'auteur se rapproche beaucoup de nos vues p. 123 sans toutefois préciser que l'image se rapporte aux attributs divins et la nuée à la nature.

<sup>4</sup> Vie de Moïse, PG 44, 377 A.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

à l'origine, sa perte par le péché, son recouvrement grâce au Christ et à l'Esprit Saint, son accomplissement eschatologique que la virginité anticipe. Tout l'effort de l'homme en est supporté: son effort de contemplation et son effort moral qui, ensemble, font de lui un être vivant de la vie continuellement nouvelle de l'Esprit. Il n'y a là ni moralisme ni ascétisme mais assimilation vitale d'une doctrine de foi, il a y là une théologie spirituelle.

## Le Problème de la «Vision face à face» et la Tradition patristique de Byzance

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La vision de Dieu «face à face», «tel qu'Il est», promise aux élus dans le siècle futur, pose devant la pensée chrétienne un problème qui a pu recevoir, au cours des siècles, des solutions théologiques différentes. Néanmoins, toutes ces doctrines de la vision finale de Dieu doivent s'accorder sur deux points, pour rester fidèles aux exigences de l'autorité scripturaire (*I Jean* 3, 2; *I Cor.* 13, 12): 1°, l'objet de la vision est Dieu lui-même et non une autre réalité qui le représenterait; 2°, cette vision de Dieu est directe, sans aucune médiation d'ordre créé ou divin.

Or c'est justement la présence de ces deux conditions dans les doctrines patristiques de la vision des bienheureux qui a été mise en doute par Gabriel Vasquez, un théologien de formation scolastique, trop attaché au paysage doctrinal et à la terminologie spécifique d'une école pour admettre la vérité des solutions obtenues par d'autres moyens et exprimées en termes ayant une autre valeur, trop honnête aussi pour se contenter d'une conciliation facile de doctrines patristiques avec la théologie qui lui était familière. La manière dont la question de la *visio beata* chez les Pères fut posée, vers la fin du XVI<sup>e</sup>, et débattue, au cours de la première moitié du XVII<sup>e</sup> siècle, par les théologiens n'a pas été sans importance pour les études patristiques d'époques plus récentes. En particulier la dernière phase de ces débats sur les doctrines de la vision face à face qui pouvaient paraître suspectes dans la tradition grecque a contribué, dans une grande mesure, à la formation d'un préjugé défavorable vis à vis de la théologie byzantine du XIV<sup>e</sup> siècle, préjugé qui reste encore de nos jours très tenace en Occident.

Je me permettrai de retracer brièvement les moments saillants de cette longue controverse de théologiens sur la vision de Dieu

dans la tradition patristique. On cherchera ensuite à dégager, chez quelques Pères grecs, certains traits doctrinaux qui pourraient caractériser des conceptions théologiques de la vision face à face, où le moment de la connaissance de Dieu κατ' οὐσταν n'intervient pas.

La controverse sur la vision béatifique dans la théologie des Pères de l'Eglise a été ouverte par le savant Jésuite Gabriel Vasquez (1551—1604), qui professa la théologie à Madrid et à Rome. Dans ses *Commentaires et Discussions* sur la 1<sup>e</sup> partie de la Somme théologique<sup>1</sup>, Vasquez, en traitant la question de la *visio Dei sicuti est*, remarque (sur la foi d'un auteur qu'il appelle Armacanus) que les Arméniens et les Grecs d'une époque assez récente avaient professé une doctrine erronée d'après laquelle une vision claire de Dieu selon son essence même serait refusée aux bienheureux; ceux-ci ne pourraient voir Dieu autrement que par une sorte d'image ou lumière émanant de Lui (*tantum per quandam illius similitudinem, aut lucem ab eo derivatam*). D'après Alphonse de Castro, auteur d'une réfutation volumineuse de toutes les hérésies, Abélard aurait donné naissance à la même erreur en Occident; par Arnaud de Brescia, son aberration se serait communiquée à Amaury de Bène, sous Innocent III, époque à laquelle les hérétiques Albigeois l'avaient reçue également<sup>2</sup>. Sans chercher

<sup>1</sup> *Commentariorum ac disputationum in primam partem S. Thomae t. I* (Antverpiae 1621), disp. XXXVII, pp. 195—200.

<sup>2</sup> Ce tableau fantaisiste de l'histoire d'une erreur, qu'Alphonse de Castro a voulu attribuer, en premier chef, à Abélard (Alfonsi a Castro, Zamorensis, *Ordinis Minorum regularis Observantiae, Provinciae sancti Jacobi, adversus omnes Haereses, Libri XIII*. — Antverpiae, in aedibus Johannis Steelsii, anno MDLVI, fol. 90 v—91 r), devait se rapporter, en réalité, à l'un des articles des Amauriciens, dont on a cru trouver la source chez Jean Scot Erigène en 1215, d'après Martin le Polonais (*Chronicon Pontificum et Imperatorum*, in MGH. SS. XXII, 438): *Item dixit (Amalericus), quod sicut lux non videtur in se, sed in aere, sic Deus nec ab angelo nec ab homine videtur in se, sed tantum in creaturis...* Qui omnes errores inveniuntur in libro, qui intitulatur *periphiseon*. — Cf. G. C. Capelle, Amaury de Bène (Bibl. thomiste, XVI, Paris 1932), pp. 52—53; 65; 105—108.

à défendre Abélard, Vasquez s'étonne un peu du silence de saint Bernard devant une erreur aussi grave. Mais les opinions d'un philosophe malfamé ne le préoccupent pas plus que celles des Arméniens ou des schismatiques grecs : «ce qui est important (*quod caput est*), c'est que, parmi les Pères de l'Eglise les plus grands, plusieurs semblent avoir été assez proches de cette opinion» (*non longe ab hac sententia fuisse videntur nonnulli ex gravioribus Ecclesiae Patribus*).

Comment Vasquez a-t-il été amené à faire cette constatation aussi troublante? Il avait devant lui un texte de saint Thomas d'Aquin à commenter, un article de la Somme théologique<sup>1</sup> où les arguments contraires à la thèse de la vision de Dieu *per essentiam* étaient empruntés à deux autorités patristiques grecques : saint Jean Chrysostome et le pseudo-Denys. Le texte de Chrysostome est tiré de sa XV<sup>e</sup> homélie sur l'Evangile de S. Jean et se rapporte à 1, 18 : «personne n'a jamais vu Dieu». Il dit (PG 59, col. 98) : «Ni les prophètes, ni même les anges et les archanges n'ont vu ce que Dieu est par Lui-même. En effet, comment ce qui est de nature créée pourrait voir ce qui est incréé?» Le texte de Denys est une paraphrase du passage négatif du *Parménide* (142a, fin de la première hypothèse sur l'Un), que l'auteur des Noms divins (1, 5: PG 3, col. 593a) applique à la Théarchie suressentielle : «Il n'y a d'Elle ni sensation, ni image, ni opinion, ni raisonnement, ni science». Saint Thomas répond que ces deux autorités se rapportent à l'incompréhensibilité plutôt qu'à l'incognoscibilité de l'essence divine (*Dicendum quod utraque auctoritas loquitur de visione comprehensionis*). En ce qui concerne l'autorité de Denys, Vasquez admet pleinement cette solution de la difficulté : commentés par le Docteur angélique et par tant d'autres théologiens latins du Moyen âge, les textes apophatiques les plus hardis du présumé disciple de S. Paul ne pouvaient effrayer personne en Occident. Mais il en était autrement pour Chrysostome : saint Thomas avait-il des fondements suffisants pour interpréter sa doctrine de la vision de Dieu dans le bon sens? Le contexte

<sup>1</sup> I<sup>a</sup>, q. 12, a. 1: *Utrum aliquis intellectus creatus possit Deum per essentiam videre?*

au passage de ce Père grec, cité dans la Somme, et, surtout, l'étude des Homélies sur l'Incompréhensible de saint Jean Chrysostome, ainsi que d'autres recherches que Vasquez entreprend sur les écrits patristiques dirigés contre les Anoméens, lui font croire que l'interprétation proposée par saint Thomas est insoutenable «Nous pouvons prouver avec évidence, — dit-il, — que l'on ne doit pas interpréter la doctrine (négative) de ces Pères dans le sens de la vision que les Scolastiques appellent compréhensive, mais bien dans le sens (de l'impossibilité) de toute notion claire et intuitive de Dieu tel qu'Il est».

Devant cette erreur manifeste, qui rapproche les Pères du IV<sup>e</sup> siècle de l'impiété des Arméniens, Vasquez ira jusqu'à justifier, dans une certaine mesure, la thèse d'Eunomius qui soutenait la compréhensibilité totale de l'essence de Dieu pour l'intellect humain. «Eunomius n'a pas été, tout de même, aussi fou (*nec enim ita amens fuit Eunomius*) pour prétendre que la notion qu'il pouvait avoir de Dieu soit parfaitement égale à la notion et connaissance que Dieu a de Lui-même.» L'égalité de connaissance qu'Eunomius soutenait contre les Pères se rapporterait uniquement à l'objet. Tout ce qu'il voulait dire, c'est qu'il n'y a rien qui soit en Dieu formellement et fasse l'objet de la connaissance divine, sans être à la fois connaissable à lui, Eunomius. Mais il faut nécessairement concéder ceci aux bienheureux qui voient Dieu tel qu'Il est. En effet, tout ce qui est formellement en Dieu, est Dieu, étant identique avec son essence; donc, rien de ce qui est en Dieu et fait l'objet de sa connaissance ne saurait rester caché aux bienheureux. En transposant ainsi l'épistémologie théologique d'Eunomius sur le plan de la vision intuitive du siècle futur, Vasquez assimile cet optimisme rationaliste de l'anoméen à la doctrine scolastique de la vision de l'essence divine et reproche aux Pères qui ont polémisé avec Eunomius d'avoir nié la possibilité de voir Dieu «tel qu'Il est».

La liste des Pères qui auraient professé cette erreur s'accroît au fur et à mesure que s'étend l'enquête patristique de Vasquez. Après saint Jean Chrysostome viennent ceux qui l'ont précédé dans la polémique anti-eunoméenne: saint Basile et saint Grégoire de Nysse. Mais il faut y ajouter encore saint



Cyrille de Jérusalem, saint Epiphane, saint Cyrille d'Alexandrie, Théodoret, saint Jean Damascène et d'autres, moins importants. Seuls, parmi les Pères grecs toujours suspects, Origène, saint Grégoire de Nazianze et Denys auraient professé une doctrine sûrement orthodoxe de la vision de Dieu face à face. Les Pères latins n'ont pas échappé aux accusations de Vasquez: saint Ambroise, saint Jérôme, Primasius et saint Isidore de Séville auraient également refusé aux bienheureux la vision de Dieu *sicuti est*, d'après le théologien espagnol.

Devant le scandale de ce requisitoire dressé contre les Pères de l'Eglise, d'autres théologiens cherchèrent à défendre les accusés. François Suarez (1548—1617) trouve invraisemblable qu'une erreur aussi manifeste, contraire aux Ecritures, eût été reçue par le commun accord de Pères tellement nombreux. Ce serait là, en effet, une «faute intolérable» (*intolerabilis lapsus*) qu'il refuse *a priori* d'admettre dans la tradition patristique. Aussi Suarez explique-t-il tous les «passages obscurs» concernant la «claire vision» chez les Pères, cités par Vasquez, dans le sens scolastique de l'impossibilité d'une vision compréhensive de l'essence divine. Tout en reconnaissant les difficultés que présentent les textes de Chrysostome (*Chrysostomus obscurius et difficiliter loquitur*), Suarez n'en est pas moins persuadé qu'avec un peu de bonne volonté on peut triompher de tous les obstacles du *Περί 'Ακαταλήπτου*. Voulant défendre contre toute accusation possible quelques autres Pères, non mentionnés par Vasquez, il n'arrive qu'à rendre suspects encore deux: saint Cyprien et saint Athanase<sup>1</sup>.

Un autre commentateur de saint Thomas, le théologien jésuite Diego Ruiz de Montoya (1562—1632), a failli donner une nouvelle tournure aux débats soulevés par Vasquez. Ayant remarqué que les mêmes Pères qui semblent avoir nié la vision de Dieu *sicuti est* dans quelques passages de leurs œuvres l'admettent dans d'autres, Ruiz se demande si l'interprétation correcte de la pensée patristique est possible sans une étude

<sup>1</sup> *Commentaria ac Disputationes in Iam Partem Divi Thomae: De Deo uno et trino. Cap. VII: An Deus sit invisibilis in se et in substantia sua respectu omnis intellectus creati* (Moguntiae 1607), pp. 45—49.

préalable des modes d'expression théologique propres aux Pères de l'Eglise. Il aurait voulu, comme Suarez, interpréter ces doctrines de la vision de Dieu face à face en limitant leurs déclarations négatives à l'impossibilité d'une *visio comprehensiva*; d'autre part, comme Vasquez, il se rend compte que la distinction scolastique entre la connaissance claire et la compréhension, appliquée aux textes des Pères, ne résout pas la difficulté. Mais l'attitude de Ruiz est contraire à celle de Vasquez: ce dernier, en défendant Eunomius contre les Pères, rapprochait trop la connaissance de Dieu de la compréhension, tandis que Ruiz cherchera à dissocier davantage ces deux moments. Aussi, la *Disputatio VIIa* de son commentaire sur saint Thomas sera intitulée: *Utrum sola divina scientia sit comprehensiva Dei*<sup>1</sup>. Ruiz est sûr que les doctrines des Pères, difficiles à interpréter, ne refusent pas aux bienheureux la vision de Dieu face à face *simpliciter et omni modo*. Mais pour retrouver le «mode» patristique qui correspondrait à la vision-connaissance, il s'agit de définir exactement ce que veut dire la vision-compréhension chez les Scolastiques. Comprendre, c'est connaître parfaitement; or la connaissance d'une chose ne peut être dite parfaite sans que la chose soit connue dans la mesure même où elle est connaissable. Donc, seule la connaissance incréée que Dieu a de Lui-même est compréhension, c'est à dire connaissance adéquate à la cognoscibilité de son objet incréé. Jamais la vision béatifique, pour autant qu'elle reste une connaissance créée, ne pourra atteindre la perfection de la science compréhensive de Dieu. Diego Ruiz conclut: *absolute loquendo, divinae scientiae et visionis beatificae formale objectum non est prorsus idem in ratione cognoscibilis et objecti*. Ainsi, voulant défendre les Pères contre les accusations de Vasquez, Ruiz adopte une méthode qui est contraire à celle de Suarez: au lieu d'interpréter les textes des auteurs anciens dans le sens scolastique, il cherche à réformer, chez saint Thomas, la doctrine de l'incompréhensibilité divine, jusqu'à verser dans une sorte d'agnosticisme:

<sup>1</sup> Commentarii ac Disputationes de scientia, de ideis, de veritate ac de vita Dei. Ad primam partem S. Thomae, a q. 14 usque ad 18 (Lutetiae Parisiorum 1629), pp. 44—60.

en tant qu'Il est parfaitement connaissable, Dieu n'est pas un objet absolument identique pour Lui-même et pour les intellects créés qui jouissent de la vision de son essence.

Il serait trop long d'énumérer tout les théologiens (Jean de Lugo, Nicolas Isambert et d'autres) qui sont intervenus dans les débats: ce qui a été dit montre assez bien d'insuccès des tentatives d'interpréter convenablement les textes des Pères, en restant dans les cadres habituels de la théologie scolastique du XVI<sup>e</sup> et XVII<sup>e</sup> siècles. En essayant de concilier les Pères et les Scolastiques, on a voulu prêter tantôt aux uns, tantôt aux autres, de doctrines qu'ils n'ont jamais professées. Ceci a été très bien compris par Denis Pétau (ou Petavius, 1583—1652) qui fut historien en même temps que théologien. Dans son *Opus de theologicis dogmatibus*<sup>1</sup>, Pétau attaque Ruiz de Montoya pour avoir mal interprété saint Thomas. Si la compréhension était une connaissance égale à la cognoscibilité de la chose connue, non seulement l'essence divine, mais aussi les substances créées nous seraient incompréhensibles. La compréhension se rapporte uniquement à l'ampleur de la chose connue, ce qui permet de soutenir, dans le cas de la vision de l'essence divine, une identité parfaite de l'objet de compréhension infinie de Dieu et de connaissance finie des élus. Les deux sont «représentatives» de l'objet ou «objectives», comme disent les philosophes, en usurpant ce terme chez les théologiens scolastiques<sup>2</sup>. Cependant la connaissance des bienheureux ne pourra jamais *adaequare amplitudinem rei cognitae*. Les textes patristiques qui semblent nier la possibilité de connaître Dieu dans son essence doivent être interprétés en partant de ce principe. Cependant, tout en s'efforçant d'accorder les Pères et les Scolastiques, Pétau se refuse de leur faire violence «en leur tordant le cou» (*oborto quodammodo collo, vique iis illata*); une telle méthode

<sup>1</sup> Voir *De Deo Deique proprietatibus, lib. VII, in quo de Dei visione agitur* (éd. J. B. Thomas, Bar-le-Duc 1864), pp. 553—605.

<sup>2</sup> Malgré cette allusion désobligeante à Descartes, on peut se demander si, à son tour, Petavius n'a pas «usurpé» le sens moderne des mots «*objectum*», «*objective*», «*repraesentativus*» dans la III<sup>e</sup> Méditation (Oeuvres complètes, éd. Ch. Adam et P. Tannery, t. VII, pp. 40—42; t. IX, pp. 31—33).

serait absolument étrangère à la tâche d'un théologien honnête et prudent, aussi bien qu'à ses propres mœurs et coutumes (*quod ut ab officio probi ac prudentis theologi, sic a meis moribus et institutis alienissimum est*).

Denis Pétau a-t-il réussi à mettre fin au trouble causé par la déclaration de Vasquez, en montrant le vrai sens des doctrines patristiques de la vision face à face? S'il n'a pas fait violence aux Pères des premiers siècles, pour leur imposer à tout prix les cadres de la théologie scolastique, il n'a pas osé, non plus, adopter pleinement leur façon de poser le problème de la vision de Dieu, en allant jusqu'au fond de leur pensée, afin de la rendre compréhensible. En restant sur la superficie, il cherche avant tout de sauver l'honneur de quelques Pères grecs et latins, les plus éminents, discrédités par Vasquez. Il y réussit plus ou moins, non sans avouer parfois sa gêne extrême, par exemple devant les «Homélies sur l'Incompréhensible» de saint Jean Chrysostome. Devant certains théologiens grecs et syriens Pétau se voit obligé de renoncer à toute tentative d'une interprétation favorable à la conception scolastique. Il découvre cependant encore un auteur — Clément d'Alexandrie — qui aurait sûrement professé une doctrine de la vision de l'essence divine. En définitive, chez Pétau la liste des théologiens absolument irréductibles à la bonne doctrine est moins impressionnante que celle de Vasquez: elle ne comprend que des noms peu connus ou des personnages plus ou moins compromis dans l'affaire nestorienne. Ce sont: Titus de Bostra, Théodore de Mopsueste, Théodoret de Cyr, Basile de Séleucie, Oecuménius, Anastase le Sinaïte, Théophylacte de Bulgarie.

Ici Petavius, sans doute non satisfait des résultats de son enquête patristique, abandonne les auteurs anciens qui auraient nié, *obscura vel evidentius*, la vision intuitive de l'essence divine, pour faire une manœuvre de diversion du côté des théologiens plus récents chez lesquels il veut trouver une erreur manifeste au sujet de la vision de Dieu tel qu'Il est. Ce sont les hérétiques arméniens et, surtout, les schismatiques byzantins du XIV<sup>e</sup> siècle, avec le «coryphée de leur nouvelle faction», un certain Grégoire Palamas, dont les doctrines ridicules (*ridicula dog-*

*mata*) sur les attributs divins ont déjà été exposées plus haut (dans le 1<sup>er</sup> livre du même ouvrage de Pétau, pp. 145—160). Le «théologien honnête et prudent» n'a plus de scrupules pour ne pas faire violence à une doctrine dans laquelle il verra la source de l'erreur sur la vision de Dieu, reprochée aux Arméniens en 1341. Il est encore plus étonnant que cet érudit, auteur de plusieurs ouvrages consacrés spécialement aux questions de chronologie, néglige complètement la science des dates en laissant entendre que les Arméniens, mentionnés par Vasquez, auraient subi l'influence de la nouvelle doctrine de Palamas. Pétau ne pouvait pas ignorer qui était l'«Armacain», cité par Vasquez comme source de ses renseignements sur les Arméniens: c'est Richard Fitz-Ralph, qui fut archevêque d'Armagh entre 1347 et 1360. En 1341—1342 Fitz-Ralph se trouvait à Avignon, où Benoît XII le chargea d'examiner les doctrines des Arméniens venus en ce moment pour chercher l'union avec l'Eglise de Rome. Théologien assez connu, Richard Fitz-Ralph était un «augustinien averroïsant». Pour quelqu'un qui voulait identifier l'intellect agent d'Averroès avec Dieu, le problème de la vision intuitive de l'essence divine devait représenter un intérêt particulier. Aussi Richard a-t-il donné une place assez importante, dans sa *Summa in Quaestionibus Armenorum*<sup>1</sup>, à l'étude de cet article. Quoiqu'il attribue la négation d'une vision claire et intuitive de la nature divine surtout aux «docteurs grecs modernes» (*Tenent grecorum doctores moderni et etiam armenorum aliqui*, etc.), Richard Fitz-Ralph ne pouvait avoir en vue l'enseignement de saint Grégoire Palamas. En effet, le premier Concile «palamite» se réunissait à Constantinople en 1341, au moment où les théologiens arméniens arrivaient à Avignon. La date-limite du commencement de la controverse hésychaste

<sup>1</sup> L'unique édition de cette Somme en 19 livres, rédigée sous forme de dialogue entre le maître et le disciple, est assez rare: *Summa Domini Armacani in questionibus Armenorum, noviter impressa et correcta a... Iohanne Sudoris* (Parisiis), *venales habentur in vico divi Iacobi sub Lilio aureo* (1511). — Le livre XIV, où Richard Fitz-Ralph traite la question qui nous intéresse (fol. 109vb—118vb), est ainsi annoncé: *Incipit liber decimus-quartus in quo tractabitur questio grecorum de visione nuda et clara divine essentie a veris beatis. Et habet viginti novem capitula.*

est 1337. Si l'on veut voir dans le « palamisme » une doctrine nouvelle, étrangère à la tradition théologique de Byzance, on ne saurait prétendre qu'elle eût une diffusion aussi rapide, en dehors même de l'orthodoxie byzantine, dans les milieux des monophysites arméniens. Les *Graecorum doctores moderni* de Richard Fitz-Ralph devaient appartenir à une époque antérieure aux débats sur la Lumière de Thabor; c'étaient, sans doute, des théologiens byzantins du XIII<sup>e</sup> siècle (probablement des contemporains du Concile de Lyon), dont la doctrine de vision face à face aurait pu frapper les Occidentaux. En tout cas, s'il fallait chercher chez les Grecs orthodoxes la source de l'opinion des Arméniens monophysites censurée en 1341, on se verrait obligé de remonter beaucoup plus loin dans le passé, peut être jusqu'aux grands siècles de la théologie patristique, avant Chalcédoine.

Gabriel Vasquez n'avait pas tort de pousser son enquête jusqu'aux Pères des premiers siècles. Son erreur consistait dans l'étroitesse de jugement sur les doctrines de la vision de Dieu face à face dans une tradition qui lui restait étrangère. Les débats qui ont suivi sa déclaration ont été faussés par les tentatives infructueuses de concilier les Pères et les Scolastiques. Après une controverse qui dura près de cinquante ans, le problème posé par Vasquez est resté sans réponse: au lieu de résoudre les difficultés d'interprétation des enseignements patristiques, Denis Pétau a simplement déplacé le problème, en rejetant sur les théologiens byzantins du XIV<sup>e</sup> siècle l'accusation d'avoir rompu avec la tradition patristique d'une doctrine saine sur la vision de Dieu « tel qu'Il est ». Néanmoins, ce long débat de théologiens reste très instructif pour tous ceux qui se gardent bien de confondre l'unité de la Tradition chrétienne, riche de perspectives théologiques différentes, avec l'uniformité doctrinale d'un enseignement systématisé.

Pour être en mesure de replacer dans leurs contextes doctrinaux les solutions différentes du problème de la vision de Dieu face à face qui ont pu avoir lieu dans la tradition patristique de Byzance, il aurait fallu étudier dans son ensemble la pensée de chacun des théologiens mis en cause au cours de la contro-

verse soulevée par Vasquez. Aussi notre tâche se limitera-t-elle à faire quelques remarques qui ne seront qu'une esquisse, un programme d'études à entreprendre, plutôt qu'un tableau achevé qui pourrait servir de réplique positive à l'enquête négative de Vasquez. Dans les cinq paragraphes qui vont suivre, je m'arrêterai brièvement sur les différents aspects doctrinaux qui entrent en jeu lorsqu'il s'agit d'interpréter la vision de Dieu dans la pensée patristique de tradition grecque.

1. Il faudra dire d'abord quelques mots au sujet de la polémique anti-eunomienne de saint Basile et de saint Grégoire de Nysse. Ici le problème de la vision de Dieu face à face n'a pas été posé directement. Il s'agissait plutôt, pour Eunomius, d'une cognoscibilité conceptuelle de l'essence divine, identifiée avec le Père et exprimable par le concept d'*ἀγενεσία* qui aurait le sens positif de l'aséité. En attaquant cet optimisme intellectuel d'Eunomius, les Cappadociens ont voulu trouver dans cette théorie de la connaissance, où les raisons séminales des Stoïciens sont devenues les noms essentiels des choses semés dans l'âme humaine par le Dieu Créateur de la Genèse, une philosophie du langage très proche de celle de Cratyle, dans le dialogue qui porte ce nom (Gr. de Nysse, *C. Eun. XII*: PG 45, 1045c). En reprenant en partie les arguments de Socrate, Basile et Grégoire soutiennent, contre la révélation essentielle des choses dans les noms-concepts, la thèse qui prête une valeur positive à la part de convention dans l'imposition des noms. Les noms répondent à des propriétés plutôt qu'aux essences mêmes des choses que nous cherchons à connaître. Dans ce contexte la connaissance des choses *κατ' οὐσίαν*, si chère à Eunomius, devait nécessairement apauvrir la réalité créée, tandis que la connaissance *κατ' ἐπινοίαν* défendue par les Cappadociens permettait de découvrir dans tout être une richesse inépuisable en concepts, irréductible à une notion adéquate de l'essence. Le sens du terme *οὐσία* chez saint Basile n'a été compris, ni par son accusateur, ni par ses défenseurs scolastiques : pour Basile (et encore plus pour son frère), connaître une chose par son essence, c'est remplacer la connaissance de l'objet réel

par celle d'un concept. Il y a encore un aspect du même problème, exprimé surtout chez Grégoire de Nysse: notre intellect découvre les propriétés des choses, d'après lesquelles nous formons leurs noms, dans la mesure où ceci est nécessaire à notre vie (*Idem*: col. 949b; cf. 1041d); Dieu seul connaît les essences créées: si nous pouvions voir les fondements essentiels des créatures, nous serions éblouis par la puissance créatrice qui les produit (*Ib.*: 937: *In Hexaem.*: 44, 73a b et 76a b). La connaissance *οὐσιώδης* des créatures dépasse nos facultés cognitives<sup>1</sup>.

Chez saint Basile, comme chez son frère, l'incognoscibilité des essences créées ne rendait pas la connaissance des choses de ce monde moins directe. De même, en affirmant que Dieu se fait connaître dans sa puissance (*δύναμις*) ou dans ses opérations (*ἐνεργεῖαι*), tandis que sa connaissance essentielle reste inaccessible aux créatures (S. Bas., *C. Eun.* I, 6: PG 29, 521—524; II, 4: 577—580; II, 32, 648; *Ep.* 234, à *Amphil.*: PG 32, 869. — S. Gr. de Nysse, *Sur les béatitudes*, hom. VI: PG 44, 1269), ni Basile ni Grégoire n'ont rendu impossible pour les bienheureux la vision de Dieu «tel qu'Il est». Le refus d'une vision de l'*οὐσία* ne signale que l'impossibilité de connaître Dieu dans sa transcendance absolue, en dehors de tout rapport avec les êtres créés, au delà de sa révélation dans l'économie créatrice et rédemptrice. Puisque la Trinité consubstantielle est indépendante de ses relations économiques avec le monde créé, les «théologiens» devons bien parler de l'*οὐσία*, mais ils ne pourront le faire que «tropologiquement» et «allégoriquement», en guidant

<sup>1</sup> Je me permettrai de signaler ici, dans l'article de M. Joseph Pieper, *De l'élément négatif dans la philosophie de S. Thomas d'Aquin* (in *Dieu vivant* 20, p. 43), ce passage instructif: «Selon l'opinion de saint Thomas, il est inhérent à l'essence des choses *en tant que creatura* que leur cognoscibilité ne puisse être épuisée par un entendement fini, parce que la cause de cette cognoscibilité (luminosité, visibilité) a en même temps nécessairement pour effet de rendre les choses insondables». (Les mots en italique ont été soulignés par l'auteur de l'article cité.) — S'il est ainsi, le «thomisme» de saint Thomas d'Aquin a été, peut être, plus proche de la pensée des Cappadociens que du «thomisme» éclectique des théologiens du XVII<sup>e</sup> siècle. Il y a de ces recoupements de grandes doctrines que l'on découvre subitement quand on ne cherche pas à les accorder à tout prix.



la pensée vers un sens supérieur à l'entendement (S. Bas., *C. Eun.* I, 4: 29, 544).

Ici il faut rappeler la notion patristique de *θεολογία* et d'*οἰκονομία*, dualité d'aspects dans la théognosie qui est très importante pour la compréhension du vrai sens de la distinction, ébauchée chez les Cappadociens, entre l'*οὐσία* inaccessible et la *δύναμις* ou *ἐνέργεια* qui «descend jusqu'à nous». On sait quelle importance devaient avoir, dans la théologie proprement byzantine, postérieure au pseudo-Denys (et spécialement chez les théologiens du XIV<sup>e</sup> siècle) les *δυνάμεις* et *ἐνέργειαι* de saint Basile et de saint Grégoire de Nysse. Contre Eunomius, qui séparait l'*ἐνέργεια* de l'*οὐσία* divine pour l'attribuer au *Λόγος*, seul être créé immédiatement par l'*Ἀγέννητος* (*Apologie*: PG 30, 859), saint Basile soutenait l'inséparabilité de ces deux moments: s'il en était autrement, Dieu resterait non manifesté et inconnaissable dans son rapport aux créatures. Mais Basile insiste en même temps sur la nécessité de les distinguer: autrement la relation aux êtres créés déterminerait, en quelque sorte, l'*οὐσία* de la Trinité, en supprimant le caractère absolu de sa transcendance (*C. Eun.* II, 32: PG 29, 648).

Les deux aspects, «théologie» et «économie», étant inséparables, l'un est manifesté par l'autre, et, puisque l'Incarnation du Fils est le moment central de l'économie, on ne peut connaître la Trinité en dehors de l'Incarnation. La vision de Dieu face à face sera donc, pour saint Basile, une révélation trinitaire — du Père, par le Fils, dans l'Esprit-Saint, en même temps que la «*theoria*» de la Personne du Fils incarné. Il dit, dans le «Traité du Saint-Esprit» (IX, 23: PG 32, 109 b; Sources chr., p. 147): «Comme le soleil, lorsqu'il rencontre un oeil pur, (l'Esprit-Saint) te montrera en Lui-même l'Image de l'Invisible. Dans la bienheureuse contemplation de cette Image, tu verras l'ineffable beauté de l'Archétype». L'Image est le Fils; l'Invisible, l'Archétype — le Père. On pourrait citer plusieurs autres textes analogues<sup>1</sup>, applicables aussi bien à la contemplation mystique

<sup>1</sup> Cités en note dans l'éd. des Sources chr., *loc. cit.*; par exemple ce passage de la Lettre 226 (PG 32, 849a): «Illuminé par l'Esprit, notre esprit fixe son regard sur le Fils et en Celui-ci, comme en une Image, contemple le Père».

qu'à la vision finale de Dieu par les bienheureux. Sans pouvoir m'arrêter ici sur le sens spécial que le «face à face» reçoit chez saint Grégoire de Nysse, je signalerai cependant le moment de «ténèbre» et d'«inconnaissance» qui caractérise pour lui la transcendance essentielle de Dieu. La conscience de la nature transcendante de Dieu incite le *νοῦς* créé à se dépasser dans une «progression infinie» de l'union déifiante sans terme. Ce moment négatif sera développé et systématisé par le pseudo-Denys.

2. Un autre élément doctrinal qui, dans la tradition patristique d'Orient, s'attache au problème de la vision de Dieu face à face, se fait remarquer surtout dans la spiritualité. C'est le moment de la Lumière divine.

Les grands Cappadociens ont critiqué, dans la doctrine d'Eunomius, non seulement une simplification arienne du «spiritualisme mystique» d'Origène, mais aussi (indirectement) l'origénisme même, en ce qui l'apparentait à la théo-cosmologie du moyen platonisme. Sur le plan spirituel, l'intellectualisme origéniste était représenté par Evagre le Pontique, dont l'apport considérable à la spiritualité byzantine peut être mesuré — et apprécié — surtout chez ceux qui se sont efforcés de surmonter l'origénisme latent dans sa doctrine du *νοῦς* humain.

Ainsi qu'Origène, Evagre n'admet pas un dépassement du *νοῦς* dans l'expérience de l'union avec Dieu. S'il parle de l'*ἀπείρατος ἀγνοσία*, ce n'est pas, comme l'aurait fait un Grégoire de Nysse et, plus tard, un Denys, dans le sens d'une apophase mystique. Le R. P. Hausherr<sup>1</sup> a très bien montré que cette expression chez Evagre doit signifier l'exclusion de toute connaissance qui ne soit celle de Dieu. En se découvrant dans l'état de l'oraison pure, le *νοῦς* *γυμνός* découvre en même temps la lumière de la Trinité dont il est le réceptacle naturel. Cette *γνώσις οὐσιώδης* est due, bien sûr, à la grâce, mais elle ne suppose pas moins l'idée d'une certaine parenté de l'intellectuel et du divin dans l'arrière-fond origéniste de la pensée d'Evagre. Le caractère uniforme de la «gnose essentielle», tou-

<sup>1</sup> Dans la notice *Ignorance in finis*, in *Orientalia christiana periodica* (Rome 1936), II, nn. 3—4, pp. 351—362.

jours égale à elle-même, sans accroissements ni diminutions, permet de la rapprocher de la *κατάληψις* intellectuelle que les élus auront, d'après Evagre, dans la «gnose face à face» (Pseudo-Basile, *Ep. VIII*: PG 32, 257a), connaissance accomplie que les anges ne possèdent pas encore et que le Christ Lui-même ne pouvait avoir dans son humanité. On comprend pourquoi, au cours des discussions soulevées par Vasquez, les défenseurs de saint Basile, voulant lui attribuer une doctrine de la vision de l'essence divine, cherchèrent à s'appuyer surtout sur la Lettre VIII, pseudo-basilienne, qui est, en réalité, un écrit d'Evagre.

Le thème de la lumière divine est traité par Evagre dans les cadres d'une mystique intellectualiste. Aussi, si son Dieu est transcendant à la créature sensible, on ne voit pas qu'Il le soit également par rapport au monde des intelligences créées. Le dualisme platonicien s'introduit ici dans la spiritualité pré-byzantine et on a l'impression que la Trinité évagrienne, avec sa lumière essentielle, se range du côté de l'intelligible, comme un soleil du *κόσμος νοητός*.

A juger d'après ce que nous savons sur la secte des messaliens, leur doctrine de la vision de l'essence de Dieu par les yeux corporels représenterait une sorte d'antithèse du spiritualisme origéniste. Il y aurait eu donc, au IV<sup>e</sup> siècle, deux courants opposés: d'une part le spiritualisme aigu d'Evagre, avec sa lumière divine intelligible, d'autre part le matérialisme mystique de la secte messalienne, à base du monisme stoïcien vulgarisé et abâtardi, avec la luminosité sensible de la Divinité. La spiritualité orthodoxe cherchera à transcender, dans la notion de la lumière divine, l'opposition de «lumière sensible» et «lumière intelligible», deux catégories qui appartiennent également à la réalité créée.

Les *Homélies spirituelles* de saint Macaire (ou du pseudo-Macaire), dans lesquelles on a voulu voir à tort un écrit messalien, parlent d'un «feu divin» immatériel qui n'est pas, cependant, spirituel dans le sens intellectualiste d'Evagre. Dans cette mystique affective de la «grâce sentie», l'expérience de la lumière n'appartient proprement ni aux sens ni aux facultés intellectuelles, mais plutôt à la conscience du sujet humain. On peut

dire la même chose de saint Diadoque de Photicé, qui est plus proche, peut être, d'Evagre que ne l'avait été l'auteur des «Homélies spirituelles». L'objet propre de la vision face à face, pour Diadoque («Vision», réponse 21: édition des *Sources chr.*, p. 178) comme pour Macaire (XVII, 4: PG 34, 625), est le Christ, Dieu-homme, dans sa gloire éternelle.

Les étapes du dépassement des limites intellectualistes d'Origène-Evagre, dans le problème de la vision de Dieu, peuvent être trouvées chez saint Maxime (*Schol. in N. D. I*, 4: PG 4, 197), chez saint Jean Damascène (*Hom. sur la Transf.*, 12: PG 96, 564s) et, enfin, chez saint Syméon le Nouveau Théologien, notamment dans sa doctrine de la lumière incréée<sup>1</sup>. La distinction entre «lumière sensible», «lumière intelligible» et «lumière incréée», qui transcende l'opposition des deux premières, sera nettement exprimée dans le *Tome hagioritique* qu'il faut attribuer à saint Grégoire Palamas<sup>2</sup>. La mystique de la Lumière divine recevra ici son fondement théologique.

En signalant ce deuxième moment doctrinal qui s'attache au problème de la vision face à face dans la tradition patristique de Byzance, nous laissons ouverte la question si, chez les Arméniens du XIV<sup>e</sup> siècle, une vision de la lumière a remplacé l'intuition directe de Dieu *sicuti est*, comme l'avait prétendu Richard Fitz-Ralph et, après lui, Vasquez et d'autres. Remarquons cependant que la réponse des théologiens arméniens (Mansi XXV, 1197) permet de supposer qu'on n'a pas su interpréter convenablement leur doctrine de la vision de Dieu face à face, en 1341.

3. Considérons à présent un autre aspect du problème, notamment celui qui rendait les passages de saint Jean Chrysostome, signalés par Vasquez et Pétau, tellement difficiles à interpréter dans le sens d'une vision directe de Dieu «tel qu'Il est». Il s'agit des implications christologiques de la question qui reçoit

<sup>1</sup> Pour avoir une idée plus exacte de la doctrine de saint Syméon, il faudra attendre l'édition critique de ses œuvres, préparée par le R. P. Krivochéine.

<sup>2</sup> Comme il apparaît de sa lettre à Akindynos, publiée par M. Jean Meyendorff dans *ΘΕΟΛΟΓΙΑ*, t. 24 (Athènes 1952).

vent, chez les théologiens d'Antioche, une signification spécifique.

Nous laisserons de côté le moment négatif chez saint Jean Chrysostome, développé surtout dans les cinq homélies «Sur l'Incompréhensible»<sup>1</sup> et dans la 15<sup>e</sup> homélie sur l'Evangile selon S. Jean. Inconnaissable dans son essence nue (*οὐσία γυμνή*) ou nature simple (*φύσις ἀπλή*), Dieu se révèle aux anges et aux hommes dans sa «condescendance» (*συνκατάβασις*). Cette expression n'a pas ici un sens uniquement moral: elle reçoit sa valeur théologique lorsqu'on la rapproche du terme *οἰκονομία*, désignant les dispositions providentielles dans le gouvernement du monde. Or les «économies» divines restaient en partie inconnues même aux vertus angéliques (*Sur l'Incompr. IV*: PG 48, 729) qui n'ont pu les apprendre qu'avec nous et grâce à nous, par l'Incarnation de Fils (col. 730), cette «économie» par excellence (ib. V: col. 738d), la *συνκατάβασις* proprement dite. En effet, d'après Chrysostome, avant que le Verbe ne se fit chair, les anges ne pouvaient voir Dieu autrement que dans leur pensée (*κατὰ διάνοιαν ὄψις*), en se l'imaginant (*φαντάζονται*) dans leurs natures pures et vigilantes (*Sur S. Jean XV, 2*: PG 59, 100). La vision de Dieu est donc conditionnée, pour les êtres créés, par l'Incarnation. C'est dans le contexte christologique que saint Jean Chrysostome commente le «face à face» de I Cor. 13, 12: «alors je connaîtrai comme j'ai été connu» voudrait dire: «je connaîtrai en venant vers Dieu, comme Dieu est venu vers moi» (*In Ep. ad Cor. I*: PG 61, 287—288). Si la connaissance «en partie» (*ἐκ μέρους*) se rapporte aux «économies» ou dispensations divines, ceci ne veut pas dire que la connaissance parfaite, totale, sera celle de l'essence même de Dieu. On connaîtra totalement, pleinement, l'économie divine accomplie dans l'Incarnation du Fils. Quant à la gnose exacte (*τὴν ἀκριβή*) ou compréhension (*κατάληψις*) de l'essence, elle n'appartient qu'au Fils et au Saint-Esprit, coessentiels avec le Père. La connaissance créée dépendra toujours du Mono-

<sup>1</sup> Voir à ce sujet l'étude du R. P. Daniélou, dans l'introduction au *Περὶ Ἀκαταλήπτου*, éd. Sources chrétiennes.

gène qui «expliqua» (ἐξηγήσατο — *Jean I, 18*) le Dieu invisible (*Sur S. Jean XV, 2: PG 59, 100*).

Ici intervient un thème très important: celui de la Personne du Fils en tant qu'«Image» du Père. Pour être l'Image parfaite de l'Invisible, le Fils doit être Lui-même invisible dans sa nature divine. Si l'Image de l'Invisible devient visible aux anges et aux hommes en s'incarnant, il est certain que cette manifestation de Dieu «par la chair» n'est pas «selon l'essence» (*Sur S. Jean XV, 2: PG 59, 98*). Chrysostome n'explicite pas ici le moment trinitaire de cette théologie de l'Image; il reste dans les cadres strictement christologiques. Cependant, puisque c'est l'Image même qui est connue dans son Incarnation, la Personne du Fils, devenue visible, fait connaître le Père. Ici-bas, pendant la vie terrestre du Christ, l'«Image de Dieu invisible» ne se manifestait, dans son humanité, que «par miroir et en énigmes». Même quand Il se transfigura devant ses disciples, le Christ ne leur montra qu'une «figure obscure des biens futurs», adaptée aux regards mortels. Mais dans le siècle à venir les bienheureux verront face à face le Christ dans la plénitude de sa gloire divine. Puisque Dieu se manifesta en devenant homme, on verra Dieu dans l'humanité du Christ.

On peut dire que cette conception christologique de la vision de Dieu est commune aux théologiens de la tradition d'Antioche. Cependant le moment de l'«Image invisible» devenue visible par l'Incarnation, moment du Logos-Image qui sauvegarde l'orthodoxie chez saint Jean Chrysostome, fait défaut chez un Théodore de Mopsueste: pour lui c'est uniquement l'homme Jésus qui est l'image de la Divinité invisible (*Sur l'Ep. aux Coloss. I, 15: PG 66, 928 bc*). De même pour Théodoret de Cyr. L'immutabilité du Verbe divin dans l'Incarnation entraîne l'invisibilité absolue de Dieu. On ne saurait donc parler d'une «syncatabase» dans le sens hypostatique: la Personne divine du Fils ne se révèle pas en s'incarnant, mais demeure cachée sous le voile de la chair humaine dont elle se sert pour montrer sa présence par des signes qui sont, avant tout, les miracles du Christ (*Eranistes, 1<sup>re</sup> dial. sur l'Immuable: PG 83, coll. 45—52*). Si Théodoret affirme que dans le siècle futur le Seigneur Lui-

même sera vu face à face, cela veut dire que «les fidèles comme les infidèles verront la nature qu'Il avait prise de nous adorée par toute la créature» (*Sur l'Ep. aux Ephes. II*: PG 82, 521). C'est une vision de l'humanité du Christ, rien de plus. Chez les représentants nestorianisants de la théologie d'Antioche, — il faut bien le reconnaître, — une christologie défectueuse rend impossible la doctrine de la vision de Dieu face à face. Pour une fois, peut être, Vasquez a-t-il eu raison.

4. Le christocentrisme des théologiens d'Antioche a un caractère limitatif: même quand il ne remplace pas la connaissance de Dieu «tel qu'Il est» par une vision de l'humanité du Christ, cet attachement exclusif au moment «économique» de l'Incarnation ne permet guère d'expliciter d'autres aspects doctrinaux du problème. Mais ils ne sont pas pour autant rejetés. Ainsi, l'exégèse très sobre de Chrysostome — «connaître Dieu comme Il nous a connus, c'est venir vers Lui comme Il est venu vers nous» — laisse entendre que la descente du Verbe divin qui se fit homme rend possible la montée de l'homme vers Dieu. Pour l'école d'Alexandrie, c'est le thème de la déification: encore un aspect du problème de la vision de Dieu sur lequel il faudra dire quelques mots.

Le moment christologique dans la doctrine de la vision face à face n'est pas un apanage des Antiochiens: il n'est pas moins important chez leur grand antagoniste, saint Cyrille d'Alexandrie. Mais le rôle de l'Esprit-Saint, agent de la déification, mis en relief chez Cyrille, donne à sa doctrine de la béatitude finale une ampleur inconnue aux théologiens d'Antioche. Si l'Incarnation du Fils nous permet de devenir, à notre tour, «fils de Dieu», — non par nature mais par participation (*μέθεξις*), — c'est à l'Esprit-Saint qu'il appartient de nous rendre semblables au Fils, seule Image parfaite du Père (*Sur S. Jean XVII*, 18—19: PG 74, 541d). On devient semblable au Fils — et «fils par participation» — en participant à la nature divine dans l'Esprit-Saint (*Trésor*, ass. 34: PG 75, 597c). Etre déifié, c'est recevoir dans la nature créée la beauté de la nature divine (*Ib.*, ass. 33: 572c; ass. 34: 609a; cf. *De la Trinité*, dial. VII:

75, 1089), en se laissant pénétrer de Divinité, comme l'étoffe qui reçoit le parfum des essences aromatiques (*Sur S. Jean XVI, 24*: PG 74, 452d—453a). La déification progressive, accompagnée d'une connaissance de plus en plus parfaite de Dieu, s'accomplit dans la vie sacramentelle. La gnose parfaite du Christ s'obtient par le baptême et l'illumination de l'Esprit-Saint (*Glaphyres sur l'Exode, II*: PG 69, 432a). Le corps doit avoir sa part dans la vie spirituelle, en union avec Dieu; ceci apparaît surtout dans le sacrement eucharistique qui est, pour Cyrille, une union corporelle avec le Christ (*Sur S. Jean VI, 54*: PG 73, 577bc). C'est l'Esprit-Saint, source de la vie spirituelle, qui nous rend conscients de la présence de Dieu en nous (*Ib.*, *XVII, 18—19*: 74, 545a). Il est ainsi le principe de la gnose; saint Cyrille l'appelle même l'«Intelligence du Christ», le *νοῦς Χριστοῦ* que les fidèles doivent avoir d'après S. Paul (*Ib.*, *XIV, 21*: 74, 285c).

Comme saint Grégoire de Nazianze, saint Cyrille parle souvent de l'illumination (*φωτισμός*) et ne laisse pas de place à la ténèbre, à la «connaissance par l'ignorance». Le caractère partiel (*ἐκ μέρους*) de notre connaissance du Christ est dû à l'«économie selon la chair» et finira avec elle (*Idem, XVI, 25*: 464b). Devant l'illumination du siècle futur, la «*theoria*» imparfaite s'évanouira, pour donner place à une «gnose plus lumineuse», quand «nous verrons face à face notre Roi et Dieu» (*Glaphyres sur l'Exode, II*: PG 69, 432d). Notre intelligence sera remplie de «lumière divine et ineffable» (*θείον τινὸς καὶ ἀπορρήτου φωτός* — *Sur Malachie*: PG 72, 360a). Ayant «la face découverte» (*γυμνῶ ... τῷ προσώπῳ*) et «la pensée non entravée» (*ἀπαρροδίστῳ διανοίᾳ*), nous aurons dans l'esprit (*ἐννοήσομεν*) la beauté de la nature divine de Dieu le Père (*τὸ τῆς θείας φύσεως τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ Πατρὸς ... κάλλος*), «en contemplant la gloire de Celui qui a resplendi de Lui» (*τὴν τοῦ πεφηνότος ἐξ αὐτοῦ θεωρήσαντος δόξαν*). Car nous le verrons tel qu'Il est, lorsque s'achèvera le temps de l'économie selon la chair et le Christ apparaîtra «dans sa propre gloire, qui est aussi celle du Père» (*Sur S. Jean XVI, 25*: PG 74, 464b). Saint Cyrille cite *II Cor. 5, 16*, — «si nous avons connu le Christ selon la chair, à présent



nous ne le connaissons plus ainsi», — pour montrer que l'*οἰκονομία* de l'Incarnation conduit à la *θεολογία* trinitaire (*Glaphyres sur l'Exode, II*: PG 69, 428d—429a); celle-ci atteindra sa perfection finale dans la vision face à face du Fils incarné, resplendissant de cette «beauté de la nature divine» à laquelle les bienheureux participeront aussi dans l'Esprit-Saint. On peut dire cependant que la gnose parfaite des Alexandrins, chez saint Cyrille, n'est plus la fin dernière comme telle, mais l'un des aspects principaux de la déification finale, de l'union avec Dieu: un «mode spirituel des délices» du siècle futur (*τροπὴς ... τρόπος πνευματικός* — *Sur S. Jean XIV, 21*: PG 74, 284c).

Dans leurs doctrines de la vision de Dieu, les théologiens de Byzance recueilleront l'héritage des deux traditions: celle d'Antioche, surtout par saint Jean Chrysostome, et celle d'Alexandrie, par saint Cyrille. La pensée antiochienne reste attachée à la «condescendance» économique qui adapte la manifestation de Dieu aux facultés des êtres créés; elle est de préférence christologique. La pensée alexandrine veut suivre le mouvement inverse, celui de l'homme s'élevant vers l'union avec Dieu, vers la déification finale; cette doctrine de la vision reçoit donc un accent pneumatologique. L'équilibre entre ces deux moments et l'indissoluble unité de l'*οἰκονομία* avec la *θεολογία*, légués par la pensée des «grands Cappadociens», trouveront une nouvelle expression, sur le plan christologique, chez les Pères post-chalcédoniens. La beauté (*κάλλος*) de la nature divine que l'Esprit-Saint, opérant la déification des chrétiens, fait voir aux élus dans le Logos incarné, d'après saint Cyrille, se rattachera étroitement à l'aspect de l'unité hypostatique du Christ, mise en relief dans la doctrine de la «périchorèse» ou communication énergétique des propriétés divines à l'humanité de Dieu-homme. Ceci permettra de considérer la transfiguration du Christ sur le Mont-Thabor comme une anticipation de la vision eschatologique «face à face» de l'Hypostase divine incarnée<sup>1</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Cette conception n'était pas étrangère aux «Cappadociens». Voir, par ex., saint Basile, *Homélie sur le Ps. XLIV, 5*: PG 29, 400. Cf. saint Grégoire de Nazianze, *Sermon 40, sur le Baptême*: PG 36, 365.

5. Le rôle de la Transfiguration, qui a une place si importante dans la spiritualité byzantine, fera l'objet de notre dernière remarque sur les moments doctrinaux dont il faut tenir compte en interprétant la théologie de la vision de Dieu «face à face» dans la tradition de l'Eglise d'Orient.

Trois auteurs, postérieurs au V<sup>e</sup> siècle, ont tenté de réaliser une sorte de synthèse doctrinale concernant la question qui nous préoccupe : le pseudo-Denys, saint Maxime et saint Jean Damascène.

Dans les «Noms Divins» (I, 4: PG 3, 592) la béatitude finale est appelée «destinée christiforme» des élus (*χριστοειδὸς λῆξις*). Ceux qui deviendront «fils de Dieu», étant «fils de la résurrection», seront toujours avec le Seigneur (I *Thess.* 4, 16) et jouiront de «sa théophanie visible» (*τῆς . . . ὁρατῆς αὐτοῦ θεοφανείας*), «dans les théories très pures» de son rayonnement éclatant, tout comme les disciples lors de sa divine transfiguration. Mais aussi, dans leur intelligence (*νοῦς*) impassible et immatérielle, ils participeront à l'illumination intelligible du Christ (*νοητῆς αὐτοῦ φωτοδόσας*). Enfin, au-delà du connaissable, ils auront l'union avec Dieu, union qui transcende l'intelligence (*ἐνωσις . . . ὑπὲρ νοῦν*). Le premier élément de cette vision face à face, l'humanité glorifiée du Fils, rappelle la conception de saint Jean Chrysostome; mais cette «théophanie visible» suppose une doctrine des sens spiritualisés, étrangère aux Antiochiens. Le deuxième élément — connaissance intellectuelle de Dieu dans sa lumière — ferait penser à Evagre, si la surabondance inconnaissable de cette lumière n'obligeait les personnes humaines à dépasser la connaissance dans une union au-delà du *νοῦς*. Dans ce troisième élément, la doctrine de la vision face à face, chez Denys, rejoint le «progrès infini» de saint Grégoire de Nysse. Ainsi, en voyant l'Hypostase du Fils face à face, on reçoit la manifestation plénière de Dieu dans sa *διάκρισις* révélatrice, et cependant sa nature «suressentielle» reste toujours inaccessible et inconnaissable dans l'*ἐνωσις* déifiante, car les créatures ne deviendront jamais Dieu par nature.

Il y aurait beaucoup à dire sur l'élaboration théologique de ce thème chez saint Maxime. Nous nous limiterons à quelques

indications. Les deux prophètes qui ont conversé avec le Christ au moment de la Transfiguration doivent représenter, selon Maxime, la perfection morale et la science, tandis que le Christ glorifié serait la «théologie» (*Cap. theol. et oeconom. II, 16*: PG 90, 1132). Ces trois étapes de la perfection, établies par Origène et développées par Evagre, seront transformées et recréées à base d'un schéma christologique: la *πρακτική* correspondra au corps du Christ, la gnose physique ou connaissance de Dieu dans la création — à son âme; quant à la théologie, elle comportera, chez saint Maxime, deux étapes: la «mystagogie simple de science théologique», en correspondance avec l'esprit humain du Christ, et l'apophase ou inconnaissance au-delà du *νοῦς* créé, répondant à la Divinité du Fils incarné (*De ambiguïs*: PG 91, 1360). Or, dans l'unité hypostatique de Dieu-homme, non seulement le *νοῦς* humain du Christ, mais aussi son âme et son corps se trouvent transfigurés par la participation à sa Divinité. Cette «périchorèse» ou pénétration énergétique du créé par l'incréé dans le Christ a son analogie dans les personnes créées qui deviennent «dieux par la grâce»: ainsi, dans leur vie active, la grâce les rend «au-dessus de la matière» selon le corps; dans leur vie contemplative — «au-dessus de la forme» (*ὐπὲρ τὸ εἶδος*) selon l'intelligence (*Idem*, col. 1273c). Ceux qui ont suivi le Christ en action et en contemplation seront transférés à un état toujours meilleur, «se transformant de gloire en gloire»; le temps ne saurait suffir si l'on voulait décrire toutes les ascensions (*ἀναβάσεις*) et révélations (*ἀποκαλύψεις*) des bienheureux (*Idem*, col. 1364a). La révélation énergétique de la Divinité dans l'Hypostase incarnée surpasse aussi bien l'intellect que les sens des élus: devenus uniformément un (*ἐνοειδῶς ἓν*), les hommes déifiés seront libérés des «diversités propres au composé» (*τῶν κατὰ σύνθεσιν ἑτεροτήτων* — *Schol. in Div. Nom. I, 4*: PG 4, 197). La vision face à face appartient à l'homme entier: c'est une communion personnelle des hommes déifiés avec la Personne du Fils, divine par nature, devenue Homme par l'Incarnation.

Chez saint Jean Damascène, qui avait beaucoup utilisé Maxime dans sa synthèse christologique, la manifestation de la

Divinité dans le Verbe de Dieu incarné est un corollaire de la doctrine de l'humanité déifiée du Christ. «Le corps (du Christ) a été glorifié — dit-il — en même temps qu'il fut amené du non-être à l'existence, de sorte que la gloire de la Divinité doit être dite aussi la gloire du corps» (*καὶ ἡ τῆς θεότητος δόξα καὶ δόξα τοῦ σώματος λέγεται*); ... «jamais ce corps saint n'a existé sans participer à la gloire divine» (*De la foi orth. VI, 18*: PG 94, 1188bc. Cf. *Hom. sur la Transfig.*: PG 96, 564). Au moment de la Transfiguration le Christ n'est point devenu ce qu'Il n'était pas auparavant; au contraire, Il apparut à ses disciples tel qu'Il fut, en leur ouvrant les yeux, en donnant la vue à ceux qui étaient aveugles. Le changement d'aspect n'a été qu'un changement de perception. C'est ainsi qu'il faut entendre les paroles de l'Evangile: «Il se transfigura devant eux» (*Sur la Transf.*: ib., col. 564). Ce n'est pas un texte de Grégoire Palamas que nous citons ici: c'est une homélie de Jean Damascène. Les hésychastes n'ajouteront rien à cette théologie de la Transfiguration. En participant à la même gloire divine, «les justes et les anges resplendiront comme le soleil dans la vie éternelle, avec notre Seigneur Jésus Christ, le voyant toujours et étant vus de Lui, puisant en Lui une joie incessante, le louant avec le Père et le Saint-Esprit dans les siècles des siècles» (*De la foi orth. IV, 27*: PG 94, 1228).

Au lieu d'aller plus loin, vers saint Syméon le Nouveau Théologien et saint Grégoire Palamas, remontons plutôt vers les débuts de la pensée patristique. Nous trouverons dans la christologie de saint Irénée un moment qui prête la même importance à la Transfiguration dans la doctrine de la vision de Dieu face à face. «Le Verbe se fit chair ... afin que tout ce qui existe puisse voir ... son Roi; aussi, afin que la lumière paternelle se répande dans le corps de notre Seigneur et, de son corps, vienne jusqu'à nous, pour que l'homme parvienne ainsi à l'incorruptibilité, étant revêtu de la lumière du Père» (IV, 20, 2: PG 7, 1033).

Nous avons signalé, dans cet aperçu rapide, quelques aspects du problème de la vision de Dieu face à face qui ont échappé,

le plus souvent, aussi bien à l'accusateur qu'aux défenseurs des Pères dans la controverse du XVII<sup>e</sup> siècle. Des recherches sur ces éléments de la pensée patristique pourraient servir à une compréhension plus approfondie de la théologie médiévale de Byzance qui continuait la même tradition. Vasquez a été conséquent dans ses jugements formels et étroits: il n'a pas hésité à condamner chez les Pères de l'Eglise la même «erreur» qu'il croyait trouver chez les *doctores Graecorum recentiores*. L'exemple du Jésuite espagnol devrait être suivi dans le sens opposé: puisqu'on veut bien se libérer de parti-pris d'école pour porter un jugement positif sur les doctrines des Pères grecs des huit premiers siècles, il n'y a pas de raisons pour que l'on refuse d'étendre cette générosité à la tradition byzantine d'époques plus récentes. Si l'on s'obstine à juger saint Syméon le Nouveau Théologien ou saint Grégoire Palamas en transposant leurs doctrines dans les cadres qui leurs sont étrangers, il n'y a pas de raison pour que le faux problème, posé par Vasquez, ne soulève de nouveau une controverse stérile et interminable au sujet de la vision de Dieu face à face chez les Pères et dans la théologie scolastique.

Les cinq éléments de la pensée patristique que nous avons signalés représentent autant de sujets d'études à faire sur le problème de la vision de Dieu. Ce sont:

1° une épistémologie théologique où la connaissance de l'*oûta* divine aurait eu une signification inacceptable, différente de tout ce que veut dire la vision de Dieu selon l'essence pour la théologie scolastique;

2° la notion de la lumière, révélatrice de la Divinité, avec toutes les significations différentes qu'elle peut recevoir chez les théologiens et les contemplatifs;

3° la moment christologique dans les doctrines de la vision face à face;

4° le moment pneumatologique et le rôle de la déification de l'homme;

5° le thème de l'humanité déifiée du Christ et le sens que la Transfiguration reçoit dans les doctrines sur la vision eschatologique de Dieu.

En étudiant chacun de ces éléments doctrinaux dans le contexte qui lui est propre, les historiens de la pensée chrétienne pourraient rendre aux théologiens un service inestimable : il est utile de se rappeler de temps en temps que la béatitude promise aux fils de Dieu dépasse les moyens d'expression théologique dans les limites d'un système déterminé. On ne saurait réduire le problème de la vision de Dieu à une seule perspective possible, sans risquer de substituer une théologie d'école à la Tradition de l'Eglise — unique, mais jamais uniforme. Quand on cesse d'opposer ou de concilier les Pères et les Scolastiques, on découvre chez les uns comme chez les autres la vraie richesse de leur pensée.

## Morale et spiritualité chrétiennes dans le Pédagogue de Clément d'Alexandrie

H. I. MARROU, Paris

Nous dédions cette communication à la mémoire de Bishop Potter, l'éditeur de Clément (Oxford 1715): je voudrais montrer, en prenant comme exemple le «Pédagogue», l'intérêt que présente pour l'histoire de la spiritualité chrétienne l'étude des formes particulières qu'a dû prendre au cours des siècles la morale, entendue au sens le plus concret. Parlons grec: sans doute le Christianisme est *ζωή*, *ζωή αἰώνιος*, vie éternelle, vie divine, vie surnaturelle. Mais (et c'est le sens obvie de Jac. 2, 26 b: «la Foi sans œuvres est morte») cette *ζωή* s'incarne tout naturellement dans un *βίος*, un *βίωτος* (III, Hymn., 39<sup>1</sup>), un mode particulier de vie, un régime de vie, *πολιτεία* (I, 95, 2, etc.), *δλαιτα* (II, 14, 3). Si personnel que soit l'engagement existentiel de chacun, pratiquement on pourra dégager pour un milieu, sociologiquement homogène et historiquement défini, des règles, des préceptes, qui définiront «le *βίος* des Chrétiens» (II, 1, 1; III, 41, 3). Bien entendu la morale chrétienne n'est pas une Loi de type mosaïque, elle se ramène au Décalogue (III, 89, 1) ou mieux au double précepte de l'amour de Dieu et du prochain (III, 88, 1—2), mais pratiquement la transcription concrète de cet immuable idéal dépendra du milieu de civilisation; le problème est toujours pour le chrétien de ne pas vivre comme les païens (III, 80, 3), mais suivant ce que seront les tentations du paganisme ambiant, l'accent sera mis sur telle ou telle obligation: ainsi, dans la morale sexuelle, aux USA. aujourd'hui, pour un Catholique l'accent est mis sur l'opposition au divorce et au birth-control; dans la zone d'influence de la Perse sassanide

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<sup>1</sup> Sauf indications contraires, les références renvoient au «Pédagogue», édition Stählin.

au V<sup>e</sup> s., c'étaient les mariages consanguins (Théodoret, Ep. VIII Sakk.). Un type d'enquête historique intéressant consistera à rechercher, pour des milieux de civilisation différents, quel a été le tableau concret que les chrétiens se sont tracés de leurs devoirs: en quoi consistait la vie chrétienne, le *βλος τῶν Χριστιανῶν*, pour les hommes de ce temps? Il ne s'agit pas de faire cette recherche dans un esprit de vaine, ou maligne, curiosité, collectionner les différences pour elles-mêmes: je professe que la connaissance historique ne conduit pas au relativisme, mais qu'elle est au contraire la technique qui nous permet d'échapper au déterminisme historique: c'est en retrouvant de façon concrète comment le Christianisme a été compris, pensé et vécu dans telles ou telles conditions particulières que nous, qui vivons dans d'autres conditions, elles aussi particulières, pouvons communier avec nos frères d'autrefois et d'ailleurs et constater en quelque sorte expérimentalement que nous vivons de la même foi, appartenons au même Christianisme.

Le «Pédagogue» de Clément est un document extraordinairement précieux pour un tel genre d'étude: il nous offre, surtout dans les livres II et III, le tableau le plus concret de la vie chrétienne dans le milieu aristocratique d'Alexandrie aux environs de l'an 200. Je n'ai pas à vous présenter ce livre magnifique, ce chef d'œuvre d'un authentique humanisme chrétien nourri de la culture classique la plus profonde et la plus étendue, et pourtant aussi authentiquement chrétien qu'il est vraiment hellène, ce livre écrit dans un grec admirable, où abondent non seulement les formules frappantes, mais aussi les idées les plus justes, les conseils les plus sages: comment ne pas rappeler celui que retrouvera St. Augustin, — *de utilit. ieiun.*, 5 (6) —: «bien vite on sera entraîné à faire ce qui n'est pas permis quand on fait tout ce qui est permis», II, 14, 3; et, en hommage aux *laurens* oxoniennes, comment ne pas évoquer cette spiritualité du gazon: être non pas l'herbe qui passe mais le gazon, arrosé par la grâce et qui coupé repousse, image de la Résurrection! (II, 104, 3) . . .

Ce que je voudrais en retenir aujourd'hui c'est son tableau d'un état très particulier de la morale chrétienne. Ses règles



de vie s'adressent à des gens qui vivent dans le monde (III, 78, 3), qui ont femme et enfants, un *οἶκος* à diriger: ce n'est pas là un empêchement de marcher à la suite du Christ (III, 38, 1—39, 1). L'idéal chrétien peut être réalisé dans le monde; Clément ne songe pas à arracher ses fidèles au milieu qui est le leur, milieu aristocratique, très riche (il lui faudra bien concéder un certain luxe, dans l'usage des parfums, — II, 66, 1, des fleurs, — II, 76, 5, des pierres précieuses, — II, 121, 1, du mobilier le plus précieux, héritage de famille, II, 78, 1), mêlé aux païens (repas chez eux: II, 9, 4; 10, 1—6). Le tableau qu'il nous présente est si précis que son ouvrage constitue un document historique d'une valeur inappréciable pour les mœurs alexandrines sous l'Empire, — l'équivalent, la gauloiserie en moins, de ce qu'est pour l'Italie du I<sup>er</sup> s. le «Satyricon» de Pétrone: quand il nous montre les femmes trop heureuses de se montrer dans la rue, au théâtre, dans les sanctuaires païens (III, 10, 3; 28, 3), il nous rappelle le IV<sup>e</sup> Mime d'Hérondas; que ne nous apprend-il pas: l'usage du chewing-gum (résine de lentisque: III, 15, 1), l'épilation (III, 15, 3 sq.), le cloutage publicitaire des semelles des chaussures des prostituées: II, 116, 1) . . .

C'est dans ce contexte concret qu'il développe sa morale chrétienne, elle aussi toute concrète et qui ne dédaigne pas d'entrer dans les détails les plus menus: comment la femme chrétienne doit marcher dans la rue (III, 68, 1; 73, 4 sq.; 79, 3—4); ne pas rire aux éclats, ni hors de propos (II, 47, 2—3), comment se tenir à table (II, 54, 3): il récupère au profit de l'idéal de la perfection chrétienne toute la bienséance, la civilité puérile et honnête: ne pas manger trop vite, ne pas parler la bouche pleine (II, 13, 1), etc. . . .: ne sourions pas: en 1700, saint Jean Baptiste de la Salle publiera lui aussi un traité de civilité. Tout cela, je le répète, très daté d'Alexandrie, fin II<sup>e</sup> siècle: deux chapitres sur les excès ou inconvénients des thermes (III, V et IX), condamnation des spectacles (III, 76, 3), insistance contre la *κεροδοξία* (ainsi III, 26, 3; 27, 3; 31, 1—2: le luxe inutile aux bains, ostentation analogue à celle de Trimalcion); beaucoup de diatribes contre le luxe, — dans la gastronomie, la vaisselle, le mobilier, le costume.

Tout cela largement nourri de souvenirs classiques (jusque dans le détail: «en nous dépouillant de la tunique, ne nous dépouillons pas de la pudeur»: II, 100, 2; III, 33, 1, ce qui vient d'Hérodote et Plutarque); des chapitres entiers sont construits avec des diatribes de Musonius, le maître d'Epictète. Ce n'est pas le lieu d'insister sur la méthode constamment suivie dans le «Pédagogue» (je l'ai étudiée dans une communication qui paraîtra au t. III des «Entretiens» de la Fondation Hardt) qui juxtapose systématiquement autorité biblique et autorité classique: Clément s'est expliqué à plusieurs reprises sur cet usage, cette référence à la *κοσμική σοφία* (I, 93, 2; III, 9, 1; III, 84, 2, etc.); on sait sur quelles justifications s'appuie cette pratique: soit l'idée de l'antériorité chronologique de la Sagesse inspirée (Platon disciple de Moïse) soit celle, plus profonde, de l'unité entre la raison humaine, *λόγος*, et le Verbe divin, *Λόγος* (on ne sait jamais comment traduire: l'onciale du temps de Clément n'avait pas de majuscules, ambiguïté précieuse!) . . .

Comment Clément eût-il dédaigné cette *τέχνη περὶ βίον* (II, 25, 3: définition classique de la Sagesse païenne qu'on retrouve chez Cicéron) mise au point par la tradition philosophique grecque? La morale du Verbe divin sera d'abord une morale de la raison. Morale quelquefois trop rationnelle: Clément n'évite pas le défaut qu'ont si souvent les moralistes de tous les temps (en un sens il y a une opposition latente entre la technique du moraliste et la spiritualité authentique): celui qui consiste à justifier ses préceptes par de trop bonnes, ou trop faciles, raisons. Ainsi, contre le luxe des lits de plume (II, 77, 2—3: empêche de se retourner, fait digérer trop vite!) ou contre les faux cheveux (II, 63, 1: la bénédiction par imposition des mains profitera au premier propriétaire!). Mais, naïveté mise à part, il y a là une morale très authentiquement rationnelle (contre les excès du sommeil, — trait de civilisation: ils n'avaient pas l'électricité! — II, 79, 1 sq.: idéal de la vigilance, être éveillé, ne pas perdre la moitié de sa vie; Platon et l'Evangile à la rescousse: *vigilate et orate* . . .).

Cette morale chrétienne intègre une morale rationnelle proprement humaine; contre le luxe, une esthétique fonctionnelle

(II, 37, 1): pas de superflu, suivre la nature, ne pas s'écarter de sa vérité (la femme s'honorera de sa chevelure, l'homme de sa barbe comme le lion de sa crinière, III, 11, 1; 18, 1; 24, 1): idéal de simplicité où confluent l'influence épicurienne (mais oui: le chrétien n'a besoin que de peu de choses, personne ne manque du nécessaire, II, 14, 5: ce qui rejoint la parabole sur les oiseaux du ciel et le lys des champs) et celle du stoïcisme: comme le Sage, le chrétien seul est riche (III, 34, 1 sq.).

Une première lecture laisse l'impression que Clément intègre à sa morale chrétienne tout l'idéal moral du paganisme classique; c'est vrai, mais le fait est d'interprétation délicate: il ne faut pas en conclure sommairement que Clément est plus hellène que chrétien, ou que le christianisme n'est qu'un avatar de l'hellénisme (thèse paradoxale que vient à nouveau de développer le gros livre de Carl Schneider, « Geistesgeschichte des antiken Christentums », 2 vol., München 1954: voir ma critique dans la « Revue des Etudes Anciennes »). La morale de Clément peut être à la fois hellénique et chrétienne: nous rencontrons ici le problème qui se pose à toutes les époques du rapport entre christianisme et civilisation ambiante. Pour reprendre une formule dont je me suis souvent servi, le christianisme ne crée pas les civilisations, il les sauve, c'est à dire qu'il les absorbe, les reprend dans sa propre perspective, transforme ce qui doit être transformé, corrige ce qui est dévié, supprime ce qui est corrompu, conserve ce qui est bon, exalte ce qui n'était pas porté à sa plus haute perfection (j'appliquerai hardiment au problème de la civilisation les formules de l'hymne *Veni sancte Spiritus*: oui le christianisme *lavat quod est sordidum, rigat quod est aridum, sanat quod est saucium* . . .). Il n'y a pas une civilisation chrétienne, il y a des civilisations plus ou moins parfaitement, complètement, profondément christianisées.

La morale de Clément est une christianisation de l'hellénisme; elle est un épisode de l'histoire de celui-ci (en ce sens C. Schneider a raison). Contemplée par nous, modernes, elle apparaît d'abord comme une morale grecque. Elle récupère sans effort des sentiments très beaux, qui sont particuliers à cette forme d'humanité; morale de mesure et de sobriété: sourire, ne pas rire aux éclats

(II, 45, 3), ne pas déformer le visage en buvant: et de rappeler l'épisode célèbre d'Athèna refusant de jouer de l'aulos; pas d'*ἀπαιδευσία* (II, 60, 2), rien d'*ἀνελεύθερον* (II, 41, 3); morale de simplicité, frugalité, *εὐτέλεια* (III, 37, 1), noblesse, *σεμνότης* (III, 84, 1): on voit défiler tous les beaux concepts classiques, critique de l'*ἀμετρία* (II, 11, 4; 16, 4), de la *τροφή*, de l'*ὑβρις*, éloge de l'*ἀντάρκεια* (II, 7, 3), de l'*αὐτοσυργία*: se servir soi-même; être *σώφρων* (III, 38, 3), *ἐμμελής* (III, 51, 3), *ἀστεῖος* (III, 101, 3); idéal esthétique, créature du Dieu bon, l'homme est naturellement porté à la beauté (III, 37, 1), c'est naturellement de la beauté intérieure qu'il s'agit, beauté du dedans, beauté de l'âme, explique-t-il aux femmes trop portées à la parure (II, 121, 2, où une réminiscence de la prière finale du Phèdre (*δοίητε μοι καλῶ γενέσθαι ἔνδοθεν*) s'associe au Ps. 44, 14 «*omnis gloria filiae regis ab intus*»); il insiste: se parer, c'est paraître trouver que la Création n'est pas assez belle (III, 6, 4), c'est *ἀντιδημιουργεῖν τῷ θεῷ* (III, 17, 1). Morale enfin très ascétique, dans la tradition platonicienne, stoïcienne, ... antique (l'étonnant chapitre sur la morale sexuelle, *περὶ παιδοποιίας* (II, X) très rigoureux, plus que ne le sera en définitive l'Eglise; *φυλακὴ τῆς καρδίας*: les sens, portes par où les vices entrent dans notre âme: II, 66, 3 sq.) ...

Mais vous avez hâte de voir s'opérer la christianisation de cette morale hellénique. Je ne veux pas dresser en détail la liste de tous les points sur lesquels Clément manifeste sa volonté bien arrêtée de ne pas suivre ses maîtres classiques dans leurs erreurs dogmatiques (idolâtrie, polythéisme, etc.); il suffira de prendre quelques exemples. L'ascétisme pour commencer: l'ascétisme chrétien ne peut pas être l'ascétisme radical du dualisme, platonicien ou gnostique. Clément en est une démonstration très remarquable, car soit par tempérament personnel soit pour répondre à la surenchère gnostique, il serait plutôt porté à un ascétisme excessif, mais à chaque pas cette tendance spontanée est contrée par la révélation. Ainsi: il eût volontiers été végétarien, à la pythagoricienne, mais «Jésus-Christ mangeait du chevreau pourtant» (selon le vers de Giono), II, 11, 1; 16, 1; de même il eût interdit le vin (commentant I Tim. 5, 23, il

insiste surtout sur l'ὀλίσγω) s'il n'y avait pas le fait que Jésus n'avait pas été nazir, les Noces de Cana et surtout l'espèce eucharistique (II, 19, 1 sq.; 29, 1; 32, 4), — et la prise de position de la grande Eglise contre les Encratites (II, 33, 1). C'est que tous ces biens, qui sont réellement des biens, encore que ce soit par participation aux seuls vrais biens, les biens spirituels (III, 86, 2), sont des créatures bonnes du Dieu bon: c'est vrai du vin (II, 23, 3) comme du mariage (II, 95, 2). L'homme n'est pas seulement une âme mais un composé où entre aussi le corps; aussi le but de l'ascèse sera non seulement, comme le veut le Platonisme de «purifier» l'œil mais aussi de sanctifier la chair même, ἀγνίζειν δὲ καὶ τὴν σάρκα αὐτήν (II, 1, 2—3).

La présence de la Révélation effectue comme une transmutation de tous les préceptes païens: ainsi le thème stoïcien de la κοινωμία de tous les biens: tout est commun entre les hommes, le riche n'a pas le droit de profiter seul de ses richesses, s'illumine quand il est mis en perspective avec le précepte évangélique de la charité, avec la pensée des pauvres: on passe du κοινωνικόν à l'ἀγαπητικόν (II, 120, 3—6); quand avec tous les moralistes antiques (Epictète, etc.) il blâme l'obsécénité du langage, c'est en se réclamant du Sermon sur la montagne: la pureté commence avec le langage (II, 51, 2).

On pourra résumer cette transfiguration en un mot: l'extatisme. La perspective s'ouvre au delà de la seule humanité (où malgré tout avait un peu trop tendance à se limiter le moralisme de l'époque impériale) sur l'immensité divine, la transcendance. Ainsi du précepte delphique et socratique: «Connais-toi toi-même», — cela conduit à découvrir Dieu (III, 1, 1); ainsi de la règle épicurienne: «on ne manque jamais du nécessaire», — à savoir Dieu (III, 39, 4 sq.); ou de Musonius: celui-ci disait qu'il fallait s'alléger de tout le superflu qu'implique le luxe pour mieux être libre; — d'aller à Dieu précise Clément (III, 36, 1 sq.). Ou encore: Demetrius de Phalère disait (nous le savons par Diogène Laërce) que les jeunes gens doivent respecter chez eux leurs parents, et, seuls, eux-mêmes; Clément reprend: «il faut respecter chez soi parents et domestiques (l'idée, sur laquelle il insistera beaucoup: respecter l'homme dans l'esclave,

n'était pas inconnue à Platon, cf. la citation des *Lois* dans III, 74, 1), dans la rue les passants, aux bains les femmes, dans la solitude soi-même, partout le Verbe omniprésent (III, 33, 3) . . .

Ainsi nous voyons apparaître dans ce contexte de civilisation qui paraissait au premier abord si particulier, si différent de nous, les grands thèmes dont n'a cessé de s'inspirer toute la morale, disons mieux toute la spiritualité chrétienne: l'exercice de la présence de Dieu (pour parler comme le bon frère Laurent de la Résurrection) soutient la morale de la bienséance (III, 33, 5), le Verbe toujours présent «boit avec nous», *συμποτικός ἐστιν* II, 43, 2: le passage est d'un admirable grec, intraduisible: *ὁ δὲ Λόγος οὗτος συναρμόζεται καὶ συσχηματίζεται καιροῖς, προσώποις, τόποις, συμποτικός δὲ ἐστὶ νῦν* . . . (on aura reconnu le souvenir de la notice de Diogène Laërce sur Aristippe).

Autre thème fondamental qui sous-tend chacune de ces transpositions: l'imitation de Dieu, du Verbe, du Verbe incarné, de Jésus (le nom est prononcé bien des fois et commenté avec amour (nous avons là dessus une bonne étude de Felicità Baravalle, «Il concetto de *ὁμολοῖς θεῷ* in Clemente Alessandrino», thèse de Turin 1952); ou encore l'esprit d'enfance conséquence du choix qu'il a fait de l'image du *παιδαγωγός*, le gouverneur, l'éducateur qui conduit au maître, mais aussi prépare par la formation morale un esprit capable d'en recevoir l'enseignement: ce thème remplit le livre I (12, 1—53, 3): nous devons être comme des *νήπιοι*: simplicité, humilité, mais aussi éternelle jeunesse et sens de la joie, du jeu (Clément ose adapter à la joie chrétienne l'aphorisme terrible d'Héraclite: *Αἰὼν παῖς ἐστὶ παλῶν* (I, 22, 1, il lit Zeus, non *Αἰών*); il n'y manque pas le thème de l'enfant-Jésus (I, 24, 1; 42, 1—3); thème de l'enfance spirituelle, condition du chrétien, admirablement exprimé dans l'hymne qui développe ces idées spécifiquement chrétiennes de la fin du livre III, . . . Spiritualité optimiste (polémique anti-agnostique: «que le Juste est aussi le Bon», I, VIII), notion de philanthropie divine (I, 63, 1; etc.).

Non seulement imitation du Verbe, mais inhabitation en nous de ce *Λόγος* divin: que le Verbe *ἐνοικεῖτω ἐν ὑμῖν πλουσίως* (II, 43, 1 sq.; III, 1, 5; III, 5, 3). Le thème s'amplifie et dé-

bouche sur celui de la divinisation du Chrétien par la ressemblance (dialectique de l'image et de la ressemblance), peu à peu rétablie en nous par l'œuvre de la grâce (III, 1, 5), — elle-même dérivée des bienfaits de l'Incarnation (III, 2, 1).

Où est passée l'Alexandrie du second siècle, ce milieu de civilisation si caractérisé dans son extériorité par rapport à nous? Au cœur de cette situation relative, nous avons retrouvé l'élan central qui animait le moraliste chrétien et avec lui nous nous sentons en pleine communion.

## Notes sur l'influence dionysienne en Orient

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Il est encore difficile de se faire une idée précise sur l'influence que les écrits pseudo-dionysiens ont exercé en Orient : une grande partie des sources se trouve, en effet, inédites. Je me contenterai de présenter ici quelques remarques inspirées par l'étude de textes théologiques byzantins du XIV<sup>e</sup> siècle.

Lorsque l'on se penche sur ces textes, on est frappé par les références constantes que les protagonistes de la « controverse palamite » font à ce qu'ils appellent « la sagesse du dehors » (ἡ ἔξω σοφία) : la pensée byzantine de cette époque est tout entière dominée par le problème des relations entre l'héritage de la philosophie hellénique et la Révélation chrétienne. Le Dieu d'Abraham, d'Isaac et de Jacob est-il aussi le Dieu des philosophes et des savants ? Alors que St. Grégoire Palamas et ses disciples insistent sur l'originalité absolue de la Révélation en Christ, leurs adversaires, les humanistes byzantins, affirment, au contraire, qu'une certaine dépendance de la pensée chrétienne par rapport aux philosophes de l'Antiquité est parfaitement possible et souhaitable, puisque ces derniers ont également possédé une relative connaissance de Dieu. Pour des raisons opposées, les uns et les autres se réfèrent au Pseudo-Denys : les uns trouvent chez lui les termes et les formules devenus traditionnels chez les mystiques et les théologiens, les autres y voient avant tout un néoplatonicien. Chacun en donne une interprétation favorable à son point de vue.

Cette querelle d'exégètes du Pseudo-Denys ne pouvait manquer d'apparaître comme quelque peu futile à certains esprits critiques, qui en firent retomber la faute sur l'Aréopagite lui-même. C'est ainsi que Nicéphore Grégoras, un antipalamite, lui-même interprète assidu de Denys, se permit finalement une



chose rare à l'époque : une critique ouverte de Denys. « Le divin Denys, écrit-il, apparaît rarement dans ses traités comme un allié total (*σπανίως καὶ οὐ πανταχῇ*) des divins Pères et des conciles vénérables et oecuméniques. Sa pensée est difficilement compréhensible, son expression peu claire : il cache par des termes généraux l'un et l'autre — de ces défauts » — (*πολὺ μὲν τὸ δυσθεώρητον ἔχει τῆς διανοίας, πολὺ δὲ τὸ τῆς φράσεως ἀσαφές, τῇ κοινότητι τῶν λέξεων συγκαλύπτων ἀμφοτέρω*<sup>1</sup>).

Tournons-nous maintenant vers les principaux protagonistes de la controverse hésychaste.

Barlaam le Calabrais fût officiellement chargé par Jean Cantacuzène d'enseigner l'exégèse du Pseudo-Denys à Constantinople<sup>2</sup>. Son interprétation de Denys peut se résumer en deux propositions :

a) L'homme n'a devant lui d'autre voie vers l'Inconnaissable que celle qui passe par la connaissance des êtres, disposés hiérarchiquement.

b) Dieu étant suressentiel et « au-delà des êtres », cette connaissance humaine de Dieu est « symbolique », les êtres créés ne pouvant être que des symboles de Dieu, incapables d'une communion réelle avec lui<sup>3</sup>.

Barlaam appuie très fréquemment ses affirmations sur des citations du Pseudo-Denys et il admet explicitement une interdépendance étroite entre la pensée dionysienne et les philosophes grecs : « Si tu veux savoir si les Hellènes ont eux aussi accepté que le Bien suressentiel et anonyme transcende l'intelligence, la science et toute autre atteinte, lis les œuvres des Pythagoriciens, Pantænetos, Broctinos, Philolaos, Charmidas et Philoxène consacrées à ce sujet ; tu y trouveras les expressions mêmes que le grand Denys emploie dans le dernier chapitre

<sup>1</sup> *Λόγοι στηλιτευτικοί*, inédits, Genève grec 35, fol. 77.

<sup>2</sup> Gregoras, *Hist.* XIX, 1, ed. Bonn, II, p. 923.

<sup>3</sup> Voir les extraits de traités inédits de Barlaam dans notre article : Un mauvais théologien de l'Unité au XIV<sup>e</sup>, — *Mélanges Lambert Beau-duin* — Editions de Chevetogne, 1955, pp. 47—64.

de sa Théologie Mystique» (*τὰς αὐτὰς φωνάς, ὡς ὁ μέγας Διονύσιος ἐν τῷ τελευταίῳ τοῦ περὶ μυστικῆς θεολογίας ἀφίησι*<sup>1</sup>).

Notre travail sur les œuvres inédites de St Grégoire Palamas nous conduisent à affirmer que, sur plusieurs points, le docteur hésychaste a formellement contredit Denys, ou, tout au moins, a adopté un point de vue qui diminuait beaucoup l'importance de l'Aréopagite dans la structure de sa propre pensée. Ne pouvant envisager ici le problème dans son ensemble, je me contenterai de citer quelques textes :

A. En ce qui concerne la théologie apophatique, Palamas admet avec Barlaam qu'elle n'est pas uniquement propre au Christianisme.

«Comment un homme sensé, écrit-il dans sa seconde Triade, ne penserait-il pas—en contemplant le monde—à Celui qui a si bien placé chaque chose à sa place et a établi cette admirable harmonie? . . . Quel est l'homme qui, après avoir ainsi reconnu Dieu, le confonderait encore avec l'un de ces êtres ou l'une de ces choses qui n'en sont que l'image? Cette homme aura donc connu Dieu par négation» (*τὴν ἐξ ἀποφάσεως θεογνωσίαν ἔξει*<sup>2</sup>).

«Connaître Dieu par analogie, réaliser la transcendence de la Sagesse d'après l'harmonie du monde, tout cela est accessible aux sages de ce siècle . . . Nous voyons aujourd'hui que tous les barbares reconnaissent un Dieu unique, créateur de l'univers : la théologie apophatique découle nécessairement de cette reconnaissance.»<sup>3</sup>

«La théologie apophatique n'est elle aussi qu'une parole, alors qu'il y a des contemplations qui dépassent la parole, . . . Les contemplateurs des choses invisibles la dépassent non par la parole, mais en toute réalité et vérité, par la grâce de Dieu et de l'Esprit tout-puissant qui nous donne la faculté de voir ce que l'œil n'a point vu et l'oreille n'a point entendu (I Cor. II, 9).»<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Seconde lettre à Palamas, publiée par G. Schirò: Barlaam Calabro epistole greche i primordi episodici e dottrinari delle lotte esicaste, Série publiée par l'Istituto siciliano di Studi bizantini e neogreci, Testi, 1, Palermo, 1954, pp. 298—299.

<sup>2</sup> Coisl. 100, fol. 184.

<sup>3</sup> Coisl. 100, fol. 192 v.

<sup>4</sup> Coisl. 100, fol. 185 v.

A l'agnosticisme de Barlaam, Palamas oppose une doctrine de la grâce qui accorde à l'homme une connaissance de Dieu par l'Esprit en Christ. Le Dieu inconnaissable se révèle à nous et, depuis l'Incarnation, il agit lui-même en nous et par nous. Les appellations apophatiques de la Divinité continuent à s'y appliquer, parce qu'elles appartiennent à sa nature, mais la connaissance spirituelle que la présence du Christ «au-dedans de nous» nous communique, est indépendante de ces appellations.

Le Pseudo-Denys avait lui-aussi développé une conception de la «connaissance par l'inconnaissance»<sup>1</sup> qui dépassait la connaissance des êtres. Pour lui aussi, la «connaissance par analogie» possédait un caractère mystique: l'analogie n'avait pas seulement pour lui une valeur de symbole, comme le voulait Barlaam, mais il constituait une affinité réelle avec Dieu<sup>2</sup>. Et Palamas se sert constamment de concepts dionysiens. Toutefois, dans la théologie palamite, la «connaissance par l'inconnaissance» est toujours liée à la grâce de l'Incarnation<sup>3</sup>. La pensée de Palamas est toujours centrée sur le Christ historique, objet constant de l'expérience spirituelle du chrétien: la théologie apophatique n'est jamais qu'une voie vers cette expérience. A la suite de St Maxime, Palamas apporte donc toujours un correctif christologique à la pensée de Denys.

B. Autre exemple: l'attitude du théologien hésychaste envers la doctrine dionysienne des *Hierarchies*. Selon Denys, la *πρόοδος* divine qui nous unit à Dieu est transmise par des intermédiaires hiérarchiques<sup>4</sup>. Le salut lui-même (dans la mesure où Denys en parle) est essentiellement fondé sur une reconstitution de la Hiérarchie que le péché avait perturbée. La notion d'analogie chez Denys est de nature ontologique: chaque être communie

<sup>1</sup> Voir H.-Ch. Puech, *La ténèbre mystique chez le pseudo-Denys* — *Etudes Carmélitaines*, 1938, oct. pp. 33—53.

<sup>2</sup> V. Lossky, *La notion des analogies chez Denys le Pseudo-Aréopagite* — *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen-Age*, V, 1930, pp. 279—309. R. Roques, *L'Univers dionysien*, Paris, 1954, pp. 60—65.

<sup>3</sup> Voir: *Doctrine of grace in St. Gregory Palamas* — *St. Vladimir Seminary Quarterly* — New-York, Winter 1954, pp. 17—26.

<sup>4</sup> Voir l'excellent exposé de R. Roques, *op. cit.* pp. 101—111.

à Dieu dans la mesure où la place ontologique qu'il occupe dans la Hiérarchie le lui permet<sup>1</sup>. Chez Palamas, au contraire, la notion d'analogie est toujours indépendante de toute «hiérarchie»: l'analogie dépend exclusivement des efforts de l'homme, pour atteindre Dieu avec le concours de la grâce. Quant à la «Hiérarchie», il suffit de citer un passage des «Triades» de Palamas, pour montrer qu'il l'a totalement libérée des catégories néoplatoniciennes où l'enferme Denys:

«Non seulement les visions de Dieu — après l'Incarnation — ne se réalisent pas par une voie indirecte et des intermédiaires, mais encore elles se manifestent directement sans que les premiers servent de messagers aux seconds. Car le Seigneur des seigneurs n'est pas soumis aux lois de la création. Voilà pourquoi, selon nos saintes traditions, Gabriel est le premier et le seul à être initié au mystère de l'indicible humiliation du Verbe, bien qu'il n'appartienne pas au rang angélique qui occupe la première place, immédiatement auprès de Dieu. Il fallait donc que le commencement de la nouvelle création soit lui-même nouveau (*ἔδει δ' ἄρα καὶ τὴν εἶναι τὴν τῆς καινῆς κτίσεως ἀρχήν*). Car Celui qui, pour nous, est allé jusqu'à nous dans l'humiliation, a fait toutes choses nouvelles . . . Car il est le Seigneur des Puissances et le Roi de gloire, qui possède toute puissance, même celle de mettre les derniers au-dessus des premiers, lorsqu'il le désire. Avant l'apparition de Dieu dans la chair, rien de tel ne nous a été enseigné par les anges, ni par les prophètes, en dehors de ceux qui ont décrit par avance la grâce qui allait venir: et maintenant qu'elle est apparue, il n'est plus besoin que tout s'accomplisse par des intermédiaires. Nous trouvons aussi la même chose chez le Grand Paul: «Aujourd'hui a été révélée par l'Eglise aux principautés et aux dominations, la sagesse infiniment variée de Dieu» (Eph. III, 10). Et chez Pierre, le Coryphée du chœur des apôtres: «Par ceux qui nous ont prêché l'Evangile, dans l'Esprit Saint envoyé des cieux, ces choses aujourd'hui nous

<sup>1</sup> «Denys va parfois jusqu'à identifier l'analogie avec l'ordre; c'est ainsi qu'il désigne les ordres hiérarchiques par *ἀναλογαὶ ἱεραρχικαί*» (Lossky, op. cit., p. 293).

ont été annoncées, dans lesquelles les anges désirent plonger leurs regards» (I Petr. I. 12). «Les plus petits étant ainsi devenus les plus grands sous l'action de la grâce, le bon ordre se trouve rétabli, pour demeurer intangible et immuable». (Coisl. 100, fol. 178 v).

Nous voyons très clairement dans ce passage comment Palamas traite Denys: il admet sa doctrine des hiérarchies, mais la place sur le plan de l'*okrovopla* naturelle. L'Incarnation bouleverse cet ordre en nous gratifiant de la vision «face à face».

La théologie palamite a incontestablement été un renouveau christocentrique de la pensée et de la spiritualité byzantines. Elle a souvent utilisé une terminologie dionysienne. Mais on pourrait en dire ce qu'E. Gilson a écrit au sujet de St Thomas: «La prestidigitation toujours heureuse qui permet à St Thomas de s'approprier des formules dionysiennes les plus risquées, ne doit pas faire oublier qu'il s'en empare en en métarmorphosant le contenu.»<sup>1</sup>

Le sens de la métamorphose n'a pas toujours été le même en Orient, mais le procédé n'est pas très différent.

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<sup>1</sup> Le Thomisme, Paris, 1948, p. 196.

## The *imitatio Christi* in the Mysticism of St. Ignatius of Antioch

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Anyone using the word 'mysticism' must first define the meaning which he attaches to it. In this short paper two assumptions will be made: first, that mystical experience is a compelling awareness of a uniquely intimate union with ultimate Reality which can only be expressed, and then in a hopelessly inadequate way, in symbol, and that this experience is accompanied by a sense of joy and peace. Further, the experience is 'noetic' — it is intellectually illuminating — one "sees into the heart of things". Then, second, I shall assume that mysticism is the 'metaphysics' of the experience, the analysis and systematisation of it, the attempt to set in order what we know through the experience. This is "mystical theology" as the term is used by Dionysius the Areopagite. Mysticism is concerned with describing the growth of the life in communion with God, particularly as this is focussed and expressed in the life of prayer. The writings of the mystics are presented by them as an attempt to sketch out the life of prayer in the light of their experience. St. Teresa in the preface to her *Life* states that her purpose is "to write about my way of prayer and the favours which God has granted me", and Suso in the *Little Book of Eternal Wisdom* states that he is writing a "form of instruction . . . for devotional prayers". St. François de Sales in his treatise *On the Love of God* speaks of "mystical theology which is nothing else but prayer".

If these assumptions are granted, there can be no disputing that St. Ignatius of Antioch is a mystic and a writer on mysticism. One of the key-terms in his letters is "union" (*ένότης*, *ένωσις*), and behind what he writes there is obviously a profound experience of union with God through Christ "our inse-

parable life" (τὸ ἀδιάκριτον ἡμῶν ζῆν). Like most mystics he has a perception akin to that of the poet, and his reflections on the nature and implications of his basic awareness are expressed through the poetic symbol and image (cf. his delightful hymn on the Nativity: "A star shone in heaven beyond all the stars . . ." in *Ephesians* XIX, and his startling use of imagery in *Ephesians* IX). He finds material for the analysis of the meaning of the experience in the liturgical practice of his day, especially, it would seem, in the celebration of the Eucharist. The mysticism of Ignatius is profoundly and penetratingly Christian, rooted as it is in the Incarnation and the Atonement, and finding its necessary context in the Church as apostolic Body of Christ, visibly displayed as such in her ministry and sacramental action.

It is precisely the Christian character of the mysticism of Ignatius which has been strongly challenged in the well-known article by Théo Preiss: «La mystique de l'imitation du Christ et de l'unité chez Ignace d'Antioche», first published in the *Revue d'histoire et de philosophie religieuses* (tome XVIII, 1938, pp. 197—241), and subsequently reprinted in the collection of his papers published under the title *La Vie en Christ* (1952). Preiss contends vigorously that the mysticism of Ignatius is largely non-Biblical and gnostic in character. He finds in it a feeble hold on the meaning of the historical incarnation and atonement, a defective conception of the nature of sin (identifying it with the body and matter), and, in short, a transforming or rather deforming of Christian spirituality into an "active mysticism" as he calls it, a kind of yoga of self-endeavour after God which, in reality, denies the action of the Holy Spirit and grace.

I believe that, if space allowed, it would be possible to take these points in the indictment of Preiss, and show from a detailed study of Ignatius himself that it involves a good deal of reading into the text, and building too much on the occasional phrase. I propose in this short paper simply to stress that, in fact, Ignatius is a good early example of Christian "incarnational" mysticism in which the historical life of Jesus has a central

place. He is concerned to warn his readers of the dangers of a vague amorphous 'spiritual' mysticism which he sees is bound to result from devotion to a 'docetic' Christ. The historical Incarnation and Atonement were veritably historical, and he brings this out by stressing that they were *σαρκικῶς καὶ πνευματικῶς* (this phrase, in fact, is one of the key-terms of the epistles, occurring no less than thirteen times). And because of this, the life of the Christian made possible by the action of God in Incarnation and Atonement must be *σαρκικῶς καὶ πνευματικῶς*, a true *imitatio* of the Incarnate Lord:

*"I sing the praise of the churches in the bonds which I carry about, and pray that in them there may be a union of the flesh and spirit of Jesus Christ, who is our everlasting life, a union of faith and love, to which nothing is preferable, and (what is more than all) a union of Jesus and the Father."*

*Magnesians I. 2.*

Preiss seeks to maintain that Ignatius shared the gnostic hatred of matter, and that the motive of the imitation of the Passion is to be linked with the gnostic idea of a celestial journey in which the believer must follow the steps of his saviour away from the world of matter and the body. Now the image of the Way for the Christian life is not necessarily to be traced to gnostic sources. The use of the term in the New Testament, and the frequent descriptions of the Christian life as a vocation to walk in the Way, might well be explained by the fact that this language was specially associated with Jesus himself who believed that the Father had laid upon him the task of walking, as Son of Man, in the Way of Israel, and that his faithful obedience to the Father's will constituted the 'Sign of the times'<sup>1</sup>. Discipleship of Jesus necessarily involved walking in his Way, the Way of the Son of Man, and the marks of its authenticity were the patience, humility, obedience, gentleness, charity, and willing degradation in suffering which constituted the true *imitatio Christi*. This is the essential shape of the Christian's

<sup>1</sup> I have tried to present the significance of Jesus as the 'Sign of the times' in an article in the *Scottish Journal of Theology*, Vol. 8, No. 3 (September 1955).



life for Ignatius, and in all this he is much nearer the New Testament tradition in the matter, especially St. Paul, than that of the gnostics. If he dwells on the true historical factuality of the Incarnation (*Smyrnaeans* I, II, and IV; *Trallians* IX and X), it is to insist that the Christian must not denounce outright the visible, the created, the historical, because these were the means of God's revealing action to us:

*"Be prudent as the serpent' in all things 'and pure as the dove' for ever. For this reason you consist of flesh and spirit, that you may deal tenderly with the things which appear visibly."*

*To Polycarp II. 2.*

Preiss is able to bring his charge against Ignatius because the language which the latter uses in his descriptions of the Christian life is determined by the picture of the liturgical action of the Eucharist of his day which he seems to have in mind throughout. The spiritual teaching of these epistles could well be described as a series of meditations on the union of the Christian with his Lord in his Body the Church as this is expressed in the movement of the liturgical action. Because he has in mind the Christian worship of God in Christ he naturally used the language of aspiration and speaks of the ascent to God, of "attaining to God" which Preiss particularly objects to as irreconcilable with St. Paul. The frequent use made by Ignatius of the imagery of music makes it very probable that we have here meditations based on the liturgy:

*"Therefore it is fitting that you should live in harmony with the will of the bishop, as indeed you do. For your justly famous presbytery, worthy of God, is attuned to the bishop as the strings to the harp. Therefore by your concord and harmonious love Jesus Christ is being sung. Now do each of you join in this choir, that being harmoniously in concord you may receive the key of God in unison, and sing with one voice through Jesus Christ to the Father, that he may both hear you and may recognise, through your good works, that you are members of his Son. It is therefore profitable for you to be in blameless unity, in order that you may always commune with God."*

*Ephesians IV.*

*"Be zealous to do all things in harmony with God, with the bishop presiding in the place of God and the presbyters in the place of the Council of the Apostles, and the deacons, who are most dear to me entrusted with the service of Jesus Christ, who was from eternity with the Father and was made manifest at the end of time."*

*Magnesians VI.*

*"Grant me nothing more than that I may be poured out to God, while an altar is still ready, that forming yourselves into a chorus of love, you may sing to the Father in Christ Jesus."*

*Romans II.*

Like the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, who also writes with a liturgical action in mind, Ignatius has a vivid awareness that in worship we are caught up, through the movement of the Holy Spirit, into the life of the Eternal Son himself, and in union with him enter the Father's presence. But this image of the Way to the Father, through the Son, by the Holy Spirit is frequent enough in the New Testament, and its occurrence in Ignatius does not oblige us to run to gnosticism for an explanation.

It is the abiding centrality of the place given to the Incarnation which marks off authentic Christian mysticism from a mysticism drawn from gnostic, neo-platonic, or oriental sources. In developing the theme of the Christian life as the *imitatio Christi* Ignatius takes up both from St. Paul and St. John.

First, like St. Paul, Ignatius asserts that the Christian life of the imitation of Christ is only possible because of God's saving acts. Ascension to God is only possible because of the descent of God:

(Christians are those) *"no longer living for the Sabbath, but for the Lord's Day, on which also our life sprang up through him and his death, — though some deny him, — and by this mystery we received faith, and for this reason also we suffer, that we may be found disciples of Jesus Christ"*.

*Magnesians IX. 1.*

(Our Lord) "*is in truth of the family of David according to the flesh, God's son by the will and power of God, truly born of a Virgin, baptised by John . . .*"

*Smyrnaeans I.*

"*For he suffered all these things that we might attain salvation.*"

*ibid. II.*

Preiss goes further than is warranted when he says that Ignatius "is scarcely interested in the redemptive value which the death of Jesus could have in itself". It is the redemptive action of God in Christ which alone makes the *imitatio Christi* possible. Preiss argues further that if the imitation of Christ theme is to be at all in line with the teaching of St. Paul it must be "not as with Ignatius and later Catholic mysticism in general, an *activity* of the believer having as its end conformity with Christ, but simply a *consequence* normal and necessary of the conformity with Christ realised on the Cross and marked in baptism". The *imitatio* life of the Christian, however, is not for Ignatius barely an activity. It is transformed by grace into something beyond imitation in the sense of mimicry of an active kind. It may begin with Christ as the object of it, but it ends with the realisation that he is the subject and means of it also. "You are imitators of God, and having your brotherly task kindled by the blood of God, you completed it perfectly", *Ephesians I*. Ignatian usage elsewhere shows that here "the blood of God" means for him the blood of Christ.

From St. John Ignatius takes up the theme that the Christian's imitation of his Lord is a reproduction of the Son's imitation of the Father. Jesus is preeminently the '*Imitator Patris*'<sup>1</sup>. This is a specially Johannine theme, having in turn its basis in the Synoptic Gospels and beyond that the Old Testament concept of the father-son relationship, and it certainly puts Ignatius well within the Christian tradition:

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<sup>1</sup> I have developed this theme in an article: "Jesus '*Imitator Patris*'" in *The Life of the Spirit*, Vol. IX, No. 100 (October 1954).

*"Be imitators of Jesus Christ, as was he also of his Father."*

*Philadelphians VII.*

*"As then the Lord was united to the Father and did nothing without him, neither by himself nor through the Apostles, so do you nothing without the bishop and the presbyters."*

*Magnesians VII.*

As the latter passage indicates, in Ignatius the *imitatio Christi* takes the quite concrete form of personal relationships within the Body of Christ, especially the Christian's relationship to the apostolic minister:

*"Jesus Christ, our inseparable life, is the will of the Father, even as the bishops, who have been appointed throughout the world, are by the will of Jesus Christ."*

*Ephesians III.*

*"I count you blessed who are so united with him (the bishop) as the Church is with Jesus Christ, and as Jesus Christ is with the Father, that all things may sound together in union."*

*Ephesians V.*

*"Be subject to the bishop and to one another, even as Jesus Christ was subject to the Father, and the Apostles were subject to Christ and the Father, in order that there may be a union both of flesh and spirit" (σαρκική τε καὶ πνευματική).*

*Magnesians XIII. 2.*

The *imitatio Christi* does not take place in some 'pure' 'spiritual' world which never quite has any real contact with this material world. Its necessary context is the visible Church with her apostolic ministry, and the concrete actuality of the life of imitation bears witness to the visible Incarnation and Atonement which brought it about. It is, in fact, part of the Gospel.

What are the marks of the Christian life as *imitatio Christi*? Here St. Ignatius takes up again from St. Paul. It is not imitation in the sense of literal mimicry or emulation. Were it that for Ignatius the strictures of Preiss would be valid. Rather it is a process of being conformed to the true image of God which

is the Son himself who becomes incarnate for our restoration. In so far as the Christian seeks to walk along the Way of Christ he may be sure that the Holy Spirit will take such a life and transform it into a true manifestation of the Christ life itself. The life of the Christian is part of his Lord's Gospel, and through it the Lord proclaims and ingathers. The marks of the Christian imitator are those which we find insisted upon in the New Testament, especially St. Paul:

ὁπομογή	<i>Ephes.</i> III. 1; <i>Mag.</i> I. 2; <i>Smyr.</i> IX, 2, XII. 2; <i>Pol.</i> III. 1.
μακροθυμία	<i>Ephes.</i> III. 1; <i>Pol.</i> VI. 2.
πραότης	<i>Ephes.</i> X. 2; <i>Trall.</i> III. 2, VIII. 1; <i>Pol.</i> II. 1, VI. 2.
ταπεινώσεων	<i>Ephes.</i> X. 2.
ἐπιεικεία	<i>Ephes.</i> X. 3; <i>Philad.</i> II. 1.
πίστις	<i>Ephes.</i> XIV. 1; <i>Mag.</i> I. 2; <i>Trall.</i> VIII. 1; <i>Philad.</i> IX. 2; <i>Smyr.</i> VI. 1.
ἀγάπη	<i>Ephes.</i> XIV. 1; <i>Mag.</i> I. 2; VI. 2.

and, of course, willingness to suffer and die, which is for Ignatius the Christian life as *imitatio Christi* most sharply focussed.

The epistles of St. Ignatius give a good illustration of the interdependence of Christology and spirituality. Wherever there is a docetic tendency, as in early Alexandrian Christology, there the *imitatio Christi* will take the form of absorption into the life of the Eternal Son, and the historical features of the incarnate life are regarded as being of merely temporary significance. Apollinarianism and Monophysitism are bound to be specially hospitable to mysticism of the neo-platonic kind. St. Ignatius of Antioch stands at the head of the long line of Christian mystics who, to quote Baron von Hügel, believing that in Jesus Christ God has revealed himself "in a supreme and normative manner" regard it as "folly to attempt the finding or the making of any shorter way to God than that of the closest contact with His own condescensions"<sup>1</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> F. von Hügel, *The Mystical Element of Religion*, Vol. II, p. 266.

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